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Abstract  
This dissertation, based primarily on 10-month fieldwork in the Weida factory in 
Dongguan, China and home visits with workers I met there, explores the subjective 
experience of nongmingong, rural-to-urban migrant workers, confronting China’s 
recent ICTs-driven economic restructuring in both work and leisure. This study 
contributes to sociology of labour research in China by addressing the new 
complexities brought about by digital technologies, and internationally to debates of 
digital labour and the future of work from the vintage point of the subjective 
experience of working class in Global South developing economies.  
Whether supported by the state or driven by market forces, digital technologies are 
becoming integrated into nongmingong’s life at an unprecedented pace, adding new 
complexities to the process of class formation. Incorporating the theory of the mutual 
shaping of technology and user/society into the larger framework of working class 
formation, this research takes nongmingong’s ICTs-enabled practices as the starting 
place for an intersectional analysis that considers class and gender, in order to 
understand their ICTs-mediated politics of class formation in terms of work and 
leisure.  
The findings show that ICTs-enabled jobs provide nongmingong with opportunities 
to improve the harsh factory working conditions and contribute to their economic 
security at a time of economic turbulence, allowing them to address their felt 
responsibilities and concerns in ways that are classed and gendered, especially as 
regards the family’s subsistence and upward mobility. The findings show further that 
taking up these opportunities positions nongmingong in various technologically-
mediated production regimes, engendering different dynamics of exploitation and 
resistance. Politics of production aside, in the cultural realm the commercially-
produced and politically-censored ICTs-enabled media entertainments allow them to 
negotiate alienating dagong (working for a boss) life, but they also confine them in a 
web of dominant meanings. In face of this discursive domination, nongmingong 
actively select and interpret media meanings, accepting some while rejecting others, 
according to a bitter and precarious structure of feeling. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
1.1 Where this all started 
In this thesis, I examine the subjective experience of nongmingong, rural-to-urban 
migrant workers, confronting China’s recent ICTs1-driven economic restructuring in 
both work and leisure. My interest in this topic stemmed from the observation of a 
group of female electric tricycle drivers and how they used ICTs to negotiate the 
local government’s harsh regulations in Shuyang, a small county in Jiangsu, China.  
To provide some context, lacking formal employment opportunities, these drivers 
provided tricycle services for work. Although low in prestige (Li C 2005), as a 
cheaper alternative to taxis, the tricycle service was well accepted and for decades 
proved a viable source of income. But more recently, tricycles have increasingly 
been considered by local authorities to be a symbol of backwardness, blighting the 
city’s urban character, and a major cause of road accidents. To build wenming 
chengshi, civilized cities, and compete for favourable policies from higher-level 
governments, stringent measures were implemented on a surprise basis to contain its 
development, including restricted access to the city centre, tracking, vehicle seizure, 
and hefty fines.  
I was deeply intrigued by what the drivers called ‘the safety net’, a mechanism 
through which they notify each other about the government’s surprise checks so that 
they could choose a different route to avoid punishment. In a time when smartphones 
were not yet widely adopted, this safety net was neither organized through anything 
resembling a social media group that is commonplace today, nor was any trace of 
formal organization observable. Rather, it functioned by the drivers calling or texting 
each other individually on an entirely voluntary basis, despite the high mobile costs 
involved.  
Later, during my internship with the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) in 2015, this topic resonated with me once more. As I read through its 
archives of past projects and future visions, I began to realize that, across the world, 
ICTs were a strategic means through which powerful institutions like the UNDP 
seek to empower marginalized groups. And I was surprised by how commonly these 
technologies were used to facilitate voting and political participation – rather than 
 
1 Information communication technologies. 
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for other purposes – across dissimilar historical and political economic contexts in 
Asia. This agenda seemed awkward to me when considered alongside the tricycle 
drivers’ self-organization against the government. I wondered whether, for example, 
villagers in mountainous Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, saw the GIS-based voting 
system created by UNDP as an effective solution to their long-standing political 
problems (UNDP 2014). Or could such a system be open to abuse by local officials 
and hence exacerbate their conditions? It is not my intention here to question these 
organizations’ visions. Rather, what I was inspired to contemplate is a phenomenon 
that I find to be ubiquitous: while ICTs are widely recognized and adopted as 
empowering agents, there seems to always be a discrepancy between the visions of 
those with the political economic power to set them in motion and those in need.  
This further sparked my curiosity about what had been done with nongmingong. As 
with the tricycle drivers, my interest in nongmingong also stemmed from my 
childhood experience in Shuyang, which has been a major migrant-sending city 
throughout 40 years of reforms. Despite the different migratory trajectories pursued, 
nongmingong and tricycle drivers faced strikingly similar historical conditions that 
drove their decision to migrate –  both groups can be understood as the product of 
China’s grand reform project. On the one hand, prior to migration, the tricycle 
drivers typically held a non-agricultural hukou2 and made a living as geti hu, small-
scale individual or household entrepreneurs who ran, for example, corner shops and 
delicatessen stalls, selling daily necessities and homemade food. Experienced in zuo 
shengyi, doing business, and typically more independence-minded, most decided to 
migrate to the city proper to continue their business and secure better education for 
their children in the late 1990s, the time when Shuyang welcomed its first reform-
minded, Harvard-trained party head and began to pursue radical marketization.3 On 
the other hand, for most rural hukou holders, the pain of market reform was felt 
earlier and deeper. In the early 1990s they already found it difficult to make ends 
 
2 Hukou is a system of household registration used in mainland China. According to Lu (2002) and Young (2013), it was first 
officially signed into law in 1958, but before that a registration system that distinguished rural from urban citizens in order to 
control the stream of resources moving away from the agricultural sector already existed. This establishment of the system 
divided the populace into nongmin, with an agricultural hukou, and shimin, with a non-agricultural hukou. This division was 
further linked to the country’s various distribution and re-distribution systems, including but not limited to the welfare 
programmes, the education system and the housing system. Throughout recent decades, the hukou system has raised different 
disputes at different stages of the country’s capitalist development and has undergone intensive reform. To date, the distinction 
still exists.  
3 The radical market reform led by the then-party head Qiu He had a far-reaching influence on local residents’ lives. It was also 
widely researched as a case of radical privatisation, especially in the education and medical sectors, for example, Li L (2007), 
Li L and Jiang (2007). See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qiu_He for more information on Qiu.  
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meet by farming alone. Without much capital and experience, zuo shengyi was not 
feasible, hence their decision to leave home to work in the then-mushrooming 
manufacturing factories and construction sites in the Yangtze River Delta.  
After careful research, I was surprised by how little developmental organizations and 
the Chinese government had done in this regard,  especially when nearly 21% of its 
population were nongmingong (National Bureau of Statistics 2018). And looking 
closely at the few projects underway, I was shocked by how such massive budgets 
were spent on carelessly designed projects that would appear uninteresting and 
unhelpful to nongmingong. Five years on, I can still recall one project that 
bewildered me the most. It was a project led by a provincial government through the 
dianda4 system to provide online courses for vocational skills like mechanical repair. 
The idea was to help nongmingong improve occupational skills and move forward in 
their careers. However, in the early 2010s when it was introduced, smartphones had 
not yet been widely adopted among nongmingong, and access to computers was 
limited (Qiu 2009), not to mention that vocational skills useful in factories were 
often better obtained through practice rather than lectures.5  
This is how I became interested in the relationship between ICTs and nongmingong 
and the opportunities and challenges ICTs afford to them. Moreover, these 
experiences taught me that a satisfactory answer can only be obtained by referring to 
nongmingong’s own point of view. Three years later, on a Sunday evening in late 
2018, one month after I started fieldwork, I found myself at a hotpot get-together 
hosted by Laoganma, my colleague at Weida6. It was a belated celebration of the 
Mid-autumn Festival, a national holiday and traditionally a moment for family 
reunion. We had previously received a last-minute notice from the management that 
because of a rush order and had to continue working to deliver it just-in-time. It was 
not until that Sunday, after thirteen 12-hour working days in a row, that we could 
finally have some rest. Though tired, Laoganma decided to organize the hotpot. 
Throughout her nine years at Weida, this had developed into some sort of ritual in 
her otherwise tedious and monotonous life.  
 
4 Dianda stands for China's Radio & TV Universities. First established in 1979 after the model of the British Open University, 
dianda is government initiated and state funded, and offers distance education to its students.  
5 A detailed discussion of this point can be found in Woronov (2015). Under the title of Class Work: Vocational Schools and 
China's Urban Youth, the author discussed how vocational school students in her research found the curriculum offered in their 
classroom to be unhelpful as its design failed to combine theory with practical elements.  
6 Weida is the pseudonym I created for the factory in which I conducted my fieldwork.  
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On that day, the hotpot happened at her sister’s rented room, since Laoganma lived 
in a shared factory dorm shared with seven others. Small and compact, the room fit a 
double bed, a single wardrobe, a portable induction hob, a 4-seater foldaway table 
and a toilet, all squeezed in a mere 12 square meter space, leaving little room for 
other daily activities. For a group of 10, mostly her relatives from the same village in 
Ganzhou, Jiangxi, the narrow space meant we had to sit shoulder-to-shoulder. This 
notwithstanding, accompanied by the arresting melody of Women Buyiyang (We Are 
Different) and Guangdong Aiqing Gushi (Guangdong Love Story), two top hits on 
Kuaishou7, everyone enjoyed the broth cooked with lard and air-dried duck of 
traditional Ganzhou recipe. The whole room soon filled with the heavenly aroma of 
pork fat simmering away on the hob, coupled with a savoury, delightful yumminess 
from the duck.  
Over the hotpot, Laoganma and her guests had a lively talk, all speaking Ganzhou 
dialect that I understood little. Most of the time they had smiles on their faces, while 
occasionally deep sighs emerged. Thanks to Laoganma’s translation, I could have a 
taste of the talk, and there were several topics I jotted down in fieldnotes. One 
concerned the recent move of their home village committee to re-demarcate 
collectively-owned land to make space for a public toilet. This had been the focus of 
their discussion since they first joined a WeChat group created by village leaders to 
improve the transparency of local affairs. Another issue concerned a factory worker 
spending 20,000 yuan buying virtual gifts for a female live-streamer on Kuaishou to 
see her naked on camera. They were very critical, condemning him as irresponsible, 
frivolous and dirty. Xiaohe, one of Laoganma’s cousins-in-law, complained about 
the lack of overtime work and asked for part-time job recommendations. Wujun, 
another cousin-in-law, suggested she do weishang, micro-business. He believed it 
was perfect for her since her husband was vice manager of their workshop. 
Laoganma, on the other hand, lamented that she was too old and illiterate to make 
money with her cell phone. Other issues included big sales on Pinduoduo8 and the 
harsh regulation of mobile phone use on the shop floor. Knowing I was doing a PhD, 
they turned to me for advice to avoid phone fraud.  
 
7 Kuaishou is a video-sharing and live-streaming platform that was popular among nongmingong at the time of my fieldwork. 
8 Pinduoduo is a Chinese ‘team purchase’ online shopping hub. Because it offered incredibly low prices, it was very popular 
among nongmingong. 
 14 
 
Having spent the first month tightening screws, packaging and moving boxes in the 
workshop, this hotpot get-together was more than thought-provoking for me. It 
reminded me of earlier observations on the shop floor, about how my colleagues 
buried their heads in cell phones during work breaks, watching soap operas and short 
videos instead of talking to each other; about how they organized an online cardroom 
by creatively combining WeChat with a card game app; about how young female 
workers registered via a link they found in WeChat and paid 40-yuan ‘delivery fee’ 
for a ‘free’ Chanel fragrance set, even when it was proven that the Chanel set was 
fake and that they were simply trapped by a sales trick common among small 
fragrance companies.  
These observations intrigued me more when compared to the experience of my 
middle-class friends. Most of them worked white-collar jobs and ICTs made it 
possible for them to work from home. Some did not even know about Pinduoduo, 
and I doubt if they would consider registering. In WeChat Moments9, they actively 
debate the latest public issues and are used to expressing their own opinions. And I 
can imagine that they would tell from the web design that the Chanel fragrance set 
was fake.  
When I tried to connect these micro-level observations with macro-level social 
changes, I began to realise that the influence of the penetration of digital 
technologies and the digital transformation of the Chinese economy are 
comprehensive and a qualitative or even paradigm shift is taking place. If previously 
it is sufficient to talk about mobile phones as a modern object and as a means of 
network connection that helps them maintain or build social networks and negotiate 
meaning, social/emotional support and workplace arrangements (Yang 2008; Cao 
2009; Chen Y 2010; Ding and Song 2010; Li H 2011; Wallis 2013; Ding 2014; Gao 
and Yang 2013, 2015; He 2015; Wang 2016), now digital technologies are deeply 
integrated into the arrangements of every aspect of nongmingong’s work and life, 
whether political participation, work or media consumption.  
This prompted me to think further about how the changing techno-social 
arrangements have impacted nongmingong. I wonder, for example, why is the online 
environment of my fellow colleagues so different from their middle-class 
 
9 Moments is a function offered by WeChat that allows users to post images and text, share music and comments.  
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counterparts? How does this relate to their class location? What is weishang? How 
does it work, how do they experience it and to what extent is it an effective 
alternative to the backbreaking factory jobs? Why do female workers prefer 
watching soap operas and short videos than talking to their colleagues during short 
breaks? What do they choose and prefer, why, and what do they take away? What 
about male workers? I could go on. But to start to answer these questions, we must 
first know who nongmingong are.  
 
1.2 Nongmingong: A life in-between 
Mass migration of peasants to urban areas for work is not a new phenomenon in 
China. It dates to late Qing industrialisation, reaching a climax in the 1930s as 
China’s first mingong chao, tidal wave of migrant labour (Chi 1998). In the late 
1980s, the term again made media headlines. The two waves were both the product 
of industrialisation and economic globalisation in China’s pursuit of modernity (Lv 
2003). But the same term bears very different meanings in different historical 
phases. In the former, min means the general populace, hence mingong can be 
anyone in society who becomes a worker in industry, be they peasants or urban 
residents (Chi 1998). But in the latter, min refers to nongmin, peasant, rural hukou 
holders. Mingong here is hence a shorter form of nongmingong, the term this project 
uses to refer to its research subjects. Today, the term is widely used in popular 
media, government policies and reports and in daily exchanges in China. Although 
nongmingong’s stories have been told differently from disparate positionalities, in 
most cases the term is used loosely to refer to anyone who holds rural hukou status 
but ends up working in urban workplaces.  
The notion of second-generation nongmingong has an even more explicit origin. It 
was first coined in 2010 in a report of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU) to refer to those nongmingong born after the 1980s. They are also defined 
in terms of their concerns and dispositions, which are distinctive from the first 
generation. According to the report, they are less experienced in agriculture and rural 
affairs, enjoy a higher level of material life and education, and yearn more for an 
urban lifestyle, self-autonomy and individual development (ACFTU 2010; Wang 
2010). Similarly, Li and Tian (2011) observed that the second-generation 
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demonstrated higher sensitivity to structural inequalities and sharper concern for 
occupational safety but were more optimistic about the future.  
According to the annual report by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), there are 
currently approximately 287 million nongmingong in China, among whom 50.8% 
are second-generation (NBS, 2018). Forming the backbone of China’s labour force, 
they are often found in factories, construction sites, restaurants and barbershops, and 
perform dirty, dangerous, demeaning jobs that their urban counterparts would avoid, 
earning a disproportionately low income. In Dongguan, nongmingong are usually 
paid the local minimum wage – RMB 1,700 yuan at the time of my fieldwork – 
which barely affords them a decent life, especially when most have a three-
generation family10 to support. This means they must work overtime to make ends 
meet. A 2013 report found that on average Foxconn workers in Shenzhen worked for 
an illegally long working time of 240 hours per month (iLabour 2013). In Dongguan, 
this was 260-330 hours in 2018 (Zhou 2018). This is consistent with my observation. 
At Weida, my colleagues worked a staggering 328 hours every four weeks, and more 
than half of their income depended on overtime. To get a job there, I was made to 
sign a Voluntary Overtime Application Form to help the factory bypass labour law.  
Even more problematic is the lack of occupational protection. Nongmingong 
generally receive at best minimal training before working, and to lower costs most 
factories either discourage them from using protective devices or simply do not 
provide any. This has resulted in massive occupational injury cases of various kinds. 
Xie et al. (2005) reported that around 40,000 fingers were cut in a single year in the 
Pearl River Delta (PRD). Those injured would then face dim job prospects and most 
ended up going back home, the youngest among them being 13 years old (Zhou 
2018). Although in recent years, the government has introduced a series of policies 
and legislation regarding work injuries and occupational disease, according to Hu – 
director of an NGO providing legal assistance and social services to injured workers 
– most workers do not have the time, money and literacy to complete the lengthy and 
cumbersome legal process of appraisal, as in some cases this might take up to a year 
(Hu 2018, personal communication).  
 
10 Three-generation family is a term used in sociology of family to describe the composition of Chinese families, especially 
those in rural areas. The three-generation family consists of the core family – children and parents – as well as four 
grandparents. In the absence of an effective pension system – especially for the rural population – this means that two parents 
must cover all expenses for 6-8 family members. 
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As non-local residents, they also have no access to local public health and 
educational services and can only resort to private services at a significantly higher 
price (Chen and Gallagher 2013). For some of my colleagues at Weida, the lack of 
inexpensive public health services meant that they had to go back to their places of 
origin for medical treatment of diseases like acute appendicitis. For less severe 
ailments, like colds and coughs, most simply bought medicine from a local 
pharmacy or went to private, informal clinics, some of which were not properly 
equipped for medical practices.  
The insurmountable institutional barrier to educational services in urban areas, on 
the other hand, has led to the separation of most nongmingong families, with parents 
working in urban workplaces under always tight schedules and children left behind 
with their grandparents in rural areas, studying under the heavy hopes of the family. 
I was surprised to learn from Dang, founder of an NGO of female nongmingong 
empowerment, that it afforded nongmingong parents 28 certificates for their children 
to enter a local school (Dang 2018, personal communication). Yanzi was an NGO 
veteran working with migrant children. For her, the sudden separation from parents 
and radical change in living environment at a time key for the left-behind children’s 
formation of the sense of self, life philosophies and world view have created 
alarming psychological and social problems (Yanzi, 2018, personal communication). 
What makes matters worse is the alienation of industrial life. In industrial zones, 
everything is designed for the industrial purposes of commodity production and 
reproduction of cheap labour power. Nongmingong hence must endure, for example, 
higher noise standards, expensive electricity bills and a rather limited range of 
available services. Also painfully felt is discrimination from urban locals and mass 
media. One thing that struck me most was that when I showed my Weida colleagues 
a WeChat article where the author criticized the use of the term diduan renkou, low-
end population, in media reports and governmental documents on the Daxing fire 
and forced evictions in Beijing, one of them actually cried. 
Particularly relevant for this thesis is that nongmingong are active ICTs users. 
Within workshops and outside them, ICTs are used for work, entertainment, 
shopping, networking, reading news, political participation etc. As reported by NBS 
(2008), thanks to the growth in the domestic smartphone industry and reform of the 
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telecommunications sector, by 2017 approximately 92.1% of nongmingong had 
access to the Internet, through personal computers or smartphones.  
To summarise, nongmingong are now online and floating at the margins of Chinese 
society, economically at the bottom of the income ladder, socially as low sushi 
(quality), institutionally as second-class citizens, and spatially in dusty, noisy, unsafe 
and overpopulated non-residential industrial zones. Deeply exploited and 
marginalized, in recent years, China’s cities have seen growing worker activism, 
with the China Labour Bulletin Strike Map recording a total of 8,696 cases for the 
four years since 2013.  
 
1.3 The recent digital transformation of the Chinese economy  
This section further sets the stage for the project by providing an overview of the 
recent digital transformation of the Chinese economy, its domestic and international 
context, strategy, scope and latest developments. Digital technologies have always 
been a core component in China’s quest for modernity. If in the Maoist era it was 
more of a strategic technology of national defence, after Deng’s open-door policy, 
where China began to pursue its own brand of market reform under global digital 
capitalism, ICTs have always been a means through which the Chinese government 
seeks economic growth and social development (see Chapter 3 for a fuller historical 
account).  
The recent digital transformation of the Chinese economy has taken place in the 
context of a larger, paradigmatic structural change in China’s economy: the shift 
from a labour-intensive economy to a more capital-intensive and technologically 
sophisticated one. The shift started in 2004 and had close relations with the 
imbalance in China’s economic growth pattern, domestic social crisis and changes in 
the global economic landscape (Huang 2008; Naughton 2010, 2018; Hung 2013, 
2015). On the one hand, problems of overproduction crisis, industrial overcapacity 
and overreliance on exports and investment plagued the Chinese economy. Because 
wages were low, there was a deficit in domestic demand. All of this had to do with 
China’s failure in negotiating technological import substitution, which left it no 
choice but to pursue a labour-intensive, export-driven growth model. It also had to 
do with the roles different types of capital played in the Chinese market, especially 
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China’s unique financial system and its relationship with state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs).  
On the other hand, the crisis brought about by economic imbalance was already 
being felt in the early 2000s, including the sannong crisis, labour unrest of all sorts 
in world factories and heavy environmental pollution (O’Brien and Li 2006; Lee 
2007; Chan and Pun 2009; Chan 2010, 2013; Gallagher 2014). Internationally, 
during this period, southeast Asian and African countries began to pursue their own 
brand of industrialisation, providing cheap labour and ideal land, tax and resource 
policies for international industrial transfer (Fan 2018). On the other hand, the 2008 
global financial crisis resulted in faltering demand from the global north11 (World 
Trade Organisation 2009). All these urged the Chinese government to continue and 
accelerate its step in the structural adjustment of its economy.  
In response, the strategies the Chinese government employed included shifting the 
economic growth model to rely less on investment in certain sectors, especially in 
the heavy industry, and more on its accumulated technological innovation and its 
now well-educated labour force. In the meantime, it continued investment in 
infrastructure and sought to boost domestic consumption in order to reduce reliance 
on global demand. In this context, the pursuit of economic digitalisation was a means 
through which the Chinese government sought to address its crisis and upgrade its 
economy, improve its productive force and the quality of economic growth by 
exploiting the digital infrastructure it had spent enormous efforts to build in the past 
decades (Naughton 2018).  
The transformation saw the ascent of informatisation as a ‘leading force in driving 
modernization’, and the scope was broad. Given the rapid expansion of its corporate-
run cyberspace, ICTs as a set of complex and interactive technologies, and the 
Internet industry as a slew of Web-oriented technological, business, and innovation 
models, have been deliberately deployed by the Chinese government to crosscut and 
catalyse reforms and to help upgrade the quality and composition of its economic 
 
11 According to the World Trade Organisation (2009), although the 2008 financial crisis began in the US, financial institutions 
and economies throughout the world were severely affected. The deteriorating economic situation took a toll on both consumer 
and business confidence. Declining asset prices, faltering demand and falling production translated into dramatically reduced – 
and in some cases negative – production and trade growth in many countries. China was no exception in this regard: China’s 
exports to its top six trading partners represented 70% of the country’s total exports in 2007. All these trading partners are 
currently experiencing economic contraction or slowdown and are likely to exhibit weak import demand for some time. In 
February 2009, China’s exports were down 26% compared with the same month in the previous year and 28% compared with 
January. 
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growth and social development (Hong 2017). This is explicitly stated in the Outline 
of the National Informatization Development Strategy, where a package of reform 
policies aimed at the wholesale informatization of society was proposed,  
1) Fostering the information economy, stimulating the transformation of 
development, including manufacturing, agricultural and service 
industries, through decentralization of power and upgrade of information 
infrastructure; 2) Deepening e-governance, moving forward with the 
modernization of state governance, including the party, the government, 
law and public order maintenance; 3) Letting online culture flourish, 
strengthening national soft power, including boosting and diversifying 
cultural industry while persisting in the progressive orientation of 
advanced Socialist culture; 4) Innovating public services, guaranteeing 
and improving the people’s livelihood, including education, scientific 
research, medical service, employment and social security, and poverty 
relief; 5) Serving the construction of an ecological civilization, helping 
beautiful China; and 6) Accelerating a strong information army, building 
a modern military forces system. (Central Committee General Office and 
State Council General Office 2016) 
On the ground, policies like Made in China 2025, ‘Internet Plus’, and Mass 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation have been devised to promote ‘restructuring 
through networking’ (Wang 2016; Hong 2017). Whereas Made in China 2025 seeks 
to upgrade the manufacturing capabilities through technological advancement and 
innovations – for which ICTs are a strategic component part – the Internet Plus 
policy aims to promote industrial reorganisation and upgrade and create new 
economic and production forms (State Council 2015). Mass Entrepreneurship and 
Innovation, on the other hand, seeks to mobilise the mass uptake of entrepreneurship. 
In the meantime, the deployment of digital technologies was carried out alongside 
other measures, for example, the gradual opening of hitherto state-monopolised 
sectors to the market, for example, the cultural sector, and the adjustment of capital 
structure in the domestic market – in this regard, a bigger role was granted to 
domestic private capital and international financial capital.  
It is the joint force of these measures that has underpinned the rapid rise of the 
digital economy in China. It did not take the digital economy long to take a 
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significant share of the Chinese economy, and China to ascend to global leadership 
in digital economy. According to a recent report from the China Academy of 
Information and Communications Technology (CAICT) of the Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology, in 2019, China's digital economy was worth a total of 
35.8 trillion-yuan, accounting for 36.2% of its total GDP (CAICT 2020). Among 
these, the total GDP produced by the digitally-enabled reorganisation of traditional 
service, agricultural and industrial sectors was 28.8 trillion, accounting for 29%. 
Globally, China, together with the US, is reported to lead the economic geography of 
the digital economy, as they account for 90% of the market value of the world’s 70 
largest digital platforms (UNCTAD 2019). Similarly, a 2017 report from McKinsey 
& Company described China as “a leading global force” in the global digital 
economic landscape (Woetzel et al. 2017). Thanks to its large, young market, and the 
government’s active support, it is now a global leader in e-commerce and digital 
payments, a leading global investor, a major player in global data flows, and home to 
one-third of the world’s unicorns.12 It is exporting digitally-driven business models 
and enabling foreign partners.  
The rapid rise of the digital economy also has precipitated profound changes in 
productive force and employment in China. On the one hand, data become a new 
raw material of production while traditional agricultural, manufacturing and services 
sectors were reorganised through digital technologies, giving rise to such new 
models like platform economy, sharing economy, crowdsourcing, among others, and 
news forms of employment like self-employment, freelance work and part-time 
employment. According a 2017 report from Didi, leader in China’s e-hailing market, 
a total of 21.08 million registered and work on it, among them over 5 million were 
rural migrants (Xue et.al 2017). A more recent from CAICT (2018) shows that in 
2018, the digital sector creates a total of 191 million jobs, which is an 11.5% 
increase from 2017, accounting for 24.6% of the total amount of jobs of the same 
year. Among them, 178 million were in digitally-reorganised manufacturing and 
service sectors.  
 
1.4 Overview of the thesis 
 
12 Defined as privately-held start-ups valued at over US$1 billion. 
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Above I have introduced the main concern of the thesis: to understand 
nongmingong’s subjective experience of the recent digital transformation of the 
Chinese economy, or ICTs-driven economic restructuring, in both work and leisure. 
I then introduced who nongmingong are and provided a brief overview of the digital 
transformation of the economy. I pointed out that the recent economic 
transformation was part of the larger paradigmatic shift of the Chinese economy – 
from a labour-intensive economy to a more capital-intensive, and technologically 
sophisticated one – before setting out the domestic and international context, 
strategy, scope and latest developments of the digital transformation. 
Chapter 2 provides a review of sociology of labour research in China, both before 
and after the digital transformation of the economy. The goal was to position the 
project within the field. Through this discussion, I state that I will follow the left-
leaning tradition and provide an explanation. I then identify gaps in current 
literature, before unpacking the overarching research question raised at the very 
beginning of the thesis. This chapter ends with a brief discussion of the theoretical 
framework I use to address these questions.  
Chapter 3 is a historical account of the changing relations between China’s approach 
to ICTs, its economic development strategy and changing class relations in order to 
provide the historical context for the thesis. It shows how China’s ICTs-driven 
developmentalism has repeatedly marginalized, if not failed, nongmingong as 
China’s new working class since the economic reform in the 1980s.  
Chapter 4 introduces the methodological approach employed to conduct the research. 
I start with a discussion of the epistemological and methodological challenges the 
increasingly globalised and digitalised world has brought to ethnographers. Informed 
by this, I then provide a narrative of the journey of the fieldwork itself, detailing the 
strategies I used and decisions I made on the one hand, and how the fieldwork 
evolved, and the focus narrowed on the other. Throughout the narrative I highlight 
how my positionality might have impacted on the scope of the project as well as the 
ethical issues that emerged. I go on to demonstrate my analytical framework and 
consideration of the presentation of the data and results.  
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Chapters 5 and 6 examine nongmingong’s experience of production under economic 
transition by exploring how they respond to it. I focus on three forms of ICTs-
mediated work popular among nongmingong: rijie, weishang and Didi. I discuss the 
configurations of the party-state-market, labour market conditions and managerial 
autonomy that gave rise to these forms of work; I also discuss how nongmingong 
occupying different class positions (diverging in management status and levels of 
skill) and with different gender identities experience the changing labourscape 
differently. Chapter 5 deals with those who engage in multi-jobbing practices and 
Chapter 6 turns to those who quit their factory jobs and switch entirely to the 
platform-based Didi. In each of these chapters, I explore how labour processes are 
organised, how they are experienced and make sense of the relations in production, 
as well as their resistance and non-resistance at both individual and collective levels.  
In Chapter 7 I turn to workers’ everyday life. The focus here is on the rising digital 
content industry, whose popularity among and penetration into nongmingong’s 
everyday lives make it a powerful force in mediating their perceived relationship 
with ‘others’ within the society. The articles and videos discussed in this chapter 
derive from their self-reported preferences – what they find interesting, inspiring or 
impressive. Based on this, I discuss the relationship between their preferences and 
modes of viewing with their working-class way of life. I also discuss what kinds of 
understanding and ways of seeing are proffered and advocated by the dominant 
actors in these pieces, as well as how they, by drawing on their bitter and precarious 
structure of feeling, actively interpret them.  
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by summarising the findings and detailing the 
contribution the thesis made to understanding labour conditions in China. This 
allows me to reflect on China’s ongoing reform as well as its techno-driven 
developmentalism and modernity in general. Beyond the immediate case of China, 
the discussion sheds light on the debate of the future of work from the vintage point 
of the implications of digital capitalism on the working class in developing 
economies. I end the chapter with a reflection on the limitation of the research and 
some suggestion for future research.  
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Chapter 2 The Nongmingong Question in China 
 
the criticisms… I had described the logic of industrialism, not 
capitalism… this… require comparing capitalist with non-
capitalist production, but what non-capitalist production? I 
decided to study work in Soviet societies... It was dishonest to 
simply dismiss the Soviet Union as a form of state capitalism 
(or a degenerate workers’ state) and then project “real” 
socialism as some unexamined and idealized utopia that 
contrasted with the ugly realities of capitalism. This was no 
more acceptable than launching attacks on the Soviet Union 
by comparing its brutality and inefficiency with idealizations 
of capitalism put about by apologists and ideologists. These 
false comparisons of the idealization of one society with the 
reality of the other had to be replaced with comparisons of 
ideal type with ideal type, reality with reality. Best of all 
would be a comparison of the relations between idealization 
and reality in the two worlds! (Burawoy 2008, p.13)  
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed how I came to concern with nongmingong’s 
subjective experience of the recent digital transformation of the Chinese economy. I 
also provided a brief picture of nongmingong in terms of demographic composition, 
generational division, work and living conditions, and their main concerns and 
struggles. In the past decades, this mass phenomenon of migration, especially the 
inequalities they face, has generated continual and conscientious attention from the 
academia. In this chapter, I present a review of the field. The goal is to position this 
project within it.  
2.1 Nongmingong as rational individual 
Whereas rational individual is the figure underlying most economic theories, in the 
study of nongmingong it can be found mostly in the works of demographists and 
sociologists influenced by economic sociology. What puzzled them is the reason 
behind nongmingong’s massive migration.   
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Some tries to provide a macro-level explanation. Among them, the push-pull-
obstacle model first outlined by Chicago demographer Donald Bogue was the most 
widely invoked framework. For Bogue (1969), migration is a highly situation-
dependent response of the human organism to economic, social and demographic 
forces. All voluntary migration ultimately results from migrants’ evaluation of two 
subjectively interpreted socioeconomic environments: the home/destination societies 
in terms of push and pull factors, and intervening obstacles whose influence depends 
on the impedimenta with which the person is encumbered. Following this model, 
they have explored the complex macro-level push, pull and intervening factors 
behind nongmingong’s mass migration (Du and Bai 1997; Cai 2001; Bai and He 
2002; Li 2003; Zou 2005; Guo and Wang 2011). A widely cited study in this regard 
was Li (2003). Based on four large-scale surveys and interviews in Beijing between 
1999 and 2002, he argued that economic motivation was the main reason behind 
nongmingong’s migration, which was consistent with findings of the ‘international 
studies’ he used as a yardstick to evaluate the Chinese case. For him, economic 
motivation was at once a rural push factor (extreme poverty, lower income and lack 
of work opportunities) and an urban pull factor (higher income and broader 
horizons). His data also revealed a pattern inconsistent with ‘international studies’, 
that is, while most who he surveyed saw the hukou system as a strong push factor, 
they still chose to stay in cities, even when jobless or completely broke. His 
explanation was that the hukou system rendered the model ineffective in explaining 
the Chinese case because it led to nongmingong’s cognitive distortion in terms of life 
expectations and goals. Guo and Wang (2011) surveyed second-generation 
nongmingong and suggested that economic factors continued to motivate their 
migration. But compared to ten years ago, urban economic pulling forces were 
stronger and rural pulling forces weaker. This, they argued, had to do with the 
younger generation’s preference of urban modern lifestyle over rural backwardness. 
They further pointed out that urban pushing forces was growing, as the pain of 
institutional discrimination and that by local residents and mass media was 
increasingly felt. 
The micro-level analysts, on the other hand, found the then-mainstream discourse of 
nongmingong as mangliu, blind flow, problematic. They drew on rational choice 
theory and tried to establish the nature of the rationality driving this migration 
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(Huang, 1997; Du and Bai, 1997; Cai, 2000; Wen, 2001; Tan, 2003). A consensus 
across the literature was that whereas in the West, migration was a rational decision-
making process by migrants to maximize individual interest, nongmingong differed 
because the decision-making process happened on a family basis, although Tan 
(1997) offered a counterargument. They argued most families saw migration as an 
investment of human resources and considered gender, age and educational level 
when investing. While some saw behind this investment the desire to increase 
income, others argued that it was better understood as existential needs (Huang 
1997). Wen (2001) further enriched the literature by exploring the ‘social rationality’ 
behind migration. This line of research provides some insight into the reasons behind 
mass migration. By inviting nongmingong themselves to justify their decisions to 
migrate, it recognised their agency and forcefully refuted popular stigmatisation of 
nongmingong as blindly and irrationally flowing around the country, ruthlessly 
seeking personal financial gains. 
However, in much of this research, nongmingong’s agency is undertheorized. Their 
rationality is understood in only limited – and predominantly economic – terms. This 
betrayed itself when Li (2003) resorted to the cognitive to explain where economic 
rationality failed, leading to his appalling argument that nongmingong were 
cognitively distorted. This was also manifest in the essentialist argument that the 
decision-making of Chinese nongmingong differed from their Western counterparts 
because it happened at the family level, for consideration of family as part of the 
migrant individual’s rationality was not recognized. Besides, from this literature one 
gets no sense of nongmingong as living in social relations of some kind. Although all 
informants in these studies were assembled under the same category of 
nongmingong, in analysis, the sense of collectivity – shared position within social 
structure of some kind – embodied in the term is missed. As a result, one gets no 
sense of how, for example, being undereducated or low-skilled, or not owning means 
of production, imposes constraints on decisions to migrate.   
2.2 Nongmingong as emancipated migrants13 
The second strand of literature relates to what I call the emancipated migrant, which 
is based on a critique of the leftover labour assumption underlying the rational 
 
13 For Marx (1843), emancipation distinguishes between political and human emancipation. Political emancipation entails the 
equal status of individual citizens, whatever their property, religion and other psychological characteristics, in relation to the 
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individual thesis. The leftover labour argument, according to Sun (2003), implied 
that land-owning peasants chose to migrate only when sufficient labour power was 
spared for agriculture, which failed to explain the mass abandonment of arable land 
in China since the 2000s, and the fact that most nongmingong were actually rural 
elites. Based on a historical analysis of China’s transition, they argued that 
nongmingong’s self-reported economic motivation should be understood as response 
to absolute poverty in rural China, which in turn had to do with institutional 
discrimination against rural areas (Sun 2003; Lu 1991, 2007, 2009).  
According to them, in Maoist era, China faced a divided and closed international 
environment because of the Cold War. To consolidate the hard-won autonomy and 
pursue socialist construction, lacking in primary accumulation and resources, the 
Chinese government turned inward to prioritize urban industrialization at the cost of 
rural development. Central to this strategy was the hukou system that was invariably 
linked to the country’s (re-)production and (re-)distribution systems in order to 
secure industrial raw materials provision and the livelihood of the urban workforce. 
As a result, peasants’ freedom of migration and work in cities was constrained (Lu, 
2003). Most of the time they were effectively tied to rural areas and agriculture and 
were asked to hand in a significant proportion of their production. (Lu 1986; Zhang 
1998). During the reform era, whereas rural reform was soon stagnated, in urban 
areas, socialist institutions were gradually marketized by the state to release and 
develop productive forces, and this was believed to be congruent with the 
fundamental interest of the overwhelming majority of the people (Lu 2006, 2008). In 
this process, the straitjacket of hukou became loosened, and peasants were allowed 
to migrate to become part of the urban workforce.  
In this analysis, Maoist socialism represents mere constraints on peasants and has led 
to their absolute poverty before migration. The post-1978 market-oriented reform, on 
the other hand, was a fairly positive endeavour by the central government to 
gradually remove these constraints. Nongmingong’s migration is therefore 
understood as their spontaneous move to shake off poverty. After years of 
repression, they were finally emancipated and allowed to “lift themselves out of 
poverty through sweat and toil, pursue their own happiness and change their own 
 
state and before law, and is the final form of human emancipation within the existing world order. In this section, I use the term 
not in this strictly Marxist sense, but more generally to refer to the process of giving people social or political freedom and 
rights. 
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and their children’s fate, with their humble labour, at their free will” (Qiufeng, cited 
in Lv, 2003; p 253).  
Guided by this understanding, this strand of literature covers a range of topics, e.g. 
mechanisms of social stratification; institutional and social discrimination and 
inequalities; and nongmingong crimes and social control; from an ‘agent-practice’ 
(Tan, 2006) perspective, scholars have investigated among other topics patterns and 
non-economic motivations of migration, the ways in which they negotiate 
inequalities and discrimination, and the impact on rural China (Wang 1995 ; Wang et 
al. 1997; Murphy 2002; Li 2003 ; Li 2004 ; Xiang 2004; Lan 2005). In both threads, 
gender is a main concern (Jin 1998, 2000; Ke and Li 2001; Tan 1997, 1998, 2001; 
Tang 1996;  Tang and Feng 2000). In what follows, I briefly present two topics 
belonging respectively to the two threads: mechanisms of stratification, and the 
guanxi debate. The aim is to deliver a sense of this literature in order to discuss its 
strength and weakness, particularly in terms of conceptualising nongmingong’s 
agency. 
2.2.1 Mechanisms of social stratification and the guanxi debate 
In evaluating the impact of state and the market on nongmingong, the literature is 
mostly dominated by the Weberian approach to class analysis. This was a conscious 
choice because the Marxist framework ‘reminded people of the old socialist politics 
of hua jieji, ding chengfen, determining class status of individuals and the family, 
and the mobilization of one class to publicly criticize and humiliate the other’ (p.15), 
while the Weberian approach was constructive and conducive to social integration 
(Li P et al. 2005 p15; Liu and Tian 2018) 
Informed by Weberian class analysis, along with his colleagues at the China 
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Lu Xueyi, ‘the prime architect of the current 
structure of class in China’ (Goodman, 2014, p.4), carried out a three-year national 
survey, and presented a 10-strata hierarchical model of the overall social structure in 
China by occupation. In their model, nongmingong belonged to the industrial worker 
strata and ranked 8th. Others’ findings echoed Lu’s. Li P (2003) and Li Q (2004) 
argued that although nongmingong’s wealth increased through occupational change, 
it did not result in upward mobility in the overall social ladder. Li C (2005) 
examined prestige stratification by occupation and found that nongmingong ranked 
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77th among her 81 categories, higher only than tricycle drivers, small vendors, 
porters and domestic helpers.  
As for institutional arrangements behind the model, a central mechanism they 
identified was what Li Q (2004) called the dual labour market, consisting of a 
primary sector and a second sector. It was in the second, informal sector that was 
low in income and social security and degraded in work environment that 
nongmingong were mostly likely to be found. For him, this was because employment 
remained closely linked to the hukou system, creating an insuperable hurdle for 
nongmingong to enter the primary sector. Li C (2006) compared nongmingong and 
urban workers. She found that although nongmingong changed jobs more often and 
worked harder, their opportunities for upward mobility were slimmer. As she wrote,  
normal factors and formal institutions do not impact them in a normal way, 
rather, formal institutions have a decisive effect on their social mobility – 
squeezing them out of the realm of formal institutional arrangements to the 
social margin. They are hence not able to achieve upward mobility through 
normal ways, but do it in their special way. (p.105, my emphasis) 
Zhao and Wang (2002) focused on the role of the market. Drawing on notions of 
human capital and social capital, they analysed survey data collected from a sample 
of 7,500 in Beijing, Zhuhai and Wuxi, and found that the correlation between both 
human/social capital and income were statistically significant, with more 
training/education leading to higher income. Focusing on gender, Jin (2000) 
examined how ‘developmental resources’ were distributed between and had an 
impact on both genders. Based on her research in South Jiangsu, she argued that the 
new industrial system gave rise to gendered industries, allowing males to reconfigure 
domination over females with advantages in technology-related skills and inherited 
social resources. Others observed a feminization of the agricultural workforce. 
Whereas for some this was a rational choice of the family under the global optimal 
principle (Du and Bai 1997), they attributed this to the dominant gendered ideology 
(Tang and Feng 2000). Tan (2000) echoed this latter position as she found women 
were more likely to find labour-intensive, low-skilled, long-hour yet low-income 
jobs.  
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Whereas the abovementioned studies approached the phenomenon from a structural 
perspective, ‘the guanxi debate’ took nongmingong’s day-to-day practice as the point 
of departure. Building on the emancipated migrant thesis, the guanxi debate 
examined 1) how nongmingong mobilized guanxi to negotiate structural constraints 
and the lack of social and emotional support during and throughout migration, and 2) 
the potential of the new social relations and social forms – e.g. new forms of 
community, new gender relations – as alternative forms of social organization thus 
emerged14 (Li 1996, 2004; Qu, 2001; Xiang, 2004; Lan, 2005). 
A consensus across the debate was that for most nongmingong, unlike urban 
workers, the social resources they relied on came not from the government or the 
market, but from xiangtu guanxi, those networks they brought with them from places 
of origin. A term coined to describe this phenomenon was lianshi liudong, chain 
migration. Despite this, researchers have diverged in understanding the nature of this 
reliance. For Li (1996), xiangtu guanxi consisted of a primary level that existed prior 
to migration and a secondary level they built after migration. Bian (1997), 
reconsidering Granovetter's weak-tie theory, established that in China jobs were 
acquired more often through strong ties than through weak ties. A similar pattern 
was also found among nongmingong (Qu, 2001; Li H, 2003) with the strength of ties 
defined in terms of blood relations and place of origin. Xiang (2004) focused on 
small business vendors, a group loosely defined as nongmingong in this literature. 
Based on the reflection of the market hype15 within Chinese society in general and 
academia in particular, he presented a bottom-up thick description of how the 
Zhejiangcun community formed and developed in different stages from various 
clusters of interactive relations among those migrants, different levels of 
governments and urban residents. For Xiang, guanxi should not be understood in an 
essentialist way as unique to the Chinese context, nor should it be reduced to such 
notions as ‘social capital’, ‘tie’ or ‘network’, as these capture only part of this rich 
concept. He articulated a position that saw guanxi as ‘simultaneously related to 
interpersonal relations, individuals and social structure’ (p.3) and called for a return 
 
14 Similar research could also be found on other groups of rural-to-urban migrants, for example, the Zhejiangcun research on 
those small business vendors of Wenzhou origin in Beijing (Wang C, 1995; Wang H et al., 1997; Zhou, 1998; Xiang, 2004). In 
terms of gender, within this tradition, Li Y et al. (2000), Jacka (2006) and Lin (2013) have discussed nongmingong’s gendered 
lived experience.  
15 Xiang started his book with a critique of two prevalent phenomena in 1990s China. One was the adoption of the Western 
market-driven modernity as the standard to evaluate Chinese society and its people; the other, associated with the first, was the 
blind faith in the market as the solution to all problems.  
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to the process in which migrants themselves mobilized guanxi to deal with others 
and negotiate institutional constraints. In Transcending Boundaries, this thick 
description led him to reflect on the potential of the ‘non-state space’ – the social 
space Zhejiangcun migrants created with guanxi – as a ‘new social space’ (p.500) to 
provide a reference point for reforms in other social realms. 
2.2.2 The emancipated migrant literature revisited  
Compared to the rational individual literature where nongmingong were 
conceptualized as rational individuals operating in ideal market conditions, the 
emancipated migrant thesis considered the workers as a social group, tracing its 
origin to the larger historical institutional contexts. It analysed how these 
arrangements shaped their experience, and how they negotiated the constraints.  
In explaining mechanisms of social stratification, much of the literature has criticised 
the government solely. Informed by their historical and institutional analysis, 
scholars tended to attribute nongmingong’s problematic conditions to the residue of 
the old institution-driven rural-urban duality to which the hukou system was central. 
For them, this was a symptom of the disrupted optimum deployment of resources by 
the market, due to the government’s failure to create a healthy and free market 
resembling that in the West. Even when evidence showed that social/human capital 
had an influence on income, they did not see it as a problem with the market as-it-
was, but attributed it to the workers’ failure in preparing themselves for the market. 
In the guanxi debate, there is a similar lack of attention to the constraints imposed by 
the market. Attention is overwhelmingly paid to the use of guanxi for purposes like 
expanding personal networks, getting emotional support, building romantic 
relationships, and dealing with government regulation. Even Xiang’s thick 
description, where he highlighted ‘market as a social construct’ (Xiang, 2004, p.xvi), 
‘falls sadly short in providing sufficient information on the production process: how 
workers were organized and controlled in workshops to transform their labour into 
material commodities’ (p.xv).  
In much of this literature adopting a top-down approach, underlying this lack of 
attention to the market is a functionalist - and essentialist - understanding of the 
state, the market and the workers. Here, market functions as the mechanism of 
resource distribution of the society: the state regulates the market, secures production 
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and manages the society, while nongmingong function as the labour power that 
executes production. Their roles within the society are considered separately, rather 
than through their interconnections. Besides, both top-down and bottom-up 
approaches share a similar preoccupation with the market. For most authors, with a 
few exceptions (e.g. Xiang 2004), the effectiveness of the market system is assumed 
rather than examined, with a fully-fledged free market considered congruent to the 
interests of the state and nongmingong alike. The state-market relationship is 
assumed to be antagonistic, and the state-nongmingong relationship is also assumed, 
with the state always considering nongmingong’s fundamental interests. The 
intention of the state’s reformation of the market is hence not contextualized and 
linked to, for example, the operation of the market as-it-is, the global market 
economy, and its changing relationship with nongmingong. Finally, nongmingong’s 
decision to migrate to and their predicaments in urban areas are not explained in 
relation to the market but are ascribed to old institutional barriers as much as their 
own inability to meet market demand. This is associated with a teleological view of 
the history, or as Xiang (2004) put, the use of Western realities to evaluate Chinese 
realities. 
Based on this discussion, I argue that in this extant literature, the conceptualization 
of nongmingong’s agency is inadequate, for it fails to thoroughly consider it within 
its intricate, mutually constructive relationships with the state and the market. 
Considering preoccupations among intellectuals with market mechanisms solving 
every problem, and with modernization and development over people’s actual 
wellbeing, I further argue that in much of this literature nongmingong’s voice is 
actually systematically repressed. It is not difficult to find statements suggesting that 
nongmingong do not care much about the inequalities of hukou because they do not 
want to settle down in urban areas. Most of the time, the impoverishment of 
nongmingong is not investigated in its own right, but became the focus of inquiry 
only when it is considered an urban ailment. The following quotes are telling: 
The nongmingong problem is important because it relates to the fundamental 
question of China’s sustainable development and long-term stability and 
sustained economic growth in the next 50 years… The logic of 
nongmingong’s life is simply ‘to survive’. However, some wrongly took risks 
and commited crime for wealth… [this] needs some action, since unemployed 
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and impoverished nongmingong can be a real threat to urban residents. (Li  
2002) 
Nongmingong… promotes urbanization and modernization by gradually 
bridging the massive economic and cultural gap. However, this migration is 
massive, disorderly and unsafe, and puts the destination society into potential 
instability and structural tension. (Li 2003) 
Based on the analysis so far, to adequately theorise nongmingong’s agency 
necessitates a framework thoroughly addressing the state-market-nongmingong 
interrelations whilst transcending the teleological view of the history. This leads me 
to the work of China’s new left16. 
2.3 Nongmingong as forced workers  
Actually, the above discussed understanding of nongmingong’s historical and 
institutional roots is associated with a liberal-leaning understanding of Chinese 
modernity. This view saw the pre-PRC China as a century of humiliation for the 
Chinese people and nation, while Maoist China - particularly the decade of the 
“Cultural Revolution" - represented a failed attempt of modernisation. Their 
appraisal of Mao considered his contributions as far outweigh mistakes. While 
acknowledging his contribution as a great Marxist and a great proletarian 
revolutionary, strategist and theorist, they nevertheless criticized his “left errors”, of 
which the erroneous theory and practice of taking class struggle as the key link and 
the gross mistake of initiating the cultural revolution were epitomic (Wang 2005; 
Zhu 2007; Qin 2013; Wu 2017).  This, for the new left, is far from convincing, for in 
this view, market economy, liberal democracy and nation state are taking as the 
defining hallmarks of modernity. Anything deviate from this model are deemed as 
lack of modern content. Capitalism is taken, whether explicitly or implicitly, as the 
globally irresistible trend and the only imaginable historical horizon. 
For the new left, this is symptomatic of the “intrinsic difficulties in attempting to 
grasp the idea a of China in familiar social science language” (Lin 2013; p5). 
Although Wang Hui, a core member of this collective, openly dismissed this label 
 
16 The Chinese new left is a heterogenous group that emerged in the mid-1990s in a debate concerning the future direction of 
China’s reform. While each scholar may have their own opinions on different issues, what they share in common was that they 
embraced leftist theories, ideals and traditions ranging from Marxism to socialism, postmodernism and other schools criticizing 
neoliberalism.  
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because it risks conflating them with the old left, one thing that distinguishes them 
from the liberals is their appraisal of Maoist China and its historical 
(dis-)continuities with Republican and post-Mao China, for they found in their 
narratives an inadequate understanding of the historical specificities and continuities. 
On the other hand, while they certainly appreciate the efforts of localist turn 
advocates among China historians to “decenter national history” (Daura 1991, 1997), 
they nevertheless consider their efforts as flawed, not least because of their failure to 
appreciate the entirety and trans-local complexity of modern Chinese development. 
For them, a thoroughgoing narrative of Chinese modernity requires taking issue with 
the whole “China/West” binary. Such an endeavour cannot be fulfilled unless one 
distances her/himself from the Eurocentric historical narratives that identify 
modernity with the nation-state and capitalism, and starts to grant China its due 
historical recognition as neither “nation” nor “empire”. To borrow Burawoy’s quote 
above, while the liberals wrongly compare the reality of China with the idealization 
of the West, the new left try to correct this by establishing China as an ideal type, 
before assessing its reality against this idealization.  
Guided by this rationale, they date the birth of a cohesive self-consciousness of 
modern Chinese identity back to the rise of revolutionary nationalism after the 1840s 
when China was forced to open its door to the world market during the Opium wars. 
For them, pre-PRC China was a century of humiliation; it also represented a self-
conscious exploration of the form and path of Chinese modernity by the Chinese 
people and elites - loyalists, warlords, republicans, anarchists, nationalists, Marxists 
or communists/internationalists etc. - in face of imperialist powers and complex 
domestic social relationships and interests (Dirlik 1989). Thanks to the well-founded 
articulation of the enemies of the revolution as “imperialism, feudalism, and 
bureaucratic capitalism”, it was the communists who finally brought China to 
independence, through its strategic reliance on not only - as orthodox Marxism 
would suggest - the industrial working class, but social forces from rural margins 
with mixed ethnicities. Thus, they reconfirmed that the communist revolution in 
China was at once an epic struggle for national independence and a radical social 
revolution that aimed to “liberate its internal minorities from traditional ruling class 
chauvinism” (Lin 2013; p6). Meanwhile, they see the Chinese revolution as part of 
the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and fascism across the world. It drew 
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lessons from but never blindly follow the West or the Soviet in institutional 
arrangements, policy generation and implementation techniques and revolutionary 
visions, and it bore intricate connections with national independence movements in 
capitalist third world but distanced from them with its insistence on socialism and 
internationalism (Selden 1995; Tsou 2002; Lin 2013; Heilmann and Perry 2011; 
Wang 2011).  
New China then pursued its own brand of socialist transformation and 
industrialization.  Here, the new left urges us to recognize its modern content, e.g. 
egalitarianist principles and people’s democracy, and remind us of its profound 
continuity - rather than rupture - with the collective search for national and social 
liberation, equality, and prosperity in previous years. For them, policies in the 
socialist phase were unprecedented, adventurous and ultramodern. By contrast, 
Dengist reform, much applaud by the liberals, represents an abandonment of 
socialism in the name of reform.  
It is this state-orchestrated de facto betrayal of its socialist promise that concerns 
them most. Hence Lin Chun (2013) in her widely-read China and Global Capitalism 
wrote, “the politics of debating Chinese socialism is not about restoring any past but 
about learning lessons for its rejuvenation” (p55). Similarly, Huang and Cui (2005) 
called for an exploration of whether and to what extent is China positioned to 
construct a more equal and justice society than the West as it is, and in so doing 
asserts local alternative to resist and eventually take over global capitalism as the 
dominant form of modernity. Born into a rural background, Wang drew our attention 
to questions of social stratification and rampant inequalities, for example, the ever-
expanding wealth gap, the commericalised social welfare system, environmental 
degradation, particularly what these mean for workers and peasants.  
With specific reference to nongmingong, the new left rejected the emancipated 
migrant thesis. For them, throughout 40 years of reform, with hitherto socialist 
relations of production shattered, China is now incorporated into the global capitalist 
system, and it is the market and the private sector, rather than central planning and 
the public sector, that now dominate China’s economy. In this process, nongmingong 
as a social group have undergone a process of unfinished proletarianization (Pun and 
Lu 2010). Instead of willing migrants, most do not have much option but to migrate 
to big cities, since rural areas fail to provide even faint promise for their livelihoods 
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and ambitions. Far from being emancipated, migration, while providing better 
income and opportunities, re-inserts them into the exploitative capitalist relations of 
production. Domestically, they face a similar situation as laid-off state workers and 
together they have formed China’s new working class (Pun 2016). 
Based on this proposition, for these left-leaning sociologists, the nongmingong 
question then became a labour question. Their research in the past decades has traced 
how capitalist relations of production have played out in the historical context of 
China and under the neoliberal expansion of global capitalism, the politics of 
production and how this in turn contributed to the making of nongmingong as 
China’s new working class. This can be divided roughly into a state-civil society 
approach and a class formation approach. 
2.3.1 The state-civil society approach 
The state-civil society approach employs a top-down perspective. It asks how the 
authoritarian state in China, through its institutional and legal apparatus, interacts 
with transnational and domestic capital, and how this interaction gives rise to 
historically specific and constantly changing configurations of capitalist relations of 
production throughout the reform, while shapes the space of agency for labour 
NGOs and worker self-organisation from below.  
A central issue in the field is employment relations. Two consensuses across the 
field are: first, after decades of marketisation, a contract-based employment system 
is gradually established; and second, employment in China is undergoing radical 
informalization, with nongmingong the most precarious group (Kuruvilla et al. 2011; 
Tomba, 2002). This, as Kuruvilla et al. (2011) have argued, is part of the global 
trend of precarisation under neoliberalism and flexible accumulation and is 
decisively shaped by national circumstances and institutions. They divided the 
development of China’s employment system into three stages. Before 1995, the 
socialist permanent employment system – of which nongmingong was historically 
not a part – dominated. Legally and institutionally unprotected, growing in numbers, 
most nongmingong were employed by foreign-invested enterprises whose 
competitive advantage stemmed from labour-intensive production without formal 
contracts.  
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The launch of the 1995 labour law smashed the ‘iron rice bowl’, marking the start of 
the second stage. Although it aimed to reduce exploitation by ‘enshrining certain 
rights and responsibilities’ in law, the inability of the state to adequately enforce it, 
plus employers’ labour flexibility strategies, resulted in intensified ‘commodification 
and casualization of labour’ (Friedman and Lee 2010, p.510). According to 
Friedman and Lee (2010), by 2007, only 12.5% of nongmingong worked under 
formal contracts with key employment-based social welfare. In this context, Zhang L 
(2008, p.28) observed the rise of ‘temporary workers in permanent jobs’. Swider 
(2015) found ‘permanent temporariness’ in the Chinese construction industry, and 
Kuruvilla et al. (2011) observed a growing trend of ‘formalization of 
informalization’ through vocational schools and labour dispatch agencies. 
The third stage is marked by extreme insecurity and informalization. Although the 
Chinese government introduced several new major labour laws (such as the 2008 
labour contract law and the pension law) – much to the consternation of employers 
(Frazier 2010) – and have made substantial efforts to enforce them (Gallagher et al. 
2015), employers and labour agencies continue to invent new informal arrangements 
to evade the law. 
Given the destabilising effects of extreme precarity, how does the Chinese 
government manage to prevent massive social uprisings and maintain social stability 
without democratising employment relations? Writing in the mid-2000s, Gallagher’s 
(2005) answer to the question was the particular sequencing of the reform in terms of 
corporate ownership structure, for different types of capitals carry with them 
distinctive sets of power relations, thus giving rise to different social consequences 
across different contexts. More specifically, she argued that key to China’s stability 
is the state’s choice to introduce FDI before privatising state sectors and allowing the 
domestic private sector to rise, for this allowed social change to take place at the 
periphery and prevent the rise of a large domestic capitalist class. This in turn 
enhanced the power of the party-state for the time being and avoided the pressure for 
political change. It also brought different types of capital into competition, thus 
fragmenting the population, weakening the union and delaying demand for political 
change. 
The absence of massive social upheaval does not mean that workers are not 
protesting. Lee (2007) documents the struggles of both the laid-off state workers and 
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nongmingong. She argued that despite the different historical and discursive 
resources drawn into the protest, both groups are responding to China’s 
‘decentralized legal authoritarianism’ by developing a unique form of protest in 
which the centrality of law and legalism is salient. Specifically, she observed that 
nongmingong were protesting mainly locally against the discrepancy between the 
promise of the law and how it was actually enforced, particularly wage arrears and 
occupational injuries. For Lee, this is because ‘[t]he labor law and the legal contract 
have given migrant industrial workers crucial institutional leverage in their contests 
with employers about violations of labor rights’ (p.191). That is to say, 
nongmingong’s protest is first and foremost shaped by the legal-institutional system 
and better conceived as legal mobilization for full citizenship, or ‘rightful resistance’ 
(O’Brien and Li 2006; O’Brien 2013), rather than class struggle.  
While worker activism in China has yet to present a serious threat to destabilise the 
regime, levels of insurgency are high and have been increasing over the past 
decades. Nongmingong are emboldened too and become more experienced in taking 
radical actions, in both covert and incredibly overt ways (Chan 2001; Pun 2005). 
These cellular and sporadic protests did engender a response from the state, mainly 
the trade union and legislation, and from the civil society. 
China’s trade union, the hierarchical national organization of the ACFTU, has long 
been derided as a corporatist yellow union (Chan, 1993). For Chen (2003, 2010), the 
union is caught between the state and the market and assumes a double institutional 
identity as both a state apparatus and a labour organization. For this reason, he 
argued that an industrial conflict solution in China is actually a quadripartite process, 
involving the government, employers, trade union and workers. In this process, the 
union derived its power from the government whose priority was to control labour 
unrest and prevent its escalation and played more of a mediating role according to 
only general and vague rules. This in turn helped enhanced its role in relation to 
employers and allowed them to lean toward the workers’ demands when possible. 
However, he warned that this is far from the rise of associational power or 
independent representation of workers.  
Friedman and Lee (2010) disagreed with Chen’s double identity theory. They argued 
that unions are better understood as government agencies, for they seek not to 
reorganize power relations from below, but to legislate and administrate from above. 
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Notwithstanding this disagreement, they agreed with Chan’s observation that union 
activities had contributed to the state’s efforts at individualizing and 
institutionalizing labour conflict resolution through non-juridical means like 
arbitration. For Friedman (2014), it is this self-imposed political constraint that has 
trapped the central state, leading to the failure of its effort to promote class 
compromise through ACFTU. For Friedman and Kuruvilla (2015), this institutional 
straitjacket has posed great constraints on the state’s recent move to reform labour 
relations in response to growing labour unrest and an unstable labour market that has 
impeded economic development. 
Apart from the union, the state has also resorted to legal means to channel individual 
worker grievance and formalise and restructure labour relations to reduce social 
conflict, address growing economic inequality and prepare for the transition from 
unregulated capitalism to a Fordist model of high consumption (Friedman and Lee 
2010; Hui and Chan 2014; Friedman and Kuruvilla 2015). This legislative process, 
as shown by scholars, is a power-laden process involving mainly foreign chambers 
of commerce and government agencies. Friedman and Lee (2010) told a story of 
labour-protective clauses watered down by employer lobbying of EU and US 
chambers of commerce. Hui and Chan (2014) documented local labour legislation 
contested by Hong Kong chambers of commerce in Shenzhen and Guangdong. They 
observed that two factors determined this process: the position in global production 
chains of the firms they represent; and the relevant industrial relations model. Chan 
(2011) and Gallagher et al. (2014), on the other hand, focused on the effects of 
legislation. Whereas Chan was optimistic about the long-term effects of labour law 
in setting the patterns of industrial relations, Gallagher et al. showed that the 2008 
labour contract law and its enforcement had variably influenced workers’ propensity 
to have a contract, awareness of law content and likelihood of initiating dispute, 
according to education level.  
Li C (2015) divided labour NGOs into three categories: service-oriented; rights-
protection oriented; and activism-oriented. As regards the role of labour NGOs in 
state-labour relations, the consensus is that although they have contributed to the 
state’s legal project to automate labour grievances and shepherd it to arbitration, they 
nevertheless faced constant harassment and surveillance by the state and were 
limited in scope of action. To understand NGOs’ changing space of agency, Howell 
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and Pringle (2019) developed the conceptual tool of ‘shades of authoritarianism’ by 
which they defined ideal types of approaches of authoritarian governments to state-
labour relations. The ‘shade’, according to them, is blurred at the edges and operates 
within ‘a broader political-economic environment shaped by globalization, 
development strategy and leadership approach and motivated by the need for regime 
stability and sustaining stable capitalist development’ (p.240). Four ‘shades’ that 
they identified in China include: exploitative; protective; open and encapsulating – 
each having distinctive impacts on the role that labour NGOs can play in state-labour 
relations. 
2.3.2 The class formation approach 
The class formation approach employs a bottom-up perspective. Theoretically, it is 
inspired by Marxist class theorists and historians like Dahrendorf (1959), Thompson 
(1980) and Katznelson and Zolberg (1986). For them, as for Marx, class is a 
relational concept and distinguishes between class-in-itself and class-for-itself. 
Working class is defined in a shared relationship to the means of production and in 
its antagonistic relationship with other classes that own, manage and control capital 
accumulation and profit maximization. Class formation entails the transition from 
class-in-itself to class-for-itself.  
Katznelson and Zolberg (1986) advanced a four-element framework to analyse class 
formation: class as structure of capitalist economic development; class as ways of 
life defined as social organization of society lived by actual people in real social 
formations both at and off work (p.15); class as shared dispositions, as ‘cognitive 
constructs map the terrain of lived experience and define the boundaries between the 
probable and improbable’ (p.17); and class as collective action – self-conscious 
action and organisation through movements and organisations to the position of the 
class within the society. Guided by this framework, scholars have explored all four 
interconnected layers.  
Concerning the first, the focus is on how the dynamics of history, the state, the 
market and globalization in China put nongmingong into what ‘objective position’. 
For these scholars, China’s reform is a state-led process of radical marketisation, 
commodification and privatisation in order to incorporate its previous socialist 
system into the global economy. For nongmingong, this means proletarianization. 
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They are deprived of means of production and subsistence and turned from land-
owning peasants into industrial workers. A shared process among working classes of 
the world, the Chinese case is peculiar as industrialization and urbanization are 
highly disconnected. Because of the market mechanism as much as the legal-
institutional systems – particularly hukou – that continue to deepen the rural-urban 
chasm, nongmingong are never granted the legal and social right to reside in the city. 
The state retreats from social reproduction and protection, delegating it to 
unregulated capital. Nongmingong are hence trapped in a liminal status of 
‘unfinished proletarianization’ (Chan et al. 2010; Pun and Lu 2010). 
The second and third levels are often examined interrelatedly. A key analytical tool 
is ‘factory regime’ developed by Marxist sociologist Michael Burawoy. Unsatisfied 
by Braverman’s (1974) singular focus on the ‘objective’ side of the labour process, 
Burawoy held that the essence of the labour process was the simultaneous securing 
and obscuring of surplus labour, and any process as such had an objective and a 
subjective side. With the notion factory regime, he aimed to bring workers’ 
subjectivity back in to capture ‘the overall politics form of production, including 
both the political effects of the labour process and the political apparatuses of 
production’ (Burawoy, 1979, p.15).  
Inspired by this notion, Lee (1998) compared two factories in Hong Kong and 
Shenzhen. She was intrigued by how labour control over women workers was 
accomplished differently when managerial structure and relationship to the state 
were similar. Problematizing Burawoy’s class-first construct with feminist theories, 
she proposed a theory of gendered politics of production and argued that gender was 
crucial in shaping workers’ condition of dependence. Whereas in Hong Kong, 
‘matron workers’ prioritised family over factory jobs and wages, in Shenzhen, 
‘maiden workers’ travelled far and competed with many others precisely to pursue 
higher wages. Consequently, whereas matron workers participated in a management 
system of familial hegemony, maiden workers confronted an internal power structure 
of localistic despotism where the crux was regional politics and kin connections.  
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Lee (1999) turned to reforming SOEs and argued that the neo-traditional organized 
dependence17 observed by Walder (1986) had disappeared. The newly-gained 
autonomy of the enterprise led to unfettered disorganized managerial despotism for 
the state failed to provide viable alternatives that undermined workers’ bargaining 
power. Similar market despotism was found by Peng (2007) in a handbag company 
in the PRD where most workers were nongmingong. Writing at a time when labour 
relations were more volatile than ever before, Chan (2010) suggested that while 
despotism still characterised Chinese factories, ‘contested despotism’ better captured 
the reality. Smith and Pun (2006) and Pun and Smith (2007) focused on the linkage 
between the production and reproduction of labour power. They argued that what 
they call the ‘dormitory labour regime’ represents a powerful labour management 
regime, for the provision of a dormitory facilitates continuous access to fresh labour 
reserves from the countryside, and discourages wage demands and collective 
organization in a confined, highly-disciplined space.  
Zhou (2007) and Pun and Lu (2010) focused on the construction industry, where 
they found a hierarchical labour subcontracting system18. Regarding the labour 
regime, they observed a ‘relation (guanxi)-based hegemony’ in which guanxi 
(relatives/co-villagers) were mobilised by subcontractors to inspire loyalty, impose 
control and discourage resistance. But this was effective only when wages were paid. 
In the garment industry, a similar subcontracting system and guanxi-based 
hegemony existed that facilitated ‘games of making out’ or ‘the boss game’ (Huang 
2012; Zheng et al. 2015).  
Concerned with female domestic workers, Yan (2008) compared the structural and 
ideological conditions that en-/dis-able their workplace autonomy in pre-/post-
reform eras. She argued that a crucial enabling condition for this autonomy in the 
pre-reform era was the valorisation of rurality by Maoist egalitarianism. After Mao, 
urban monopoly of modernity created a crisis of subjectivity for migrant domestic 
helpers and subjected them to both wage-labour and the gaze of supposedly more 
 
17 To put it simply, in a neo-traditional regime, the state is the monopolistic redistributor who provides employment security, 
adequate material support and superior political and social status for factory workers in exchange for their political allegiance. 
This is characteristic of Maoist Chinese factories.  
18 According to Pun and Lu (2010), this subcontracting system usually starts with a well-known real estate developer 
responsible for land reclamation and project design. Under them is usually a state-owned construction company that is 
responsible for project management, and equipment contractors, who in turn subcontract to several big contractors and then 
small contractors responsible for supplying labour. At the bottom of this subcontracting hierarchy is labour-use facilitators, 
usually someone from the countryside who would recruit their co-villagers or relatives to work.  
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modern, high suzhi urban employers whilst working. Recently, Fu et al. (2018) 
argued that the unholy marriage of the ‘citizenry discounting’ engendered especially 
by hukou, and the entrenched and pervasive gendered familialism were 
consequential to their wellbeing and dignity in work.  
Until recently, this line of inquiry continues. New forms of labour organization and 
domination and new dimensions of worker subjectivity across different industries 
have been unveiled, with the empirical focus extended from full-time factory 
workers of Han nationality to student interns from vocational schools (Su 2011; Lu 
et al. 2019), dispatch workers (Feng 2019a, 2019b), workers of ethnic minorities, 
especially the Yi minorities (Liu 2016; Ma 2019), and from mechanisms of the 
labour market to that of reproduction of labour power (Woronov 2016; Pun and Koo 
2018).  
Regarding class action and collective struggle, scholars have examined the forces 
turning workers into class-aware actors, forging solidarity and activating the 
formation of class. Pun and Lu (2010) mapped second-generation nongmingong’s 
structure of feeling under ‘unfinished proletarianization’. Drawing on workers’ 
narrative and ethnographic studies in Guangdong from 2005 to 2008, they argued 
that trapped in the vicious circle of the rural-urban dichotomy and the relentless 
exploitation of capitalist production, the nongmingong experience yields anger, 
trauma, and a profound sense of unfairness and hopelessness. Without retreat, and 
without effective means to air and solve their grievances and problems, they are 
caught in a politics of resentment, awoken from illusions with the state, and 
gradually becoming aware of its class position, participating in a series of collective 
actions. 
Specifically, Chan and Pun (2009) traced the impact of labour regimes on collective 
actions, based on a range of labour protests they observed between 2004 and 2007 in 
the PRD area. They argued that these protests were mostly interest-based, 
accompanied by a strong anti-capital sentiment and a discourse of workers’ rights. 
Meanwhile, the dormitory labour regime is instrumental in forging solidarity on the 
basis of locality, ethnicity, gender and peer alliance, both in a single workplace and 
in cross-factory strike tactics.  
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Focusing on workers’ associational power per se, Leung and Pun (2009) discussed 
mechanisms of mobilization and the role of the state in resistance, based on the 
observation of the collective action of a group of silicosis-afflicted gemstone factory 
workers. They argued that capitalist exploitation and state inaction transformed 
workers’ class consciousness and dictated collective action. Strategies involved in 
the struggle were not limited to legal stipulations, but negotiations, filing 
compensation claims, portioning, staging demonstrations, road-blocking and 
cooperating with the media and NGOs. Out of these struggles, a shared class identity 
as nongmingong and occupational disease victims was reaffirmed. Although 
employment-based internal divisions existed, overall cross-factory alliances were 
forged and actions taken, foretelling a gradual class formation.  
Chan (2009, 2010), on the other hand, explored the role of place-of-origin based 
networks. A long-time observer of working-class struggles in China, he argued that 
while previously the place-of-origin based worker-gangster networks had divided 
and pacified workers, their role underwent a dramatic change to become a source of 
associational power during strikes. Li (2006) complicated this argument by stressing 
the divisive effect of managerial practices. Wang (2015) argued that, original-place-
based network aside, nongmingong’s everyday lives also had political and 
ideological effects, which in turn influenced workers’ associational power, for 
example, life history, lifestyle, social network, vision, and the use of the internet.  
A trade union is traditionally a class organisation that facilitates and fosters 
collective bargaining and class consciousness. But in China, its role is highly 
compromised, not least because of the ‘socialist legacy’ of the state-led union (Chan 
2010). Nevertheless, nongmingong’s awareness of the trade union as a channel for 
articulating class interests is increasing, as manifested in the growing demand for 
independent unions (Chan 2019). Recently, the state has stepped in to promote 
collective bargaining. Overall, driven by surging labour unrest, collective negotiation 
in China has undergone a transition from ‘collective consultation as a formality’, 
through ‘collective bargaining by riot’, and towards ‘party-state-led collective 
bargaining’ (Chan and Hui, 2014). 
In contemplating an alternative for nongmingong, they considered not only space of 
agency in terms of collective action, but also social economy. In this regard, Gu et al. 
(2014) edited a volume in which contributors discussed the challenges faced by the 
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only living People’s Commune and collective economy in Zhoujia and Yakou 
villages. They also analysed existing experiments of social economy in China, 
figuring out how they practiced rules of fair trade, non-exploitative production and 
community-centeredness. 
2.3.3 Debating workplace conflicts: rightful resistance of the precariat or class 
struggle? 
The two approaches discussed above do not contradict. Both see nongmingong as 
forced workers under the dual repression of the state and the market. However, the 
two radically diverge in their assessment of the nature of nongmingong’s struggles 
and resistance. Do the surging worker militancy and favourable policies suggest 
rising class consciousness and worker empowerment? Or are nongmingong actually 
confronting new global tendency of precarisation?  
Lee (2016) is pessimistic, disaggregating the empowerment thesis into four points: 
1) increase in mobilization and activism; 2) growing class awareness as a trait of the 
second-generation, for they were ICTs-savvy and felt a stronger sense of anger, pain, 
and exclusion at the point of production; 3) a maturation and radicalization of labour 
activism from defensive, mere economic, legalistic and right-based to offensive, 
political, interest-based and transgressive; and 4) promulgation of favourable 
policies are taken to be products of worker struggle and signs of empowerment.  
Lee refuted this optimism as not sufficiently evidence-based and subjectivist. She 
began by pointing out recent institutional changes in China’s ‘authoritarian 
precarisation’ that weakened working-class power against state-capital alliance – for 
example, opportunistic instrumental use of the law by the state to fulfil its economic 
and political priorities, employer activism, the marketization of land use rights, long-
term leasing of collective land to agribusiness corporations since the 1990s, and 
more recently the ambitious state-led project of ‘National New Type Urbanisation 
Plan’ that aimed to transfer nongmingong into consumers. Against this backdrop, 
Lee argued that compared to the 1990s, strikes at the recent stage dropped in 
number, and that the second-generation stand out not in terms of legal knowledge, 
but in consumption patterns. Citing Zhang (2015), Lee pointed out that the causal 
connections made between social media use and effective mobilization were more 
assumed than demonstrated. Higher wages should not be understood as a state 
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concession, but because they fitted in well with the state’s strategy to rebalance the 
economy to a consumer-driven one. Her fourth argument stated that qualitative 
changes in class capacity and consciousness observed by the optimists are based on 
sensational moments of mobilization without recognizing reversals in union 
representations that followed.  All these led her to conclude that informality 
continued to characterise nongmingong’s lives, that there was little attenuation in 
their structural subordination, and that little evidence supported significant changes 
in mobilization pattern, organizing capacity and formation of class subjectivities.  
This rather pessimistic diagnosis about the character of radicalism among second-
generation migrant workers sparked a defence from the optimist camp. Smith and 
Pun (2018)19 contended that Lee’s work adopted the problematic concept of 
precarity that defines class through employment situation. They agreed with her 
observation of legislation and de facto land ownership but disagreed with her 
analysis that such changes necessarily disrupt or reverse class formation. For them, 
these are the latest trend in ‘unfinished proletarianization’. Instead of unmaking class 
solidarity, these changes accelerate the proletarianization of nongmingong, further 
blocking their route to economic security back home, putting them in an even more 
precarious situation, and helping to ignite in them a deeper sense of anger, 
dissatisfaction and indignity. Thus, they reaffirmed their optimistic stance toward the 
forging of a class force at the national level (Pun 2019). 
2.3.4 Working-class culture  
If production and collective action have interested labour sociologists, inspired by 
cultural Marxism (Williams 1973, 1977; Hall, 1986, 1997, 2000; Paul and du Gay 
1996; Spivak, 1988), critical media scholars have joined the debate with a focus on 
culture as a relatively autonomous realm in which class relations are lived, class 
domination played out, class identity contested, class struggle fought, and the 
possibility for a collective political consciousness emerged.  
Zhao and Wu (2014) wrote about the political economy of China’s television drama 
industry. They argued that the ideological orientation of propaganda organs, the 
constantly changing censorship of the government, the profit-seeking capital, and the 
agency of television drama producers and targeted audiences together constitute a 
 
19 See also Chan (2012) for a similar critique of Lee’s generalisation of workers’ protests with the notion of citizenship.  
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dynamic, highly complex and multi-dimensional popular television culture, making 
television drama one of the most developed subcategories of the media industry and 
the most contested spaces of meaning production. They claim that the television 
drama industry actively participated in the evolution and re-composition of class 
relations in China, demonstrating a neoliberal orientation that favours middle-class 
culture, making the question of who constitutes the ‘mass majority’ and represents 
the ‘advanced socialist culture’ an urgent question to be answered.   
Others have focused on the text, digging deep into its discursive structure. Inspired 
mainly by Hall’s work on representation (1997), Li (2006), Huang (2017) and Zhang 
(2014) have respectively considered the representation of nongmingong in market 
media, state media and popular cultural texts. According to them, between the 1980s 
and 1990s, nongmingong were addressed in official and mainstream discourses as 
mangliu (blind flow). Historically, this pejorative term had portrayed them as a 
rapacious and irrational crowd, as troublemakers, invaders and a source of potential 
crisis to the more civilized and orderly urban society. In the late 1990s, advanced by 
some liberal-minded non-fiction writers, mingong chao emerged as an alternative to 
mangliu. By comparing it either with the US Westward Movement, or the Down to 
the Countryside Movement in socialist China, or the then-craze among Chinese 
university students to study abroad, these authors described mingong chao as a 
historically progressive force, signalling the departure from a primitive, agriculture-
dominated mode of production and the pursuit of modernity. In TV plays, a parallel 
discourse of wailaimei could be found. Like mingong chao, it suggested progress, for 
she was brave and heroic enough to transcend moral and social prejudices in 
backward rural areas and achieved individual success through individual efforts in 
civilized urban areas. In official discourses, images associated with the term at this 
stage were ‘symbol of modernity’, ‘agents of economic and social transformation’ 
and ‘creators of their own life’ on the one hand, and ‘disadvantaged group’, ‘low 
sushi (quality)’ and ‘waiting to be saved’ on the other. Popular urban media 
generally resonates with this. Diverse as it might seem, as these authors argue, most 
are based on a teleological view of history and fail to recognize nongmingong as 
self-determining and self-transforming agents. 
Zhang (2012) and Sun (2008, 2014a) turned the spotlight on nongmingong 
themselves. Zhang analysed media production by a group of nongmingong of Miao 
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ethnic minorities from Guizhou, China, and how these were circulated and consumed 
among themselves. This allowed her to contemplate the relations between grassroots 
media production, identity construction and social transition. Sun (2008), on the 
other hand, zeroed in to the living room of urban homes where female domestic 
helpers worked. She was intrigued by the growing popularity of maid stories and 
wondered how the differentiated capacity to resonate and identify with the characters 
among ‘maid’ and ‘master’ viewers contribute to the cultural politics of class and 
gender in the post-Mao era (Sun 2014). In that book, she explored how two sets of 
controlling gazes – every day and televisual – reinforce and justify each other. Her 
more recent book brought her out of the living room to the labour NGOs. There she 
met and talked to NGO leaders and their active nongmingong followers. Based on 
this fieldwork, in Subaltern China, she examined nongmingong’s cultural practices, 
both production and consumption, in their intricate relationship with the voices of 
cultural elites and with the mainstream culture shaped by the joint hand of the state 
and the market, bringing the hegemonic and the marginal into confrontation, putting 
cultural forms back into the historical experiences from which they emerged.  
Sun (2014b) and Yin (2018), on the other hand, have evaluated labour cultural 
activism and its effects. Sun traced the emergence of dagong literature in 
Guangdong. She argued that these hitherto unavailable cultural spaces provided 
female nongmingong with alternative views on everyday situations and morality, 
allowing them to counter the hegemonic portrayal of their sexuality as inexperience, 
vulnerability, criminality, immorality and incivility. Yin looked at two types of 
ICTs-enabled worker media. Drawing on interviews with editors and authors, she 
analysed processes of production and distribution and the content published. Yin 
argued that while communal support could mobilize nongmingong to participate in 
alternative media production for social inclusion and equality, such transformative 
potential should be contextualised rather than inferred.  
2.4 Nongmingong and the digital transformation of the Chinese economy  
So far, my discussion has been limited to research in a factory setting, and most of 
them do not consider the impact of economic digitalisation on nongmingong. This is 
because most of them are done in between 1990s and 2000s, a time when although 
many workers began to use mobile phones, but generally belonged to what Qiu 
(2009) called low-end working-class ICTs, for example, little smart (Qiu 2007), 
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internet café (Ding 2009) etc. It is not until the recent decade, with the spread of 
network infrastructure, the reform of the telecommunications industry and 
consequent decline in tariffs,  the rise of domestic smart phones manufacturing 
industry, and the acceleration of network convergence, that nongmingong’s access to 
the internet at low price in their chosen time and place become commonplace. The 
state-led, market-driven digital transformation of the economy further propelled the 
penetration of ICTs in nongmingong’s life, mediating not only the realm of 
consumption and reproduction, but also that of production.  
In response, scholars holding the liberal leaning view of Chinese modernity have 
produced insightful analysis. For example, Wang (2016) examined how social media 
and nongmingong mutually shape each other. For her, nongmingong are ‘a relatively 
digital have-less population, still in the process of becoming modern’ (p.187), and 
social media development in China is pushed by ‘a very deliberate policy of the 
party-state, carried forward by a vast domestic market demand and accelerated by 
the booming growth of smartphones’ (p.56). Based on the rich ethnographic data 
collected during 15- month fieldwork in an industrial town near Shanghai, Wang 
presented a brilliant analysis of how nongmingong use social media in daily life to 
navigate relationships, discuss politics and gender and practice religion and modern 
life, and how they make sense of these practices, drawing on their cultural resources 
and lived experiences.  
Research based on the left-leaning view can also be found. Qiu (2009) is a 
pioneering work in the regard. It draws intensively on Castells’ network society 
theory (1996, 2010) which holds that ICTs have given rise to a society where key 
social structures and activities are organised around electronically processed 
information networks. Qiu contended that China had undergone a similar 
fundamental shift in social organisation. This had led him to redefine the notion of 
class by theorising ICTs as a new dimension of social stratification. Rather than the 
shared position within relations of production, for Qiu class is defined by ‘shared 
techno-social positioning in the marketplace of ICTs’ (p.8). This allowed him to 
announce the death of the ‘old industrial proletariat’ and the rise of a ‘new Chinese 
working-class’ (p.15), consisting of ‘low-end ICT users, service providers, and 
labourers who are manufacturing these electronics’ who, ‘compared to the upper 
classes, have limited income and influence in policy processes, although they have 
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begun to go online and use wireless phones’ (p.4), within the ‘new techno-social 
emergence’ (p.12) generated by working-class ICTs20.  
It is through this new way of seeing that Qiu came to study nongmingong as a 
subgroup of the new working-class. In Working-class Network Society (2009), his 
focus was on the question of class formation, which he defined primarily in Marxist 
terms as the transition from class-in-itself to class-for-itself, that is, the process 
wherein people of a class become aware of their shared class position and interest. 
Building on this theoretical edifice, based on the rich empirical evidence he collected 
across different provinces in China in the 2000s, Qiu examined the ‘organizational, 
cultural, and political processes that produce collective identity, class consciousness, 
solidarity, and empowerment’ (p.12). 
More recently, Qiu boldly announced ‘a fourth phase in the making of the Chinese 
working class’ (2018, p.5), a phase that is distinctive because of the all-
encompassing centrality of ICTs-enabled networks in social organisation. For him, 
this calls for a new framework to study class formation. Drawing on recent debates 
on ICTs and labour, he argued that existing attempts, like theories of audience 
labour, (im-)material labour, affective/emotional labour, free labour and ‘playbour’, 
were insightful but scattered. In arguing for a new model to understand class 
formation, Qiu linked all these concepts in a ‘circuit of labour’ model, consisting of 
a formal circuit where the body and capital form a class-based hierarchy of 
constraint and an informal circuit where networked labour draws on internal 
resources and self-made networks to develop new avenues for pleasure, survival and 
resistance. 
If for Qiu the composition of the working-class and the external conditions of class 
formation have undergone a radical shift because of ICTs, for neo-Marxists, mainly 
in labour sociology and communication studies, capitalism continues to define social 
relations in the now ICTs-saturated world, and the notion of class defined by shared 
relative position in relations of production is still relevant. Under this framework, 
they continue to debate questions of capital structure, forms of production, labour 
control, workers’ experience and forms of and potentials for class action.  
 
20 In working-class ICTs Qiu defined a growing category of low-end ICTs products and services. 
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Focusing on labour control, Liang (2017) and Wu and Li (2018) argue that labour 
control under platform is multiplied, but disagree about whether the labour control is 
based on workers’ consent (Burawoy 1975). Both Liang (2017) and Wu and Li 
(2018) identified three levels of labour control, namely, surveillance by platform 
owners or delegators, control through payment system or incentive schemes and that 
through customers. For them, these mechanisms generated a mixed sense of active 
identification and passive acceptance among the workers. in this sense, labour 
control in platforms is based on consent. By contrast, Liang (2017) and Sun (2019) 
do not observe consent in this process. Liang (2017) identifies a similar three-level 
control, but understood it within the context of the asset-light business model 
common among platforms, which allows it to sustain what she called “weak 
contract”. With her domestic workers, she finds that they actually actively resist this 
control, either by “voting with feet” or reversing the control of their clients by 
building emotion links with them. Similarly, Sun (2019) focuses on algorithm, and 
investigates how food delivery workers experience algorithm as a mechanism of 
labour control and how they create labour algorithm to negotiate control.  
Chen (2017; 2018) also looks at the platformisation of service jobs on Didi, China’s 
leading e-hailing app, and the unfolding new grounds for digital labour activism. Her 
work distinguished from others’ in that she did not take the development of Didi as 
granted but documented how its technological power took shape by reinforcing 
inequalities facing informally employed taxi drivers at the early stage of its 
development. Earlier this year, Chen, Sun and Qiu (2020) provide a worker-centred 
overview on this theme. Focusing on ride-hailing and food-delivery, drawing on a 
national survey and a systematically reviewed local and national government 
policies and regulations, their findings suggest that young, migrant, and informal 
workers dominate the platform-mediated on-demand service industries in China; that 
platform workers face intersectional labour control from algorithms designed and 
used by the digital platforms – the so-called “invisible boss”, as well as traditional 
human managers and a rapid expansion of third-party labour agency; and that 
workers engage in an array of formal and informal organizations to survive and 
thrive in the platform economy, ranging from forming social media support groups 
to exchange mundane tactics, to organizing collective actions like protests and 
strikes. 
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Platform work aside, scholars have also noted developments in the manufacturing 
sector amid the recent digital transformation of the economy that have an implication 
on nongmingong, that is, the introduction of lean production and jiqihuanren, to 
replace human workers with machines. In this regard, important critical insights into 
the state’s ‘intelligent manufacturing’ initiative – of which the jiqihuanren 
programme is an ambitious part – concerning its sectoral deployment and progress, 
and the disempowering influence on nongmingong have been generated (Zhang L 
2008, 2015; Butollo 2014; Butollo and Lüthje 2017; Huang and Sharif 2017; Huang 
and Sharif 2019). For one thing, although vigorously supported by the state and the 
neoliberal ideology of innovation, automation for individual capitalists was only one 
way to survive global economic volatility, and the decision to automate was 
contingent on a range of other factors (Sharif and Huang 2018). In Dongguan, three 
years after the policy was introduced, only 2,303 out of the over 80,000 
manufacturers received government funding. Even Sharif and Huang (2018, p.72) 
admitted that “by far, despite the high work replacement rate we recorded in our 
study, robotization might still seem a lesser evil than factory shutdown and 
relocation to Southeast Asia”. More recently, Xu and Ye (2020) offered a 
microsociology of changes in labour control after automation. Based on their 
fieldwork in three factories, they argue that as the result of automation, workers now 
face more informal labour relations, while technological control is reinforced as the 
task is now further deskilled.  
 
2.5 Research question  
So far, I have discussed three strands of research about nongmingong in Chinese 
sociology before the recent digital transformation of the Chinese economy. I provide 
an account of their burning questions, concerns, as well as the historical and 
institutional roots of the nongmingong phenomenon these approaches are based and 
how this relates to different views about Chinese modernity. With this discussion, I 
point that in this project I follow the left-leaning tradition, given my concern with 
workers’ own point of view, my commitment to studying the inequalities they face 
in its own right and my interest in an alternative for the workers. I then discuss 
labour research after the digital transformation, which I argue continues to revolve 
around questions of structures of capitalist domination and workers’ subjective 
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experience of domination, resistance and struggle. My project joins this collective 
effort. Employing a worker-centred perspective, I contend that current debate can be 
advanced by addressing the following four points.  
First, most existing research has centred on platform jobs as the archetypical ICTs-
enabled arrangement of production. This is well-founded, for in China, the platform 
economy represents a strategic move by the state to restructure old industries, spur 
economic growth and create jobs, and its development is propelled by the joint force 
of the state and the capital. It is gaining momentum and will continue to do so in the 
future. But a worker-centric perspective would prompt us to ask and explore also 
other ICTs-enabled arrangements of production. In their real life, nongmingong 
actually participate in all kinds of ICTs-enabled jobs that do not fall into the 
umbrella category of platform work, for example, weishang, livestreaming and as I 
will elaborate in chapter 4, rijie. besides, most of them actually do more than one job 
at a time, and platform jobs are actually sidelines for them.  
Second, a key debate in the field is to understand the changing nature of labour 
control in platform work. So far, scholars have focused on new forms of employment 
in platform enterprises and new ICTs-enabled managerial practices in the labour 
process. But as Burawoy demonstrated, labour control and the politics of production 
was actually enabled and bore intricate connections with the production regime as a 
whole. A holistic perspective is lack, and an analysis of how ICTs are integrated into 
the new production regime and generate new forms of labour control is needed. 
The third point concerned their subjective experience of production. Again, studies 
so far have centred disproportionately around platform sectors, which ignores the 
diversity of their mediated work practices, for example, multi-jobbing. Besides, in 
their actual analysis, the approach is worker-centred, but the drivers are defined 
more often as employees in terms of employment precarity and market status, than 
as workers in terms of the position within capitalist relations of production. This 
leaves important questions like who platform workers are, why they choose to work 
with platforms in the first place, and how their class, gender and generational 
identities, digital literacy and life/work history relates to their experience of 
production - including that in the immediate labour process and that of domination, 
struggle and resistance - unanswered.  
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Finally, so far, we know little about nongmingong’s everyday life experience outside 
production under the changing labourscape, especially how it relates to their 
experience of production and what are the new possibilities of political 
consciousness, contentious politics and the transformation of labour-capital relations 
emerging.  
Based on the discussion so far, this thesis captures the transitional moment of the 
digital transformation of the economy and asks how nongmingong as China’s new 
working-class actually experience this transition. Specifically, what are the new 
mediated arrangements of production emerging? How do nongmingong experience 
these new arrangements? What kind of actual and social practices exist around 
them? Whether, to what extent and how do these new mediated arrangements of 
production represent for them opportunities or challenges?  
 
2.6 ICTs-mediated politics of production: a theoretical framework 
In the discussion of existing literature so far, I referred to many concepts - labour 
process, production regime, the politics of production, consent, mediation, among 
other, but did not unpack them. in what follows, I will explain each of these concepts 
in order to piece together a useful framework to answer the research questions 
above.  
2.6.1  Factory regimes and the politics of production 
First proposed by sociological Marxist Michael Burawoy, the central tenet of the 
framework of labour regimes and the politics of production is to bring worker 
subjectivity back into the analysis of capitalist control in the context of the labour 
process. It is based on a critique of Braverman’s seminal work in the labour process 
debate, Labour and Monopoly Capital (1974). 
A powerful indictment of managerialism and Taylorism, in his book Braverman 
sought to unravel the nature and mechanisms of capitalist control by delving into the 
labour process. Indebted to Marx, for Braverman the relations of production 
distinguishes capitalism. Under capitalist relations of production, the labour process 
is distinctive in the sense that workers as direct producers sell labour power to 
capitalists, that is, the capacity to labour, rather than labour as crystalized in 
use/exchange values thus produced. The defining problem of the capitalist labour 
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process is then to translate the former into the latter. It is through this lens that 
Braverman explains the general decline of skilled labour under monopoly capitalism: 
for him, the secret lies in managerial strategies to expropriate skills and knowledge 
from workers and reserve it with themselves, that is, the separation of conception 
and execution. Workers were thus alienated from their productive activities.  
For Burawoy, this exclusive focus on the objective side of the labour process reduces 
the managerial problem of control to that of the alienation of the labour process from 
the labourer through confiscation of mental labour, for it makes unwarranted 
assumptions about the interests of both managers and workers. Following Gramsci, 
Poulantzas and Althusser, building on Braverman’s distinction between labour 
power and labour actualised, Burawoy argued the essence of the capitalist labour 
process was to simultaneously obscure and secure surplus labour, and an analysis of 
the dynamics as such needs to bear workers’ and managers’ subjectivities in mind.  
Specifically, for Burawoy, any labour process involves an economic dimension (the 
production of things), a political dimension (the production of social relations) and 
an ideological dimension (the production of an experience of those relations). 
Capital’s intention to control and workers’ condition of dependence depends on and 
takes form in relations in production, that is, relations on the shop floor into which 
workers enter, both with one another and with the management. In this light, we 
cannot begin to fully understand the capitalist labour process without examining in 
detail workers’ lived experience of relations in production, a process in which they 
articulate their interest by subscribing to or rejecting certain ideologies. 
As such, Burawoy inserts his microsociology of workplace politics into the labour 
process debate. In Manufacturing Consent, based on a 10-month stint in a Chicago 
factory, he showed in painstaking detail how institutions of collective bargaining, 
grievance machinery, internal labour market and the ‘internal state’ (regulating 
apparatus) materialized a power balance in production by affording workers a space 
of self-activity, setting constraints on worker struggle while reining in the 
management from authoritarian impulses, thus giving rise to a game of ‘making out’ 
where workers and managers cooperated to pursue capitalist profit (Burawoy 1979). 
This microsociology, as Burawoy (2008) himself reflected later, presumes an 
unjustifiable focus the factory, irrespective of the external forces engulfing 
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production. Precisely for this reason, upon its publication Manufacturing Consent 
was criticized for describing industrialism, not capitalism. This drew Burawoy’s 
attention to the ‘actually existing socialism’ in the East Bloc. Instead of unfairly 
dismissing it as state capitalism and simply attacking it for its brutality and 
inefficiency, he found it productive to compare the relations between ideal types and 
realities in the two worlds. In The Politics of Production, he compared factories in 
England, America, the Soviet Union, Hungary, Zambia and South Africa, each 
representing a distinctive stage or variant of capitalism and socialism (Burawoy 
1985). He found that, whereas these factories shared the same array of drills, mills 
and lathes, powered by the same barbarous relic of the assembly line and operated 
with similar payment systems, the ways in which consent and coercion were 
organised and the dynamics of class struggle were nevertheless different – this could 
be explained by a constellation of determinants of factory regime, including labour 
processes, enterprise relations to state and market, the mode of reproduction of 
labour power, and wider political economic forces of an international character.  
This dialectical approach brings workers back in, pushing the Marxist framework as 
far as it can go. But Ching Kwan Lee, Buroway’s feminist student, still found this 
problematic, for she was confounded during her fieldwork by how similar state-
enterprise relations and technological and organisational settings in two factories in 
Hong Kong and Shenzhen could generate vastly different modes of control and 
distinct workplace cultures. A relevant anomaly identified by Lee was gender. She 
challenged Burawoy’s class-primacy formulation by arguing that gender was also 
constitutive of workers’ conditions of dependence, and it was the intersection of 
class, gender and other factors that best explained the dynamics at the point of 
production. In Gender and the South China Miracle (Lee 1998), she proposed a 
feminist politics of production by synthesising Burawoy’s framework with Scott’s 
(1988) tripartite conception of gendered control and resistance: gender symbolism 
and ideology, gender organization, and gender identity.21 
Except for Lee and other feminist interventions (Milkman 1987; Salzinger 2003), 
other scholars have examined the politics of production in various political-
 
21 According to Scott, gender is an organizing principle of the labour process; gender as a power process is also latent in 
common-sense notions about who women workers are and what they need, in the workshop and in extra-shop floor social 
institutions of reproduction (labour market, family, kinship and the state). Finally, women and men are active agents; their 
actual lived experiences diverge from each other and from the hegemonic constructions of femininity and masculinity. 
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economic and socio-cultural contexts, including socialist Cuba (Fuller 1992), Taiwan 
amid international industrial transfer (Shieh 1992), China in the heyday of the 
export-oriented, labour-intensive growth regime(Lee 1998), Hungary (Burawoy and 
Lukacs 1992) and East Germany (Fuller 1999) in capitalist transition, and South 
Africa  under Apartheid (Von Holdt 2003; Webster and Von Holdt 2005). Beyond 
the manufacturing sector, Hoshschild (1979) highlighted the extraction of emotional 
labour in the service sector labour process. Leidner (1993) brought us the 
McDonalds and spatially-dispersed workspace of insurance salespeople and pursued 
a Bravermanian project to dissect how service jobs were organized and routinised. 
2.6.2 Technology and the politics of production 
While these developments enrich our understanding of capitalist control at the point 
of production across various national, historical and sectoral contexts, curiously, the 
role of technology, also central to the debate, has been relatively ignored.22 In 
Braverman and Burawoy’s debate, this concerned the relations between technology 
and the historical evolution of the labour process, or more specifically, between 
Taylorism, scientific-technical revolution and America’s post-war transition from 
competitive to monopoly capitalism.  
Taylorism denotes principles of scientific management, which according to 
Braverman (1974, p.119), comprises the gathering and development of knowledge 
about the labour process, the concentration of such knowledge as the exclusive 
province of the management, and the manipulation of it to control workers’ 
execution of tasks. For him, Taylorism was inherent in the management 
consciousness, and its domination in the US industrial scene owed to ecological 
factors, particularly the growing size of the enterprise. The scientific-technical 
revolution, on the other hand, was the product of capitalistic competition to increase 
productivity through mechanization. The design of new machines was invested and 
carried out by managers and engineers, drawing on their exclusive knowledge of the 
labour process, to enable the further breakdown of the manufacturing process among 
cheapest operators, or to ‘proletarianise labour’ (Mandel 1980, p.28). In this link, the 
historical evolution of the labour process was marked by the ever-increasing 
 
22 The questions of to what extent and in what ways a society’s technology determines political, social, economic, and cultural 
forms are always highly contested, especially among Marxists. See Mandel (1975, 1980) for the relationship between ‘long-
waves’ of capitalism and technological revolution, and Roe Smith and Marx (1994) on technological determinism.  
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efficiency and the incremental separation between conception and execution as the 
means of control, which in turn contributes to the monopolization of American 
capitalism.  
For Burawoy, this was unconvincing, for workers’ attempts to sabotage Taylorism 
were missing from the picture. Highlighting workers’ class subjectivity, he saw 
Taylorism as at once a dominant managerial practice and an ideology. Unlike 
Braverman’s identification of Taylorism with top-down separation of conception and 
execution, he observed under Taylorism a separation of workers’ and managers’ 
conception: workers were never docile victims of managerial conception, but 
actively recreated theirs to make factory work more endurable. He pointed out that 
historically, Taylorism at its nascent stage fostered antagonism and struggles 
between labour (organised as burgeoning trade unionism) and capital by marshalling 
them into hostile camps. It was not, as Braverman assumed, in the managers’ interest 
to push it thoroughly. Rather, the dynamics between labour and capital set limits on 
the separation of conception and execution, and technological advancement must be 
seen as managers’ response to increasing labour costs, but also workers’ increasing 
power and struggle emanating from their lived experience of production that is also 
determinative – rather than derivative – to capitalism.  
Furthermore, Burawoy argued that the rise of Taylorism could not be satisfyingly 
explained by the growing enterprise size, for it could not be widely adopted until 
enterprises were large enough to support it, and that the argument was based on 
unjustified assumptions about the interests of and collusions between managers and 
capitalists, and their unchallenged ability to impose it on workers. For him, what was 
really widely accepted by managers and society was the social philosophy of 
scientism underlying Taylorism. He observed that in post-war Western societies, as 
the previous free and equal market mechanism increasingly failed in mediating class 
relations, the state stepped in and assumed a larger role in regulation. In the US, 
Taylorism was promoted by the state as an ideological attack on trade unionism, as it 
stressed conformity to the management for the common interest; elsewhere, political 
parties used it to mobilise scientism and put across a utopian future to transcend 
ongoing political crises and intensifying class struggle. These in turn helped 
legitimate state intervention and mask the political question of the preservation of 
capitalist relations as one of science and technology. 
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With a historical and dialectic approach as such, Burawoy offered a counterargument 
to Braverman’s proposition of scientific management and mechanization as two 
parallel processes that chronologically and functionally grew out of monopoly 
capitalism and made it possible. For Burawoy, ‘Taylorism, rather than the 
handmaiden of monopoly capitalism, was its midwife’ (1985, p.49), and it was class 
struggle fostered by Taylorism that drove and defined technological changes in 
production, which in turn facilitated the post-war, competitive-to-monopolistic 
transition in the labour process, marked by a new set of political and ideological 
structures that helped sustain relations in production. This process of mechanization 
and transition, as he footnoted, never pushed itself forward smoothly, but was a 
struggle-laden process where the managers struck the balance between efficiency 
and domination. Once a machine – the particular way technology is organised and 
embodied in a productive apparatus – was put in place, the question became whether 
it was inclined to encourage or curtail struggle as workers’ experienced the ways in 
which it transforms the productive process and relations in production. 
This debate is associated with and responds to a key thread of debate in labour 
research, that is, the relationship between technological advancement and the 
organisation of work. Liker et al. (1999) summarises four paradigms of the debate, 
namely, technological determinism, management of technology, interpretivist and 
political interests (see the diagram below by Liker et al.).  
Both Braverman’s and Burawoy’s work fall into the political interest paradigm. This 
paradigm see advancement of technology in work organisation not as a natural and 
neutral process, but as the product of a social process embedded in the antagonism 
between the capitalist and working classes in which capital seeks to ’s efforts to 
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gradually improve modes of production to facilitate capital accumulation (Thompson 
1997). Most within this paradigm agree that technology can enhance or extend 
labour control over workers. Except for Braverman’s formulation of the separation 
between execution and execution and his deskilling argument, Edwards (1979) 
distinguished between bureaucratic control and technological control. He argued that 
while the application of technology does not necessarily entail technological control, 
mechanization itself is often accompanied by technological control, as 
mechanization can lead to a loss of worker control over the pace and flow of work. 
for him, the application of a particular technology is the result of managers' choice 
and design of technology, and that this choice is based not only on consideration of 
cost and efficiency, but also labour control, that is, how to better translate labour 
power purchased into surplus labour.  
Thompson (1997), on the other hand, did not see bureaucratic control and 
technological control as two distinctive modalities of control. For him, technological 
advancement in the organisation of labour process gives rise to a new form of 
control that goes far beyond, for example, the acceleration of task performance by 
machines. It is inseparable from bureaucratic control, but contributes to its 
reconfiguration. Thompson’s argument was based on his observation of the role of 
modern information and communication technologies, which he believed constitute a 
“digital panopticon” through which the management strengthened labour control.  
These, as Liker et al (1999) summarised, provide a static understanding of the 
relationship between technology and the organisation of work, distinguished from 
what they identified as interpretivist tradition, which conceive the labour process as a 
dynamic process that depends on socially constructed meanings. What I am curious 
is why they did not mentioned Burawoy’s work discussed above, for from my point 
of view, he provided an approach that considers both socially constructed meaning 
and the materiality of technology.  
Following this discussion, I agree with Thompson’s argument of the inseparability of 
technological control and bureaucratic control, but think this should be understood 
within the dynamics of relations in production and the socially constructed 
meanings. how technology helps reconfigure labour control is nothing static, but is a 
power-laden process where different actors within the production regime  - including 
the state, capital, labour market and particularly the workers – try to leverage the 
 61 
 
power of technology to achieve, negotiate and contest labour control. the question 
we encounter now is then how to theorise this process. As the focus of this thesis is 
on ICTs, I will now turn to It is from here I turn to theories about the relationship 
between ICTs, its users and the society.  
2.6.3  Defining ICTs: between the social and the technological  
When I turn to the literature, I find an extraordinary muddle in terms of terminology. 
As ICTs are now studied across disciplines, specialities and perspectives, in the 
literature I surveyed, terms like ICTs, digital ICTs, network technology, computing 
technology, digital technology, internet, new media and digital media are often used 
interchangeably. The surface mess notwithstanding, most scholars use these terms to 
refer to a loose set of technological innovations and developments that are closely 
associated with the invention of the microprocessors in the 1960s that allows 
information to travel long distances instantaneously (Abbate 1999; Avgerou et al 
2007).  
ICTs have always been a moving target and have undergone rapid banalization 
across the globe. Along this process, social scientists have been active in addressing 
the phenomenon from their own perspectives. Avgerou et al. (2007) provided a 
succinct review in this regard, where the editors identified mainly four strands of 
research, each theorising ICTs in diverging ways. They started with the Diffusions of 
Innovations research, epitomized by Everett Rogers’s (2003) classic Diffusion of 
Innovations. In this tradition, ICTs are defined as technical features and channels. 
The main concern is the rate and direction of adoption, with the social and ethnical 
consequences of technological innovations unattended.  
Three other strands of literature they identified all started by establishing the link 
between ICTs and the macro socioeconomic system and defined ICTs in relation to 
information, though in different ways. Daniel Bell and his followers link information 
with occupational structure. Their empirical focus resides with the growing 
contribution of information services to economic activity, measured in terms of 
quantitative shifts of employment in manufacturing and service sectors. The 
suggestion is that with the advent and rapid penetration of ICTs, the preponderance 
of occupations is now found in non-manual informational work, which announces 
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the arrival of an information society and a knowledge economy distinctive from the 
industrial society.  
The ‘network society’ literature, on the other hand, links information with spatiality 
and the reorganization of time and space. It announces our departure from the mass 
society that is shaped by groups, organizations and communities organized in 
physical co-presence. In this literature, ICTs are defined as electronically processed 
information networks that have the capacity to organize key social structures and 
activities at individual, organization and societal levels (Castells 2000). Research in 
this strand focus on the relationship between networks, information flows and time-
space reconfigurations. The aim is to understand the implications of ICTs that offer 
new means of creating and interacting with digital information in the context of 
network society (van Dijk, 2006).  
A last approach the editors identified is political economy of communication. Here, 
the connection between ICTs as information and the social economic structure is 
understood in a holistic and historical manner, informed by Marxism. Unlike the 
previous two that proclaims a new sort of society, these neo-Marxists argue that the 
form and function of information conform to the long-established principles and 
practices of capitalism. Using Herbert Schiller’s work as an example, Webster 
(2002) identified three key characteristics of this approach: an emphasis on structural 
features behind media messages; an insistence on systemic analysis of information 
communication, locating it within the functioning of capitalism and assessing it with 
reference to its operation; an emphasis on history.  
In stating their principles of editing, the editors pointed out that much of the research 
failed to link the technological thoroughly with the social, the everyday and the 
historical, because of either an assumed individual autonomy, or ignoring of the 
power relations that shape ICTs in the first place. To transcend this dichotomy, in 
that volume they tried to bring together ‘insights into the embeddedness of ICTs in 
different contexts to show how mediation processes are influenced by ICTs’ with 
‘research that acknowledges power as a factor in all socially and technologically 
mediated relationships’ (Avgerou et al 2007; p5)  
British Sociologist Frank Webster (2002) evaluated a similar set of scholarship in 
terms of to what extent can the idea of an information society sustain. He argued 
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these approaches, except for the neo-Marxist one, failed to provide a satisfactory 
definition of the key concept of information, for they all jettisoned the 
commonsensical dimension of information: the semantic. For him, this explained 
their unconvincing claims of radical social change on quantitative grounds. The neo-
Marxist approach, on the other hand, seemed to him convincing because it 
considered information as meaningful and had a quality - or in his own words, 
‘information is meaningful; it has a subject; it is intelligence or instruction about 
something or someone’ (p24), rather than something fully mathematically tractable. 
He argued that this prompted neo-Marxists to ask who had produced what kind of 
information with what consequences, thus allowing them to consider the role of 
information in a fully sociological manner.  
Following these two leads, a working definition of ICTs that seems to me useful can 
be found in Lievrouw and Livingstone (2006). The two editors, inspired by 
Silverstone’s mediation theory (2000) and Star and Bowker’s (2006) on 
infrastructure, define ICTs as infrastructures that mediate the society with three 
layers: the artefacts or devices used to communicate or convey information; the 
activities and practices in which people engage to deal with information; and the 
social arrangements or organizational forms – discursive or material - that develop 
around those devices and practices. By invoking the term ‘infrastructure’, they 
remind us although the dynamic links and interdependencies among these 
components ‘can and do become routine, established, institutionalized and so taken-
for-granted’, these are ‘by no means neutral and natural’ (p3). Behind them are 
power-laden processes await to be disentangled. For them, the dynamic links and 
interdependencies among artefacts, practices and social arrangements are what 
should guide our analysis.  
 
To summarise, in this section, I propose a three-part theoretical framework. While 
the labour process theory allows us to understand nongmingong’s subjective 
experience of production in the context of the immediate labour process and in its 
interconnections with external actors like the labour market and the state, i.e. the 
production regime as a whole, the technology and the organisation of work debate 
provides us a clue to understand that technology is integral to the production regime, 
the labour process in particular. The mutual shaping of ICTs and society framework 
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discussed in 2.6.3 further allows us to theorise – and operationalise - how technology 
is integral to the production regime and contribute to labour control. A theoretical 
framework as such requires us to fully map the specific configurations of and the 
intricate power relationships between the three layers, namely, nongmingong’s ICTs-
related practices, the specific forms of ICTs-enabled arrangements they engage, and 
the social arrangements and organisational forms developed around nongmingong 
and these techno-social forms they engage in the particular context of China’s 
economic digitalisation. It is from here I turn to the method chapter. but before that, I 
provide a review of the relationship between ICTs, China’s quest for modernity and 
nongmingong’s changing class position to provide a historical background for the 
project.  
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Chapter 3   ICTs, China’s quest for modernity and Nongmingong as China’s 
new working class 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 2, ICTs in this thesis refer to a set of technological 
innovations and developments closely associated with the invention of 
semiconductors, integrated circuits and microprocessors in the 1960s that allow 
information to travel long distances instantaneously (Abbate 1999; Avgerou et al. 
2007). For economists, ICTs fall into the category of general-purpose technologies 
(GPTs) that have the potential to drastically alter societies through their impact on 
pre-existing economic and social structures. This is because GPTs afford human 
beings the ability to perform generic functions vital to productive activities within a 
society, and because they are capable of constant advancement through continuous 
innovation by complementarities with the application sectors (Bresnahan and 
Trajtenberg 1996). Or in Marxist terms, GPTs have the potential to transform the 
elements and processes of productive and reproductive activities within a given 
society, for example, raw material, social forms of production, or the organization of 
labour process (Mandel 1975, 1980; Braverman 1974; Burawoy 1985). Thus, GPTs 
are distinguished from other technologies and are often put on a par with such 
technologies as the steam engine, electric motors, machinery and automation that 
were central to the Industrial Revolution, especially the profound changes in social 
relations throughout the historical period (Landes 1969).  
In this chapter, I treat ICTs as GPTs and trace how it has always been central to 
China’s state-led pursuit of its own brand of modernity in a constantly changing 
international environment. Specifically, I trace how ICTs have been deployed by the 
state, in the context of its other reform strategies, to transform productive force, 
reogranise productive activities, privatise and marketise new sector and construct 
new developmental infrastructure, in order to finally achieve economic growth and 
social progress, as well as how this effort is enabled or conditioned by the neoliberal 
expansion of global capitalism. I also discuss how class relations actually changed, 
with a focus on how nongmingong are constantly marginalised throughout this 
process.  
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3.2 Socialist transformation and ICTs as strategic technologies of self-reliance 
If the founding of the PRC in 1949 marked the success of Chinese communists in 
leading the struggle for national independence against imperialist powers, global and 
regional Cold War contenders from the free world continued to contain the new-born 
communist state. Meanwhile, as the CCP transformed from a revolutionary party to a 
ruling position, it took on the new historical tasks of first continuing the radical 
social revolution to liberate internal minorities from traditional dominant powers, 
and second rising above national backwardness and catch up with the West. This 
triad of nationalism, socialism and developmentalism had deep implications for the 
political economy of Maoist socialist transformation and the role of ICTs within this 
development (Lin 2006). 
The transformation started with rural land reform. The aim was to gradually 
eradicate (semi-)feudal forms of land ownership, exploitation and power and finally 
establish more equal relations of production among the peasantry. Meanwhile, a 
parallel process of agricultural collectivization took place. The dismantling of old 
powers did not lead to private land ownership. Rather, the state became the 
uppermost owner, and peasants were allowed to cultivate their designated 
proportion. They were then organised into production brigades, teams and 
communes, and formed the backbone of the socialist collective agricultural sector, 
producing agricultural products not only for their own use but to support urban 
industrialisation (Li 2009; Wen 2013). These dual processes of land reform and 
agricultural collectivisation were also a cultural process of political socialization 
where peasants began to shake off their subordinate status and mentality and attain a 
new social subjectivity through “speaking bitterness” (Guo and Sun 2002; Hershatter 
2011).  
In urban areas, the transformation took the form of the nationalization of the 
shougongye, the handcraft industry, and zibenzhuyi gongshangye, capitalist 
industries and commerce, paving the way for more systematic, state-planned 
industrialization that started from as early as 1953 when its first Five-Year Plan was 
released. The grand aim of industrialisation at this stage was to achieve ‘four 
modernisations’ of agriculture, industry, national defence and science and 
technology. This effort was socialist in that the purpose of production was not for 
profit, but to satisfy broad social needs from the viewpoint of equality. This was 
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reflected in the institutional arrangements of (re-)production and (re-)distribution 
activities, to which public ownership, the danwei system23 and redistributive justice 
overseen by the state were central components. The danwei system operated with 
workers’ workplace self-management and was at once a production unit and a 
rudimentary social security system, while the state as the authoritarian monopolist of 
power operated according to the perceived public good it generated by such working 
methods as mass line24 and ‘working groups’ (Lin 2006; Heilmann and Perry 2011). 
The socialist nature of the endeavour was also reflected in the fact that it followed 
the Soviet model and defined productive activities in terms of material production 
that serves basic human needs – agriculture and manufacturing – whereas services, 
culture and communications did not count as ‘industry’ (Wu 2017).    
In a matter of a few decades, the socialist industrialisation succeeded in laying an 
industrial foundation without the typical costs of primitive accumulation like slavery 
or colonialism. To provide the material, energy and machinery basis for future 
development, concerned by threats to national security and sovereignty imposed by 
external economic and policy blockades and military actions, this industrial 
foundation consisted of primarily heavy industries, spanning military, metallurgy, 
chemical industry, machining and energy (Wu 2017; Lin et al. 1996). The lack of 
colonies and an international blockade left the party-state little choice but to sacrifice 
and exploit the peasantry, subordinating the countryside to urban demands through 
an administrative-driven rural-urban segregation to which the hukou system and state 
monopoly over the procurement of agricultural produce were central (Wen 2013). 
Besides, Maoist China also saw the rise of a rudimentary social security system that 
prioritized citizen well-being and provided universal and accessible public services, 
and a ‘people’s democracy’ that organized and engaged citizens in urban danwei and 
rural commune systems as well as work groups and mass campaigns to ensure 
effective participation in decision-making for social change. Its record of gender 
equality was also outstanding, although state socialism was not without its pitfalls 
(Wang 2005, 2017).  
However, the communist endeavour was not without its dark side. Socialist China 
did suffer from great upheavals during, for example, the Great Leap Forward, the 
 
23 Danwei is a work unit. 
24 This worked via the institutional infrastructure of mass organizations like women’s unions, trade unions, and the youth 
league. 
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Great Famine and the Cultural Revolution, and more chronic and recurrent problems 
like internal purges and female political under-representation, leading to thousands 
of civilian deaths and wrongful convictions. While liberals and victim’s memoirs 
and autobiographies have attributed this to Mao’s brutal dictatorship (Chang and 
Halliday 2006; Dikötter 2008, 2011, 2013; Gao 2008), more serious and comparative 
social science and historical studies revealed that this owed much to the intersection 
of the persistence and adaptability of old, privileged powers, formidable geopolitical 
adversities and the intrinsic contradictions of the new system (Walder 1986; Howard 
1988; Lin 2006; Wemheuer, 2014). At the latter stage of this phase, the complex 
workings of this triad planted the seeds that allowed a ‘new bourgeoisie’ to emerge 
within the Communist Party. The Cultural Revolution launched in the first place to 
rectify this development with a genuinely democratic impulse for realizing the 
creativity and self-organization of the masses was premature and hence doomed to 
fail. The bureaucratic capitalist class was consolidating its power, and a great 
reversal was soon to be seen.  
Perhaps incongruent with the impressions of many, already at this stage, ICTs as 
defined in this thesis had become a strategic element in the state-led pursuit of 
modernity, almost in synchronicity with the West. In the Cold War context of high-
tech warfare and the nuclear arms race, ICTs were embraced and prioritized by the 
state mainly as part of the national defence industries of aviation and nuclear 
weapons, with no intention for civilian use. Thus Feigenhaum’s (2003: 4) comment 
about military technologies also applies to ICTs: technology as a matter of grand 
strategy and self-reliance as a strategy of technological development. Whereas some 
technological innovations within the factories were then informed by proletariat 
politics (Wang 2015), informed by its military-led techno-nationalism (Zhao 2007), 
the decision-making power in ICTs development resided exclusively with scientists 
and specialists of the highest technical stature, with the outcome evaluated by 
universal standardization and by comparison with international technical 
developments. 
It is worth noting that at this stage, based on inherited arrangements and networks 
from the Republican Era, the state started to build its own mass communication and 
telecommunication institutions and infrastructures. Specifically, forms of mass 
communication, including newspapers, radio, television, films and literature, were 
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not seen as part of ‘industry’. For example, journalism was essentially a weapon for 
class struggle and was inseparable from propaganda. This was bitterly defended by 
Renmin University Professor Gan Xifen, founder of the Party Journalism Theory in 
China, against Fudan Professor Wang Zhong’s more liberal position throughout the 
entire phase (Liu 2019). Instead, they were part of the political culture and state 
welfare, operating according to a party-mandated public interest principle. The role 
of mass communication was fundamentally pedagogic, often used for political 
mobilisation and the making of new Man and a more modern China (Pye 1978). 
On the other hand, the telecommunications system, consisting mainly of telegram 
and telephone, was a means of elite political communication. The construction of 
these networks was coordinated by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications 
(MPT) and overseen by the State Council. All investments came from the national 
government's budget, and no private carriers were allowed. Like the urban bias in 
many other areas, the rural-urban gap in telecommunication infrastructure was 
massive, not to mention that most telephones in the countryside were for military 
commanders, leaving virtually nothing for residential use. They had little choice but 
to rely on the extensive post office network that was then part of the public service 
(He 1991; Harwit 1998; Wu 2008). 
 
3.3 The start of the reform and ICTs as a means of relinking 
Until the late 1970s, China was close to the developed world in its heavy industry, 
but the command economy equilibrium was broken, leading to chifan wenti, food 
provision crises, in rural areas, and low efficiency and prevailing bureaucratic 
corruption and privileges in urban SOEs. Internationally, because Brezhnev’s Soviet 
Union actively sought military expansion in Asia, posing threats to China’s national 
security and sovereignty, long-term contradictions between the two in terms of 
national interests and revolutionary ideology broke out, hence the Sino-Soviet split 
and the CCP’s open dismissal of the Soviet as suxiu, social imperialism, in the 
1960s. The CCP then actively ‘exported’ its own version of socialist revolution to 
third-world countries25, while strategically forging international alliances to fight 
against suxiu. Historically, this cleared the way for the establishment of Sino-US 
 
25 This includes communist parties in Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Cuba, among others.  
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diplomatic relations and China’s re-linking with global capitalism that began to 
reconstitute itself around transnational information networks (Halliday 1999; Lin 
2006).  
In 1978, the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP marked 
Deng’s ascent to leadership and kickstarted the reform. It discredited revolutionary 
democracy, put an end to the era of revolution exportation and yi jiejidouzheng 
weigang26, and ushered in a new era where the ‘four modernizations’ of agriculture, 
industry, national defence and science and technology were considered the Party’s 
key tasks and development its ultimate principle. Developmentalism began to 
override socialist principles. Economic development no longer prioritized broad, 
equal social needs, and profit became a legitimate pursuit – to become rich was 
glorious. But this does not mean that socialism and nationalism were entirely 
abandoned. The goal of development was set to construct a xiaokang shehui27, 
achieve common prosperity and strive for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation. The state retained a planning role through its arm of the National Committee 
of Economic Reform and oversaw “the market while the market leads enterprises” 
(Gan and Cui 1997; Lin 2006). 
In the shadow of chifan wenti, reform started in rural areas. Two main policies 
established the household responsibility system and supported the expansion of 
TVEs. State monopoly over the procurement of agricultural produce was removed 
and peasants were free to trade in the market. This gave rise to a petty peasant 
economy where the individual household was the basic economic unit, while TVEs 
pursued market economy and provided non-agricultural jobs in slack seasons.  
Rural reform became stagnated when the urban-centric market-oriented reform 
kicked off in the mid-1980s. The goal was to correct the socialist ‘high-goal, high-
accumulation and lousy-efficiency’ regime of growth that the new ruling elites held 
responsible for its various social problems, and to rebalance the economy by 
strengthening agriculture, service sectors and light industry (Lin 2011). Central to 
this plan was the decentralization of power and interests, where the state strategically 
relinquished its control over industry and commerce by reorganizing previously 
state-owned/controlled social advantages, resources and interests into autonomous, 
 
26 Taking class struggle as the key link. 
27 Moderately prosperous society. 
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profit-making units (Huang 2008; Wang 2004, 2009). Four crucial developments in 
this regard were: first, an adjustment of central-local relations in which the local 
government gained more autonomy over its own interests and development plan; 
second, SOEs and TVEs reform in which the state “gave a measure of power back to 
the enterprises” by “permitting them to close, freeze, combine, transfer, or 
redistribute, and finally, alter the mode of management, transforming productive 
relations” (Wang 2009: 25); third, the gradual replacement of centrally-set fixed 
prices by floating market prices; fourth, the establishment of the market for a number 
of productive factors and public services. Besides, to mitigate the employment 
pressure engendered by the return of zhiqing28 of the shangshan xiaxiang 
movement29, getihu, individual household economy, previously banned because of 
its capitalist nature, was revived (Wu 2017).   
Externally, from 1979, foreign businesses were allowed to invest in SEZs30 in 
coastal areas and set up export processing businesses outside. Because official 
reserves had dropped to virtually zero, the sanlai yibu31 model that allowed 
enterprises to import duty-free materials for the production of export goods was 
established to attract investment and earn foreign exchange. New central government 
trade and investment corporations and greatly expanded operations of Chinese 
corporations in Hong Kong created new opportunities for Chinese domestic firms 
not under the government’s direct command (Lin 2011; Wu 2017). 
Political reform at this stage focused on party-government relations and deliberately 
kept a distance from wholesale liberalisation. The aim was to tackle redundant 
government bureaucracy that was too large and expensive but moved slowly, and to 
improve administrative efficiency. The leadership of the Party was reconfirmed, 
while its division of labour with the government was more clearly demarcated and 
their operations made more independent32 (O’Brien 2008).  
Predominantly domestic in scope, reform at this stage brought to end most of the 
Maoist communes and danwei, and the free public service associated with it. The 
 
28 Educated youth. 
29 The Up to the Mountains and Down to the Countryside Movement. 
30 Special economic zones. 
31 Sanlai Yibu means processing with imported materials, processing according to foreign model, assembling by using foreign 
parts and compensation trade.  
32 Political reform saw a reversal. In the early 1980s, a reform proposal to liberalise and democratise the party-state was 
proposed by Liao Gailong, a senior party official. This was later set aside after the disintegrations and economic hardship in the 
aftermath of the velvet and violent revolutions in the 1980s in the Eastern Bloc.  
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iron rice bowl began to be smashed and social security became associated with 
labour contracts. Market opportunities and consumer economy became the new norm 
(Hung 2013). In rural areas, the household registration system, the collective 
ownership of TVEs and the lift of trade restraints all boosted productivity. Explicitly 
private entrepreneurship in the non-farm sectors developed vigorously and rapidly 
(Huang 2008). Living standards were substantially improved and the prosperity of 
TVEs even provided the long-overdue social welfare, making the 1980s a rare 
decade when rural-urban inequality was retrenched (Lee and Selden 2007).  
In urban areas, the lack of effective check-and-correction mechanisms in SOEs 
reform and the interim dual-track price system gave rise to hyperinflation and 
unfettered corruption. Hitherto state-owned resources became privatized – legally 
and illegally – to benefit a small minority, while cadres and their associates quickly 
aggregated vast wealth through price scissors. This twin process consolidated the 
power of the bureaucratic capitalist class (Sun 2003; Wen 2004) – or the 
“bureaucratic-comprador bourgeoisie” (Lin 2015: 35), and created alongside it a 
working class comprising mainly laid-off SOEs workers who used to be entitled to 
lifetime benefits in exchange for loyalty to the party-state (Walder 1986; Lee 1999). 
Between them, new ‘middle’ categories such as getihu and managerial, technical and 
professional staff in businesses and social organisations began to emerge (Goodman 
2015).  
It did not take long for the economic volatility, corruption and class polarization 
engendered by this paradigmatic shift of the economy to culminate in social crisis 
and unrest as massive and momentous as the 1989 Tiananmen protest. Long 
portrayed by the mainstream Western and Chinese media as a pro-democracy 
movement led solely by liberal-minded students and intellectuals to demolish the 
Maoist socialist system, urban industrial workers nevertheless actively contributed to 
the movement (Walder and Gong 1993). In Beijing, they organised themselves 
around the gongzilian.33 Instead of demolishing the Maoist system, they demanded a 
return to that system to end bureaucratisation, job insecurity and rampant 
inequalities. Against the backdrop of the fall of communism in the Eastern Block, 
 
33 Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation. 
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this first wave of the post-reform labour movement was soon quelled, with its 
leaders fleeing outside mainland China. 
At this stage science and technology were elevated to ‘the primary productive force’ 
and their modernisation key to Chinese modernity. In promoting science and 
technology, the advancement of the productive force and economic growth were the 
guiding principles, hence the dual emphasis on applied technologies and basic 
research. This is best manifested in the introduction of the ‘863 plan’ in 1986 to 
“above all yoke technological achievements to strategic goals of the state” 
(Feigenbaum 2003: 163). To date, it remains China’s premiere hi-tech development 
plan, focusing mainly on applied technologies to quickly translate research output 
into productive force and economic efficiency, and nurturing next-generation 
technology talents (Zhao 2007). 
ICTs constituted a substantial part of that plan, taking up 2/3 of the total budget, and 
their role was no longer limited to military use. This owed much to also the 
centrality of ICTs to the then Western capitalism – or the emerging digital capitalism 
– as these economies had to either restructure themselves around transnational 
information networks for low production costs elsewhere, or turn ICTs-related 
activities and demands into a major growth outlet (Schiller 1999, 2010; Nolan 2001). 
In 1984, a national-level government body was created – the Leading Group for the 
Revitalization of the Electronic Industries – and its action plan called for the wider 
application of ICTs in various economic and social spheres.  
Wide-ranging in scope, its implementation was nevertheless limited by domestic 
economic and technological backwardness. Because a fully-fledged national market 
was yet to be established and the domestic market was believed to be too 
underdeveloped to match the speedy global expansion of ICTs, for fear of being left 
behind, gaining access to the latest – however downstream – technology and 
industrial investments in the ICTs sector seemed to the then Chinese leadership a 
prerequisite and premium strategy to relink with the global market. While nurturing 
a larger domestic market was still on the agenda, state policy gradually shifted from 
import substitution toward an export-oriented mode (Hong 2008). In 1986, the 
Decision of Encouraging Foreign Investments was released. Preferential policies 
allowed foreign-invested enterprises in export processing and high-tech sectors to 
operate in China as joint ventures and through contractual agreements. As a result, 
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infant domestic enterprises were left with limited space to develop their R&D and 
market capacities. Hence, the role of ICTs was limited to that of a new 
manufacturing sector and a means to relink with the global market as a 
manufacturing base downstream in the global value chain. 
Another way ICTs were integral to China’s economic and social development was 
the construction of a telecommunication infrastructure that was increasingly seen as 
an infrastructure for production and a new sector of the economy. Led by the central 
planning of the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT) and driven by the 
market incentives of local posts and telecommunication bureaus (PTBs), the state 
offered little investment, but provided support with preferential policies in access to 
domestic and foreign loans, access to foreign exchange to import advanced 
technologies and the permission to charge high installation fees to customers. This 
created strong regional and rural-urban disparity, with east coastal urban areas, 
supported by the need of foreign investors, flourished very quickly (Zhao 2000; 
Zhao and Schiller 2001). 
Yet another development related to ICTs was the commodification of information 
and the creation of an entire media and cultural sector. The Gan-Wang debate 
discussed earlier resurfaced in the early 1980s and was somewhat settled, with news 
information recognized as a commodity, especially for its role in providing 
information for economic exchange (Liu 2019). Market-oriented popular newspapers 
and broadcasters, alongside party media, began to flourish and vowed to provide 
facts and news to cater to the needs of readers/audiences, rather than the qunzhong, 
the mass, although institutionally it remained part of the party organ. The sijiban 
model was proposed, with the media organised at national, provincial, city and 
county levels to expand coverage and the scope of propaganda. Foreign TV dramas 
and films were imported while domestic productions expressed sharp concern about 
social injustice and appealed greatly to the general public (Zhao 2003; Sun 2008; 
Huang et al. 2008;  et al. 2008). Cultural system reform set out to commercialise 
formerly state budget-supported institutions without losing state dominance. Under 
the auspices of the Ministry of Culture, the reform permitted market-oriented re-
organization of production, personnel, and distribution on a project-by-project basis 
and was relatively peripheral and sluggish due to ideological rigidity, institutional 
conservatism and intellectual resistance (Hong 2014). 
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3.4 The export-driven economic miracle and informatisation as an apolitical 
solution to development 
If the previous stage resulted in imperilling old socialist workers’ job security and 
social welfare and created a corruptive bureaucratic capitalist class above them, 
reform since Deng’s 1992 Southern Tour deepened this neoliberal attack: it further 
accelerated the proletarianization of land-owning peasants (Pun 2016). To ease 
inflation and break from international isolation after Tiananmen, under the mantra of 
‘buzhenglun’34 and ‘yu guoji jiegui’, join the international track, aided by its 
uncompromised authoritarian rule, the state embraced the Washington consensus, 
followed the advice of US financial experts, and pursued a neoliberal reform agenda 
(Huang and Cui 2005; Huang 2008; Hung, 2013).  
Three interrelated lines of development took place. Reform of SOEs into profit-
oriented corporations continued in selected fields. What was distinctive about this 
stage was the active and strategic engagement with transnational industrial and 
financial capital, particularly US investment banks, in restructuring some of the 
biggest SOEs, allowing them to float in domestic and international stock markets 
(Huang 2008; Hung 2013). Other SOEs and TVEs underwent a similar process, 
albeit mainly in collusion with local elites (Wang 2006). As such, SOEs and TVEs 
no longer lived up to the socialist promise of full employment and workers’ 
wellbeing. The second line of development concerned the development of non-
public or private sector economy owned by domestic capital; the third concerned the 
introduction of a large-scale, labour-intensive, export-oriented, FDI-dependent 
manufacturing sector.  
Alongside these processes, reforms in the exchange rate regime and foreign trade 
system were implemented to adapt to the neoliberal international rule. China’s 
accession to the WTO in 2001 deepened and accelerated this process. Transitional 
flexibilities and the manoeuvring space of the state were gradually phased out, and 
the accession was based on broad concessions, to the extent that “domestic and 
foreign capital effectively operated within different legal parameters” with “the more 
 
34 No arguing. The ‘no arguing’ principle was put forward by Deng to put a brake on the debate about the origins of economic 
and political turbulence in the late 1980s, with some attributing it to xing zi, the market orientation of the reform, or xing she, 
the socialist legacy.  
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favourable laws applied to foreign, not domestic capital” (Branstetter and Lardy 
2008; Panitch and Gindin 2012: 296). On the other hand, SOE/TVE reform provided 
some of the much-needed labour force for the mushrooming workshops across the 
country, particular in the PRD, as did policy changes in agriculture and in rural 
areas, for example, cut-backs in favourable policies for TVEs, further reform of 
grain procurement policy and price regime, the opening of the agricultural market to 
the US in exchange for WTO membership, and the reform of land policy favouring 
agricultural industrialization. In line with modern corporate management, a fully-
fledged labour market was in the making, with labour laws promogulated, the labour 
contract replacing the socialist contract and labour-related information services 
flourishing. The state continued to retreat from public services; healthcare and 
pension systems became linked with labour contracts; while housing was now 
entirely subject to market provision (Lü 2012; Wen 2013; Lee 2016; Pun 2016; Wu 
2017). 
At this stage, the Chinese economy saw striking growth, with an average annual rate 
of 10%, and it managed to lift the majority of its population out of poverty. The 
economy itself also underwent a paradigm change. The fundamental role of market 
mechanisms was enhanced as the price of most commodities and services – land, 
natural resources, labour power, public services – were now set by the market. The 
domination of public ownership as the foundation of a socialist economy faded 
away. The proportion of GDP generated by the private sector – directly fostered by 
the state and the SOEs– grew at a spectacular rate, reaching 60%, while the state-
owned sector fell to around 1/3, retaining its leading role only in basic industries 
(Gao 2009, cited in Pun 2016).  
The dependence on the external market became more entrenched, and its economic 
and financial autonomy was eroded by swelling foreign control, especially after it 
imported US inflation. In 2007, its 68% trade-to-GDP ratio was well above the world 
average (Panitch and Gindin 2012), and the export trade was highly concentrated in 
the US consumer market, which absorbed more than 30% of China’s total exports 
(Roach 2006). The situation was further exacerbated by weak domestic consumption 
due to intense labour exploitation. Figures from the World Bank suggested that the 
share of wage income in China’s GDP declined from 53% in 1998 to 41.4% in 2005 
(He and Kuijs 2007). This was in line with Pun’s (2016) observation that before 
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2005, despite lowest wage standards being established across China, nongmingong’s 
income did not see a meaningful rise. The dependence also became more deep-
seated because of its failed attempt to exchange market for advanced technological 
transfer. Despite R&D breakthroughs in SOEs, China’s high-tech exports remained 
controlled by multinationals and foreign companies (Nolan 2012).  
Domestically, this development was imbalanced in rural-urban and regional terms. 
Rural reforms bankrupted and privatized TVEs under bureaucratic-capitalist logics 
while local markets were inserted into larger national and global markets and 
severely undermined. In the meantime, FDI-invested manufacturing industries, the 
main engine of China’s economic miracle, were mainly deployed in eastern coastal 
areas. In terms of the central-local relationship, the central government gradually lost 
its grip over entrenched local interests reaping enormous short-term profits from the 
investment boom, while anarchic competition among localities resulted in 
uncoordinated construction of redundant production capacity and infrastructure 
(Hung 2016). Rawski (2002) observed that idle capacity in such key sectors as steel, 
automobiles, cement, aluminium and real estate had been soaring ever since the mid-
1990s. Similarly, Rajan (2006) estimated that over 75% of China’s industries were 
plagued by overcapacity by 2006. 
These enduring trends pushed the rural economy and that of China’s hinterland to a 
dead end and helped stabilize an enduring pattern of economic growth – excessive 
investment, overproduction in manufacturing, deficiency in domestic demand and 
high dependence in demand from the north, making it particularly vulnerable to 
global economic changes (Lü 2003; Huang 2008; Hung 2013).  
Socially, significant changes in social structure gradually materialized and 
inequalities deepened. SOEs/TVEs reform consolidated the bureaucratic-comprador 
capitalist class in both power and scale. Alongside it were what Wang (2014) called 
the urban new poor, comprising of mainly three subgroups: a new class of white-
collar workers, made up of well-educated youth doing office jobs in first-tier cities 
but constantly struggling to make ends meet in the lure of omnipresent consumerism; 
proletarianized SOEs workers who continued to lose the iron rice bowl and were left 
in precariousness, with some ending up in coastal industrial complexes; and peasant-
turned nongmingong mostly working in labour-intensive industries in eastern coastal 
areas. At the bottom were those who remained in rural areas because of their 
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inability to sell their labour power. In recent decades, these political economic 
transformations have led to a range of protests from below, both self-organised and 
NGO-facilitated, among which nongmingong and peasant were perhaps the most 
active participants (O’Brien and Li 2006; Lee 2007; Chan and Pun 2009; Chan 2010; 
Chan 2011, 2013; Gallagher 2014). 
At this stage, the technocratic and techno-nationalist elite’s pursuit of modernization 
continued to drive the deployment and development of ICTs in China. What was 
distinctive was the strategic significance of ICTs in the overall modernisation 
programme, its perceived relationship with industrialisation and scope for 
socioeconomic development, and the leverage of domestic consumerist drive.  
Just as the scientism of machinery and Taylorism had particular ideological appeal to 
post-war Western capitalist states (Burawoy 1985), the scientism and economism 
beyond social division and political conflicts theories that information society 
posited (Schiller 1996) had similar appeal to China’s ruling elites after the Cultural 
Revolution and Tiananmen. Rhetorically, informatization was declared to be the 
mother of all modernizations (Zhao and Schiller 2001). Priority of the post-Mao 
developmental state was given to the construction of a national information 
infrastructure, the expansion of information industries and the application of ICTs in 
all areas of socioeconomic development. Alongside the expansion of 
telecommunication networks, starting in 1993, the various ‘Golden Projects’ were a 
concerted state effort to connect its governments, families, businesses and banks 
following the 863 Plan (Feigenbaum 2003). In 2001, the strategy of ‘using 
informatisation to propel industrialization’ was written into China’s 10th Five-Year 
Plan; in 2002 the 16th Party Congress reconfirmed this focus, postulating ICTs as the 
logical choice for the acceleration of industrialization and modernization. The 
intention and determination of the state to exploit the technological potential of ICTs 
to achieve leapfrogged development in its productive force was manifest, and a 
digital revolution was in the making (Zhao 2007).  
In its actual unfolding, as Zhao (2000, 2003, 2007) and Hong (2011, 2o17) observed, 
China’s informatisation at this stage was contested by a constellation of factors and 
powers. These included the state’s imperative of economic development, its 
consideration for network expansion, military, surveillance and national integration, 
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technocratic rationality35, elite interests, market orientation, civilian uses, and the 
intention of transnational capitalism to exploit China’s world’s-largest consumer 
market and cheap processing base while protecting their technologically 
advantageous position. Two decades into its development, the outcome has been 
substantial. 
Identical to the general trend of China’s economic development, the export-oriented 
regime in the electronic communications manufacturing sector was brought even 
further in line with the WTO’s neoliberal regulatory lines. The sector itself saw the 
highest growth rate (40-50% between 1992 and 1998), contributing significantly to 
the country’s overall growth, making China one of the biggest exporters of 
telecommunications devices. ICTs soon became the most popularized and 
commercialized hi-tech in China. However, the sector was predominantly foreign-
owned, and domestic industry remained downstream in the value chain and weak in 
R&D and marketing capacity. By 2005 more than 70% of its value-added profits was 
controlled by foreign capital and the drift has not since halted. Its role in industrial 
upgrade was limited to facilitating communication between economic functions (Hu 
and Jefferson 2008; Lin 2016; Wu 2017). 
In terms of network expansion and ICT diffusion, it has allowed China to build up its 
network infrastructure at an unprecedented pace. By 1998, a fibre-optic backbone 
connecting all major cities and the second largest fixed line public telephone 
network in the world was in place. The ‘Golden Projects’ gradually took shape and 
1999 was declared the year for ‘government on the net’. In 2010, a nationwide 
broadband fibre optic network supporting high-speed Internet access was in use. In 
rural areas, the ‘Cuncun Tong Project’, which aimed to extend radio, TV and 
Internet coverage to all villages, was implemented from 2004, achieving telephone 
access in 94.5% of the natural villages and broadband connections in 83% of the 
administrative villages in 2011. But this development was not without its biases. 
Incentivized by the demands of foreign business and middle-class consumers, the 
more state-of-the-art, value-added network links and devices were made available 
more in east coastal and urban areas than in rural areas and the hinterland (Zhao 
2000; Zhao and Schiller 2001; Hong 2013). 
 
35 What the elite define to be China’s ‘national interest’. 
 80 
 
The media and cultural sector underwent further market-oriented reorganization. 
News and broadcasting organizations underwent conglomeration and tried hard to 
strike a difficult balance between the party line and the bottom line. Popular media 
foregrounded the day-to-day needs and concerns of an audience as citizens and 
middle-class consumers (Huang et al. 2008; Sun 2008; Zhao 2008). Television and 
film industries saw short-lived innovation and a diversification in genres (Zhu et al. 
2008). Video-on-demand websites emerged in 2004 and allowed users to upload 
pirated foreign productions and UGCs to increase viewer traffic and market share. 
Although China promulgated its copyright law in 2001, in much of this phase it did 
not prohibit infringement behaviours and penalties were low. Cultural reform 
emerged from a peripheral to a central position, and the culture and creative 
industries become part of the national economic restructuring scheme, especially 
after 2005 (Montgomery and Fitzgerald 2006; Montgomery 2009; Hong 2014; Wang 
et al. 2016; Keane and Chen 2017). Throughout this development, the state’s stake to 
exert influence and control to maintain stability and construct what it defined as the 
‘advanced socialist culture’ were high. Either the reform was to set out to 
consolidate a powerful economic base to enhance party propaganda, or measures like 
licensing and pre/post-release censorship or national planning informed by such 
aspirational slogans like the Chinese dream were implemented. As such, the media 
and cultural sector demonstrated a neoliberal orientation that favoured middle-class 
culture and political elites, and contributed substantially to shape class relations: it 
created a new (middle-)class of knowledge workers, while contributed discursively 
to redefine the meaning of class (Hong 2011; Wang 2011; Yao 2014; Zhao and Wu 
2014). 
 
3.5 The 2008 global financial crises and restructuring/upgrading through 
networking 
By the mid-2000s, the particular regime of growth that precipitated China’s 
economic miracle also drew it into a looming economic, social and environmental 
crisis. In response, since the mid-2000s, the Chinese government has taken a number 
of precautionary measures to pre-emptively rebalance the economy, shift the growth 
model while address its social and environmental crisis (Wu 2014; Naughton 2006; 
2018; Hung 2015).  
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To reduce excessive production capacity and reduce dependence on foreign capital, 
SOEs reform was redirected to bring domestic private capital in to form a mixed-
ownership regime while resource tax system reform sought to curb the investment 
frenzy in resource-intensive sectors. To enhance market competition, non-public 
capital36 was allowed and encouraged to invest in traditionally state-monopolised 
areas, with roles limited to non-controlling shareholder in areas of natural monopoly. 
Meanwhile, agricultural taxes were abolished and dibao and xinnongbao37 were 
introduced as part of the initiative to improve development prospects and living 
standards in rural China. To stem mounting labour unrest and increase wage share in 
the economy, two pieces of pro-labour legislation38 in this phase for the first time 
officially recognized nongmingong as China’s industrial labour along with their 
contribution to its modernisation. The establishment of a rural-urban unified labour 
market was proposed to protect migrant rights and enhance public services through 
stricter implementation of minimum wage standards and a labour contract system.  
The 2008 global financial crisis brought these efforts of structural adjustment to a 
halt. As global demand dropped, China’s export engine stalled and the PRD area saw 
a high tide of factory relocation (Fan 2018). In response, the Chinese government 
introduced a sizeable stimulus via state bank lending to speed up and expand 
infrastructure constructions. While it enabled China to rebound swiftly from the 
initial fallout of the global crisis, in 2011–2012, it started to lose steam, and local 
government’s heavy indebtedness resulting from the stimulus began to hamper 
growth. It is in this context that Xi Jinping came to power (Hung 2013).  
Three interrelated lines of development took place in Xi’s era. Mixed-ownership 
reform in SOEs continued and the role of minjian ziben was further enhanced. Apart 
from participation in SOEs reform, it is now permissible to invest in areas previously 
exclusive to state-owned capital, for example, infrastructure and basic industries, 
social housing and public services, social services, financial services and even 
national defence. Measures were also taken to balance China’s relationship with 
foreign capital and markets in trade, investment and demand. Both state and minjian 
capital were encouraged to ‘go out’ to participate in international competition and 
seek international expansion. A flagship policy in this regard was the Belt and Road 
 
36 Individual and private economy and foreign capital. 
37 Lowest Living Standard Guarantee and New Rural Pension Scheme. 
38 The Opinions of the State Council on Resolving the Problems faced by Migrant Workers and the 2008 Labour Contract Law. 
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Initiative (BRI). A global development strategy adopted by the Chinese government 
in 2013 involving infrastructure development and investments, the BRI aims to 
“construct a unified large market and make full use of both international and 
domestic markets, through cultural exchange and integration, to enhance mutual 
understanding and trust of member nations, ending up in an innovative pattern with 
capital inflows, talent pool, and technology database” (Cai 2017; Jones and Zeng 
2019; Lin et al. 2019).  
Political reform at this stage focused on central-local and party-government 
relations. On the one hand, the anti-corruption campaign, widely criticized as a 
‘political purge’ and ‘fractional war’, actually helped Xi clean up entrenched vested 
interests, curb corruption, and restore public confidence in the CCP’s mandate to 
rule, paving the way for larger structural reforms. On the other hand, the government 
was reformed to be service-oriented, assuming a lesser role in market regulation, 
while the role of the party became ever more central, as manifested by the removal 
of presidential term limits and the return of “ensuring party leadership over all work” 
in the 19th Party Congress (Li and McElveen 2014; Fenby 2015).  
Also central to the development strategy at this stage is the reliance on technological 
innovation and network leadership – rather than applied technologies and its quick 
translation into productive force in the previous stage – to improve the quality and 
efficiency of economic growth and move the country up in the global value chain. A 
flagship plan in this regard is the US$300-billion Made in China 2025 plan. The plan 
focuses on high-tech fields including pharmaceutics, the automotive industry, 
aerospace industry, semiconductors, IT and robotics, which are presently the 
purview of foreign companies, and the goal is to comprehensively turn China into a 
more technology-intensive manufacturing powerhouse. While in the previous phase 
most high-tech innovations were achieved in SOEs, private capital and 
entrepreneurial spirit are now also identified as a driving force of innovation.  
Throughout this process, the state has made some progress in promoting 
redistributive justice, although this may be equally underpinned by the imperative to 
boost domestic consumption to divert the economy (Lee 2016). Reform of the hukou 
system to gradually remove the hukou-based distinction has always been the central 
locus of media and public attention. Related to this, rural-urban unified public 
services (pensions, basic medical insurance, education, housing) were well under 
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way. Rural reform emphasized the modernization of agriculture and experimented 
with new forms of land ownership and organisational forms (family-run, 
cooperatives, collectively-owned and corporatisation), as well as new technologies to 
nurture new products and connections. Priority was given to the improvement of 
agricultural infrastructure and the development of economies of scale. 
Regarding ICTs, this stage saw the ascent of informatisation as a ‘leading force in 
driving modernization’. Given the rapid expansion of its corporate-run cyberspace, 
ICTs as a set of complex and interactive technologies – and the Internet industry as a 
slew of Web-oriented technological, business, and innovation models – are 
deliberately deployed by the Chinese government to crosscut and catalyse reforms 
and to help upgrade the quality and composition of its economic growth and social 
development (Hong 2018). This is explicitly stated in the Outline of the National 
Informatization Development Strategy, where a package of reform policies aimed at 
the wholesale informatization of society was proposed,  
1) Fostering the information economy, stimulating the transformation of 
development, including manufacturing, agricultural and service industries, 
through decentralization of power and upgrade of information 
infrastructure; 2) Deepening e-governance, moving forward with the 
modernization of state governance, including the party, the government, law 
and public order maintenance; 3) Letting online culture flourish, 
strengthening national soft power, including boosting and diversifying 
cultural industry while persisting in the progressive orientation of advanced 
Socialist culture; 4) Innovating public services, guaranteeing and improving 
the people’s livelihood, including education, scientific research, medical 
service, employment and social security, and poverty relief; 5) Serving the 
construction of an ecological civilization, helping beautiful China; and 6) 
Accelerating a strong information army, building a modern military forces 
system. 
On the ground, policies like Made in China 2025, ‘Internet Plus’, and Mass 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation have been devised to promote ‘restructuring 
through networking’ (Wang 2016; Hong 2017). Whereas Made in China 2025 seeks 
to upgrade the manufacturing capabilities through technological advancement and 
innovations – of which ICTs are a strategic component part – the Internet Plus policy 
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aims to promote industrial reorganisation and upgrade and create new economic and 
production forms (State Council 2015). Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation, on 
the other hand, seeks to mobilise the mass uptake of entrepreneurship.  
The promise of communications for economic recovery and self-repositioning 
should not be taken-for-granted. In Hong’s (2017) state-centred story of the political 
economy of China’s emerging communications sector, she showed in detail how the 
state – itself constitutive of self-serving bureaucratic interests and complex central-
local and inter-regional relationships – in conjunction with market forces and 
fragmented class interest, constructed and realigned its digitalized sectors by 
juggling state socialist principles with capitalist fundamentals. The works of Xia and 
Fuchs (2017), Jia and Winseck (2018), and Tang (2019) reveal the heavy hand of 
transnational financial capital and the dialectical role of the Chinese state as more 
constitutive than constraining in this development.  
Under this nexus of power, the Chinese state is currently orchestrating a society-
wide deployment of networked ICT applications in traditional industrial and service 
sectors, as well as a sweeping corporatization and reorganisation of the culture, 
media and communications sectors. The telecommunication industry was repurposed 
to be capital friendly, which, together with the massive electronics manufacturing 
sector, allows consumer ICTs, especially smart phones, to expand quickly and 
penetrate to virtually every corner of Chinese society. It is reported that by March 
2020, 904 million of China’s population are online, among whom 897 million get 
connected with mobile phones, and its Internet penetration rate reached 64.5% 
(Hong 2013).  
In a time of dwindling orders, rising labour prices, large-scale factory relocation, 
increasingly stringent environment policy, and government-led efforts to automate 
labour-intensive industries and promote high-tech, value-added manufacturing 
(Lüthje et al. 2013; Huang and Sharif 2017; Fan 2018; Sharif and Huang 2019) in 
the manufacturing sector, this has led to the westward transfer of the unwieldy 
export-oriented ICTs manufacturing industry, bringing capitalism to its hinterland. 
As a result of the ‘Internet Plus’ policy and the mass entrepreneurship campaign, 
coupled with the discourse of innovation, scientism and ‘job creation’ (Chen 2019), 
traditional service industries like transportation, domestic services, takeaways, 
delivery and retail are undergoing a process of reorganization and are now managed 
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and transacted increasingly through online platforms, rather than, for example, 
factories. ‘Platform’ became a new buzzword for venture capital investors and 
government reports while the platform economy became one of the fastest growing 
sectors (CNNIC 2020). In rural areas, ecommerce has a strategic role in the state’s 
poverty alleviation initiative and boosting local development (Lüthje 2019; Zeng 
2019).  
The cultural and media industry has also gained new momentum, although it 
continues to be heavily censored and regulated by the government and has conferred 
upon it the new task of promoting socialist core values. The joint forces of ICTs, 
politics, market forces and relevant legislations (especially the copyright law) have 
had an impact on content creators, the apparatus and logic of content production and 
distribution as well as business models in the sector. The neoliberal orientation that 
favours middle-class culture and political elites that characterised the sector in the 
previous phase has altered little, but the role of audience-user-consumer has become 
more prominent, and the market more segmented. The integration of media content 
with niche consumption market has deepened, making the question of how to seize 
certain niche markets a pertinent question for many content entrepreneurs to 
consider. The digital content industry is on the rise and the multi-channel network 
model has emerged dominant (Montgomery and Fitzgerald 2006; Zhao and Keane 
2013; Li 2019; Topklout 2019). 
ICTs are also a key element in China’s global expansion and a digital silk road or 
‘digital empire’ is emerging. The expansion of Chinese digital connectivity and 
business empires along the BRI is driven by the state imperative to mitigate 
industrial overcapacity, facilitating international industrial capacity cooperation, 
enable going out 2.0 and construct a China-centred transnational network 
infrastructure with its own technological standards, through capitalist imperatives for 
new markets and profits as well as a civilization mission that dovetails with the 
state’s ambitions to promote a Chinese version of new world order of “shared 
destiny” (Shen 2018; Keane and Yu 2019).  
3.6 Conclusion 
Past explanations of China’s phenomenal economic growth since 1970s have 
focused on its unique, context-specific local institutional innovations, such as 
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ownership by the local state of TVEs, decentralization, and selective financial 
controls. Others highlighted the role of private ownership, property rights security, 
financial liberalization and reforms of political institutions. Still others stress the 
hard work of the Chinese working-class (Naughton 2006, 2018; Huang 2008; Lin 
2011; Lin et al. 1996; Pun 2016; Wu 2017). In this chapter, my emphasis is on the 
integral role of technology, especially ICTs and its related innovations, in this 
process. As I have demonstrated, ICTs have been integral to China’s development 
strategy from the very start of the reform. And this has to do with the particular 
timing of the reform: the 1970s saw the rise of digital capitalism in the West when 
these economies began to either restructure themselves around transnational 
information networks for low production costs elsewhere, or turn ICTs-related 
activities and demands into a major growth outlet (Zhao and Schiller 2001, Hong 
2011).  
At the early stage of the reform, there was an attempt by China to follow the East 
Asian model of import substitution, and foster a relatively autonomous domestic 
ICTs sector, but this was failed due to the underdeveloped domestic market and the 
lack of capital. It is worth noting that at this stage, the role of ICTs in the Chinese 
society underwent a dramatic change, as it began to evolve from a means of national 
defense, political communication and public service in the Maoist era to a means for 
production, a drive for economic growth and a means for relinking with global 
capitalism. It is at this stage China's techno-driven developmentalism began to take 
shape.  
The failure in the attempt to follow the East Asian model also have to do with the 
social and political crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s, both domestic and 
international. A more radical strategy of marketisation was pursued thereafter and an 
export-driven growth regime was put in place. At this stage, the ICTs sector was 
listed as a strategic sector and ICTs became an apolitical solution to development 
and economic growth. 20 years’ development has turned China the world’s ICTs 
manufacturing base and the world’s biggest exporter in ICTs hardware (Hong 2017). 
In the meantime, China managed to build a massive national information 
infrastructure that span across its rural and urban areas, to boost economic 
development and provide economic service. On top of these, innovation was on the 
agenda but paled when compared to manufacturing. This has its roots in the 
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overemphasis on immediate economic growth in the innovation process, as well as 
the regime of innovation.  
Since mid-2000, especially after 2010, China’s export-oriented growth regime was 
increasingly challenged by global economic crisis and new trends in international 
industrial transfer on the one hand, and domestic social and environmental crisis and 
protests on the other. Hence pursuing economic upgrade and reducing overreliance 
on external demands became a pressing issue for the Chinese government. It is in 
this context that ICTs become ever more central to economic restructuring, to the 
extent that it is possible to talk about the digital transformation of the Chinese 
economy.  
Throughout this process, this state-led, market-oriented, techno-driven 
developmentalism, as I have outlined, has repeatedly marginalized, if not failed, 
Chinese working class since the economic reform in the 1980s. If the transformation 
of the 1970s turned nongmingong from the country’s master to commodified labour 
power, ICTs-enabled and facilitated development since then did not improve the 
workers situation, but turn them into hands that manufacture communications 
hardware of all kinds. It also helps create above a better-educated middle class who 
are ICTs literate and can work in digitalised environment of marketised urban 
industries. The communicative power afforded by ICTs further contribute to the 
discursive redefinition of the meaning of class, reinforcing their subordination.  
The more recent digital transformation of the economy continues to be market-
driven. The role of financial capital and domestic private capital are enhanced to 
participate in the reorganisation of traditional agricultural, manufacturing and service 
jobs and to turn data into a new raw material of production. This will precipitate 
further changes in class relations in China and nongmingong’s class location, 
whether in production or reproduction.  
This sets the stage for discussion of nongmingong’s subjective experience of the 
digital transformation of the economy in China in the chapters to follow. But before 
that, I provide an account of the methods and research design of this project.  
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Chapter 4 Methods 
4.1 Overview  
This chapter sets out the methodological considerations, design and processes of this 
research. As stated earlier, the aim of this thesis is to understand the subjective 
experience of nongmingong, rural-to-urban migrant workers, confronting China’s 
recent ICTs- driven economic restructuring in both work and leisure. In Chapter two, 
I further unpack this overarching question into three sub-questions, namely  
1) what are the new mediated arrangements of production emerging?  
2) How do nongmingong experience these new arrangements? What kind of 
actual and social practices exist around them?  
3) Whether, to what extent and how do these new mediated arrangements of 
production represent for them opportunities or challenges?  
As discussed in previous chapters, my approach to ICTs follows Lievrouw and 
Livingstone (2006) who drew on the ‘social shaping’ tradition in STS studies and 
understand ICTs as the totality of three component processes: artefacts, practices and 
social arrangements. For them, ICTs are not self-generating, but are invented within 
certain societal circumstances, arising from particular practices and social 
arrangements. ICTs thus take on certain forms and qualities, offering specific 
possibilities and constraints, enabling or disabling certain social capabilities. While 
this approach has its own logic, this does not determine its uses and consequences. 
Rather, its consequences arise from the actual practices of use as those possibilities 
and constraints are taken up, rejected, and reworked by its users operating within 
specific social arrangements.  
And my approach to nongmingong defines them as forced workers. If we follow 
Sewell (1992: 21) to think of one’s agency as one’s social positioning, ‘laden with 
collectively produced differences of power’ and thus conditioned by the social 
groups one belongs to, in this thesis, nongmingong’s agency is understood in relation 
to their class position – their position within the capitalist relations of production – in 
its intersection with their gender and other identities.  
Then, methodologically, to address the thesis’ main concerns demands a framework 
that acknowledges nongmingong’s agency while at the same time – to avoid the 
interpretivist trap (Hammersley 1992; Schnegg 2015) – addresses the various 
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structural constraints, local and global, that they face. This in turn calls for data 
collection and analysis methods that can best capture, record, analyse and represent 
nongmingong’s own practices and viewpoints as they use ICTs in the ‘natural 
unfolding’ of their daily lives to respond to life circumstances on the one hand, and 
methods that can generate insights into the practices and social arrangements that 
give rise to the technologies on the other. This leads me to ethnography and semi-
structured in-depth interview as the main methods of data collection.  
It should be noted that by observing and documenting the ‘natural unfolding’ of 
lives, I do not intend to invoke a naïve realist position that understands social 
phenomena as objects existing independently of and external to the researcher 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). Rather I follow a critical realist position that 
necessitates reflexivity as a device to explicate the role of the researcher in 
ethnographic fieldwork and representation. The concept of reflexivity contends that 
researchers are themselves an inevitable part of the social world under investigation 
and acknowledges that the orientations of researchers are shaped by their socio-
historical locations and the values and interests these locations confer upon them 
(Hammersley 1992; Madison 2012). In the following sections, I address these 
methodological points by illustrating how I tried to achieve them throughout the 
research process.  
 
4.2 Ethnographic field in a globalising and digitalising world  
Conventionally, within the discipline of anthropology, the very idea of the ‘field’ has 
often been beyond reflexivity, and the field-site often took the form of a bounded 
and disconnected space like a village (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997). Underlying this 
was the assumption of a bounded space as containing a whole culture. In recent 
years, this assumption has been increasingly challenged by changes in the structures 
and interconnections in late capitalism that have increased the scale and complexity 
of social processes.  
In an attempt to address this challenge, Marcus (1995: 97) observed that “empirically 
following the thread of cultural process itself impels the move toward multi-sited 
ethnography”, for empirical changes in the world – by which he meant globalisation 
– blur the distinctions between subjects’ life worlds and the system, and the cultural 
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logics sought after by ethnographers become multiply produced. This call for multi-
sitedness helped frame and reify a methodological trend. Ethnographers were freed 
from the limitations of the bounded site, and allowed to follow movements of 
people, ideas, objects and metaphors, to trace and map complex networks.  
This “research imaginary” (Marcus 1995) marked by freedom, complexity and 
expansion, according to Candea (2007), has been the main source of novelty in 
ethnographic theories and methodologies in recent years. Not necessarily disagreeing 
with Marcus, he prompted us to rethink the effectiveness of moving towards multi-
sitedness as a methodological response to empirical changes. Examining Marcus’ 
original article and later debates on the nature and bounded-ness of the field closely, 
he pointed out that underlying this methodological move is an implicit holism, not of 
“the world system as a totality” (Marcus and Fischer 1999), but of “the imagined 
totality of cultural formations”, for “the desire to break out bounded sites in itself 
presuppose a totality out there, which the bounded sites prevent us from studying” 
(Candea 2007: 178). That ethnographically produced knowledge is a partial truth, as 
argued by postmodernists (Clifford et al. 2010), and hence becomes a matter of 
incomplete account that can be resolved through good research design and 
unbounded following. The role played by ethnographers during the fieldwork – 
“bounding, selection and choice” (Candea 2007: 169) – that is integral to the 
production of the final meaningful ethnographic account is thus not adequately 
accounted for. In so doing, even though the multi-sited imaginary enables 
researchers to expand their horizon, it also imposes upon them a sense of illicit 
incompleteness, especially when the fieldwork process is always one of reducing 
initial indeterminacy.  
Thus, Candea reconsidered the value of ‘arbitrary location’, by which he defined an 
existing instance whose messiness, contingency and lack of an overarching 
coherence or meaning serve as a contingent window into the complexities of a 
broader abstract object of study. He aligned himself with the postmodern view that 
“the fragmentary and the partial as the specific province of ethnographic knowledge” 
(Tyler 1986, cited in Candea 2007: 179), and argued that ethnography is about 
setting up such arbitrary locations, for doing so allowed us to “posit wholes by 
showing their fragments”. For him, focusing on arbitrary locations can better 
respond to the methodological challenges facing ethnographers as it assumes no 
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implicit holism of cultural formation external to the ethnographer. By defending 
arbitrary location, however, he did not mean to call for a return to traditional 
practice, but urged us to recognize any single site as profoundly multiple, and 
prompted us to appreciate ‘self-imposed restrictions’ and ‘self-limitation’, to be self-
critical and reflexive about these decisions as well as about what is included or 
excluded (Candea 2007).  
From my understanding, Candea’s critique is not a total negation of multi-sitedness. 
His article can be best read as an epistemological and methodological reflection on 
multi-sitedness. His defence of single-sitedness is thus more a showcase of the 
potential of single-sitedness as qualified by researcher self-reflexivity on the process 
in which the field is constructed. The two authors identify two important questions 
for ethnographers in defining their field: one about ‘multi‘ relating to where to go, 
and the other about ‘siting’ relating to the field itself as shaped by the ethnographer’s 
preoccupations, theoretical curiosity and what may be interesting about their chosen 
topic and discipline. There need not necessarily be only one, or many. Rather, it is 
shaped by the tension between the very culture under scrutiny and the ethnographer 
themselves as the research tool, and hence is inherently fluid, reflexive and 
pragmatic.  
These insights apply equally to an increasingly digitalising world, for the digital and 
the Internet are not a singular object within one site that could be captured in its 
entirety, but are profoundly embedded and embodied, and thus integral to and 
constitutive of the complexities of social processes.  
 
4.3 Why Weida factory? Justifying the initial field 
Following the epistemological and methodological position discussed above, my 
fieldwork began in Weida, a medium-sized factory in a small industrial town in 
Dongguan in the Pearl River Delta area (PRD). I chose the PRD area because until 
recently it remained a major destination for second-generation nongmingong. In 
2017 there were reportedly over 47 million workers in PRD, among whom 65% 
were second-generations, accounting for 40% of the total national migrant 
population (National Bureau of Statistics 2018). As such, the PRD promised rich 
material for research and analysis.  
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The decision to go to work in a factory instead of a Non-Governmental Organisation 
(NGO) – as many scholars have done before – came from my pre-fieldwork visit to 
Shenzhen in the summer of 2016. There I was welcomed by its staff who were 
influenced by left-wing thoughts. Through their introductions I met and talked with a 
group of workers and was surprised by the strong affiliation they had developed with 
the NGO and how they tended to describe their work and life concerns in a way that 
was significantly shaped by it, using a language that resembled less my 
nongmingong relatives and more like that of left-wing students. This alerted me to 
the sharp difference between nongmingong who actively engaged with NGOs and 
those who did not.  
The particular NGO I visited was no exception in this regard, for labour NGOs in 
Guangdong had always been strongly influenced by left-wing scholars and 
international civil societies, both intellectually and in terms of sources of funding (Li 
C 2015). The work these NGOs had done was no doubt incredible and talking to 
nongmingong inspired by them offered further inspiration. But for this project using 
an NGO for fieldwork would only offer a very biased picture, for the research 
interest lies in the lived experience of ordinary nongmingong. Engaging with these 
NGO-inspired workers would likely risk academic self-reproduction, rendering a 
much larger group invisible. 
Working in a factory with the research subjects also has other benefits that staying at 
an NGO does not have. As nongmingong typically work on very tight schedules,  
spending most of their time and living most of their daily life in the factory, working 
in a factory affords more time and good opportunities to closely observe their life, 
talk to them about it, experience it on my own and to forge relationship with them. 
The understandings thus generated will allow me to better understand their feelings 
and predicaments and, based on this, raise more relevant questions when collecting 
data and better put their words back into the context and interpret it from their own 
perspective when analysing the data.  
On top of these reasons, Weida is itself in many ways an ‘ordinary’ factory. The 
manufacturing plant of a Taipei-headquartered electronics dealer, Weida was first 
established in the late 1990s, a time when the local state tried hard to attract FDIs 
into the labour-intensive manufacturing sector. It operated a time-rate payment 
system, and like other foreign-invested enterprises, at the top of its hierarchical 
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management team were a group of taigan39 who oversaw the factory’s overall 
production, administration and communications, where the only mainlander was a 
Hubei local who managed government relations with little role in production. Like 
other factories, from the early to mid-2010s Weida also felt pressure from the global 
capitalist crisis, changing party-state-capital relations, surging labour costs and 
labour shortage. As a response, it tried automation, but failed, before resorting to 
relocation. By 2018, it had opened three other manufacturing plants, in Yanbian 
(Jilin), Yongzhou (Hubei) and Thailand. 
 
4.4 Access to the factory  
Access to Weida factory was achieved through my personal connection, Leo. Before 
finding him, I had spent one month in Shenzhen, trying to negotiate access by 
getting in direct contact with factory managers and indirectly through local labour 
dispatching agents. Without exception, I failed because of their distrust – they could 
not imagine how staying in a factory for an extended period of time could be 
legitimate part of a PhD programme. 
I also tried institutional connections. When I was back in Shenzhen in 2017, I 
consulted my NGO friends about access. They warmly offered connections in 
Shenzhen Federation of Trade Union (SFTU) but warned me that in one of the 
previous SFTU projects, they ended up assigned to a workshop set up specially for 
them, and hence were excluded from the normal scene. A more effective strategy, 
they recommended, was to enter factories through recruitment and operate covertly 
as pugong40. As for my worries about being discovered, they shrugged: “well, just go 
to another one”.  
This might be productive for them as NGO practitioners (Harmmersley 1992), 
however, for researchers it raises both ethical and feasibility concerns. Ethically, 
covert ethnographers usually face huge challenges regarding consent from research 
subjects. Practically, operating covertly in factories renders building rapport and 
quality relationships difficult. During my visit to the NGO, workers there advised me 
not to leave much to chance, for they could easily see through it all, especially when 
 
39 Taiwanese managers. 
40 Pugong refers to those who assume non-managerial/skilled positions in the factory. They are often at the bottom of the 
factory’s hierarchy and are most likely to be replaced. 
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I had no previous factory experience and that I would have to juggle a heavy 
workload with significant research commitments. Should this happen, they told me, 
my requests for interviews would be immediately turned down.  
I obtained Leo’s WeChat account in September 2017 through an introduction by 
Jian, my close friend and Leo’s close family member, with whom I came from the 
same place of origin. Leo was a veteran customs official who had worked in the 
PRD for 30 years. During our first meeting, he showed a general interest in my 
research topic and offered his view on nongmingong: “their life is very difficult 
despite their hard work. But you reap what you sow”. This sympathy partly 
motivated his decision to help me out. Another reason I believe came from his 
ambivalence towards his childhood hometown, and related to this, he felt an 
obligation to support young people from there. As he said, “I wish one day I could 
see Shuyang growing into a prosperous city like Guangzhou. You are now studying 
in a top university. We Shuyang-ers are proud of you. Do remember to give back 
after you make your mark” (fieldnote).  
He then introduced me in person to Yuan, manager of a local factory. By the time we 
met, they had known each other for 20 years, initially as work friends, but this later 
developed into, as Yuan put it, a life-long brotherhood-like friendship. Upon Leo’s 
request, Yuan readily agreed to meet me. After I talked him through the project and 
the consent form, he introduced me to Weida through his connection Mr Li, who was 
a taigan there.  
I never met Mr Li, for he went back to Taipei after completing his term in Dongguan 
the day before my registration. When I finally registered as a pugong at Weida and 
settled down in an eight-bed male dormitory, it was already the end of September, a 
busy season for Weida. That afternoon I was welcomed by Mr Chen, manager of 
Manufacturing Department I, and we discussed my project and he signed the consent 
form. He told me they were shorthanded at the moment and my arrival was a timely 
help. He even kindly offered me a cadre dormitory, which I politely declined and 
explained to him why being a pugong would be best for my research. Of course, he 
did not accept my presence without reservation. When I explained the risks the 
project might entail, he revealed his bottom line: my work should not interrupt 
production or bring any economic or reputational loss to the factory.  
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4.5 Building rapport and self-positioning 
As discussed so far, instead of covert participation, I opted for personal connection 
and achieved overt access. Because of the nature of the relationship between Leo, 
Yuan, Chen and me, I was allowed considerable freedom so long as no disorder and 
loss arose. While other ethnographers working in factory settings have reported 
being required to spy on workers by the management (Lee 1998; Wang 2015), I was 
never instructed to do so.  
This decision to work as pugong was made with rapport-building in mind, for the 
relations between pugong and management was inevitably shaped by their power 
differences (Pun 1995; Chan 2010). Participating overtly, my first step to build 
rapport was to reveal my identity as researcher and obtain consent. To achieve this, 
my original plan was to talk participants through pre-prepared documents 
individually, for previous literature revealed that talking was not allowed during 
work time in factories. But this did not seem to apply to Weida. Despite the 
deafening and erratic noise, when engaged in work, I was quickly ‘interrogated’ by 
my curious colleagues. 
Bearing in mind that it can be hard to expect frankness from informants while not 
being frank about oneself (O'Reilly 2012), considering Shenzhen workers’ advice, 
my strategy to respond to their ‘interrogations’ was to stay honest and humble: 
honest when answering questions about myself and my research, and humble when 
disagreements occurred. This meant that I frankly confessed to them that I was a 
PhD student who was there to work not for the wage but because I wanted to write a 
thesis on their engagement with ICTs, that I was in sore need of their consent and 
help, and that I would stay only for a limited period of time. By being humble I 
respected differences, listening to what they had to say, and replying honestly using 
their language while knowing that my view could only be my view and was no more 
legitimate than theirs. 
However, this strategy did not immediately achieve the desired effect, for as I 
gradually realised, sociality on the factory floor was characterised by vigilance and 
mistrust. I do not mean that nongmingong never forged meaningful relationships 
based on mutual trust and support in factories, but that such relationships usually 
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started with reservations and built through daily interactions as they observed and 
tested each other against their own criteria. Two stories are illustrative in this regard.  
One was a warning from Laoganma, the first to ‘interrogate’ me, playing a useful 
icebreaker role in breaking my initial embarrassment on the shop floor. One week 
later, we were again assigned to adjacent workstations and she whispered in my ear,  
don’t be silly, Daxuesheng. How can you be always so honest here in this 
factory? Student is student. A university degree makes no difference. These 
women, old or young, are not so innocent and honest as you thought. You 
ought to be careful. You never know how they will twist your words. 
(fieldnotes)  
Another story occurred in December, when I met HQX from production line B as her 
team was temporarily combined with mine. One time we were talking about her 
experience in other factories, and she asked how I found people at Weida. I told her 
sometimes I felt uncomfortable but believed everyone did what they did for a reason. 
In response, she said I ‘reminded her of her daughter’: 
you are just like my daughter when she first left home and came to work in a 
factory… gullible, trusted everyone without reservation, still such a babe in 
arms too naïve and innocent to imagine people smiling at her could cheat 
her, making their small gains at her expense… after several months, you 
must have found how uneven work was distributed and how experienced 
workers bully newbies… (fieldnotes) 
Upon reflection, it was precisely this nature of shop floor sociality – their tacit 
reservations about trust – that underlaid my confusion about why my invitations to 
dinner were often rejected – I used this as a strategy to build rapport, as many others 
have done (for example, Heimer and Thøgersen 2006; Lan 2006). Later, I became 
very careful and did not initiate such invitations until I decided that our relationships 
were robust enough for such close hangouts. This understanding was also very 
productive in guiding my later effort to forge meaningful rapport.  
Another challenge was that before I was able to personally explain everything, my 
colleagues already heard about it from others and decided I was there to 
tiyanshenghuo (experience the hardship of life) and shixi (do internship). Despite my 
efforts to clarify my researcher identity, they simply stuck to their own terms. I was 
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frustrated at first, but soon turned to make sure that they understood the implications 
of my presence as a researcher, regardless of the terms they used. Because task 
allocation was relatively random, it took me almost a month to do this.  
Nevertheless, once I passed their tests and became seen as trustworthy, they very 
quickly accepted me, and did whatever they could to help me out. In this regard, the 
long and repetitive process of explanation turned out to be a productive one. From 
my honest and humble attitude and patient explanation they felt a sense of frankness 
and transparency. Trust and rapport were hence achieved.  
In many ethnographic method discussions, scholars touch upon the tension between 
tact and courtesy, self-conscious impression management, and deception, especially 
when the religious or political attitudes and commitments of the researcher and the 
researched differed markedly from each other (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007: 72). 
This is ultimately a discussion of the difficult self-positioning of the ethnographer in 
the field to generate rich data about the subjects and their native point of view while 
maintaining an ethical approach. Thus, by participating overtly and keeping honest 
and humble, I do not consider myself as facing such situations. At least during the 
fieldwork, I did not see myself as mechanically affiliated with certain rigid political 
or religious systems of belief. Rather, my interaction with participants was marked 
more by my position as semi-emic participant observer, which was a product of my 
personal experience.  
Growing up in an extended family where many members were nongmingong, I left 
home for education at 14, but kept close contact with my family. When I spatially 
separated from their daily grind, this allowed me to experience their life indirectly. 
During the fieldwork, this indirect experience formed a productive basis for the 
various dialogues between the workers and me. My familiarity with nongmingong 
life convinced them that I was different from their educated relatives for I could 
understand their thoughts and grievances (talk with Lao Pan), while the indirectness 
and partiality of this familiarity sensitised me to the particularities of their 
experience. 
Upon reflection, several strategies were useful in establishing this sympathetic image 
of mine and in bringing us closer. First, eating together with them at food stalls near 
the factory gate, and occasionally paying for them. Kaiping later told me she decided 
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to open up to me after I paid for one of her meals, not for the money, but because she 
felt valued, trusted and respected. Besides, eating together at the food stalls also 
created a relatively private space – compared to the assembly line – to talk and 
gossip freely without other people’s gaze.  
A further fruitful strategy was showing genuine respect, sympathy and care where 
appropriate and offering help where needed. For example, I offered free daigou, 
surrogate shopping in my visit to Hong Kong during the fieldwork after I learned 
pharmacies there sold their much-needed Wintergreen Oil41 at a much lower price. 
This was well remembered even after I left. For another example, when Xiaoping 
poured out her concern with her son not performing well in school and blaming 
herself for having not taken good care of him, I told her not to listen to what people 
around her said, and, drawing on my life experience and sociological knowledge, 
explained to her why she should not be blamed.  
Three further aspects of my identity loomed large throughout this process, 
significantly shaping my ‘field’, and my access to and understanding of their ICTs-
mediated lived experience. First, being a university student meant that I was invested 
with more trust, in the sense that I was no gossipmonger, and that I was expected to 
offer some good advice about their life problems. It surprised me when they so 
suddenly became so open to me after my university student identity was vindicated 
by my identity card. It was not my plan to earn trust in this way. At first, their 
circulation of my ID card, without my knowledge, even discomforted me. 
Paradoxically, it turned out to be more effective than a thousand words. Besides, that 
I would certainly leave the factory soon relieved them of concerns about future 
negative consequences of their murmurings and complaints. 
Second, being a young man in my 20s made it difficult for me to build close 
relations with young female workers, married or not, especially given my 
educational and family background. They worried that being too close with me 
would incur rumours, defamation or even mudslinging that would mark them out as 
snobbish or of easy virtue, not to mention that these rumours travelled afar to their 
rural homes. To avoid this, some even adopted a no-male strategy with WeChat.  
 
41 Good for alleviating bone pains from repetitive use of certain parts of the body. 
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Third, I originally came from Jiangsu, East China, while most of the workers came 
from southwestern provinces like Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan and Hubei. This 
difference in place of origin ruled out any ascribed bonding with any particular 
regional subgroup and placed me in the same starting point in forging relationship 
with them. Further, east coastal and southwestern areas, though both belonging to 
China, underwent historically different trajectories of development within the grand 
‘national’ project of reform and opening up. The difference in place of origin hence 
had the further implication of casting me as their social and historical ‘Other’. 
 
4.6 The evolving field  
So far, I have illustrated how my research interest and ambition, experience and 
resources enabled and shaped my choice and entry into the initial field. I have also 
discussed my strategies of rapport building and self-positioning in the field and 
reflected on their implications. This first stage of fieldwork took about 6 weeks. 
Surviving that, I arrived at a fuller understanding of nongmingong’s sociality, their 
concerns, their offline and online life and the local economic situation. More 
importantly, I was able to adjust myself well to the rhythm of factory work and to 
build rapport robust enough for the next stage.  
Nonetheless, proceeding in this way, I found my observation was limited to my 
production line and dorm, not least because of the assembly setting in the workshop. 
In addition, while most workers in my team were second-generation, the gender ratio 
was sharp. Also becoming problematic was the long working time, which is on 
average 12 hour per day, 6.5 days per week. While this used to give me enough time 
to gain consent and build relations, now it left me little time and energy to focus on 
research.  
Facing these constraints, to get a broader and more balanced picture, in the second 
stage, I decided to keep the job, but shorten my work time to 8 hours a day and move 
out to live in the nearby migrant village, Luyuan. During the nights, I would hang 
around and observe and get to know and talk to new people where possible.  
One useful strategy in this regard was to snowball from Weida colleagues. Confident 
about me, they offered their help without much reservation. Usually they introduced 
me to their close friends or relatives through WeChat. I would then follow up by 
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sending friend requests, visiting their rented place or hanging out with them for 
dinner or barbecue and beer. The strength of this strategy lay in that getting to know 
me through their trusted friends, they tended to also trust me more.  
Another strategy was to join nongmingong’s online groups either through invitation 
or by the ‘nearby group’ function afforded by QQ or Blued42. These were often open 
groups loose in identity checks, organised by location, places of origin or interests. 
Compared to the first strategy, it significantly enhanced my reach, allowing me to 
meet a wider range of workers from different factories, industries and sectors, but it 
was less effective in securing trust and rapport afterwards. For practical concerns, I 
limited my scope to Luyuan.  
In this second stage, I began to talk to more people and got to know more about what 
was going on outside the factory. For example, my landlord kindly introduced me to 
his friends who had worked in Dongguan for many years, and they shared with me 
stories about how local life and economy had changed over the past decades, their 
observation of nongmingong’s living conditions in Dongguan and the emergence of 
ICTs. The Didi drivers I met when using their services were also generous in sharing 
their own life experience, from which I realised that many had previously worked in 
factories. On the way back from the factory to my place, I often stopped in front of 
recruitment stalls set up by local labour intermediaries who seemed to recruit all year 
round; perhaps because of the lack of job hunters they were more than happy to talk 
with me. From time to time we drank beers, ate barbeque and visited massages 
shops.  
In this process, I gradually built up a larger picture of working-class life and began 
to focus on several issues. Specifically, I narrowed down the focus by juxtaposing 
three lists, one about nongmingong’s life concerns, another concerning my 
observation of the ways in which they engage with (use or discuss) ICTs most 
frequently, and the last concerning ways of engagement with ICTs they found most 
relevant. By comparing the lists, three issue areas emerged: work-related 
engagement; family-related use, including binding the family together when 
physically separate and the education of their children; and digital media 
 
42 QQ is a popular instant messenger app among nongmingong. Blued is a popular gay social media platform in China. I used it 
mainly because I also met some gay workers in the field.  
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consumption. These three issue areas informed much of the later fieldwork and 
interviews.  
 
4.7 Capturing nongmingong’s ICTs-mediated practices, meanings and 
arrangements 
 
4.7.1 Rationale and strategy  
In previous chapters I stated that an important way this project breaks away from 
sociology of labour literature is that it recognizes that nongmingong are now 
working and living in an increasingly ICTs-mediated environment. And the key 
point about this ICTs-mediated-ness is that, given its particular relevance in Chinese 
society, being positioned by particular forms of ICTs, with particular forms of 
appropriation and engagement, with particular practices, meanings and arrangements 
realized, crystallized and legitimated over others, becomes increasingly essential to 
the making of nongmingong as China’s new working class. Capturing these 
‘particular practices, meanings and arrangements’ is therefore central to the 
fieldwork. In the following, I focus mainly on the methods and strategies I used to 
achieve this end.  
Ethnographers who research Internet-related phenomena have long engaged in the 
trade of gathering data from online spheres (including Turkle 2005,2011; Baym 
2000, 2015; Miller and Slater 2000; Bakardjieva 2005; boyd 2014). Methods 
handbooks and textbooks have been available for some time. Guided by different 
understandings of technology-human relations, driven by different sensitivities and 
aims, scholars have explored various methods and strategies to collect online data. 
Hine (2015, 2017: 320) summarised these works and argued that they fell into the 
“community-focused online-only model”. She identified Baym (1995) as a pioneer 
of the model, where the author in her fieldwork observed an online soap opera 
discussion group’s daily activities and discussions as an active participant, 
conducting interviews and surveys. All the data was achieved online – only 
occasionally did Baym follow the group’s offline gatherings (see also Willison and 
Peterson 2002; Boellstorff 2015).  
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This was productive if the goal was to understand one bounded online group 
contained in one single software platform, mirroring traditional anthropological 
fieldwork. However, technological development, particularly Web 2.0 or the 
participatory web (O’Reilly 2005; Blank and Reisdorf 2012), increasingly challenges 
the notion of self-contained online groups as containing their own culture. The 
growing individualised ways users engage with the Internet and ICTs and the extent 
to which they have become embedded in ordinary people’s everyday life has pushed 
this further. As a result, the ‘community-focused online-only model’ has largely 
been superseded by more ‘exploratory’ approaches.  
Exploratory approaches, according to Hine (2017), avoid setting prior boundaries for 
the field site, but allow it to emerge as ethnographers engage with their research 
subjects and identify phenomena of interest to them according to the questions 
asked. Beginning with a decision about what to study, ethnographers adopting this 
approach will then follow it across boundaries and sites, deciding what might be the 
significant connections to follow, exploring its manifestations in different spheres, 
before developing an understanding of both online and offline behaviours in their 
embeddedness in each other.  
This strategy effectively resolves the debates concerning the community-focused 
online-only model about the extent to which online observation and interaction alone 
are sufficient for a fully rounded understanding of the life of research subjects from 
their own perspective (Paccagnella 1997; Bengtsson 2014; Hine 2015). Building on 
the user-centred perspective, and associated with it, recognising the embedded and 
embodied nature of the Internet and ICTs, this strategy stays open to all kinds and 
degrees of engagements, relationship and articulations between human agents and 
ICTs, and triangulations between online and offline worlds. 
Hine also reminds us how further advancement of pervasive digital technologies 
were likely to outmode exploratory approaches by rendering communications more 
or less ephemeral, less observable and more unpredictable, noting that explanatory 
approaches 
face challenges as the Internet continues to develop in forms that deviate 
even further from a model of discrete field sites open to the ethnographer’s 
gaze. Increasingly, online activities are not directly observable, as enclosed 
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password-protected spaces, proprietary ownership and apps that promote 
private interactions proliferate. The model of an observable, immersive 
Internet seems increasingly outdated. It is questionable, therefore, how far 
even a networked and multi-sited version of online ethnography is 
sustainable, if much of what people do online is out of sight to any but those 
directly involved. (Hine 2017: 320) 
By reflecting on the notion of co-presence, observation and participation in this 
emerging technological landscape, Hine suggests that to achieve co-presence in a 
full ethnographic sense is challenging, and there exists no single solution that can 
fulfil all the requirements. What ethnographers can do, then, while recognising that 
any final decisions taken would inevitably reveal only certain facets of the overall 
situation and downplay others, is to strike a balance between different approaches: 
observing what there is that is available to be observed and learning from 
the subjective experience of silences and frustrations that this entails; 
participating in one’s own right and learning what there is to be learnt from 
this form of subjective experience; and asking participants retrospective 
questions about their experiences while accepting the inherent artificiality of 
asking people to verbalise features of their unspoken practices and 
assumptions. (Hine 2017: 323) 
I agree that a carefully managed balance between these three approaches promises a 
fruitful outcome. However, what is new about this ‘emerging technological 
landscape’ needs to be contextualised, as does the challenge it poses to 
ethnographers working with different groups of people who engage with various 
forms of ICTs in a variety of ways. Ethnographers never actually manage to collect 
data about and understand fully each and every part of a particular culture, either in 
non-digital or digital settings. This is of course not to say that new technologies 
bring nothing new and need no development in methods to tackle them. Neither do I 
mean that awareness about the partiality of data collected due to certain method 
choices is not relevant. What I do mean is that to render the unobservable observable 
as much as possible and to negotiate a higher level of immersion and engagement to 
gather data that can better inform the issue in question has always been a crucial part 
of ethnographers’ work. What I argue relates to the question of how this balance can 
be best achieved. In this regard, I believe that the rapport-building and self-
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positioning endeavours of previous ethnographers to secure effective data collection 
while maintaining ethical approaches has a lot to offer.  
In my fieldwork, this balance is achieved by dividing the fieldwork into roughly 
three stages. The first stage took place mainly in the factory, where I worked as 
pugong with the main task of building rapport and trust and self-positioning. In the 
second stage I moved out of the factory and expanded my scope to a wider range of 
people; I also followed my fellow workers back to their rural homes. This was 
because of their deeply translocal lifestyle – though not the place they physically 
inhabited, rural homes were at least equally as important, if not more so, as their 
urban destination. I used the final stage mainly to conduct interviews. Participant 
observation was carried out throughout the fieldwork, with different focuses at 
different stages.  
In previous sections I have discussed mainly the first stage, mainly because it 
significantly shaped the scope of subsequent fieldwork and achieved balance, though 
not exactly in the way I anticipated. Initially, Weida was meant to be the main field 
site, however, this turned out to extend well beyond the shop floor. But this did not 
undermine my efforts, for the trust and rapport built throughout this process provided 
me with an effective lens to consider nongmingong’s everyday lives and ICTs 
engagement. More importantly, as workers I met tended to reserve trust in strangers, 
this experience of working as a pugong in Weida seemed to me the best way to 
secure trust from them.43 This further cleared the way for later observation, 
interviews and home visits, where the main body of data was collected.  
 
4.7.2 Participant observation  
Organising participant observation on the shop floor was at once easy and difficult. 
As stated earlier, I worked in the factory as a pugong, entitled to no special 
treatment. Though factory work was itself dull and tiring, thanks to my colleagues’ 
curiosity and hospitality and my previous experience with nongmingong, I quickly 
adapted myself to the intensive work, and became confident enough to insert myself 
into their conversations.  
 
43 Previous researcher largely resolved this by resorting to relatives and friends, though this might significantly compromise the 
scope of investigation. However, having spent most of my life in east coastal China, this approach was not an option.  
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Assuming a pugong role and following its routine was crucially informative. 
Following a pugong routine meant that at the factory I got up at 06:30, had a quick 
breakfast with them at the factory gate, and rushed to the workshop. Before work 
started at 07:30 there was usually a quick session where the forewomen summarised 
the team’s performance, levelled criticisms or verbal reprimands and assigned new 
tasks. The day that ended at 22:00 was divided into three 4-hour sessions by one 
lunch break and one dinner break, lasting 90 and 60 minutes respectively. During 
each 4-hour session there was a 10-minute break.  
This total immersion in their work environment first impressed me with the kind of 
alienation participants experienced in work. Experience speaks louder than a 
thousand words. By working with them, I was initially overwhelmed by how the 
hands of human beings were reduced to mere equivalents of machine handles, as 
well as how unimportant human intelligence, feelings, and even dignity could be in 
the pursuit of efficiency and profits in industrial production. It also exposed me to 
the kinds of structural constraints and hierarchies nongmingong faced on the shop 
floor, engendered by the factory management system, age, gender, and places of 
origins, among other factors, and how each of them reacted to these differences. 
While some scholars have observed ICTs-free workshops, using ICTs during work, 
though not permitted, was actually not uncommon in Weida. It only became a 
problem when higher level managers conducted spot checks or when a prescribed 
production quota was unlikely to be met. During each 10-minute break, the workers 
would do nothing other than go to toilet, drink water and play with their mobile 
phones. Most of the time, several groups of female workers would form a small 
circle, discussing what they had recently bought online or good bargains that had 
recently become available, while most male workers played video games or read 
fantasy novels. At other times, they simply watched TV series or short clips from 
livestreaming platforms like Kuaishou or XiguaVideo. Another time I observed their 
ICTs use was during lunch and dinner breaks. Most of my fellow workers who lived 
outside the factory would stay in the workshop as the break was too short to go 
anywhere else.  
It may be surprising, but the workshop toilet was where I gathered some interesting 
data. Some male workers would play video games for up to half an hour on the 
pretext of using the toilet. Two other such spaces were food stalls and dorms. Also 
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worth mentioning was an occasion that was productive for my observation when 
they turned to me for problems they had in using mobile phones and the Internet, 
especially where there was English language involved.  
On top of all these opportunities for observation, I added most colleagues on my 
WeChat the first week I arrived. Occasionally technicians and pugong from other 
production lines and dorms, usually male, would strike up conversations with me 
and add me as their WeChat friends, so returned the favour. Topics of our 
conversations ranged from factory history to their personal experience. Apart from 
being yet another site for observation, WeChat was also an important site where I 
interacted with them and liked their posts. From time to time, I also hung out with 
them, where I observed the migrant villages and its surroundings either under their 
guidance or on my own.  
On the factory floor and in the dorm, talk was often fast, rowdy, sometimes with 
heavy accents, and hence was often difficult to grasp. The noise of the machines 
only aggravated this situation. Having to stick to work, taking notes in such an 
environment was difficult, if not impossible. Any appearance of a pen and notebook 
was too ’bookish’ and awkward, and only interrupted the scene. Since mobile phone 
use was tolerated, it was possible to jot down keywords. Where work was too busy, 
voice notes recorded in the toilet or staircase were made during short breaks. Since 
they knew about my researcher role, I always opted for note-taking methods that 
were least disruptive. This sometimes also included shooting photos and videos. All 
jotted notes were later written up into full notes after work.  
One of the main dilemmas I faced was how to reach as many gongyou as possible. 
Production in our workshop was organized in the form of an assembly line. Limited 
types of jobs led to relatively fixed job allocations, as efficiency rather than workers’ 
wellbeing was upheld as the prime concern. For the first two weeks in the factory, I 
was able to become familiar with only 8 of my 30 teammates. I tried to solve this 
predicament by actively initiating conservations with them during short breaks. 
However, 1o minutes was obviously too short for natural future follow-ups. 
Sometimes it just got embarrassing and I later asked the forewoman for help. She 
was helpful and sent me to jobs off the assembly line where possible. I also took 
over the feijishou position – the person responsible for repairing defective products – 
for two months when the previous person was away for corn harvest. I was worried 
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that doing this job would increase others’ workload but was told that the managers 
counted me as half a person when calculating daily production quota.  
Overall, observation throughout the fieldwork proceeded to adhere to the iterative-
inductive loop established by O'Reilly (2015), among others. It moved back and 
forth between my concern about nongmingong’s ICTs-mediated experience and their 
own voice, and sociological theories of ICTs, user agency, class and labour. This 
iterative process prompted me to keep thinking about what they were concerned 
about and tended to talk about most regarding ICTs (see also section 3.6). It also 
informed home visits and interview guides. Writing different forms of fieldnotes 
proved to be helpful. Apart from fieldnotes proper, every 2-4 weeks I wrote scratch 
notes to evaluate past work and decide on what to do next (Emerson et al. 2011; Guo 
2015, 2016). 
 
4.7.3 Home visits 
Home visits were carried out under the multi-sited rationale, as nongmingong life is 
deeply translocal. While spending most of their time working in urban factories, they 
do so mostly for purposes related to their rural home, for example, to renovate run-
down rural houses, to buy new flats in nearby down town areas, or to pay for their 
kids’ education. Many told me that should they have any proper work opportunity 
and make a so-so living they would not want to leave home. Besides, during the 
fieldwork, the workers constantly mentioned various governmental projects, some of 
them ICTs-related, that were going on back in their home villages. I was curious 
about to what extent they could participate in and benefit from such initiatives, and 
what the constraints and opportunities might be.  
I did not have much choice in terms of where to go. This was on the one hand 
because of the tight timeframe. I interrupted factory work from early January 2018 
when the workers one after another embarked on their journey back home – they had 
to come back before the end of February when the new year’s production began. On 
the other hand, upon hearing my request to visit their home villages, while male 
colleagues were often quick to agree, female workers were more reluctant as 
bringing a man back home, especially during the spring festival, was regarded as 
shameful and unacceptable, often incurring rumours of extra-marital affairs. Xiaomei 
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was among those female workers who said yes at first. However, the day before I 
arrived at her home city, she texted me that her father would not agree. She then 
introduced me to one of her male friends, who offered unfailing help during my visit.  
Altogether I visited three villages, among which one was in a city bordering 
Myanmar in Yunnan Province. It was the only city in the province that had no high-
speed road links. The village, located deep in the mountains, was only recently 
linked to the outside by a concrete road. The nearest public transportation stop took a 
40-minute car ride. Ads for e-commerce services provided by massive-scale Beijing 
companies could be easily spotted. Another village I visited was one formed mainly 
by ethnic Gelao and Dong. During my visit, under the support of local government, 
the village was making its 2019 tourism development plan. As a haigui, a returned 
graduate from overseas universities, introduced by gongyou, I was invited to 
contribute to the brainstorming sessions. The third village was in Guangxi, located in 
a mountainous area within 30 minutes’ drive from the China-Vietnam border, with a 
mixed population of both ethnic Zhuang and ethnic Han.  
The home visits normally started with my colleague’s guided tour around the village, 
where I asked questions about their life experience and changes to the village since 
they were young. These talks were recorded with the participant’s consent. 
Occasionally I wandered around the village and the small town by myself, taking 
notes and pictures of the signs, slogans, billboards, industries and institutions, among 
other possible key nodes of the central government’s recent ‘Internet+ village’ 
initiative, and asked questions where possible.  
In one of the villages, I was introduced to previous village cadres who led and 
witnessed the village’s development in recent decades, and schoolteachers and other 
villagers who just came back from work in other PRD factories. Interviews with 
them were informative, revealing a lot about the village’s past, recent policies of 
development and education, as well as the left-behind kids. During the Guizhou visit, 
I talked to a previous worker who now ran his own online shop on Taobao.com and 
we discussed the policies, opportunities and obstacles he faced. These interviews 
were not conducted in a one-to-one form. Usually taking place in the interviewee’s 
home, it was actually open to any passers-by and unexpected participants who would 
chip in from time to time.  
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4.7.4 Interviews 
I conducted mainly in-depth interview, rather than opportunistic chats or group 
interviews that are also commonly used by ethnographers (Skinner 2012). 
Interviewing as a method has a long history in the field of media and communication 
studies, particularly in audience studies. It is widely recognised for its critical 
potential in “giving people a voice”, for its nature as a “discursive generator for 
obtaining an insight into the interpretative repertoires at the disposal of the 
informants as they make sense of a specific media product”, and ultimately as “a 
vehicle for bringing forward the media-induced meanings of the informants 
lifeworld” (Schrøder et al. 2003: 143 , cited in Livingstone, 2010).    
I conducted my first interview before I started factory work. It was with Leo, Yuan 
and Chen, the manager, and was mainly about getring a sense of the economic and 
migrant situation factories like Weida faced in Dongguan. Most of the interviews 
were conducted at the last stage to gather data about less observable engagement 
with ICTs, and the subjective meanings associated with this. 
Altogether I conducted 45 interviews. All interviewees were born between 1980 and 
2000, with only two after 1995. Most female interviewees were married while 
almost half of the men were single. I tried to keep a gender balance but was not able 
to achieve it. Among the 45 interviewees, only 18 were female. This was mainly 
because of my identity as a male researcher, which I will reflect on later. 20 of the 45 
interviewees were recruited from Weida, with 15 from my team, 1 from the engineer 
team and 4 from other production teams. Rapport and trust built in the first stage 
played crucial roles in securing these interview opportunities as well as a reliable 
outcome, especially given participants’ limited amount of free time.  
Other interviewees were enrolled mainly from two sources. First, snowballing 
through the introduction of gongyou at Weida. That they often introduced me to only 
their closest friends and relatives mitigated the lack of prior rapport-building. 
Second, through introductions by my NGO friends. Earlier I discussed my 
engagement with Shenzhen’s labour NGOs and why I did not choose NGO as my 
field. My worry was mainly with the implications their engagement with NGOs 
might have on them. However, I did visit the NGO a lot during the fieldwork. The 
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rapport and trust relations with the workers there developed during this process was 
mediated by the NGO and was very strong. Their closest friends and relatives hence 
made good interviewees. In the actual interview process, I usually started by greeting 
them, mentioning my relationship with our common connection, and talked a little 
about what I had learnt about them from gongyou, before presenting them with the 
consent form.  
In the first few interviews, I talked my interviewees through the consent form 
immediately after the quick rapport-building hook, before asking them to sign it for 
me. The interviews were generally divided into two parts. In the first part, I mainly 
asked questions about their life history, work experience and concerns, as well as 
their personal experience with various forms of ICTs (landlines, pagers, non-smart 
phones, PCs, among others) from when they were young and how it related to their 
migratory experience. Usually this took 20-30 minutes. The second part was longer. 
Its actual length depended largely on how intensive the interviewees used ICTs, and 
normally lasted between 45-60 minutes.  
The second part of the interviews largely borrowed the ‘thinking aloud’ procedure 
that is widely used in the computer industry to gather data in usability tests in 
product design and in academia in researching computer-mediated human 
communication. By definition, the thinking aloud method consists of asking people 
to think aloud while solving a problem and analysing the resulting verbal protocols 
(Someren et al. 1994). Its strength lies in that it requires the participants to express 
their thoughts verbally or in other meaningful ways (for example, body language). 
While for product design purpose researchers often ask subjects their experience 
with certain functions or content, I approached this in a slightly different way. Given 
my aim to gain a more comprehensive and deeper understanding of their ICTs use 
and subject meanings, I first asked them to talk me through their phone, and then 
narrowed down the focus on frequently used apps or functions. Where permitted, I 
took pictures of their app use histories, among other archival information. Where 
accessible, I dug deep into certain interesting connections in their social apps, 
pictures or videos they saved or starred, getting them to describe certain shows or 
short video clips they often watched. Where relevant, I interrogated how certain uses 
of app led to both constraints and livelihood opportunities to them.  
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A good venue is important for interviews, qualitative interviews in particular, for 
certain environments may have an impact on the interviewee’s willingness to talk, 
and what they decide to reveal (Spradley 1984).  I hence asked the interviewees to 
pick anywhere they felt comfortable and was quiet enough to talk. Due to the general 
lack of public spaces in migrant villages, most interviews ultimately took place in 
their rented rooms. 
As the interviews went on, some changes were made to my approach. The request 
for written consent forms was not well received in most cases and even 
straightforwardly refused in several, as it added a hint of officialness, inviting 
worries about a hidden governmental agenda in China’s unique political climate (see 
Heimer and Thøgersen 2006). It also consolidated existing power differentials 
arising from educational status, or more broadly, social status in general. The 
relaxing and relatively equal vibe so meticulous created and maintained suddenly 
became nervous and embarrassing. Therefore, I later opted for recorded oral consent.  
The question guide itself also underwent considerable change. At the beginning, it 
was relatively simple and consisted of only few very direct and general questions 
about the participants’ uses, feelings, impressions and meanings. I did this because I 
was aware that any clues about my motive I offered might distort their answer in a 
certain direction. However, most of the time, they found such questions difficult to 
answer, for they were not specific enough, and there was no obvious clue about what 
to follow and where to focus. This was especially problematic given most of my 
interviewees were not used to an interview situation. I hence opted for a more 
engaging approach: using my accumulated knowledge about them to provide clues 
where needed and asking for anecdotes and more descriptive details rather than 
abstract opinions. This proved to be productive in bringing out surprising stories, 
points and articulations.  
 
4.8 Thematic analysis and presentation 
After the fieldwork, I found myself faced with a massive amount of data, which 
included fieldnotes – most in written forms and others in audio recordings – 45 in-
depth interviews, many other talks recorded with Didi drivers, labour intermediaries 
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and during home visits, as well as the artefacts, apps, digital media articles and 
videos that workers shared with me or talked me through during our interviews.  
From July 2018 on, I spent nearly 5 months transcribing most of the recordings in 
full length in Chinese. In the meantime, I conducted some initial analysis of this data 
by jotting down some initial notes and thoughts about the themes, and this was 
informed by impressions I derived from the analytical notes I wrote during the 
fieldwork as well as the research questions, the literature review and the conceptual 
framework. In parallel, I also carried out some complementary data collection to 
generate insights into the practices and social arrangements that give rise to the 
technologies.44 
Based on the ‘themes’ that thus emerged, after this initial stage, I used NVivo 11 to 
assist coding. This round of in-depth thematic analysis dealt with mainly fieldnotes 
and interview data, and was carried out in principle in an ‘ethnographic’ manner, 
primarily from bottom-up, but blended deductive with inductive parts. I first grouped 
a number of larger sections of texts in the data under the initial themes identified in 
the transcription stage and identified some key protagonists in each category, to 
which I further linked texts about their life and work experiences to provide a 
background and a device of corroboration for interpretation. On top of these, I was 
aware of my limits as an ethnographer and that of the theory and initial conceptual 
framework, so I also kept a close eye on new themes emerging. After the first round 
was done, the data was broken down to become more manageable. I then further 
coded each section of data under the themes with several nodes. Finally, I drew links 
from the themes and nodes to theories and concepts from my theoretical framework.  
The presentation of the empirical findings was done with the aim to convey an 
‘ethnographic’ flavour and to enable the workers interviewed and studied to tell their 
own stories and speak for themselves. Because they were not ‘good’ interviewees in 
the sense that they were not very articulate and narratives were often fractured – with 
some questions initially answered, then broken off, before suddenly being returned 
to at a later point – in such cases I carried out a synthesis on the narrative to make it 
more readable, based on my knowledge of the particular interviewee and reflection 
on the context of the interview. Moreover, since each and every story was equally 
 
44 This included relevant government reports, company profiles, policies and annual reports, third-party industrial reports by 
consultancies and other investigation agencies, and media stories.  
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important and exciting to me – despite sharing similar social positions, it was 
difficult to choose between them in the presentation of results. Further, there was 
also limitations of length to consider. While trying to achieve a balance between 
thematic analysis and ethnographic storytelling, I tried to present as many of their 
voices as possible and using long quotes when needed.  
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Chapter 5 Nongmingong, ICTs and work (I): Between the factory and the 
platform 
 
5.1 Introduction 
I got to know Rizuo on my first day working at Weida. Because he seldom joined 
our idle chitchat on the assembly line and his eyes kept wandering into nowhere 
even when named and shamed during morning meetings, I had always thought he 
had a shy and introverted personality and that he got emotionally drained in social 
settings. It was not until four months later when he resigned that things began to 
reveal themselves to me.  
One day in mid-December, he suddenly asked for one month’s leave – at Weida, and 
perhaps for migrant factory workers in general, this was a strategy to resign without 
losing one-month’s salary withheld by the factory. On that night I was writing 
fieldnotes alone in the dorm when he came back a little tipsy from dinner. By means 
of Dutch courage, he began to complain about Weida while packing for his train the 
next day. Previously, his plan was to resign at the end of December, but now he 
decided to leave earlier because he felt embarrassed and humiliated by Laocheng, 
our assistant line supervisor, who rebuked him sternly and openly that afternoon 
because he performed a new task slightly slower than others.  
I quickly grabbed some beer, latiao, spicy gluten sticks and roasted peanuts from the 
convenience store downstairs. Accompanied by the groan and clank of factory 
machinery from afar, we talked for several hours. It did not take long for the talk to 
evolve into a quasi-interview situation, where I asked him about his work and life 
experience, and he asked about mine. He confessed that Laocheng’s harsh words 
were just a trigger and his decision to quit owed more to his deep-seated aversion to 
factory work in general. He was reticent not because of self-absorption, but because, 
having worked in factories for 20 years, he had learned not to expect too much from 
his colleagues. Burying his head in work and getting his money without engaging 
much in his surroundings only made things easier for him. Nevertheless, he did 
reveal lingering nostalgia for the long-gone ‘golden old times’ he spent working in a 
football factory 10 years earlier where the foreman treated him like a brother. 
Overwhelmed by his emotion, I quickly switched to asking about his plans for the 
 115 
 
future. He answered without much hesitation: “Well, I hope to start my own 
business. Nowadays, it is getting more and more difficult to do so. What do you 
think of online business? Which industry is the most profitable?”  
During the 10-month of fieldwork, I had numerous such conversations with people I 
met. Though in different ways, most saw ICTs-enabled work and livelihood 
opportunities as an alternative to factory jobs. They invested much hope in ICTs to 
change their heavily exploited, precarious and floating conditions, particularly in a 
time of economic volatility, rampant precarity and ‘restructuring through 
networking’. In this chapter and the next I examine their choices, strategies and 
experiences in detail, based on which I discuss the opportunities and challenges ICTs 
afford nongmingong in terms of income, working conditions, upward mobility, and 
struggle and the formation of class-based solidarity in present-day China. The 
theoretical framework I draw on is that of labour regimes and politics of production, 
as I have laid out in previous chapters. 
 
5.2 Why ICTs-enabled jobs? Financial gains and beyond 
Xuanfa was in his mid-20s but looked older in his grey Odidos45 T-shirt and paint-
splattered cotton shorts. I would not have guessed he had been married without his 
telling me, as marriage had become increasingly difficult for male nongmingong 
(Murphy et al. 2011). He and his wife Shujuan first met online five years earlier, and 
he decided to marry her after she travelled all the way from Foshan to Dongguan on 
her own to meet him with unreserved trust. Until they married in mid-2016, both 
worked as pugong46 in a toy factory, each earning 2,000-3,500 yuan per month. The 
job was okay, but the household income seemed modest when they considered 
having a child. Hence, Xuanfa decided to take up work with Didi while keeping his 
job:  
We invest all our savings – the betrothal gift and red envelopes from friends 
and relatives during the wedding – to make the down-payment for an SUV. 
Nowadays, gongchang yuelaiyue buhao zuo, factory work is getting worse. 
We have to find a way out.  
 
45 A copycat brand of Adidas. 
46 Rank-and-file workers, the lowest rank within the factory hierarchy. 
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Shujuan, on the other hand, set up a weishang account, a micro business, selling a 
range of products from cosmetics to menstrual pads. 
Of all my informants, around 80% reported experience with ICTs-enabled jobs. Most 
of them, not unlike Xuanfa and Shujuan, stuck with factory jobs while taking 
advantage of ICTs-enabled jobs as a side-line. Others quit the factory to begin afresh 
in digital sectors. Difference in strategies aside, when asked why they made this 
move at all, Xuanfa’s complaint about factory work getting worse was almost always 
the most immediate and common response – so much so that it even made a good 
icebreaker later in the fieldwork.  
When pushed further on what it was about factory jobs that was getting worse, two 
different yet related answers emerged. One was the unstable and falling overtime 
hours, which meant a significant decline in income at a time of surging prices. The 
other was that, because of the declining income, for many, the unfettered despotic 
managerial and disciplinary practices prevalent in these workshops (Lee 1995; Chan 
2008) became less bearable. If previously they were more tolerant because of the 
modest wage, now such despotism only added insult to injury. As Guixiang’s jail 
metaphor made clear:  
working in factories is like serving sentence in jail. You cannot even see the 
sunlight much. If under such conditions they cannot even offer proper 
salaries, why should I still put up with it? I am no doormat anyway. 
A crucial reason for irregular work arrangements and reduced income had to do with 
the larger political economic changes in the recent decade. In response to the 
aggravating economic, social and environmental crisis descended from its export-
dependent economic miracle in the 1990s, from as early as the mid-2000s. A number 
of labour-favouring and environment-protecting legislations were introduced and 
implemented more fully than before (Gallagher et al. 2015; Lee 2016). More 
recently, especially after the 2008 global financial crisis which led to a slump in 
demand from the North and the looming Sino-US trade war, the state further pursued 
a range of policies to upgrade and transform its economy into one driven by 
domestic consumption and innovation to finally move the country upward in the 
global value chain and reclaim economic self-reliance (Hung 2013; Hong 2017).  As 
a result, most of the manufacturing industries in the PRD saw a rising labour price, 
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dwindling orders, more stringent environment and labour law enforcement, and less 
favourable policies from the state, at both local and central levels.  
To mitigate the negative influence, profit-seeking companies have adopted various 
strategies. Some relocated for lower labour and environmental costs. Popular 
destinations include China’s inland provinces and Southeast Asian countries like 
Vietnam and Cambodia (Fan 2018). Roy was a veteran export merchandiser in 
Tangxia who I got to know at a barbeque get-together in a local dapaidang, cooked-
food stalls. As one of the few English-speaking merchandisers in town, in recent 
years he had received many job invitations from relocated workshops in Cambodia, 
Philippines and Thailand. Other companies opened new branches in cheaper 
destinations while steadily cutting production in Dongguan. For example, Weida 
opened a new plant in 2015 in Yanbian, a border city in Northeast China, and 
another two in 2018 in Thailand and Hubei Province, China. Weida’s manager Yazi 
told me that her Taiwanese boss planned to gradually close down the Dongguan 
compound in three years, and instead start a primary school until the end of the 50-
year contract of land use.  
Still other companies tried to restore the low-cost production regime by working 
with labour intermediaries of all sorts to diversify labour use strategies and enable 
flexible use of cheap labour, for example, dispatch agency workers, student interns, 
older workers, workers from ethnic minority groups, clandestine workers from 
villages on the Vietnam-China border, among others (Su 2010; Pun and Koo 2015). 
Another common strategy was to put contracts out to small, informal workshops. 
This is reminiscent of the same workshops Shieh (1992) documented in 
deindustrialising Taiwan. Usually run by former factory forepersons, these 
workshops were located in residential areas with cheaper electricity and water, and 
further reduced costs by bypassing strict labour rights and environmental regulations. 
Against this backdrop, financial gains became the primary motivation nongmingong 
sought for ICTs-enabled jobs. Yet, as stated earlier, their actual decisions about 
whether and what to engage in was both strategic and diverse, and a closer 
examination revealed a highly class-based and gendered pattern.  
Most of my female respondents were married and held pugong positions. I was 
rather shocked to learn that 20-year-old Xiaomei, my colleague at Weida, was 
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already a mother of two 5-year-olds, and she told me that girls in her village had to 
marry to be allowed to dagong. Two types of ICTs-enabled jobs popular among 
them were rijie and weishang. Rijie literally means ‘jobs remunerated daily’, while 
weishang is a feature in WeChat that allows users to sell goods and services to their 
contacts. 
For Shujuan, to conduct weishang was a practical choice. Before marrying Xuanfa, 
she was a skilled sewing machine operator in a garment factory in Foshan, an 
industrial city in the PRD. This meant she could have doubled her wage by moving 
to the apparel industry in Guangzhou. But she decided to give up and stayed with her 
husband because of thes responsibility she felt as the wife of the family: 
If I am single, I will definitely go… it is a good opportunity. But married 
now, I should do what a wife is supposed to… to bind the family together… 
Recently, my mother-in-law urged us to have a child… 
Jihong’s husband was a vice departmental manager at Foxconn. This had allowed 
them to bring their kids to Shenzhen. She was just back home after picking up her 
daughter from kindergarten when we met at Dili, an NGO providing support for 
migrant mothers. In our interview, she described her life in the past five years as 
“centring around my two kids”. She had left Foxconn since becoming pregnant, and 
like Shujuan, she gave up a clerk position at Foxconn two years earlier and 
proceeded with rijie. This is because rijie gave her the flexibility a clerk job could 
not, that would allow her to practice her mothering role: 
…myself left-behind, I knew exactly what it was like… grandparents have so 
many kids to look after and often pamper them… No matter how difficult life 
is for us adults, it is worth it. As a mother, I want them to grow up healthily, 
get proper education, have a decent job... 
Jihong had also tried weishang before but found it unprofitable for novice, unskilled 
traders like herself and it did not fit into her routine as a working mother. By 
contrast, rijie seemed to her more stable and practical, allowing her to juggle work 
with parenting: 
I gave up weishang because I wrote no attractive ads and had few WeChat 
contacts... most importantly, it required instant response and hence did not 
fit into my routine… by contrast, rijie offers a stable, fair income. More 
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importantly, you can ask for leave whenever you want. Nowadays, you never 
know when the kindergarten needs you there. 
For Jihong, the decision that she, rather than her husband, made career changes to 
take care of the family was natural. In our conversation, she admitted never thinking 
that the gendered division of labour within the family could be the other way around, 
although she did regret giving up the clerk position. Perhaps because she felt the 
need to justify her sacrifice to a stranger, she quickly added: “reaching mid-30s and 
poorly educated, we are abandoned by the society. There is nothing much ahead of 
us. Our hope is with the kids anyway”.  
If for Shujuan and Jihong, femininity meant family responsibility and motherhood, 
for Jincai and other younger women, this was defined more in terms of individual 
development and independence. Jincai never set foot in her husband’s village after 
their wedding ceremony, for she could barely get along with him. Rather than a 
product of true love and willing consent, their marriage was more a product of her 
parents’ wishful thinking that his family background could secure a decent and 
happy life for her. This was why she decided to discontinue her pregnancy in early 
2018 without her husband’s knowledge. For Jincai, work was a weapon through 
which she could shake off the shackles of unwanted marriage and the patriarchal 
family. She considered ICTs-enabled jobs before but could not find anything 
suitable, for Weishang was unstable and unprofitable, while food delivery and Didi 
were unsafe and physically overdemanding. And besides: 
…these jobs mean heavy workload and exposure to blazing sunlight. You age 
quicker and people turn their noses up at you. Although I do not like my 
marriage now, I do retain high romantic expectations about future marriage! 
Among male workers, the decision varied across different marital statuses. Like 
married women, married men often undertook ICTs-enabled jobs as a side-line. 
Here, the gendered division of labour reasserted itself. Because of the perceived 
main breadwinner role within the three-generation family, they generally preferred 
ICTs-enabled jobs that generated steady and higher income, for instance, rijie or 
Didi. During interviews, it was not uncommon to hear complaints about the dreadful 
pressure to earn a living.  
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A pugong in his 30s, Liufeng’s eyesight was very poor because of long-time 
working under fluorescent lamps on the assembly line. When I expressed my 
concern about his safety since he usually, after a normal 12-hour working day, 
continued to work by Didi late until after midnight, he turned to me, his voice 
wavering: 
Life is so difficult… My wife and I used to earn… 100,000 a year... I have a 
son in middle school and a daughter in vocational school. Tuition fees add 
up to 10,000, living expenses 30,000, and there are arbitrary fees. My 
daughter… begins to care about personal image, and I do not want her to 
feel inferior... My parents grow vegetables and raise livestock to feed 
themselves, but medical bills are growing... Besides, we have the irrationally 
high renqing-wanglai47, up to 500 each time… Every year we have to be 
super thrifty to save some money, but the price is growing in our hometown, 
even more expensive than Guangdong… 
Such pressure allowed participants little space to experiment with ICTs-enabled jobs, 
trapping them in an infinite loop. As Chaoming confessed:  
I thought about becoming a full-time Didi driver or doing huolala48. These 
were more profitable, but I never really get there… We post-80s are the 
backbone of the family and bedrock of the society… there is little space for 
trial and error. We cannot afford any failure. You may even lose your wife. 
After all, pinjian fuqi baishi ai, everything goes wrong for poor couples. 
In contrast, without a heavy family burden, unmarried young men were bolder and 
more active in exploring the opportunities afforded by ICTs. In justifying this 
preference, most invoked factory experience, with detailed reference to heavy 
workload and inhumane management. More importantly, factory work promised 
nothing but a gloomy and bleak future, which was particularly undesirable for those 
who began to think seriously about the future or aspired to become the pillar of the 
family. The desire and pressure to erli, become established, was repeatedly 
mentioned during interviews. For them, “people in factories are short-sighted and 
inflexible”, “factories are attractive only because of changmei, female workers” 
 
47 Reciprocal gift-giving in order to maintain guanxi networks. 
48 An app operated by lalamove, a Hong Kong-based on-demand logistics company. 
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(Junfeng, in interview), and “you earn as little as you spend and can never save 
enough money to learn skills for a sustained livelihood” (Nian, in interview). 
In contrast with the language of boredom, ridicule, unfairness and anger they used to 
describe factory experience, typical words associated with ICTs-enabled jobs were 
‘freedom’, ‘interesting’, ‘feeling good’, and ‘tiring but better-paid than factory’. 
Dazhong was 22 and had spent seven years at Weida after dropping out of a local 
vocational school in his home county in Guizhou Province. Because his mother was 
a forewoman here, his factory experience was less stressful and arduous. But even 
with this privilege, from 2014 he had quit three times to work for Meituan. Just 
before I left the field, he quit again and started a new job in Shenzhen, again in food 
delivery. For him, although the delivery job was no less onerous, the temptation of 
freedom and the feeling that “you are not treated unfairly and scolded at all times” 
was irresistible. For Haonian, working as a deliveryman allowed him to meet new 
people every day and stay open-minded; it gave him the hope to save some money 
for a course on auto mechanics offered by local repairmen in his home county, as he 
was “still young and could work for longer to earn more” (Haonian, in interview). 
So far, I have explored the context, strategies and reasons for nongmingong engaging 
with ICTs-enabled jobs. In a time of transition, as the state continued to be derelict in 
the reproduction of labour power (Pun and Lu 2011), nongmingong who were 
increasingly proletarianized had no choice but to rely on alternative sources of 
income to sustain their lifestyles. In this link, ICTs-enabled jobs emerging from the 
state’s and capital’s deployment of ICTs to channel class conflicts and reduce costs 
presented themselves to nongmingong as a feasible option. 
Specifically, concerns related to gender, marital status and family underlie 
nongmingong’s strategies for navigating the new working-class labourscape. 
Difference in class position defined in terms of skill levels or managerial rankings 
within the factory did not seem to have much effect at this level, but as I will 
demonstrate, it did so when it came to their subjective experiences of production. On 
the one hand, married men saw themselves as breadwinners, seeking extra income 
with minimum risks and uncertainties. They kept their factory jobs, picking up ICTs-
enabled jobs as side-lines and working as many hours as they could for more money. 
On the other hand, younger men aspired to fend for themselves and ‘become 
established’. Supported by their families, their concern was to explore new ICTs-
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enabled possibilities to finally secure a stable income for the future. Also engaged in 
ICTs-enabled jobs, they nevertheless entertained no long-term hopes for them. 
Instead of a permanent, secure way to make a living, they saw ICTs-enabled 
opportunities more as a makeshift arrangement through which they could work 
longer and harder to more quickly amass a fortune for later skill attainment. By 
contrast, female nongmingong tended to define femininity in relation to the three-
generation family and motherhood over themselves as individuals. Because of their 
heavier role in reproduction and lighter role in production – if we are to retain this 
problematic division for now – for them, ICTs-enabled jobs were supplementary, 
though their contribution to the family’s income should not be underestimated. But 
this did not apply equally to all women, for some did define womanhood in terms of 
individual independence and autonomy, and this was found more often among 
younger women without children than otherwise.  
But were the nongmingong happy with their new working lives? If so, why did 
Dazhong keep coming and going between factory and food delivery? How possible 
was it for Haonian to save enough money through ‘hard work’ as he wished? In 
other words, to what extent did these freedoms and needs, generated and partially 
satisfied amid the social transition of production, represent a genuine alternative? 
Was it a paradise of flexibility and individual freedom, or was it wholly contained 
within the reproduction of capitalist relations and representing yet another world of 
exploitation and conflict? It is from here I turn to an analysis of nongmingong’s 
subjective experience at the point of production.  
 
5.3 Multi-jobbing  
By ‘multi-jobbing’ I refer to the cases where nongmingong kept their factory jobs 
and took up ICTs-enabled jobs as a side-line. Among my respondents this was major 
strategy, with 50% doing so, and the options mainly included weishang, rijie and 
Didi. Around two thirds of the multi-jobbing women I talked to reported experience 
with weishang, but only two lasted in the role until the point we talked, with others 
soon opting out. They then turned to rijie for a more reliable option. Rijie was also 
popular among men, especially male pugong. More than half of the multi-jobbing 
male workers I met reported doing rijie regularly, while only three registered with 
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Didi. All other part-time Didi drivers I talked to assumed lower managerial positions 
in factories.49  
From the labour process point of view, multi-jobbing signals a shift in the 
institutional arrangements and ideological structures within which work is organised, 
managed and regulated among nongmingong, a shift that transports them from a 
singular factory regime to multiple combined production regimes. But this does not 
mean their subjective experience of work can be fully captured simply by the two 
together. Rather, they reinvent and combine these jobs strategically to their own ends 
and interests. This leads us to the question of what each job means for them.  
As noted earlier, most nongmingong took primary factory jobs and supplementary 
ICTs-enabled jobs. They continued to spend most of their working time on the shop-
floor and factory wages continued to constitute the bulk of their income. Most 
looked for alternative jobs only when factory jobs no longer paid their bills. Thus, 
my time at Weida allowed me to explore the world of factory work as the 
nongmingong experienced it. 
 
5.3.1 Factory work in a time of transition 
5.3.1.1 Managerial despotism and the politics of core/periphery and gender  
Before going into more detail about nongmingong’s subjective experience of the 
changing labourscape, I first provide a brief account of how work is organised in 
factories in this transitional moment. Writing in the Chinese context, labour 
sociologists have characterized various factory regimes that co-existed and evolved 
under the permissive banner of market socialism throughout the period of reform. 
Since no fundamental shift has taken place in the mode of labour reproduction and 
enterprise relations to the state and the market, it is useful to base my account on this 
existing work. 
Lee (1999) traced patterns of change in factory regimes engendered by SOEs reform 
as they were embodied in reform politics and practiced by managers and workers. 
She observed a shift from Walder’s (1986) neo-traditionalism and organized 
dependence to what she called ‘disorganized despotism’. Whereas in the socialist 
 
49 Two other options also widely adopted by men were takeaway drivers and Huolala moving specialists. Unfortunately I was 
not able to meet many involved in these roles during the fieldwork. 
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era, SOEs operated with the state as a monopolistic redistributor providing 
employment security, material support and superior political and social status in 
exchange for workers’ political allegiances, the reform resulted in the withdrawal of 
the state’s financial and institutional support and the increasing role of the market in 
organising and regulating production. The state became external to the point of 
production and assumed a legislative and regulatory role. A relatively independent 
labour market encompassing hitherto divided rural and urban populations was 
installed, which, together with increasing enterprise autonomy, led to unfettered 
managerial domination over state workers as much as nongmingong.  
In a similar vein, Lee (1996), Pun (2007) and Zhou (2007) focused on private 
entities in a time of rapid economic growth. They found that despite the lack of state 
provision of social security and welfare, backbreaking work and low wages, labour 
processes in these workplaces was sustained in a despotic way. In Lee’s Shenzhen 
factory, this related to ‘localist despotism’, an internal system of power based on 
regional politics and kin connections. On Zh0u’s construction site in Beijing, there 
was guanxi despotism, where the contractors strategically exploited laoxiang50 
relations, kinship and friendship to create identification, loyalty and consent. Pun 
and Smith (2007) explored the dormitory as a site of control and resistance where 
capital sought to secure and maximize surplus labour by flexibly manipulating and 
exploiting workers’ leisure time. They hence drew attention to the dormitory labour 
regime as a mechanism that deepened workers’ alienation. Chan (2010) wrote in a 
time of labour unrest. He coined the term ‘contested despotism’ to capture a situation 
where despotism prevailed while state intervention and collective action became 
increasingly commonplace.  
At Weida, I observed a similar despotic regime. Weida is the manufacturing site of a 
Taipei-headquartered electronics company. It has four manufacturing departments 
and runs a time-rate payment system. The executive team comprises a group of 
taigan, Taiwanese managers, that oversees its overall production, administration and 
communications. The only exception in the team is a Hubei local who manages 
government relations and plays a minimal role in production. Below taigan, each 
 
50 The same place of origin. 
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department has a team that oversees day-to-day production. The diagram below 
shows Weida’s managerial structure.  
 
 
In Manufacturing Department I, slightly different from the male dominance of 
managerial positions in Chan’s (2010) factory, the majority of the managers were 
female, except for jingli and liucheng. Women also constituted the bulk of pugong: 
among the 28 pugong in the Panel line I worked, only five were male, including 
myself. As a result, there was a distinct gendered division of labour in production in 
which men were assigned to physically demanding tasks like packaging and moving 
boxes and women to those requiring extreme care like pin insertion and quality 
checks. In terms of place-of-origin, while most high-level managers came from 
Yongzhou, Hubei, around 30 lower-level managers and pugong came from eight 
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different provinces in Southwestern, Southern and Central China.51 All lazhang and 
fulazhang were promoted from pugong out of familiarity with production routines, 
management ability, guanxi or a combination of these factors. Previously, Dazhong 
was appointed fulazhang but was soon replaced by a former worker because of his 
inability to manage. Disciplinary rules were based on fines, but these were only 
loosely implemented amid a high turnover rate.  
This managerial structure, demographic composition and division of labour, I argue, 
gave rise to a despotic factory regime with an internal power structure marked by the 
politics of core/periphery and gender.  
In actual production, it was usually fulazhang who allocated tasks and implemented 
discipline. But as their formal role was limited to task allocation, if pugong 
disobeyed their instructions, they could do little more than report to lazhang. 
However, it was not in their interest to do so, for reporting too much suggested an 
inability to manage. Meanwhile, it was also not in lazhang’s interest to strictly carry 
out the rules, for that slowed down production, which would in turn affect their 
performance and bonus, and higher-level managers would diao – openly and 
mercilessly rebuke and scold – them. In fact, so long as the goals were fulfilled, it 
was in none of the local managers’ interests to enforce the rules too closely. This 
explained why most of the time it was lazhang who warned pugong of jingli or 
shengguan’s inspections, and thus they seldom conducted inspections unless the 
production rate dropped or taigan visited.  
Caught in-between, lazhang and fulazhang responded by forming their own core 
groups. Whether one was core or peripheral depended as much on contribution to 
production as on relationships with the management – kinship and friendship were 
more effective while place-of-origin was less so. Core workers often consisted not 
only of close friends and relatives of lazhang or fulazhang, but veteran workers 
familiar with production routines, skilled workers taking key positions requiring 
much experience with a specific task and those who were hardworking and obedient. 
Usually, they were treated with more tolerance and granted more freedom. Because 
of the disproportionally small numbers of male workers, they often belonged to the 
core only if they performed modestly.  
 
51 These were Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi, Sichuan, Hu’nan, Hubei, He’nan and Guangdong.  
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While most of my respondents worked in foreign-invested factories like Weida, 
some came from family-run factories where the management was made up of the 
boss’ close relatives.52 In these factories, similar managerial despotism and divisions 
of core/periphery and gender existed. A key difference was the nature of 
management-capitalist relations –  in the latter, the interests of the two were closely 
merged. Therefore, managers would do whatever they could to maximize 
productivity and extract surplus labour. 
 
5.3.1.2 Heightened control and calculated consent 
Working under managerial despotism and workplace politics at a time of economic 
turbulence, when asked about their experiences, many first mentioned unstable work 
arrangements, lack of overtime hours and negatively affected income. This was a 
result of global and domestic market changes; it also set in motion a mechanism of 
temporal governance at the point of production, enabled by unfettered managerial 
power, which in turn gave rise to a heightened sense of antagonism between their 
interests and that of the managers as individuals.  
At Weida, this had meant tasks were arranged in time slots when the hourly rate was 
lower.53 Jincai’s average monthly wage in 2017 was as little as 2,500 yuan and she 
attributed this to the ‘always plotting’ production manager:  
she was very crafty, never considered for us, never gave us more overtime… 
we gave her the nickname Yazi, duck, for she would do everything… to please 
Manager Chen, her boss. We could work overtime… only when machines 
broke down or when there was a rush order. 
I was confused by their use of the term ‘duck’ to ridicule the production manager 
since in Chinese, ‘yazi’ as slang often refers to male prostitutes. Jincai explained that 
this was because she had a raspy voice that sounded like a man, and that her family 
 
52 I did not visit every one of the factories in which my interviewees worked. Instead, I asked them to describe key dimensions 
of the production regimes in their respective workplaces, including the rate system, capital-management structure, and 
demographic composition. Where they were less articulate, I drew on my own experience at Weida and asked them to compare 
their experience with mine.  
53 It is useful to provide some background about the complex composition of nongmingong wages. Usually, a pugong’s wage is 
made up of five parts: 1) the minimum wage set by the local government and meant to remunerate jobs performed during the 
legislated five eight-hour workdays; 2) workday overtime when the hourly-rate is 1.5 times the minimum wage; 3) weekends 
when the hourly-rate is twice the minimum wage; 4) holidays when the hourly-rate triples the minimum; and 5) social welfare 
and bonus – at least half of the monthly social welfare fee: the bonus is usually calculated by seniority and the nature of tasks 
performed, especially the level of skill involved.  
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name was Tang, the same as the popular Disney character ‘Tang Laoya’, Donald 
Duck.  
At Sanko, a family-run factory specializing in producing watch bracelets, the 
production manager was the boss’ younger sister and the general manager was his 
wife. For Yongjuan and her colleagues, the situation had recently become their 
nightmare. Because of the heavy pollution it produced, Sanko became the target of 
the governmental-led campaign to clear away ‘backward industries’ to make space 
for more advanced ones, with its production constantly disrupted by planned 
electricity and water outage at only very short notice: 
She is indeed buhui zuoren, untactful. Where they were given short notice of 
water outage by the government, she gave us short notice for rest. Where she 
suffered some loss, she got it back from us. Last month, for four days in one 
single week, she deliberately gave us excessive amount of work. When we 
failed to finish it all in due time, she made us work extra hours without due 
remuneration. If the outage was on workdays, she called the day off but 
hailed us back to work on weekends without paying the higher rate. 
Overtime was also used by the managers as leverage to contain complaints of unfair, 
sometimes law-violating, treatment of workers. During our three-hour interview, 
Xiaoping spent 40 minutes complaining about how, after she refused to sign an 
illegal agreement, her managers made things difficult for her by not assigning her 
overtime hours: 
…[it] goes that if we had any unreported diseases, the company can be 
exempted from paying our severance package. You know, we dagongde 
always have diseases of this or that kind. I had high-blood pressure so 
refused to sign. I managed to defend myself after arguing with jingli. But 
since then, I hardly had any overtime. 
Under such heightened control, many of the workers still chose to stay with their 
factory jobs. For Mianbange, this was because he did not believe jumping to another 
factory helped improve their conditions: “factories are factories. It is the entire 
economy that goes wrong, not this particular factory. Besides, although many 
factories are recruiting, they are only interested in temporary workers. Why bother?” 
Kaiping shared Mianbange’s sentiment, adding: “it takes time to get used to a 
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factory, its work and its people… That is a troublesome process I do not want to go 
through again.” 
A second keyword used to describe factory experience was ‘unfair’, especially 
among peripheral workers who failed to forge good guanxi with the management or 
demonstrate less ‘usefulness’ in production. Given their peripheral status, they were 
often given tasks that were physically demanding, difficult or even harmful, 
dangerous and health threatening. The Wet/Transfer Printing team was one everyone 
at Weida would avoid due to the pungent smell of the toxic gas disseminated by the 
high temperature working process. Xiaohe was immediately chosen to be ‘borrowed 
out’ to that team when Laoliu, our lazhang, received a request. This resulted in a 
dreadful row between them where Xiaohe cried for fairness and Laoliu responded 
with a firm no: “this is a factory, not the court, not the place for fairness!” 
Another source of the sense of unfairness was the paternalism found in conflict 
settlement. Since the supervisor’s task was mainly to keep the assembly line going, it 
was not their priority to solve conflicts fairly, as that took time and upset production. 
Normally, they blamed both sides for disrupting the production process in a parental 
tone. Haonian was dismissed from his previous factory because of a fight with a 
colleague. Outside work, they were friends, but Haonian had long been unhappy 
with his colleague’s slacking off, which meant he had to work harder for the 
assembly line to proceed smoothly. Haonian had reported to lazhang several times 
but received no response. One day he decided not to bear it anymore and hit the 
colleague in the face, causing his nose to bleed:  
I was wrong. I should not have resorted to violence, but the lazhang did not 
even try to figure out what really happened, just turned around and directed 
a torrent of abuse at me. When I answered back, I was told I was fired. The 
other guy reacted with silence and he managed to keep his job! You never 
know how unfair they could be. 
Compared to Xiaohe and Haonian, as a core worker in the Panel Line, Mianbange 
had more space of resistance in such unfair situations. He became a member of core 
workers known for being hardworking: ‘Mianbange’ was not his real name but a 
nickname as he fixed screws onto the panel (mianban) very quickly. One day during 
the morning meeting, he was punished with doing a week’s cleaning for his failure to 
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meet the production quota the day before. He found this ridiculous and resisted with 
silence. Later that day when we discussed this on our way home, he was so angry 
that he almost screamed: “Fuck her mother. Is she blind? Everyone knows I work 
very hard, never taking even one second’s nap. I do so not because I am silly, but 
because I know life is not easy for her, just like for me. Where could she find anyone 
like me? Want to embarrass me? Fuck off! I will just quit if she keeps pushing me”. 
It turned out that no one even mentioned this incident the next morning.  
On top of these examples, my interviewees also reported a sense of indignity and 
shame, which stemmed from the style of language used in managerial practices. This 
was felt more strongly among men, for they were often considered more thick-
skinned and hence rebuked more abusively, and the supervisors were female. Many 
of my colleagues told me what they disliked most about Weida was the morning 
meeting because Laoliu would reproach them “as if she were our mother” (Rizuo, 
fieldnotes). Below is an excerpt from my fieldnotes where I reconstructed one of the 
morning meetings at Weida by memory: 
Look at what you have done! Are you even capable of doing anything? If not, 
get out as quick as you can! Everything is so easy but even this you cannot do 
well. I am not asking you climb a mountain, nor putting you in an exam. Just 
moving boxes from one place to another and applying stickers to the right 
place, how come you did it so slowly? What on earth are you capable of 
doing? I really don’t understand what is wrong with you all while other 
teams could meet their quotas. All of you eat three meals a day, have two 
hands and two eyes, don’t you? We are all adults, and I don’t want to be too 
tough. But I will take necessary measures if you continue to have similar 
issues next time. 
 
5.3.2 Rijie  
5.3.2.1 Rijie as an ICTs-enabled, hyper-flexible regime of labour use 
As alluded to earlier, rijie refers to jobs that are remunerated daily. In this sense they 
are a form of flexible and informal labour usage like that of temporary, dispatch or 
gig workers. Rijie is distinguished from these roles as it is often organized by local 
labour agencies through WeChat or QQ Groups without pre-existing formal relations 
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of any kind. Whereas in cases of temporary, dispatch or gig workers, there are 
formal mechanisms (for example, contracts) and offline offices for workers and 
recruiters to meet and negotiate when disputes arise, the connections between 
recruiter intermediaries and the workers are rather loose and informal, usually 
limited to that of WeChat contacts or membership in the same WeChat group, which 
can easily dissolve once deleted, blacklisted or removed. Neither do the workers 
form any formal relationship with the factory. Even payment is handled by the 
intermediaries through WeChat.  
According to Leilei, a worker-turned labour intermediary, and Huage, a veteran 
labour intermediary, rijie as a form of labour recruitment was a new phenomenon. It 
gained popularity in Dongguan party because small labour agencies found it 
increasingly difficult to recruit and generate profits, and partly owed to the rise of 
small family-run workshops. I first met Leilei at a job fair in a migrant village, and 
he was rather open about this:  
Nowadays recruitment is difficult. You must not be fooled by the many people 
who come and go here. Most of them are just here for higher-paid jobs. Some 
come every day, and I can even recognize them. I even went to dapaidang 
with some of them. Young men nowadays do not like factories. The only 
reason they may take factory positions is the girls – reaching early 20s, they 
all need to zhaoduixiang, look for a girlfriend. But factories usually want one 
female worker to be coupled by one male worker. It is already difficult to 
recruit one, let alone two. 
In Leilei’s QQ and WeChat, he had more than 20 rijie recruitment groups and all 
were migrant-village-based. This, according to both him and Huage, was because 
workers tended to look for rijie jobs near their factories and accommodation as this 
saved time and travelling expenses. Building up the 20 groups took Leilei almost 20 
days and he reached most by adding them one-by-one at his recruitment stall and by 
snowballing from there. The ‘nearby group’ function in QQ also proved to be 
efficient for him.  
Things were much easier for Huage. He managed to establish 100 groups in one 
single day with the help of a WeChat plug-in called BlueChat that allowed him to 
befriend 500 contacts within 5 kilometres without their approval. It also afforded 
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bulk multi-media text messaging and multiple account operation. BlueChat was not 
an official WeChat product but was developed originally for salesmen by software 
companies in Huaqiangbei54 and distributed through sales networks comprising local 
phone repair shops and wholesalers there. Only recently did it begin to be adopted by 
labour intermediaries.   
Having established these groups, Leilei’s daily work involved distributing job 
information his boss had collected through personal connections from nearby 
factories. This occasionally included mega factories like Foxconn, but more often 
their clients were medium- or small-sized factories or family-run workshops in 
neighbouring areas. When someone showed interest in the group chat, Leilei would 
then talk to them in person, making sure that they were a real person, before taking 
down their names and arranging logistics, telling them when and where to meet.  
The average hourly rate rijie offers was usually the equivalent of the workday 
overtime rate, which was 15-18 yuan per hour. The employers wished to pay a 
slightly higher rate mainly because the absence of a legal contract exempts them 
from paying for social welfare and bonuses. In cases of rush orders, higher prices of 
up to 20 yuan per hour were not impossible in exchange for flexibility. But normally 
the workers earned 1-2 yuan less, which the intermediaries extracted as commission.  
 
5.3.2.2 Practicing rijie: Flexibility, marginality and precarity  
As established above, for most people, rijie is complementary to their regular work. 
Even though with rijie they could theoretically work for 12 hours per day, seven 
days a week, most people did spare some time to rest. Usually, they followed the 
normal factory routine before the decline of overtime hours and took one night off 
every two weeks.  
The decision to engage in rijie was also gendered and closely associated with the 
gendered division of labour within working-class families where men were the main 
breadwinner and women assumed more of a domestic role. As a result, male workers 
generally felt more responsibility and urgency to do rijie. Chensheng and his wife 
 
54 Huaqiangbei is home to Shenzhen’s widely-known gigantic electronics parts market and was a centre for copycat smart 
phones before the rise of national brands like Huawei and Xiaomi in the early 2010s.  
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rented a room five minutes’ walk from their factory. While he did rijie on both days 
of the weekend, his wife only did it on Saturdays: 
I often tell my wife not to work on Sundays, but to do the cleaning, cook a 
proper meal while taking some rest. Although we are here to make money, we 
need some family life. Factory jobs are much more demanding than family 
chores, and as a man I think I should take this responsibility. 
Down on the shop-floor, although managerial practices in different workshops did 
not radically differ, their experiences of rijie jobs were nevertheless different from 
that in their home factory, not least because their presence was temporary, and as a 
result of this, their status in the rijie factory was marginal. As peripheral workers in 
the new workplace, they often found themselves given tasks others would avoid. 
Most interviewees reported that rijie jobs were much more demanding. Xiaoping had 
experience doing rijie by herself and she also had rijie colleagues on her line when 
working for Foxconn: 
lazhang are astute. They know well about how to take advantage of the 
newbies and temporaries to please and woo veteran colleagues and win them 
over. Otherwise they won’t make it to their position. 
But for Xiaoping, as for many others, this was not something to complain about, so 
long as the wages were paid sufficiently and on time:  
I do not really mind. I think one of the virtues of rijie is that you get paid 
immediately after the job was done. No deposits kept. This is more flexible. If 
you like it, you come back next time, and if not, then just leave. 
The marginal status has also incurred verbal abuse and unfair treatment by both 
contract workers and management. Often, this was either simply ignored or resolved 
with the managers taking a partisan position favouring contract workers. In this 
circumstances, most rijie workers would simply ignore it: “usually we do not talk 
back; we vote with feet. It is not worth risking losing the money, and there are many 
other factories out there”.  
Further, the risk of not getting paid was real for some. Many had experience of 
acting as audiences for roadshow campaigns. Although paid slightly less, such jobs 
were attractive because they involved little more than physical presence in the 
audience, and they could do whatever they liked in the meantime so long as it did not 
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disturb the event. But such one-off jobs were often the riskiest. In our interview, 
Nian talked about his experience working for a weishang event as a member of the 
audience in a four-star hotel – he ended up not getting paid because they were 
blocked on WeChat by the intermediary and could no longer reach him after the 
event.  
As I have demonstrated so far, rijie is an ICTs-based hyper-flexible regime of labour 
use, even more so than the gig work widely criticized in the West, not least because 
of the lack of any established formal institutions for coordination and the absence of 
formal contracts. Compared to gig intermediaries like gigtogig.co.uk, rijie 
intermediaries are more mobile and hence more difficult to locate and regulate. One 
may be a labour intermediary today and become a salesperson tomorrow. This 
further increases workers’ vulnerability and risk, putting them in extremely 
precarious situations. However, they have found ways to circumvent the greedy hand 
of the intermediaries. One crucial strategy was to build long-term connections with 
the bosses themselves – this can be found most often in small workshops, and among 
skilled workers more than non-skilled workers.  
 
5.3.3 Weishang  
5.3.3.1 Weishang as networked reseller 
For economists weishang is a form of ecommerce (or ‘new retailing’) based 
primarily on WeChat and the social network it affords. It became commonplace in 
China from 2015, at the height of B2C ecommerce. At the early stage of its 
development, it did not enjoy a good reputation and was often associated with 
‘xiaochang’, small, unapproved manufacturers, and ‘zhiliang cha’, low product 
quality. It was only recently that big brands like Pechoin and Mengniu Diary began 
to dip their toes in weishang.  
Weishang distinguishes between corporate and individual operators. Corporations in 
China entered weishang at a much later stage and relied mainly on corporate apps 
and mini-programmes, apps within an app, to publicise product information, reach 
potential customers and conduct sales. Horizontal ecommerce entities (like Amazon) 
or producer companies are seen as entering the new marketing battlefield of social 
networking space engendered by WeChat to compete for market share and revenue. 
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Apart from corporate efforts in marketing, they also actively engage with a 
hierarchical network of individual operators to enhance sales capacity.  
Individual weishang operators, on the other hand, sell goods and services to their 
contacts by advertising through Moments and group chat, but mostly as part of a 
larger, hierarchical network of non-salaried sellers managed by an upstream supplier 
company or platform. The promotional materials are usually provided by the 
company through weishang apps. The earnings of individual weishang operators 
derive mainly from two sources: by selling directly to retail consumers through 
relationship referrals and word-of-mouth marketing; and through the wholesale 
purchases made by downline distributors they are incentivised to recruit into the 
network. Business activities and processes are integrated into and coordinated 
through a digital enterprise architect (EA) system and its mobile applications, while 
the entire sales network is managed through a network of WeChat groups, formed 
along regional and hierarchical lines. 
 
5.3.3.2 Weishang as a working-class female experience 
If rijie was taken up by both genders, weishang was more of a female choice, with 
men considering it “not serious”, “chuanxiao, pyramid sales” or “a cheating plot” 
(fieldnotes). As stated earlier, many who did weishang soon gave it up, while only 
two were still involved in it at the time of my fieldwork. One was Hong, a line 
supervisor at Sanko; the other was Gaoqun, who was previously a pugong and later 
became a full-time weishang-er. The range of products they sold could be divided 
roughly into three categories: feminine supplies, e.g. daily intimate wash and 
menstrual pads; beauty products, e.g. shampoo, facial cleanser and masks; and health 
supplements. The actual process of promotion and sales involved editing the 
promotional materials in a way that was attractive to potential customers, posting it 
in Moments and WeChat Groups, and responding to customer enquiries in a timely 
manner.  
For those who gave up, their decision to undertake weishang, was not, as one might 
expect, because they were fooled by rags-to-riches success stories created by 
weishang companies to attract distributors. Rather, it was actually from very 
practical evaluations of their own economic capacity, based on the experience of 
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recruiters who were real people they knew. The stories usually went that a close 
friend or acquaintance who did weishang told them it was a good secondary job, did 
not take much time and most importantly, required little investment. This convinced 
Yongjuan when Sister Li, the owner of the breakfast stall she went to every morning, 
tried to recruit her: “I started weishang because she told me it was profitable and 
easy. It sounds practical and worth trying and so I trust her”. Sister Li began to do 
weishang following the recommendation of Hong, Yongjuan’s colleague, in a 
similar way.  
When asked why they gave up, it surprised me that they did not immediately 
mention its unprofitability, for the organisational structure of weishang resembles a 
pyramid scheme in which the upstream profits trickle down. Instead, they 
highlighted pressures from their immediate life circle, including families and 
colleagues. This was especially so among those who sold feminine supplies or 
condoms. Although these products were used daily and could be found in stores even 
in the remotest villages in China, in their social circles, they were still considered as 
something better kept under the table, rather than posted and promoted in such 
public spaces as WeChat Moments. As Yongjuan elaborated: 
I personally do not find it problematic to sell menstruation pads and 
condoms… But my mother-in-law strongly opposed it. She considered it 
disgraceful and offensive to public decency and worried that this might incur 
scornful and carping comments from fellow villagers… I even managed to 
persuade my husband! But our life was turned upside down by her. Finally, I 
gave in. 
Another reason Yongjuan decided to close her weishang account was the difficulty 
in finding clients and the lack of time available to maintain customer relations and 
manage the business. Working full-time on an assembly line, she barely had the 
freedom to instantly reply to emerging interests, explaining the pros and cons of the 
products or bargaining with them. Many times, she got diao by the management 
because of replying to clients whilst working. For her, this meant a significant drain 
on her already small customer pool.  
She also barely had enough time to learn about the products from weishang apps, let 
alone edit them for her own use: “These might sound easy. But it involves much 
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work, taking very long time. When I just started, I spent an hour every day on it after 
the night shift”. She later realized that by design weishang was unprofitable for her. 
But rather than criticizing its hierarchical mechanism of profit distribution, she 
attributed her failure to her lack of contacts: “I know how the system works, but that 
is how society operates. It is natural that you earn less when you invest less. The 
model is good, but not designed for us.”  
On top of this, for Liming, the problem with weishang also concerned the 
exaggerated and misleading promotional material the companies offered, which had 
brought her into disrepute:  
I do not think these products have much virtue compared to those in the 
market. Basically, they buy from me for two reasons: mianzi and trust, and 
product quality. If the product does not fulfil its promise, people are not 
stupid. Even though they do not give it straight, they vote with their feet. For 
me, weishang is arduous yet fruitless. 
Yongjuan’s failure partly explained Hong’s success. As a lazhang who had worked 
in Sanko for 11 years, she had built a massive guanxi network in the local 
community; all her siblings lived in nearby migrant villages, either assuming 
managerial factory roles or managing properties for local landlords who had moved 
to Hong Kong. Her managerial position had permitted her to manage weishang 
whilst working, while her extensive social network made it possible for her to build 
up a distribution network and recruit more downline sellers. She was aware of the 
politics of mianzi in this process:  
I really appreciate that my friends, colleagues and relatives give me mianzi 
and buy from me. From time to time, I do what I can to give back. This is not 
being mercenary. Such is how we Chinese build our relations, isn’t it? 
Those advantages apart, Hong devoted strenuous effort to weishang. When she 
showed her phone to me, I was surprised to find she had four weishang apps, 
meaning that she delegated for four brands. She told me this was commonplace 
among her weishang colleagues: “Such is weishang. After all, the products cannot be 
consumed in a day and the profit margin is slim. We can only expand our product 
range”. On her phone I also found Qianniu, Taobao’s seller app, where she opened 
another shopfront outside the WeChat ecosystem to expand her reach.  
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It is interesting that she used the word ‘we’ when talking about weishang, despite 
never having met her managers or colleagues from the weishang company in person. 
A closer scrutiny of her experience revealed where this sense of community came 
from. Compared to Liming’s characterisation of weishang as ‘arduous yet fruitless’, 
for her it was arduous but well-rewarded and was primarily an empowering 
undertaking, not only because of the economic benefits, but it was an opportunity to 
learn knowledge and skills useful for daily life and in preparing for future 
uncertainties.  
As mentioned earlier, weishang was enabled by weishang apps in conjunction with a 
matrix of WeChat groups. While the former provided a platform where promotional 
materials are handed down to distributors and business exchanges (like stocks) are 
conducted, the latter was a space for communications and administrative issues. For 
Hong, the advertisement material the company pushed through the apps on a daily 
basis were a valuable source of knowledge about women’s health. Created to attract 
and convince potential customers, these materials were often written informatively 
about everyday life problems and filled with scientific jargon to convey a sense of 
scientific authenticity and authority. For example, the ad for a shampoo she 
promoted highlighted lab research findings on the benefit of ginger extract for hair 
quality; in another ad, a candied plum product was said to contain enzymes and 
probiotics that could perform a colon cleanse. Although she could not understand the 
terminologies fully, she was no easy victim of them: “I bet they exaggerate the 
effects. My way to guarantee product quality is to try everything by myself”.  
Besides, to enhance the sales skills of the downline seller, sales tips were also 
delivered through the apps on a regular basis. This was further complemented by a 
series of sales lessons organised by the company in the WeChat groups. Oftentimes, 
upstream delegates with the highest sales records were invited to share their 
experiences in boosting sales, and this was exclusive to groups at and above the 
prefectural level. Hong was eager to learn these skills and confessed that this desire 
had kept her motivated: 
These sessions were basically where those delegates with staggering sales 
records talked about their success… I have always wanted to reach their 
level. You have received good education, but we do not, and this is a good 
 139 
 
opportunity for us to learn something useful. I really envy their opportunity 
to study tour to Tsinghua, which is beyond even my wildest dream! 
If Hong’s success owed much to her managerial position and extensive social 
network, for Gaoqun, getting herself established in weishang as a female pugong 
involved daunting risks. Originally from a mountain village in Lupanshui, Guizhou 
province, Gaoqun and I first met at Kaiping’s over a weekend dinner. Aged 17, she 
was already a mother of two:  three years earlier, after dropping out of middle-school 
and marrying her husband, she joined her husband, a pugong in Dongguan, and 
started to work in a printing facility. Two months after that she found herself 
pregnant. After her request to change for a different shift in the factory was turned 
down, she decided to resign to dip her toes into weishang.  
She started with cosmetics but soon faced similar problems as Yongjuan. As she was 
about to give up, a weishang-er selling condoms managed to recruit her. She was 
convinced by this contact that condoms were more suitable for weishang because 
they were a one-off, and everybody needed them. Gaoqun was shy and hesitant at 
first, and her husband was no different. But soon they found it difficult to make ends 
meet by relying solely on his factory job, and so they compromised. 
It turned out that condoms did help her to build up a client network – this also owed 
to her ICTs-enabled integrated marketing strategy. Growing up with digital 
technologies, she was more ICTs-savvy than her elder counterparts. In promoting her 
products, she combined multiple platforms with multiple media forms. The two 
platforms she used most were QQ and WeChat, and QQ was most effective for her, 
for its ‘nearby group’ function allowed her to reach out to larger groups at a time; 
others included live-streaming and short-video sharing platforms like Kuaishou, 
Douyu and Panda. While she conducted sales, maintained client relations and 
addressed complaints in QQ and WeChat, she used live-streaming platforms as more 
of a promotional tool. One strategy she found particularly useful in conducting 
promotion on these platforms was to take advantage of her female identity. Most of 
her pictures and videos featured herself made up in a seductive way, holding a 
condom, wearing sexy clothes, with her face photoshopped and unrecognizable.  
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While effective in gathering clients, this strategy also incurred verbal abuse, insult 
and sexual harassment. She was frightened by this at first, but it did not take her long 
to find her way around it:  
at the beginning, to reduce cost, I delivered orders nearby by myself. There 
were several times when male buyers tried to hug me and kiss me. Then, I 
decided not to deliver in the evening and met clients only in public spaces. 
Sales of condoms have accumulated a large customer pool for Gaoqun, with which 
she actively extended her business to include other products. Like Hong, she now 
delegated for four companies – for three of them, she was Star Delegate, and had 1o 
downline distributors across Dongguan. On average, she worked 13 hours per day 
taking videos and answering customer inquiries, longer than she did in factories. But 
still, she considered weishang to be a better option:  
now I am a full-time weishang-er and work for myself. I am proud of it. 
Although I work for longer, it is way freer than the factory. The only con side 
of weishang I can imagine is the notoriety associated with it. But why should 
I care? Rumours dissipate quickly, especially when you become rich. 
 
5.3.4 Didi 
A third side-line option popular among my respondents was Didi, a leading taxi-
hailing service in China. Since I will discuss Didi’s labour process in detail in the 
next chapter, here I only briefly introduce it. Officially, Didi defines itself as an 
information provider that cooperates with drivers to provide transportation services 
to the public. To become a Didi driver, one needs a fully licensed car and a working 
smart phone. Because the relationship between Didi and drivers is defined as 
cooperation rather than employment, drivers are free to operate whenever they want 
and turn the app off whenever they like. Didi Chuxing, the company behind Didi, 
builds its revenue by charging a pre-fixed proportion of the fees generated by each 
service accomplished as commission.  
This flexibility was exploited among factory workers – mostly by lower managerial 
staff. This is because most of the time they could leave the workshop with the tacit 
consent of higher-level managers during night shifts, so long as they had all their 
tasks arranged and were responsive when emergencies occurred. I also met three 
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pugong who pursued a Didi side-line, all born in the early 1980s. They chose Didi 
because they happened to own a car, which they were able to afford with the savings 
from past years when the economy was robust. All the drivers I met were male – 
women tended to think of Didi as a dangerous occupation. 
Like the case of weishang, managerial workers generally experienced part-time Didi 
jobs differently from pugong. For the former, the level of reliance on Didi was much 
lower than the latter. This was manifested in the time of day they worked. While 
managerial workers usually ended their day before 10 pm, the time they had to go 
back to the factory to dismiss their fellow workers, for the three pugong I met, it was 
not uncommon for them to continue to work until midnight after a 12-hour working 
day, or even later in cases of bad weather or intercity orders. If for those in the 
managerial position working with Didi was ‘merely’ to earn ‘some extra money’, for 
pugong it was a necessary complement to the factory wage in order to make ends 
meet. Excessive working hours and darkness during the night were insidious threats 
to their health and even lives, especially when they suffered from serious eye 
problems after working in factories for decades. All three pugong drivers reported 
sleep problems and driving into sludge after rain, and two reported running into road 
accidents.  
A further problem arising from this situation concerned their passengers. Didi 
operated a system that allowed passengers to rate the drivers’ service, which was in 
turn linked to its order dispatch system, which it claimed was ‘scientific’ and entirely 
algorithm-driven. Based on his own experience, Laohu believed that the lower the 
rating, the less likely they were to be dispatched to an order. He thought of this as 
unfair to night-shift drivers like him, for he had had many experiences of getting just 
one out of five starts after his car ran into sludge or spending two hours on a 40 km 
distance simply because he wanted to drive safely, despite exhausting his patience 
apologising and pandering to passengers and turning a smiling face to their 
sometimes caustic complaints. Not only was the emotional cost huge, but it also 
significantly influenced their income levels. 
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5.4 An interim conclusion  
In this chapter, I have begun to draw on empirical data collected during fieldwork to 
examine nongmngong’s experience at the point of production under economic 
digitalisation. I come to this point not just because production is widely held as the 
most important site of working-class formation and class struggle in world history 
(Dahrendorf 1959; Katznelson and Zolberg 1986; Silver 2003; Pun 2016) – the 
decision is also driven by my observation that a vast majority of factory 
nongmingong now take up new work and livelihood opportunities afforded by ICTs. 
A crucial background of this development, as I have characterised it, was the post-
2008 global financial crisis and the Chinese state’s technology-centred response, and 
the shift in China’s working-class labourscape engendered by these events: the 
beginning of the decline of the factory as a major form of labour organization and 
the growing relevance of the platform as an alternative.   
In this transitional period in China, factories relocated, the manufacturing sector 
declined, factory jobs became increasingly unstable, insecure and precarious, and 
nongmingong’s income dropped, and their livelihood was threatened. But the 
scenarios of economic collapse, intensification of class contradictions and the 
upsurge of class conflicts and collective actions as predicted by many did not 
follow.55 On nongmingong’s side, this partly owes to the fact that most of them 
turned to the newly-created digital sector to find a way out. In this process, 
individual strategies (such as whether to keep factory jobs and which ICTs-enabled 
job to choose) varied across different groups, divided along lines of gender and 
marital status and, related to this, one’s perceived role within the extended, three-
generation family. From the analysis above, it is clear that the gendered division of 
labour within the family and the workplace has been reproduced, although some 
young women workers have taken bold steps to pursue independence through work.  
The latter half of this chapter focused on the experiences of multi-jobbing 
practitioners. Within factories, the high turn-over rate did not lead to improvement in 
their work conditions. In contrast, control and exploitation were heightened and 
became more despotic and authoritarian, particularly for peripheral and female 
 
55 For example, Pun (2019) boldly announced that “a new working class comprising rural migrants and urban workers is being 
created, and they now form the new political subjects for potential resistance and shape the future of the labor movement in 
China, as well as placing a place to envision world labour internationalism”.  
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workers, not least because of the tightened environment and labour rights regulations 
and growing labour costs. In these circumstances, they chose to stay with their 
factory jobs on the one hand because they did not see any better alternatives, and on 
the other because factory jobs gave them a sense of stability and security. 
Three of the most popular ICTs-enabled side-lines among my respondents were rijie, 
weishang and Didi. Both the adoption and experience of these options were highly 
class based and gendered. Rijie was popular among workers of both genders and was 
a product of ICTs-enabled labour informalization and precarisation where local 
labour agencies played a key role. It was widely accepted and adopted among the 
workers mainly because it offered stable and modest anticipated income. Like Zhang 
Lu’s (2015) temporary workers in her automobile factories, rijie workers were 
usually the marginal group in rijie workshops and were hence more heavily 
exploited. The biggest risk associated with rijie was wage arrears, and because of the 
lack of formal contracts and effective offline mechanisms of conflict settlement, 
those engaged in rijie were very vulnerable under such conditions. 
Among my respondents weishang was an option for women more than men. Because 
success in weishang demands instant replies to clients, careful customer relation 
management and an extensive personal network, for many female pugong it was not 
a viable option. Their female identity and the moral disciplines associated with it 
further set limits on them. The only female pugong who was successful did it full-
time and unfortunately had to deal with gender-specific risks and threats. In contrast, 
constraints were fewer for those who took managerial positions in factories, not least 
given their position within the power relations in the workshop and beyond. 
Compared to weishang, Didi was practiced more by men. In fact, the digital 
transformation of the working-class labourscape did not seem to offer many 
opportunities for women, except for rijie. Thus, they were pushed further from the 
social realm of production into the reproduction sphere of the family. Among part-
time Didi drivers, like weishang, those who took managerial positions within the 
factory faced fewer constraints from factory work and had more time and freedom to 
practice Didi for extra income. But for pugong, the opportunities offered by Didi 
actually pushed them to work longer hours to earn more, adding pressure to their 
already overloaded factory work. The passenger supremacy characteristic of Didi’s 
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labour regime further exacerbated their condition. In extreme conditions, excessive 
working hours and overloaded work even posed lethal physical threats to them.  
In summary, for multi-jobbing nongmingong, the digital transformation of the 
working-class labourscape has given them a viable option to respond to the adverse 
impact of the global economic downturn, for it has provided alternative job 
opportunities and sources of income. But this has been at the cost of heightened 
exploitation and control, increasing informalization and precarisation, and gendered 
and even life-threatening risks, which have in turn fostered a heightened sense of 
exploitation, unfairness and desperation, as well as growing antagonism between 
nongmingong and management.  
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Chapter 6 Nongmingong, ICTs and work (II): Platform-based labour, 
technological despotism and heightened control 
 
In this chapter, I continue the discussion from the last chapter on the mediated 
politics of production by focusing on a different form of mediation: platform-based 
labour. By platform-based labour I am referring to cases where nongmingong quit 
factory jobs and switch to full-time jobs in ICTs-enabled, low-end service sectors, 
for example, car-hailing, home and cargo moving, and takeaway delivery.  
While the same set of phenomena are elsewhere conceptualized as gig 
workers/economy or precarious labour (Graham 2017; Graham et al. 2017), I use the 
term platform-based labour here on the one hand to distinguish it from factory-based 
labour, highlighting the platform as a new mode of labour organization, and on the 
other hand to capture the continuity between the two: despite the changes in 
organizational infrastructure and arrangements, questions of labour conditions, 
resistance and struggle continue to be relevant. 
 
6.1 Didi as a moving target 
Headquartered in Beijing, Didi is a transportation company that provides e-hailing 
services in China. Compared to factories, the production regime of Didi is difficult to 
characterize, not only because of the capillary entanglement of technological and 
non-technological factors in its labour process, but also because it is itself a moving 
target.  
Since its founding in late 2012, Didi has undergone what its CEO William Chan 
called “an expansion frenzy” (Liao 2019), using aggressive price war strategies, 
supported by ambitious, profit-seeking investors from both within China and abroad. 
As is shown on its official website56, these investors include not only industrial titans 
specialising in Internet and information technologies like Alibaba, Apple, Baidu, 
Tencent and Uber, but also financial capital from banks and venture capital investors 
like Softbank, Tiger Fund and Temasek Holdings. Until 2018, the cash-burning 
model of expansion persisted, and Didi was reported to lose a staggering US$585 
million in the first half of 2018 and $1.6 billion across the entire year (Chen 2018; 
 
56 https://www.didiglobal.com/  
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Liao 2019). Over the years, it completed successive rounds of fundraising, merged 
with Kuaidi, outspent rivals like Yidao Yongche and Uber China, rebranded itself as 
Didi Chuxing, acquired Uber China, captured a lion’s share of the market (90% in 
2017) and finally secured its monopolistic position in China’s taxi-hailing and 
private car-hailing markets (Tsang et al. 2018).  
Throughout this process, the range of services provided by Didi also multiplied. 
Starting with taxi-hailing (09/2012) by cooperating with and transforming the taxi 
industry, Didi gradually expanded and diversified its product range to include 
Premiere service (middle-end vehicles, 09/2014), Express service (lower-end 
vehicles, 05/2015), Hitch (social ride-sharing, 06/2015), Bus-booking (07/2015), 
Designated driving (07/2015), Carpooling (2017) and Luxe (higher-end vehicles, 
05/2017), each targeting a different niche market. After the central government 
stepped in to regulate and raised the threshold for licenses and certificates for driver 
entry in late 2016, Didi joined the then-burgeoning local car-rental industry to rent 
out cars to drivers negatively influenced by the regulation and attract potential 
drivers, through its offline premises of Didi Driver’s Club. 
 
6.2 Driving Didi as a technologically-mediated capitalist labour process  
Although given its ownership structure and relationship with the state, there is little 
doubt that Didi is a capitalist enterprise, and its platform-based model nevertheless 
stands out from the factory model in many ways. Since Burawoy’s framework is 
based on the latter, it is useful to establish the characteristics driving Didi as a 
technologically-mediated capitalist labour process, before analysing its politics of 
production.  
Drawing on Marx, Burawoy (1979: 20-35) distinguished between feudal and 
capitalist labour processes. For him, in a capitalist labour process, there is no 
separation either in time or space between necessary labour (the wage equivalent) 
and surplus labour (its realization in the form of profit). While under Feudalism serfs 
mostly performed on the lord’s demesne to render the rent and cultivate ‘their own’ 
land in the remaining time for means of survival, under capitalism, surplus labour is 
obscured and workers cannot live off what they produce on the shop floor, for the 
means of existence is only accessible through the market. Under capitalism, workers 
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neither possess means of production, nor can they set the machineries in motion by 
themselves. Control and coordination by managers are two aspects of the same 
process. Struggles over production activities take place on the shop floor, rather than 
in manorial courts. The relationship between workers and capitalists is marked by 
their economic interdependence, and the production of commodities is 
simultaneously the production of the labourer through necessary labour and the 
capitalist through surplus labour.  
In its agreement with drivers, in contrast to employment relations that define the 
traditional taxi industry, Didi recognises itself as an operator of the “mobile driver 
app and platform” and a provider of “related support services” for drivers to receive 
and fulfil requests for transportation services. Drivers are positioned as independent 
service providers, or ‘driver-partners’. Once a request is accepted, they enter into a 
separate agreement with the rider and have the sole responsibility to deliver the 
service and deal with whatever incident arises. In other words, although Didi is often 
praised in official documents and popular discourse for being a big employer, the 
drivers are by no means employees protected by the Labour Law, but partners 
regulated by the Contract Law. 
Here, one might already begin to contest the applicability of Burawoy’s theory to the 
case of Didi, for the drivers retain a certain degree of independence from Didi. After 
all, it is they themselves who own the car, the means of production, which they are 
free to set in motion or not. However, a closer analysis of the entire process leads to 
a different conclusion. A car becomes a means of production only when it is used to 
deliver a transportation service, that is, to produce the ride-hailing services. 
However, ride-hailing in present-day China has become so tied to these apps and the 
order-dispatching services they offer that it is very difficult for a car to effectively 
operate as a means of production without the mediation of the apps, especially in big 
cities. If Didi has truly changed mobility in China in any way, they have re-
commodified the transportation service by integrating into it externally provided 
information as a new raw material of production.  
The actual process in which transportation service as a service commodity is 
produced relies heavily on digital technologies. This might on the surface look easy 
and simple, but behind the seemingly user-friendly interfaces of the app, there is an 
entire algorithm-based infrastructure, designed, written, revised, updated and 
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maintained by hundreds of programmers and product managers on behalf of Didi, 
consisting of terabytes of data that support each and every trip on the platform.  
Central to this capitalistic technological infrastructure is a map system and a dispatch 
system comprising demand and supply services and a system for matching. In its 
simplest form57, both supply and demand services use actively updated geolocation 
data to locate passengers and drivers on the map. Whereas the supply service further 
models detailed attributes of drivers and their vehicles (e.g. number of seats 
available), the demand service tracks order requirements (for example, vehicle 
types). These details then go through a matching system for dispatch optimization, 
according to a ‘distance first, global optimum and safety first’ principle.58 
Meanwhile, the map will plan a route – again based on algorithm. Once a match is 
made, orders will be sent to both sides. The service then starts by drivers picking up 
riders and ends with the rider’s arrival at their destination.  
Ironically, as partners drivers have no role in pricing, which is totally controlled by 
Didi. After a service is completed, riders pay through a digital system integrated into 
the app directly to the company, which is then divided between Didi and their 
drivers. In the contract, Didi reserves the right to decide on the revenue split. At the 
time of my fieldwork, Didi took 20% of the revenue as commission, as an 
‘information service fee’. If under the factory system the extraction of surplus value 
is obscured through the wage equivalent, in Didi it is taken relatively transparently 
with the drivers’ knowledge.  
Defined in terms of cooperation and without co-presence in the same confined 
physical space, managerial power under the platform system may seem weaker and 
less coercive. Rosenblat and Stark (2016) and Chen (2018) coined the term ‘soft 
techniques of labour control’ to describe managerial practices in Uber and Didi such 
as surging pricing.59 But this seems misleading to me, as it indicates that these 
strategies are less consequential to drivers and that there is more space for 
 
57 What I describe here is the simplest form of how the technological system works and the aim is to illustrate the place of ICTs 
in the core production process. But in its actual operation, the technological system Didi relies on is far more complex. 
According to Ye Jieping, vice president of the Didi Research Institute, the company recently invested heavily in developing the 
‘Didi Brain’, an artificial intelligence system comprising cloud computing, big data and machine learning technologies, to 
enhance its capacity in all respects. Whereas cloud computing promises flexible and fast calculating capacity, big data and 
machine learning help Didi model unstandardized transportation services that happen in all environments and contexts more 
accurately.  
58 Recently, Lai Chunbo, Director of Platform Governance at Didi, revealed in Economic Daily that the company’s order 
dispatching system models are based on more than 200 factors, including passengers’ sex, travel needs, order distance, order 
time, and the drivers’ sex, driving habits, order history, and complaint records. 
59 Surging pricing occurs when a company raises the price of its offering as demand increases. 
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negotiation. As far as my fieldwork is concerned, for those drivers who used Didi as 
a full-time job and relied on it for their livelihood, the control might be softer in the 
sense that they do not involve direct paternalistic confrontations (as epitomised by 
the diao culture), but this does not necessarily lead to a rebalancing in manager-
labour power relations, and we cannot begin to understand the differences without 
closely examining how management is institutionalised in the labour process and 
experienced by the drivers.  
In Didi’s case, as the three authors rightly point out, digital technologies are integral 
to its management. In the place of human resources departments, Didi operates a 
verification system for drivers and their cars. One will need to upload their ID, car 
specs, and relevant licenses and certificates and pass the company’s checks to 
successfully register and be ‘listed’ on the app. If a driver is regarded by the 
company as no longer eligible, it can ‘delist’ them without their knowledge. As an 
equivalent to quality control mechanisms in factories, Didi features a rating system 
that allows riders to rate the service, putting drivers under riders’ gaze. During my 
fieldwork, it was suggested that ‘attitude’, ‘vehicle condition’, ‘driver 
professionalism’60 and ‘city knowledge’61 were key indicators of service quality. 
Where passengers feel offended or unsatisfied, the Didi app features a function for 
them to lodge complaints, which is further supplemented by a hotline service.  
To attract more customers while maintaining driver loyalty and encouraging them to 
work to the full, incentive schemes and campaigns are devised and held by the 
management and realised through manager-led development of new app features. To 
customers, Didi distributes coupons and red envelopes and links their face value with 
numbers of social media sharing and likes. With drivers, devices and techniques like 
surging pricing, order-based monetary incentives, priority order dispatching, scalable 
management62 (van Doorn 2017) and push notifications via app and text messaging 
are actively exploited. At the corporate level, drivers of different subgroups63 are 
invited in and given special considerations at different stages. As in factories, these 
disciplinary rules and incentive strategies are in principle standing practices but are 
 
60 Whether riding with this driver has been a relaxing and comfortable experience. 
61 Whether the driver knows the best route. 
62 In scalable management, labourers are categorized into different, often hierarchal levels, based on their performance in work. 
The system is then linked to order dispatching, pricing or bonus schemes.  
63 For example, taxi drivers, private car owners, drivers renting cars from Didi, drivers renting cars from other companies. 
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actually implemented on a flexible and improvisational basis, depending on what the 
management sees as their best interest.  
Whereas corporate-designed, algorithm-driven digital infrastructures form the 
backbone of Didi’s management system, other, offline apparatuses are also central to 
it. For instance, during my fieldwork, two such apparatuses observed were Driver’s 
Club and shenfang, anonymous riders. Driver’s Club in Dongguan was built on a 
town-by-town basis. It provided car maintenance and repair services and was 
simultaneously a centre for complaint settlement and management, with its daily 
activities carried out through a set of WeChat groups. Shenfang, on the other hand, is 
a means through which Didi watches designated drivers. Designated drivers are in 
theory partners of the company, but Didi sets overengineered standard operating 
procedures for them.64 To ensure their execution, Didi designates anonymous riders 
to test them. Where the drivers fail the test, punishment is applied, and they either 
receive a compulsory intensive training session or get ‘delisted’ for good.  
It is also worth noting the difference in the nature of the products, and the interests 
and intentions of capital between Burawoy’s factory and Didi as a platform-based 
enterprise. Factories, as described by Burawoy (1985), are invested in by industrial 
capital and transform the nature into products. Hence, to obscure and secure surplus 
labour requires the management, based on a combination of coercion and consent, to 
translate as much of the workers’ labour power into labour actualised in the 
immediate productive process on the shop floor as possible. But for Didi, precisely 
because it deals with information, its products go beyond transportation services. For 
example, the user data generated provides raw materials that open further options for 
monetization. This, plus the dominance of financial capital, complicates what it 
means to obscure and secure surplus labour, which is not only to generate as much 
immediate profit as possible, but also to seize a larger market share and maintain 
monopoly status to pave the way for further monetisation.65 
 
 
64 This code of conduct comprises multiple parts, including clothing, reception manner, service package (including white 
gloves, car seat protectors and boot mats to keep the car clean), pre-ride checks (to avoid possible conflict over car conditions) 
and safety belts. It also requires the driver to keep silent throughout the entire service period. 
65 I did not have the opportunity to interview high-level managers from Didi. What is said here is based on three sources: first, 
general theories of the distinction between industrial and financial capitals; second, interviews and talks Didi management have 
given in the media; and third, my personal exchanges with connections holding senior managerial roles at one of China’s 
leading ‘AI+ Medical service’ start-ups with a similar ownership structure to Didi.  
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6.3 The lure of freedom and its limits 
I think factory jobs and Didi both have their virtues. Factory jobs give you 
steady income and there is little risk. But it is not comfortable, and you feel 
constrained, for the boss always wants to maximise profits and managers 
blindly follow. When I feel down, I prefer Didi, because it makes me feel freer 
and cheers me up. It is worth it even at the cost of the day’s income 
(interview with Xiaoli). 
Perhaps because all the drivers I talked to were worker-turned-Didi-drivers, when 
asked about their experience with Didi, they often started by comparing it with 
factory jobs and highlighted the ziyou, freedom, it allowed them. For them, this 
freedom was genuine, and this partly explained why many stuck around in the job 
for a long time. This sense of freedom was experienced in various ways.  
One point the interviewees repeatedly made in explaining what it was about Didi that 
was freeing concerned the arrangement of work. But this should not be confused 
with the utopian scenario of overall autonomy and control over work put across by 
the company, an instance where labour is no longer estranged and the drivers make 
decisions about whether to operate or not solely at their own will, without having to 
consider all kinds of economic constraints and livelihood concerns. In contrast, as 
seen in Xiaoli’s quote above, for him, the freedom associated with Didi was of a 
different and, sadly, much less empowering nature. It gave him the freedom to not 
work when he was not in a good mood to do so – but this came at a price, for 
although it cheered him up, this was at the cost of a day’s income, a significant loss 
for him. The use of the word ‘even’ by Xiaoli conveyed exactly this ambivalence: 
although the button to switch the app on and off is in their hands, being a Didi driver 
does not give them sufficient financial gains and sense of security to stay off work – 
even just taking one day off when in dire need – without worries. Rather than the 
rediscovery of labourers’ agency and control over work, this freedom is better 
understood as an uneasy moment of respite.  
A second meaning of this ziyou was the freedom from factory rules and the day-to-
day managerial paternalism and despotism on the shop floor discussed in the 
previous chapter. In this sense, they considered Didi to be a decent job that they 
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could work with dignity. Tang had worked in factories for more than a decade before 
becoming a Didi driver in 2014:  
Being a Didi driver is freer. In a factory you have no choice but to pander for 
money… but when driving, you can make phone calls and talk whenever and 
wherever you want. You do not have a supervisor who would always boss 
you around, and publicly scolds you as if you were a primary school student 
and they were your teacher. That is such a shame for adults. 
The freedom of Didi as experienced by my respondents also stemmed from changes 
in work environment, both physical and social. Physically, the factory shops they 
used to work in were typically dark, hot, full of machines – unpleasant locations. 
There was little fresh air and sunlight, not to mention the noises generated by the 
productive activities throughout the day and the sharp and pungent industrial odour 
hanging inside the workshop and around the factory premises that never dissipated. 
What they found even more unbearable was the sociality on the shop floor and the 
parochial mentality and outlook it cultivated. For them, those who stuck to factory 
jobs were ‘short-sighted’, ‘easily satisfied’, ‘lacking in ambition and passion’, 
‘shamelessly bending for minuscule profits’, and ‘preoccupied by shop floor 
micropolitics’.  
For Tang, and for many others like him, not only was the physical environment of 
the factory unfavourable, but the social environment was uncongenial, sterile and 
spiritless and thus difficult to put up with. By contrast, Didi was freer in the sense 
that it did not confine them to an environment as such, allowing them to travel across 
the city, meet new people, broaden their horizons and keep an open mind.  
While freedom appeared to be a main motivation, Didi became popular among 
factory workers more than anything else because it was reasonably remunerative, 
offering an income comparable to – and in some cases better than – factory jobs. 
This was the baseline for many. Rizuo had been single throughout his life. Having 
lost both of his parents and living alone, he had little savings in his bank account. In 
2015 he borrowed some money from his friends and bought a second-hand car to 
enter Didi. For him, that was a rare time when his daily income reached as much as 
300 yuan. This almost rekindled his hope for life, and he even renovated the leaking 
roof of his rural house, painted the wall and went on some blind dates. Sadly, this 
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proved to be a flash in the pan. From March to June 2016, he earned an average of 
just 2,500 yuan per month by working 12 hours a day, hence his decision to return to 
Weida in July.  
This longing for freedom and autonomy from the constraints and alienations of 
factory life as felt by nongmingong, albeit limited, I argue, underpins and sustains 
their transfer to Didi in a time when old, secure factory jobs are in crisis and 
becoming less endurable. But even this patchy freedom was not equally attainable to 
every nongmingong.  
On the one hand, an important prerequisite to become a Didi driver in the early stage 
of my fieldwork was to own a car. Although in the recent decade, state intervention 
had been effective in creating a fast-growing automobile manufacturing and 
consumption market and had significantly lowered car prices in China (Zhang 
2014)66, for many nongmingong (like Xuanfa and Shujuan in Chapter 4), the price 
was still prohibitive and buying a car drained their savings. For this reason, most of 
my driver respondents previously held lower-level managerial factory positions 
(such as lazhang, fulazhang), while a smaller group got cars from their parents as 
bride prices or bought them with financial support from their family. Meanwhile, it 
is worth noting that the decision to make this big purchase was often not solely 
driven by the plan to take up Didi. When choosing a particular model, family use 
was also of crucial concern, as was the price. This explained why many of their 
vehicles were SUVs with low engine displacement rather than saloons.  
On the other hand, as Didi gradually snatched more market share, its threshold for 
drivers’ backgrounds and car specs crept higher, for example, at the turn of 2018, the 
requirement for engine displacement was elevated to above 1.6. State regulation also 
tightened. A new legal framework was put in place from mid-2017 which meant that 
driving with ride-hailing apps required double licenses – a driver’s license and ride-
hailing driver’s permit, a local hukou and a commercial operating car license. For 
drivers, this meant they had to cover the extra costs of licensing, training, insurance, 
maintenance and scrap their vehicle after eight years. All these criteria had either 
 
66 Among the set of policies, two are particularly relevant for nongmingong. One is the 2006 policy that encouraged the 
development of energy-saving and environmentally-friendly cars with low engine displacement (below 1.6); the other is the 
decision to halve the purchase tax of a car with an engine displacement of 1.6 or less from October 2015 until the end of 2016. 
Whereas the former policy encouraged automobile manufacturers to invest more in small-displacement cars, the latter was 
fruitful in stimulating consumption of them, as it meant a big saving for many. 
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effectively driven out many nongmingong drivers, especially pugong, or put those 
who tried to avoid such big costs in a grey zone, playing a never-ending cat-and-
mouse game with the local traffic police. 
 
6.4 Didi as an embodied experience: Changing despotism, reconfigured control 
and multifaceted exploitation 
So far, drawing on their own experience, I have argued that a major motivation by 
which factory nongmingong switch to Didi is the relative freedom it offers, which is 
experienced in various ways and in comparison with factory work. I have also 
pointed out that this freedom is patchy and limited. In this regard, their experience 
confirms my evaluation. During our interviews, discussion about freedom was 
usually very soon followed by a denial of freedom, with the conversation switching 
quickly to how Didi was not as free as it appeared to be, and how it was sometimes 
even more constraining than factory jobs, albeit in different ways. This usually 
started with a general complaint, either ‘Didi is no longer profitable’, or ‘it is 
increasingly difficult to work on Didi’. 
 
6.4.1 Didi in transition and the sense of betrayal and antagonism 
It is intriguing that all respondents talked of Didi as ‘no longer profitable’ and 
‘increasingly difficult to operate’, and when pushed to clarify this, they tended to 
start by telling a story of the development of China’s ride-hailing industry in general. 
Regardless of when they started the job, their narrative was similar: Didi became less 
profitable from early 2016, and two landmark events underlying this change were the 
Didi-Kuaidi merger and Didi’s acquisition of Uber China.  
As they recalled, before 2016, Didi could indeed bring them higher income. 
According to Tang and his peer A’wen, who was also a seasoned driver, back then 
Didi had just launched in Dongguan and was at a stage of massive driver recruitment 
and market expansion. To recruit and retain more drivers it sent many offline teams 
to the streets, handed out smartphones to taxi drivers, installed the app for them and 
deleted rival apps, provided hands-on instructions and offered them a range of 
subsidies. On the other hand, it showered riders with red envelopes and dispensed 
incentives to encourage social media sharing. Basically, the more orders a driver 
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took, the more subsidies they could earn; and the greater number of social media 
shares a rider achieved, the higher the face value of the red envelope. At the height 
of this aggressive price war strategy, it was commonplace that passengers got free 
rides and drivers earned up to 500 yuan a day. However, this did not last long. Tang 
could still recall how it had all gone overnight: 
in Dongguan, [the subsidies and benefits] were all gone in one month… they 
substituted it with a ‘bonus’, which is bullshit… you have to complete 20 
orders a day to get a bonus of 100 yuan; otherwise you get nothing. This is 
almost impossible, especially as the number of drivers grows and riders drop 
after the price war. 
Xiaoli was 25 and started Didi in late 2015. To my surprise, his knowledge of Didi’s 
history was no less than Tang’s, and his evaluation was that Didi actually took 
advantage of its drivers to achieve market leadership and simply threw them to the 
wind thereafter. This sense of betrayal and antagonism was not uncommon among 
the drivers. As Xiaoli elaborated: 
The profit margin is getting all the more meagre and this owes much to 
Didi’s policy. The subsidies are like carrots, some sweetness they use to lure 
you. After you become increasingly dependent on it, they hit back to profit 
from your dependence. They are expert in this... they keep splitting us into 
small groups, giving carrots to one group at a time for its own interest. To 
put it bluntly, these are bawang taikuan, high-handed and arrogant clauses. 
But there is little we can do but to accept it. 
I was curious about how he already knew so much as he had only joined Didi 
recently. He then showed me several WeChat groups comprising Didi drivers, and 
told me that in these groups, Didi’s constantly changing policy was always one of 
the most discussed topics. Interestingly, this discussion was based not only on their 
personal experience, but also on news articles from media outlets like Tencent and 
Jinri Toutiao. He also mentioned another site where such discussion often took 
place: public spaces in the bustling and vibrant points of the city where drivers 
gathered for orders.  
This open and continuous discussion within the driver’s community both online and 
offline, however trivial and informal it might seem, fostered among them a collective 
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understanding of their relationship with Didi. Perhaps because of its decidedly 
historical nature, this understanding is distinctive from their perceived relationship 
with the factory. With factory jobs, while being aware that the management tried to 
squeeze the most out of them, they generally considered themselves as deserving of 
the low wage because of their lack of education or skills. By contrast, they saw Didi 
as taking advantage of and betraying them and their interests as antagonistic. 
 
6.4.2 The real face of cooperation 
At the day-to-day level, this sense of betrayal and being taken advantage of is 
enhanced by a sense of hyper-exploitation and unfairness, which has its roots in the 
gap between the way Didi defines its relationship with the drivers and how this 
relationship actually plays out, particularly in Didi’s commission-based approach to 
extracting surplus value.  
So far, drivers have been understood by legal agreement to be Didi’s partners, not 
employees. As such, Didi holds its drivers in a position to cover all operational costs. 
This includes both short-term and long-term expenses, for example, oil fees, wear 
and tear, repairs, smart devices, fines for running red lights, speeding tickets, car 
depreciation, accidents and even drinking water. Designated drivers are required to 
buy uniforms from the company at a fairly high price and prepare service packages 
solely at their own expense.  
When these costs are taken into account, it turns out that Didi’s reported commission 
rate of 20% is a hypocritical claim, a flawed mask it uses to hide its greedy hand 
from the public. By taking 20% from the revenue, it actually extracts 50% or more of 
the drivers’ profit. Based on one of the trips he completed earlier that day, in our 
interview Nian worked this out for me, where he concluded that Didi was 
comparable to a heartless and blood-thirsty vampire:  
this morning on my way back from Nancheng67, I received four hitch requests 
respectively to Changping, Qingxi and Zhangmutou68, which added up to 120 
yuan. Although Didi planned a best route that connected these destinations, 
my cost was very high as we got caught in traffic jams several times off the 
 
67 Dongguan’s downtown area. 
68  Three neighbouring towns in Dongguan. 
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highway. I drove for 100 km and four hours. The oil cost about 50 and Didi 
took away 24. That means I earned 46 in four hours, abrasions not 
considered. Actually, Didi took away way more than it claimed, and it is like 
a vampire feeding on we drivers’ blood. 
The following quote Tang showed me that was widely circulated in local drivers’ 
WeChat groups echoed Nian’s concern, but calculated the earnings on a longer time 
scale: 
about Didi, only do it part-time when you already have a car… nowadays, on 
average, one can complete 16 trips on weekdays in over 10 working hours. 
This leads to a revenue of 200. After oil fees (60) and Didi’s commission (40) 
are deducted, we earn 100, which is complemented by a bonus of 58 from 
Didi… during weekends, demand surges and normally one works for over 12 
hours, completes 24-30 orders, builds up a revenue of 350, and earns 180 
plus a bonus of 100. If things go smoothly, and you take two days off each 
month, the total monthly earnings amounts to 6,500… the living expense is 
around 3,000, since it is not possible to eat at home…  After insurance and 
car maintenance fees are deducted, you should be able to save 50,000 in two 
years, which may be just sufficient to cover car depreciation after such 
intensive use for two years… at the end of the day, Didi is the final winner. 
Hyper extraction of surplus labour and meagre profits apart, among the drivers, the 
sense of exploitation and unfairness also stems from Didi’s absence in contributing 
to their social security. Although through its legal framework Didi does not have the 
responsibility to do so, the drivers did not find this arrangement fair and convincing. 
Although most could not articulate it explicitly, they nevertheless pointed out that by 
positioning them as partners, Didi intended to avoid this payment and evade its due 
obligations to them.  
It may be surprising that nongmingong drivers took issue with Didi over the problem 
of social security. Popular belief suggests that they are considered to be less 
interested in social security than compensation in the form of spendable money. 
However, echoing critical scholars’ arguments, my observation was that this was not 
because they rejected the idea of social security per se: what they truly rejected was 
the poorly designed social security system. Predominantly employment-contract-
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based and hukou-based, the social security system in China is linked to jobs through 
contract and builds on contributions from both employers and employees. It 
distinguishes between rural and urban hukou status and across different regions, 
while the management of the social insurance fund is conducted on a territorial basis 
(Frazier 2010; Chen and Gallagher 2013; Young 2013). Not only do people of 
different hukou statuses and from different regions enjoy different provisions, but the 
benefits are mostly accessible only where the account is registered, and to transfer it 
to another city involves convoluted procedures. The system also presumes stable 
employment. In 2017 in Dongguan, one would no longer be eligible for benefits if 
one discontinued them for two months. Considering their low income and high 
turnover rate, this system became more of a nuisance than a blessing in times when 
they were robust, and the economy was stable.  
But this does not mean that the drivers do not consider social security as constitutive 
of their interest. In fact, in my daily exchanges with workers at Weida, they 
demonstrated strong awareness of the importance and usefulness of social security. I 
was surprised that many of my colleagues, mostly elders, asked me about how to 
check their social security account on WeChat and Alipay, and how younger workers 
saw social security as a natural part of their work-related rights and entitlements. 
This echoed Gallagher et al.’s (2015) evaluation of the implications of the 2008 
Labour Contract Law, where they observed a growing awareness of the Law’s key 
principles and showed higher propensity for a labour contract. 
These workers-turned-drivers – with much experience of working for a boss in 
factories and better-informed about work-related entitlements – understood their 
relationship with Didi through the lens of their factory experience and hence rejected 
Didi’s strategic invoking of a ‘partnership’ relationship to exploit the loopholes in 
legislation and shirk employer responsibilities through legal means. As far as their 
lived relations in production were concerned, the formal distinction between the 
legal languages of ‘partner’ and ‘employee’ did not make much sense, and Didi 
failed to convince them of their ‘driver-partner’ status. Instead, they considered it to 
be an arrogant violation of their interests. This distanced them from Didi, reminding 
them that they were not part of it. As Xiaoliu commented, in an angry tone: 
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they may think we drivers are fools, but… giving it a misleading name will 
not gloss over its nature. Bullying us laobaixing69 for being not well-
educated and poor? I bet it will go bankrupt very soon… from my 
perspective, Didi is really stupid and does not know how to shoumai renxin, 
win popular support. 200 yuan is not a big deal for them, but in saving it, the 
company is losing our heart. Whereas I consider myself as an employee and 
part of the factory – at least during my stay, with Didi I think I am little more 
than its tool, no feeling of belonging. It could be Baba, or anything. 
 
6.4.3 Technological despotism, extreme control and hyper-exploitation 
The second way in which Didi is restrictive rather than emancipatory for its drivers 
has to do with what I call ‘technological despotism’, which owes on the one hand to 
its market and management strategies at the time of my fieldwork, and on the other 
to its algorithm-based, scientific and intelligent technological apparatus of labour 
process management. Working under such conditions, the drivers felt an intense 
sense of alienation, of being controlled and pushed to the limit, and because of the 
impersonal nature of the technological system, a profound sense of desperation 
arose. 
Earlier, I stated that Didi secured market leadership in the domestic e-hailing sector 
in 2017 and one method the company used to achieve this was to outspend and 
acquire its rivals, distributing subsidies to drivers and coupons to riders. At a later 
stage, in response to the rising regulatory hurdles of double certificates rolled out by 
the government that put a squeeze on driver numbers, Didi lowered the barriers of 
entry by allowing drivers to rent licensed cars it sourced from local car rental and 
automaker partners. Both strategies had the effect of expanding and diversifying its 
driver pool and changing the power contrast between the two. If previously it was 
Didi that tried to recruit and retain as many drivers as possible, now it was the 
drivers who relied on Didi for work and competed with a growing number of others 
for riders.  
After the price war ended, the market and the daily operation of Didi returned to 
normal. For drivers, this resulted in an awkward situation where orders dropped, and 
 
69 Common people. 
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profit margins shrank. Against this backdrop, to boost driver retention and morale, 
the managers introduced a bonus scheme, which was closely linked to the number of 
trips each driver accomplished and rejected. In so doing, the drivers were set by the 
company to complete more orders to earn a modest amount of money. 
In terms of the daily labour process, all the orders are assigned to the drivers through 
Didi’s technological system that operates according to the principles of the so-called 
‘global optimum’, which is defined by managers and programmers of the company 
as inter-driver time and cost effectiveness and efficiency and realized through 
algorithms and machine learning models (Li et al. 2019). Despite their nominal 
driver-partner status, there is no way the drivers can contribute to or influence the 
design and development of this system. For drivers, this has meant their preferences 
of orders and specific conditions of working are not considered. Within the system, 
all they can do with the orders assigned to them is to accept or reject them, and it is 
not possible to, for example, transfer it to someone else or reject it with a reason. 
This decision is then returned to the system as some general ‘value’, with the 
specific and diverse reasons underlying the decisions reduced to a number whose 
meaning is pre-determined by the programme. This input will then put a further set 
of programmes into effect, generating another set of results that provides the basis 
for managerial decisions. It is in this automated and impersonal way that Didi’s 
labour process is organised and managed through the platform system. 
The drivers’ space of action is further undermined when Didi offers virtually no 
meaningful channels for them to air their grievances. Although it has a WeChat-
based driver service system and a similar feature on its apps, for many drivers it 
could take up to three hours to finally be able to speak to a Didi representative, and a 
week for an issue to be resolved. Precisely because management is now carried out 
by automated machines, the space of negotiation between managers and workers that 
serves to organise consent on the factory shop floor is gone, making the system all 
the more despotic.  
For many drivers, this technological despotism, at a time of growing power 
imbalance between them and Didi and shrinking profit margins, gives them an 
intense sense of control and pushes them to the limit. In interviews, participants 
described the company as ‘scheming and calculating’, and their experience of 
relations in production of Didi as more coercive than in the factory. For example, 
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like Tang, Xiaoliu found the bonus scheme to be ‘bullshit’. But if Tang was forced to 
work for more than 12 hours a day because of the contrast between growing numbers 
of drivers and dwindling orders, for Xiaoliu the problem was more to do with the 
order dispatching system, and how the bonus system was effectively transformed 
into one of coercive control by it: 
[Didi] orders are dispatched automatically. Although it has a ‘reject’ button, 
I do not think I really have a choice… I do not know why, but the system 
keeps assigning to me awkward orders, for example, that from Dongguan to 
Shenzhen, which I do not like because my car is registered in Dongguan and 
cannot take orders in Shenzhen, meaning that I have to drive back without a 
rider. If I reject it, the system keeps pushing it to me. In the end, I have no 
choice but to accept it for the bonus. Nowadays, profits from Didi basically 
come from bonuses. 
Xiaoliu’s ambivalence was also felt by Laoyang, but as he did not operate in border 
areas, he was only occasionally assigned such inter-city orders. For Laoyang, the 
sense of control and desperation stemmed more from the tension between Didi’s 
underdeveloped map system and its regulation concerning driver route-taking: 
Didi’s map system is really shit. it works better in Shenzhen, but in cities like 
Dongguan where the road systems are extremely complex, the geo-location 
data is imprecise, and many of the routes it plans lead you to dead ends. But 
according to Didi’s rules, we have to drive strictly according to those routes. 
If you make a detour, some people will complain to Didi, and we will be 
punished regardless of why we take the detour… 
In face of this technological despotism, unless pushed to the limit, it is not in the 
drivers’ interest to contest it. It is true that some drivers, as Sun (2019) found in her 
research on Beijing’s food deliverymen, did try to learn about the algorithm and 
work the system, and on a daily basis they shared their experience and guesses about 
the system with peer drivers in WeChat groups. However, none of my respondents 
considered this meaningful in guiding them to better navigate the system. By 
contrast, most felt they had no choice but to yield to it and did not consider it worth 
the risk of violating the rules to test the algorithm. This is because the 
unpredictability of the system has an immediate price for them to pay, for example, 
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decreasing orders, loss of bonus and the fear of things getting worse. Having 
substantially invested, they felt an urgency to make more money by working longer 
and harder. Some worried they might be removed entirely from the system, since it 
cost Didi little to do so. After all, under the legal framework of the Contract Law, 
Didi need not pay a severance package, for example, to dismiss drivers. 
 
6.4.4 The rider’s gaze  
The bonus scheme, route regulation and the order dispatch system aside, Didi’s 
rating system is also central to drivers’ experiences. Itself constantly changing, at the 
time of my fieldwork, the rating system had three components: order completion 
rate; five-star rate; and complaint rate. Order completion rate is the percentage of 
orders fulfilled against orders assigned – it encourages drivers to accept every order 
the system dispatches. The five-star rate and complaint rates are set to encourage 
workers to deliver the service in a way that satisfies passengers.  
For the drivers, it was natural that Didi wanted to encourage them to work more and 
provide excellent service to the passengers. But they found the system wretched in 
its actual implementation, as it allowed riders to mark the service without having to 
worry about consequences. Although Didi did suggest several indicators, ultimately 
the rating relied entirely on the rider’s discretion. In this way, Didi effectively put 
the drivers under the riders’ gaze. This riders’ gaze became more powerful when the 
rating system was linked to the order dispatching system, which had a direct impact 
on drivers’ income but was effectively a black box to them. 
In their daily encounters with the riders, many drivers reported that they were often 
yelled at and looked down upon and were often forced to accept excessive 
requirements. Tang became furious when talking about this: 
In Dongguan you meet all sorts of riders, many of whom are fucking stupid. 
They act as if you owe them a big chunk of money. Who do they think they 
are? Come on, spending 5 yuan to get a Didi ride does not make you God! 
You are still dagong de, OK? 
This emotional cost also involved a gender dimension. Xiaoli was in his 30s and had 
been a driver for two years. He particularly disliked the feeling of having to bow 
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down to the riders’ mistreatment and unreasonable requirements almost on a daily 
basis, which had trapped him in a crisis of masculinity: 
You cannot imagine how arrogant they are... here in Tangxia, you can 
always meet people who… do not really treat you properly, as an equal 
person… This makes me really unhappy and feel ashamed. After all, I am a 
man! What is a man? A man is supposed to be dingtian lidi [of indomitable 
spirit], to be the master of the family and you benshi, you chuxi [skilled, 
capable of doing meaningful deeds and full of promise]. But I am so wonang 
[useless]! 
Frustration related to passenger supremacy was also deeply felt – albeit in a different 
way – by those drivers who had received higher-level education. Among the drivers 
I talked to, three held vocational school degrees, two dazhuan, and one sanben.70 
This echoes the well-established fact that second-generation nongmingong are 
generally better educated than their parent generation (Wang 2010). Because of the 
sharp contrast between the bright future promised by education, the high hopes of 
their parents, and the cruel reality, they typically felt a sense of desperation, 
dislocation and meaninglessness, and this was similar among educated drivers. Huzi 
was a designated driver who worked for three days a week to earn enough money to 
rest for four days. According to him, this was not because he was too lazy to work, 
but he saw no point in the job:  
being a designated driver means you work mostly for rich drunkards. Very 
often you find yourself 50 kilometres away from home late at 3 am, and your 
body covered all over by disgusting vomit. But you have no choice but to take 
care of them, although it is not part of your job. Otherwise, they will 
complain and Didi will definitely fine you. What is the point in suffering from 
all this after struggling in school for years? 
Although feeling very angry, drivers seldom answered back when treated as such 
because they did not want to encourage a low rating, for as far as their experience 
was concerned, the more low ratings they received, the less likely they were to 
receive ‘good’ orders. For Xiaoliu, this meant long-distance orders, and for Laoyang, 
this meant orders from and to bustling areas.  
 
70 Dazhuan and sanben are higher education institutes in China. 
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Drivers also tended to react passively in the face of passenger offences because they 
did not consider Didi to be as fair to them as much as they were to riders, and neither 
did they have the time to deal with the burdensome processes of settling conflicts. As 
Laoyang put it:  
Spending time educating the riders or arguing with Didi is not worth it. You 
can even understand by thinking with your toes that Didi always sides with 
the riders. My experience teaches me the same. Didi is never fair. It never 
listens to us and puts itself in our shoes. Even though it was finally found out 
to be the passengers’ fault, so what? We never get any compensation for our 
losses, I mean, the time we spent in handling it. Rather than wasting time on 
that, spending it on two more orders seems to me more practical. 
Although drivers tended to avoid conflicts, they did consider it to be part of their 
cost, and although they attributed problems partly to riders’ personal attainment, they 
did recognise Didi’s role in this process. For Xiaoli, Didi’s lack of effective 
measures to regulate rider behaviour was intentional, and in doing so, it sought to 
reduce costs by shifting the responsibilities to the drivers: 
Didi…  knows well how to leave all the problems to us and at our cost, 
fleecing us as much as they can… they are absolutely bandits. But to the 
passengers, it acts like a bitch, pleasing them without principles. 
 
6.5 Struggle and resistance  
So far, I have painted a rather pessimistic picture regarding what it is like to be a 
Didi driver. I have argued that while most drivers were attracted to Didi in the first 
place because it was a profitable and freer option, at the end of the day, it often did 
not take them long to figure out that it was not much freer than the factories. As the 
analysis above shows, relations in production of Didi as experienced by my 
participants are better characterised as the exploitation and extraction of surplus 
value becoming more transparent and multifaceted, strategies of control reconfigured 
to become ever more despotic and coercive, and spaces of negotiation that 
previously served to organize consent and soften the antagonistic relationship 
between managers and workers on the shop floor have vanished. As used by Didi, 
digital technologies are, to use Tang’s metaphor, like the gold crown on Sun 
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Wukong’s head, which might on the surface look fancy but Sun Wukong needs to be 
put under the close control of his master Tang Sanzang who knows how to tighten 
the crown by chanting magic words.  
However, where there is dominance, there is also struggle and resistance. Among my 
respondents and their colleagues in Dongguan, struggles happened on both mundane 
and eventful bases, at both individual and collective levels. The only individual-
based mode of resistance I observed happened in attempts to circumvent Didi’s 
technological despotism through use of plug-in apps. I am aware of the current 
debate within the field on workers’ space of agency under the platform economy, 
where a central argument is that workers are technologically literate and are actively 
making sense of the algorithm, and that they remake a set of ‘labour algorithms’ by 
‘inputting’ diverse work practices in the labour process. Typical evidence they offer 
is, for example, veteran deliverymen choosing a different route from that suggested 
by the algorithm based on rich local knowledge, or female domestic workers leaving 
the platform to return to traditional domestic worker dispatch agencies (Liang 2017; 
Sun P 2019). But in what way do these strategies represent struggles and resistance 
from below? From my point of view, if in doing so they have truly made decisions 
diverging from what the apps suggest (for example, the different routes taken by 
food delivery drivers) during work, this does not necessary challenge the labour 
regime to which the technology is integral. These seem to me more like factory 
workers hopping to another factory or trying to figure out how to perform tasks in a 
less physically-demanding way, which can be best seen as tactics to make the job 
more bearable. 
The plug-in apps, on the other hand, have disrupted Didi’s technological despotism 
at its core. Whereas the drivers tended to use different plug-ins, there were generally 
two ways in which these apps circumvented Didi’s system: one focused on pricing – 
these plug-ins allowed drivers to set the price by themselves; and the other targeted 
the order dispatching system, allowing drivers to assert themselves in positions of 
higher priority within Didi’s algorithm, to set their own preferences concerning 
riders and orders, change their GPS location, reject orders without punishment, and 
even pre-arrange orders for the next day. Like the WeChat plug-ins popular among 
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rijie intermediaries, all these bot apps were created by small, local companies in 
Dongguan, Shenzhen and Guangzhou.71  
Not surprisingly, this activity has invited attention and reaction from Didi. In 
collaboration with the government, it has launched several rounds of crackdown 
campaigns. It may be surprising that developing and reselling such apps was illegal 
in China, and some of the developers and resellers have been arrested for “providing 
programs and tools to hack and illegally control computer-based information 
systems”72 and sentenced to up to three years in prison (Li T 2018). For my 
respondents, it was not uncommon to find the plug-ins no longer working two weeks 
after installation. But so long as there was an entire industry behind it, new plug-ins 
continued to emerge and replace older ones, usually offered for free or at a very low 
price to existing users.  
At the collective level, Didi drivers were the most militant group I encountered. 
During the fieldwork, I witnessed two Didi strikes, while most of my informants 
either reported having experience of strikes or had heard about them in various 
WeChat groups. For example, Nian surprised me when he told me there were five 
Didi strikes in Dongguan in the month before we met. While three of them lasted for 
only a few days, two lasted for over a week.  
Thus, WeChat groups provided a crucial infrastructure in connecting drivers and in 
mobilisation. Unlike in many factory strikes, these chat groups were not formed 
solely for organisational purposes (Wang 2015; Zhang L 2015) but were standing 
groups the drivers actively used in day-to-day work and life, with some of them 
established by local businesses and others by individuals along lines of friendship 
and locality. In normal times, these groups were where they shared complaints and 
experiences in driving, where they notified each other of traffic police, and where 
they gathered with friends and acquaintances and met new friends for late-night 
barbeques and beer after a day’s work. In short, these were a space where they 
connected with each other and formed what A’wen called the ‘jiurou xiongdi’, 
brotherly acquaintance, and ‘zhanyou’, comrade, a connection that was not as close 
 
71 I was unable to find any website for the plug-ins my respondents used, but see https://www.ddvip6688.com/dljm for one 
developed by a Beijing-based company. There were also local companies trying to gather orders from Didi to create an order 
pool and generate profits by redistributing them to the drivers, but this was unfavourable for my respondents so long as it took 
away a proportion of their already slim profits. 
72 This was written into the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China in 2009.  
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as brothers or friends but provided sufficient grounds for strategic solidarity to 
emerge at the point of resistance.  
The main appeal of the two strikes I observed related to pay cuts and restrictive work 
practices. In the mobilisation process, a clear sense of the antagonism between the 
interests of Didi and ‘we the drivers’ could be observed. Discursively, masculinity 
defined as xue xing (literally meaning ‘the spirit of blood’, which could be 
understood as courage and uprightness) and guqi (integrity) was used to mobilise the 
drivers, who were predominantly male. To avoid strike-breakers, they even called on 
the participant drivers to place fake orders to non-participants to disrupt their 
operation to finally force participation. The following quote is an open letter Nian 
showed me that was widely circulated in the WeChat groups of Dongguan drivers 
before one strike: 
Dear all, this letter is written on behalf of the interest of us Didi drivers as a 
collective. We should understand Didi treats us worse and worse. For 
example, whether it is us or the passengers who cancel the order, at the end 
of the day, it is us who are punished and fined. The fault is always ours. The 
passengers are too picky and too quick to give us low ratings. And the price 
in Dongguan is so much lower than Shenzhen and never rises. 
All in all, Didi’s policy is so exploitative and repressive that no one should 
bear it anymore. We need to stage a strike, with full participation. Whilst we 
are on strike, try to make as many orders as possible and cancel it once it is 
accepted. Why do this? To increase the cancellation rate of the strike-
breakers. If they call you, tell them today is the strike day. If they are still not 
convinced, complain to Didi about them as a rider. Please all Didi drivers 
stand in solidarity. Please spread this letter to your WeChat groups. We need 
to make sure Didi has no car to use on that day. If you are a man with 
xuexing [guts] and guqi [standing tall], please repost. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter continued discussion of nongmingong’s work experience under 
economic digitalisation, and the focus herein is on Didi as an emerging form of 
mediation, that is, platform-based labour. I started by establishing the characteristics 
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of driving Didi as an ICTs-mediated capitalist labour process. By comparison with 
the factory as an ideal type, I pointed out that, in terms of ownership structure and 
relationship with the state, Didi is a capitalist enterprise. Although on the surface it is 
the drivers who own the means of production – the car – as information provided by 
companies like Didi increasingly becomes an indispensable raw material in the 
production of transportation services as service commodity, a car is hardly an 
effective means of production without their mediation. Hence, rather than enhancing 
their bargaining power, to require drivers to own or rent a car to register as a driver 
only adds to their cost. The ways in which revenue is distributed and surplus labour 
secured in the labour process means no longer just translating as much of workers’ 
labour power into labour actualised in the immediate productive process, but surplus 
value is extracted in a relatively transparent manner in Didi. Further, because of the 
differences in the nature of the products and differences in the intentions of different 
types of capital, to obscure and secure surplus also means seizing a larger market 
share and maintaining monopoly status. 
I then turned to the drivers’ subjective experiences of Didi under such a labour 
regime. I argued that they tend to make sense of this experience by comparison with 
their past factory experience. One main motivation that made them turn to and stay 
with Didi was that they found it freer than factories, for it allowed them to not work 
when in dire situations, and they no longer had to bear managerial despotism and the 
depressing physical and social environments characteristic of the factory. But this 
option was not equally accessible to everyone.  
Thanks to the online and offline discussion groups they engaged with in everyday 
life, their perceived relationship with Didi was based not only on individual 
experiences, but also on collective, mediated and historical experiences. The contrast 
of Didi’s policies before and after it achieved market leadership inspired in them a 
sense of betrayal and antagonism. Comparing driving experience with factory 
experience, they believed the so-called ‘driver-partner’ relationship to be deceptive, 
having the effect of shifting a significant part of the operational costs on to them. 
Related to this, they found that while Didi claims to take 20% from their income as 
commission, it actually extracts much more than that.  
At the day-to-day level, their sense of being controlled, taken advantaged of and 
exploited was intense. After Didi’s aggressive price war and frenzied expansion, the 
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number of drivers grew, riders dropped, and the profit margin diminished for both 
drivers and the company. In response to this condition, Didi’s strategy was not to 
continue its price war strategy but to introduce a bonus scheme that encouraged 
drivers to accept all the orders assigned by it and to complete as many as possible, 
regardless of whether these orders led to profits for them. This created mounting 
discontent among the drivers. Adding to this, Didi also linked the customer rating 
system with these two systems, which further strengthened their control and 
exploitation over the drivers by putting them under the riders’ gaze.  
A key point in these processes is that there are no effective channels and 
mechanisms through which drivers’ voices can be heard and grievances aired. On the 
one hand, Didi’s technological system is essentially a capitalist one whose design, 
maintenance and update are carried out by Didi according to a ‘global optimum’ 
principle defined as inter-driver time and cost effectiveness and efficiency. 
Ironically, as partners, the drivers have no say in this process. On the other hand, in 
this essentially automated and impersonal system, the intentions and reasons behind 
the drivers’ day-to-day decisions in production (for example, why they want to reject 
an order) are reduced to the value of some parameter within the system whose 
meaning is programmed and pre-determined. Plus, its offline grievance apparatus 
almost always fails. Thus, the ‘human factors’ – for example, Lee’s ‘internal power 
system of regional and kinship relations’ and Zhou’s laoxiang relationship – that 
serve to organise consent and facilitate negotiation on the shop floor are almost 
entirely eliminated from the labour process. 
Under such technological despotism, most of the time the drivers choose to bear with 
it silently, for they cannot afford to raise their concerns. But this deepens their sense 
of exploitation, of being controlled and powerless. Many men feel their sense of 
masculinity deeply threated or consider their jobs to be meaningless.  
But the drivers were not always docile: facing this increasingly despotic and 
authoritarian production regime, their struggle and resistance took place on both an 
everyday and collective basis. Didi drivers were perhaps the most militant group I 
encountered, and this echoed the observation of China Labour Bulletin, which 
documented more than 300 strikes among drivers nationwide from September 2017 
(see also CLB 2018; Crothall 2018; Dai 2018). Among my respondents, none 
considered it an effective means of struggle to learn about the system and bend it to 
 170 
 
their own ends. They preferred to use bot apps that allowed them to circumvent 
Didi’s technological system. It is interesting that these apps are often developed by 
local, small companies in a time when China’s Internet industry is dominated by big 
tech companies, and that these are actually criminalised in China. 
In terms of collective actions, the underlying concerns include pay cuts and 
restrictive work practices, and WeChat provides a platform in connecting the drivers 
and in mobilisation. Based on the cases I observed, due to the absence of a confined, 
physical workplace and the lack of a human factor in the labour process, solidarity 
emerged less along lines of pre-existing relationship like tongxiang, same place-of-
origin, or shared physical spaces like dormitories that were previously effective in 
collective action organization (Perry 1993; Chan and Pun 2009; Chan 2013; Wang 
2015). Instead, solidarity emerged more through the relations forged among the 
drivers in online WeChat groups through day-to-day discussions and offline get-
togethers, a relationship they called jiurou pengyou or zhanyou. As for strategies of 
mobilisation, the distinction and antagonism between Didi’s interest and that of ‘us 
drivers’ as a group is made explicit. Since the vast majority of the drivers are male 
and their experience with Didi is gendered, discourses of masculinity are frequently 
invoked. They also take advantage of their double identities in relation to Didi – as 
producers and consumers – to play with its system and achieve ‘force mobilisation’.  
So far, I have focused primarily on nongmingong’s experience at the point of 
production. As I stated at the end of chapter 5, this is important not just because 
production is a key site of class formation and struggle, but this seems to be what 
they talked to me most and concerned most about. After all, for many, it is financial 
gains that in the first place motivate their decision to migrate. Having said this, they 
do not work 24 hours a day and they do have a life outside the world of work. 
Production aside, these reproductive activates also are contested and constitute their 
experience of the digital transformation of the economy, and the two mutually 
penetrate and construct. In the next chapter, I turn to their experience in the realm of 
reproduction, with a particular focus on media consumption.  
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Chapter 7 Nongmingong, Popular Media Culture, and the Bitter and 
Precarious Structure of Feeling 
 
7.1 Introduction 
A common scene on the shop floor during work intervals: right after the forewoman 
turns off the green-coloured assembly conveyor system, the lights go off and the 
machines continue to produce sharp noises. In the relative dimness of the workshop, 
everyone readily puts their work aside, yawning and stretching, pulling their cell 
phones out of their grey uniform pockets. Xiaolu yells cheerfully at several other 
women: “Laotaipo, Lijie, come here. What do you think of The Times We Had, that 
TV drama? Is it good?” Sitting next to her, Kaiping slightly leans over and joins 
their conversation. They quickly form a circle, leaning against the workstation, and 
begin to discuss recent events on iQiyi or Tencent Video73, sharing what they find 
interesting, commenting on what they dislike. From time to time, loud laughter and 
vulgar four-letter words burst out, amusing yet inconsequential for many.  
From the other end of the assembly line comes 22-year-old Dazhong, one of only 
four male workers in our line, who has worked at Weida for seven years, since 
dropping out of middle school. As usual, he shuffles lazily across the workshop, with 
a cigarette pinched between the tips of his thumb and middle finger. He always 
forgets his lighter but never needs to worry: as the factory offers no smoking 
facilities, the toilet has become a space for smokers, and it is not difficult to find a 
lighter there. Amid the dense cloud of smoke, he lights the cigarette with ease, taking 
a long, long drag, blowing out smoke rings. However ephemeral, the subtropical heat 
of Dongguan, the sweltering motionless air, the severe strain of work, the dust 
hanging over the aisle, even the pungent smell from the pad printers, all these 
suddenly become not so intolerable. Squatting against the wall, Dazhong begins to 
circulate a WeChat piece about rural official corruption. Dazhong and his cigarette 
mates do not like soap operas and variety shows, for these are “entirely made up, 
with no reference to reality, in which only young girls will be interested”. They 
instead prefer competitive video games, and short online video clips and news posts.   
 
73 iQiyi and Tencent Video are major online video streaming apps in China.  
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While nongmingong watching television is not a new phenomenon, watching the 
content of their own choice on their own screens is a recent development. This owes 
much to the growth of the domestic smartphone market and the reform of the 
telecommunications sector. Laoganma recalled that before 2014, she and her 
colleagues used to exchange family gossip with each other during work breaks, and 
they had to go to the factory’s common room or corner shops nearby to watch TV. 
Her memory of this was not a good one, for the common room was always crowded 
and she could never choose what she liked, not to mention the endless whining buzz 
of mosquitos. Later, some had the option to buy downloaded TV plays or pirate 
DVDs from local shops, but for many, that was an expensive option. It was not until 
recently, after Kingcard and its competing services74  were released, that watching 
favoured content at their chosen time and place became commonplace.  
However, this newfound freedom may be not as natural and innocent as it seems. As 
has been well established by cultural theorists, any communicative process can be 
understood as a power-laden circuit in which culture is (re-)produced and subjects 
sutured through the means of language and practices of signification (Hall 1973, 
1997, 2009; Fiske 1987; du Gay 1997). On the one hand, media messages do not 
grow on trees, but are produced out of the apparatuses, frameworks of knowledge, 
social relations and practices of production of an entire industrial system of media, 
which in turn operates within distinctive conditions of power and regulation. In this 
process, the dominant seeks to encode and signify social reality in certain ways, 
naturalize certain ways of seeing and prioritise certain preferred meanings, while 
repressing or rendering others invisible.  
On the other hand, the circuit is not complete unless the messages are appropriated 
as meaningful discourses and meaningfully decoded by the audience. In this moment 
of reception, the audience, occupying specific social positions (including class, 
gender, race and place of origin), draw on resources available to them and actively 
interpret dominant messages in the specific context of reception (Ang 1989, 1991, 
1996; Morley 1992; Livingstone 1992; Silverstone, 1994). Out of this process they 
 
74 Kingcard is a type of pre-paid SIM card service that is co-promoted by China Unicom and Tencent. It offers monthly mobile 
phone plans that allow unlimited access to apps developed by the two companies and their partners. In recent years, services 
like Kingcard have seen substantial growth in numbers, with Internet companies reaching all kinds of agreements with mobile 
service operators to secure market share.  
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form their own views and meanings about social reality and position themselves in 
relation to others and to society, suturing themselves as subjects.  
Based as it is on the national context of Western industrialised societies in the mass 
communication era, this understanding of media reception as a process of 
identification and subject formation has in recent years been enriched by various 
contributions. For example, Martín-Barbero (1993) contested the cultural 
imperialism thesis then dominant in the study of culture in Latin America by 
advancing a radically historical perspective. For him, the nation goes beyond a 
rational body of decision-making but is simultaneously a field full of contradictions, 
where cultural identity is under constant negotiation. Antique (2016) observed the 
banalization of transnational media. He reaffirmed the usefulness of a reception 
approach to understand the impact of ‘global imagination’ but stressed the necessity 
to consider the multiple configurations of transnational audiences in specific 
material, geographical, social and temporal relations. Others have debated the 
blurred boundaries between audience and producer, and interpretation and 
participation (Livingstone 2003, 2013; Bird, 2011; Rosen 2012; Carpentier 2011; 
Livingstone and Das 2013). Despite their different perspectives, all agree – 
technological and social changes in the mediascape notwithstanding – that: 1) 
questions of culture, power and determination remain crucial; 2) the interpretative 
relations between audiences and texts remain crucial sites of empirical investigation; 
3) the empirical active audience remains a crucial and fruitful point of departure, 
though the notion of ‘active audience’ is becoming increasingly problematic; and 4) 
a radically historical and contextual approach is needed. 
Drawing on this framework, I argue that the scenarios described at the beginning of 
this chapter represent a key moment of nongmingong’s ICTs-mediated class 
formation, this time not at the point of production, but at the point of culture. The 
communicative process, as much as the labour process, is a site where class relations 
are lived and experienced through the seemingly mundane practices of audiencing 
(Fiske 1992), and understandings of one’s class position, class interest and 
possibilities of class actions forged, contested and constantly updated.  
Much like it was in Hall’s time, nongmingong’s media consumption is still largely 
dominated by the industrial system of media production and distribution, albeit one 
that is reinvented by incorporating ICTs into the organization of these processes. 
 174 
 
While producers and consumers may have multiplied and diversified, the underlying 
power structure has not. In the introduction chapter, drawing on critical 
communication scholar Hong Yu (2017), I pointed out that China’s digital content 
industry has recently been allowed to flourish by the state as one way to offset the 
adverse effect of economic downturn and to pursue economic restructuring. In this 
process, private – both domestic and transnational – and state capital flooded in, and 
multi-channel networks (MCN)75 rose to dominate (Topklout 2019), while the state 
continued to normalise, synergise and rationalize market power in a decentralised 
manner to maintain control (Zhao 2008). In a time of mounting social economic 
crisis censorship abounds, with the new hierarchical state organ of Cyberspace 
Administration created and algorithm adopted. The digital content industry continues 
to be urban-centric and middle class oriented, caught between the party line and the 
bottom line (Zhao 1998), although new dynamics have developed – from my 
observations, there was a growing subsector specifically targeting lower classes like 
nongmingong.  
In this chapter, I discuss the relationship between the booming digital content 
industry and nongmingong’s class formation. Following their daily routine at Weida 
gave me first-hand, detailed knowledge about nongmingong’s choices and 
engagement with digital media content during and after work. Participation in the 
above-described shop floor/toilet discussions gave me a sense of how this reception 
was context-dependent and what the participants made of it. These observations 
prepared me for later in-depth interviews, where, acknowledging that some content 
mattered more for them than others, I asked them to name 5- 10 pieces they 
themselves found most interesting, relevant or inspiring, and directly elicited 
answers about their preferences and interpretations of them. Where possible, I 
watched or read some excerpts with them, asking them to talk me through the 
examples. 
 
 
75 Normally, MCNs do not produce content by themselves. Instead, they gather content produced by small and scattered 
producers and promote and monetize them by working with distributive channels like video platforms. They generate profits by 
taking a certain proportion of dividends.  
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7.2 Alienating dagong life and entertainment-seeking mode of viewing 
When I asked, ‘why do you watch digital media?’, almost all participants gave me 
the same answer without a second thought: “It is funny and relaxing. Dagong life is 
frustrating and boring and you need some entertainment”.  
Dagong life is indeed tiring and frustrating for many workers. Harsh working 
conditions, heavy family burdens and lack of institutional support aside, labour 
processes at Weida were organised by Taylorism. For me and my colleagues, this 
meant sitting or standing for 12 hours a day, repetitively performing the same 
deskilled, timed and dull job with only short toilet and meal breaks. Workplace 
management prioritises productivity over workers’ well-being. Intensive work left us 
little time and energy to deal with problems outside work.  
Ruizhuo was 35 and joined Weida as pugong76 in 2014. The long-hours of dull work 
had pushed him to look for less-demanding jobs: “Every day back home, I am 
always too tired to do anything. Sometimes I just got grumpy for no reason. Even a 
call from home can piss me off. All I want is to lie in bed and chill”. Qunxian, 
mother of two, had worked in Weida for eight years. Accustomed to the physical 
pain of factory work, what she disliked was her feeling of indignity as an adult in her 
30s:  
You might find this derisible, but every day when I wake up, I have two 
mouths to feed. My daughter keeps asking for money. Too much pressure. I 
just have to rely on this job. When I don't have to deal with these, I just want 
to stay with myself, doing whatever I like that can make me laugh. 
The statement “dagong life is frustrating and boring” refers to the repetitive work, 
inhumane management and heavy family burden; it also implies the absence of 
much-needed quality social and emotional support. When I asked Xiaolu, who I had 
befriended when we talked, what about factory life made her frustrated, her face 
turned red and she answered in a low voice, “let me tell you what I really think. I 
often feel very lonely, but still I don't open up to people here because I don’t trust 
them. All they want is to gossip”. Qunxian did have close relatives around, yet she 
also found the biweekly one-day break too long:  
 
76 Pugong are rank-and-file workers.  
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We dagong people have nothing much to talk or celebrate. All is not well. 
Nobody will put themselves in your shoes. Relatives are no different. Unlike 
you, talking with them only makes me more anxious. I personally often sleep 
the whole day. When I am awake, I watch TV drama to kill time. 
Digital media also became popular entertainment because of the lack of affordable 
offline options. In industrial towns like Tangxia, infrastructures were historically 
designed for industrial purposes. Recently gentrified, it was not surprising that the 
cinemas, malls and fine restaurants were meant for the middle classes, being far from 
the factories, and expensive. Public stadia and libraries supposedly open to all were 
subject to abuse of power and served only local officials and their associates. Around 
the migrant villages there were only Internet cafes, snooker bars, and massage 
parlours that more or less involved prostitution.  
Songli was a badminton player and swimmer before joining Weida. When he first 
arrived, he found it difficult to get away with boredom during breaks:  
Occasionally I do go to dinner with colleagues and fellow countrymen, but 
most of them have a family so there is not always one to go. I thought about 
swimming before, but the only pool in town is not open to the public. There is 
a badminton club half an hour by bike from our factory. Guess the price? 
RMB 100/hour! That is only for the bosses, not us!  
He soon turned to ICTs-enabled media services. In his cramped rented room, he 
showed me his ‘television kit’: an armchair from the landlord, a Kingcard with a 50-
yuan monthly plan offering unlimited access to all apps developed by Tencent and 
its partners, a 6.5-inch Huawei pad, as well as a Bluetooth speaker and a DJ dance 
light, both from Taobao.  
For many, this scenario of the working class using mass media in their leisure time 
for escapist entertainment is reminiscent of a key debate in the field. Smythe and his 
followers (Smythe 1977, 2012; Meehan 1984) emphasized the material aspect of this 
scenario. For them, under mass communication and monopoly capitalism, working 
class people worked 24 hours a day. The job front aside, they performed marketing 
functions and reproduced labour power in deceptive ‘leisure’ time, and in this 
process their audience power was exploited and sold as a commodity to advertisers. 
Focusing primarily on communicative institutions, this audience commodity thesis 
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reveals how mass communication economically contributes to the domination of the 
working class and sustains capitalism. However, audience activity is here reduced to 
an economic act that is meaningful only to communication institutions as 
demographics and ratings. It fails to explain why audiences, if they are doomed to be 
dominated, constantly enter into this loop without coercion (Ang 1991). This raises 
the question of how such content becomes meaningful to them.  
From the discussion above, it is clear that nongmingong’s entertainment-seeking 
mode of viewing should not be understood solely as audience work. Insofar as none 
of the workers indicated coercion, it is fair to say that everyday audiencing is also 
meaningful to them. Subjecting their statements to closer scrutiny, I argue that this 
meaningfulness cannot be fully captured by the notion of ‘mere entertainment’ as 
extant literature tends to frame it. He (2015: 86) is a case in point:  
[nongmingong’s Internet use] limits to mere entertainment, simple 
interpersonal communication… they seldom realized more powerful 
functions of the Internet like learning, enlarging occupational network, even 
claiming rights. For them, the Internet is like a friend … This is not 
surprising, for their life in big cities is lonely and dull as dishwater. 
What this view indicates is that digital media for nongmingong is at best a trivial 
form of ‘mere entertainment’ that meets individual psychological needs, helping 
soothe and kill loneliness and boredom characteristic of modern urban life. This is 
banal and irrational when compared to the ‘advanced functions’ (He 2015: 86) of the 
Internet, like self-development and democratic participation, which they fail to 
engage in mainly because of their lack of motivation, time and zhili (intelligence) to 
fully embrace its potential (He 2015).  
Diverging from this individualistic and elitist view, I insist that rather than disdained 
as inferior or trivial, nongmingong’s pleasure that is derived from purportedly 
vulgar, trashy and unimportant digital entertainment needs to be valorised in its own 
right. This is not to categorically defend the digital content industry, rather I contend 
that this pleasure, however escapist and transient, is real and important for them, not 
because it fills their spiritual void of a generally urban kind, but it allows them to 
deal with the particular pressures, sufferings and tensions of dagong experience in 
contemporary China.  
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Dagong experience is arguably urban as geographically it occurs within urban 
territories. However, it goes far beyond what can be captured by the opaque notion 
of ’lonely and boring life in big cities’. Growing out of the overlapping forces of 
state socialism, market capitalism, Chinese patriarchy, legal authoritarianism and 
rural-urban duality, the dagong experience, as characterised by many authors, 
echoing my interviewees’ accounts, is one of neoliberal individualisation, extreme 
alienation, increasing precarity, enduring liminality and uncertainty, mounting 
socioeconomic pressure and exclusion, with exceptional emotional costs (Lee 2007; 
Lu and Pun 2010; Sun 2017, 2019).  
Under such harsh conditions, digital entertainment provides a space for 
nongmingong to at least temporarily escape from these daily miseries. This echoes 
Sun (2014) finding that nongmingong preferred mainstream cinematic narratives 
about them rather than supposedly more critical elitist productions that highlight 
their miseries, where the prime rationale is gaoxiao – making them laugh. Although 
this does not solve their life problems, the pleasure and relief, as mentioned earlier, 
is nevertheless real. It allows them to throw up a screen between themselves and 
their dual responsibilities towards the family and the factory. This is a space where 
they can, in their own words, stay with themselves and be who they are, not 
compromising or suspending their own desires and wishes for closest families and 
friends, but freely choosing whatever they like to watch or read and please 
themselves. This sense of pleasure, freedom and self-control, I argue, is central to 
their experience with digital media. In the increasingly individualized and gentrified 
industrial towns of the PRC, digital media is the most affordable and convenient 
option of this kind.   
Escapist relief aside, some do see an instructive value in these relaxing moments, 
especially in terms of self-transformation into independent, mature, responsible and 
adaptable individuals who keep abreast of the times. Homing was 26 and unmarried 
when one of his fingers was cut in a work accident. At that time, limited material 
conditions, physical disability and his unsatisfactory marital status almost destroyed 
his confidence. In his rented room, we had a conversation about his digital media 
use, and I was surprised that he subscribed to five WeChat public accounts offering 
advice on how to be a good man and was a dedicated reader of them all. Burying 
head in arm, he smiled shyly and confessed:  
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I was really frustrated when first injured. A man reaching his 30s, I was a 
real nobody, no jobs, no money, no wife! It was Tonggen77 that rekindled 
hope in me: I want to be stronger and have a normal family life. Now I am 
more positive. Living alone, not wanting my parents to worry, these public 
accounts are useful as they teach me a lot about the unwritten rules and 
principles of society. 
However, to valorise this pleasure and its instructive value should not obstruct us 
from the power struggles behind this pleasurable and edifying process. This shifts 
our attention to the micro workings of media power in the interpretive process of 
everyday audience sense-making. In what follows, I synthesise my participants’ 
observation with their self-reported preference for digital media content. I focus on 
what this content is, how they find it relevant, interesting or thought-provoking, how 
they interpret it and in what context, and what kinds of understanding of lived 
experience and boundaries between the probable and the improbable – that is, class 
disposition – thus emerge. I conclude the chapter by discussing the challenges and 
opportunities for emancipatory class subjects to emerge from this cultural politics, 
understood in a classic Marxist sense.  
Despite the shared entertainment-seeking motivations, participants’ preferences are 
closely related to their classed and gendered identities and concerns. In what follows, 
I discuss four themes or genres thus emerging. These represent key aspects, as far as 
my fieldwork is concerned, of nongmingong’s ICTs-mediated class formation 
through digital media in present-day China. In this process, they negotiate and 
constantly update their understanding, drawing on media texts as well as their own 
structures of feeling and discursive resources, of what it means to be semi-proletariat 
nongmingong, positioning and imagining themselves in relation to their middle class 
counterparts, the state, the opposite gender and the rural-urban duality. 
 
 
77 Tonggen is an NGO specializing in legal aid for work injuries and occupational disease. A pseudonym is used here to protect 
the organization. Many nongmingong, because of their lack of education, find it difficult to navigate the complex work-injury 
compensation application system. Tonggen basically prepared the documents needed and made the application on Homing’s 
behalf.  
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7.3 Watching urban middle class life in shenghuoju  
For most female nongmingong in the Weida factory, what they call shenghuoju are 
invariably an important influence on their perceptions and images of middle class 
life. This is especially true when their daily round of activities centres around the 
routine of production. A term of their own invention, shenghuoju literally means TV 
dramas about life. In daily interaction, my interviewees used the term to refer to a set 
of melodramas with metropolitan settings that blend different aspects of urban 
middle class life: office politics, romantic relationships, and individual development; 
exploring themes like self-realisation (especially female), individual development, 
love and morality. Interestingly, none focused exclusively on jiating lunli, family 
ethics. Textually, shenghuoju share a similar storyline: they usually start with the 
protagonists born into or encountering major life problems or challenges of a 
particular kind, which develop as they try hard to resolve contradiction after 
contradiction through their own efforts and with the help of others, and ends with all 
challenges solved.  
Upon my arrival at the factory, the then-phenomenal First Half of My Life quickly 
gripped large urban audiences and dominated their TV talk. As a shenghuoju, First 
Half is typical in many ways: it sets the scene in metropolitan Shanghai and centres 
around the intertwined lives, loves and struggles, ups and downs in marriage, 
romantic relationships and careers of four main characters, all taking senior 
managerial positions in the high-income consulting industry – except Luo Zijun, a 
full-time housewife – in melodramatic fashion. Adapted from Hong Kong-based 
writer Yishu’s social realist novel of the same name (which in turn drew its 
inspiration from Lu Xun’s 1925 novel Shang Shi, Regret for The Past), First Half 
explores what it means to be an independent woman – a theme the two authors 
explored in 1950s HK and 1920s China – in contemporary urban China.78  
I felt rather perplexed about the immense popularity of dramas like First Half. Given 
the sharp contrast between the dagong experience and urban middle class life, I had 
expected my participants to find these dramas irrelevant, unrealistic, too posh and 
experience-distant, and hence show no interest at all. I also expected that, because of 
cultural proximity (Georgiou 2010), they would be interested in rural dramas like 
 
78 See screenwriter Qin Wen’s interview: http://m.xinhuanet.com/book/2017-07/13/c_129654193.htm  
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Rural Love Story. However, it turned out to be the opposite: while the few viewers of 
Rural Love Story complained about its implausibility, with the term shenghuoju, my 
interviewees implied that it was these dramas about urban middle class life they 
found to be more relevant, realistic and ‘about life’. The following quotes are 
illustrative in this regard: 
My criteria for choosing TV drama is ‘life’. I click open a lot, but not many I 
continue to watch full episodes. Usually I watch the first episode to see if it is 
about life. Everything I watch is about life...  (Laopen, discussing The Times 
We Had). 
I like First Half of My Life very much and have watched it twice. Now I am 
working from home, so I can watch it there. It attracts me because it is very 
realistic (Hejie, discussing First Half of My Life). 
What I like most recently is Pretty Man… Though it is entirely made up – TV 
dramas are made up, but you can always find people like them around you. 
(Qunxian, discussing Pretty Man). 
Recalling the synopsis of First Half, it is obvious that in terms of life conditions and 
everyday concerns, lives portrayed in shenghuoju and dagong experiences are far 
from similar. One also has a difficult time imagining that female nongmingong may 
prioritise self-realisation and independence over family concerns. This surface 
paradox prompts me to ask: in what ways are these dramas realistic and ‘about life’ 
for them? How is it that they can “always find people like them” around them? 
Realism is a recurring theme in audience reception studies, and the precise meanings 
of this judgement are found to be class/gender-specific and genre-related. Radway 
(1984), Long (1986) and Ang (1985) identified among Western middle class female 
audiences and readers of fictional romances and melodramas a deep allegiance to 
realism. A crucial mechanism through which this is established is ‘para-social 
interaction’ (Horton and Wohl 1956), that is, the audience emotionally identifying 
with and talking about the characters, evaluating their personal traits and experiences 
as if they were real people rather than constructed realities. On the other hand, Press 
(1991) observed among her US comedy audiences a similar pattern of working class 
female viewers recognizing middle class life scenarios on TV as realistic. She argued 
that they derived the sense of realism in a decidedly different way than the middle 
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class: not from emotional identification with characters, but distanced acceptance of 
the overall world or the ambience portrayed on TV, pertaining to details like specific 
plots, physical settings, moral issues and lessons learned – the accoutrements of 
middle class suburban houses.  
Interestingly, my female nongmingong did not recall much of the details of the 
dramas. Their recollections of shenghuoju when explaining what they found to be 
realistic had more in common with Ang’s middle class Dallas viewers, as they 
usually began by confessing emotional identification with the pitiful fate of the 
characters, before relating it to their own experience. Hejie admitted that she was a 
big fan of First Half. Since her husband pulled a few strings that allowed her to work 
from home, shenghuoju had been her loyal companion whilst working alone. On the 
hot Friday afternoon when we met, she was busy fusing charging cables with solder, 
with her 6-inch OPPO phone set up on a plastic dock in front of the soldering gun. It 
was the third time she had watched First Half. When pressed about what kept 
bringing her back to First Half, she further elaborated her notion of realism as she 
understood it: 
Similar things also happen in real life. That woman [Luo, the female 
protagonist], she stays at home as a housewife, looking after her husband 
and educating their kids. Later her husband has extramarital affairs and 
divorces her. She becomes single again and can only rely on herself. Such is 
life. You can rely on no one. This might sound cruel but simply the truth. I 
feel pity for her, but there is nothing we can do. 
In the quote above, Hejie mentioned little of concrete daily situations. Her narrative 
abstracted Luo’s personal divorce and struggles in her career from the immediate 
socio-economic setting of the drama in which it took place and framed it as general 
human experience. She talked about Luo as if she was a real person, rather than a 
character created by the screenwriters and presented through the audio-visual 
languages and techniques of the director, identifying with her emotionally and 
feeling pity and heartache for her. What motivated her emotional identification with 
Luo was her “bitter structure of feeling”, as manifested in her own words: “such is 
life”, “you can rely on no one”, “cruel but simply the truth”, “there is nothing we can 
do”. For Hejie, misfortune, cruelty, bad luck, precarity, helplessness and uncertainty 
were a normal and necessary part of life, and in her reception, First Half is 
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abstracted as a vehicle through which this notion of life is elaborated and conveyed. 
It is in this sense that she thought of it as realistic.  
Her bitter structure of feeling, of course, did not come from nowhere. As we first 
met on a personal occasion to which only close and trusted friends were invited79, in 
our interview Hejie was fairly open with me. Like most nongmingong, she was born 
into a family in reduced circumstances in a mountain village in Jiangxi, a less-
developed inland province in China. She dropped out of middle school after her 
father fell seriously ill, as a result of which her family became debt-ridden. The 
decision to follow her uncle into work in a Dongguan factory was made when she 
saw how her mother was rejected right and left when borrowing money to cover her 
father’s medical bills. Things became better for her after getting married. Her 
husband, according to her, was responsible, reliable and worldly-wise, making him 
foreman material. After he became foreman, he often used his influence to alleviate 
her workload. Recently, she was happy to be able to work from home, no longer 
having to bear unfair and disrespectful treatment.   
This emotional identification with characters based on the bitter structure of feeling 
is also manifest in Qunxian’s reception of Pretty Man, a trendy romantic drama 
concerning the love story of two protagonists from an upper middle class 
background. It is a shenghuoju in the sense that it started with the two protagonists 
breaking away from their families and working in a café to support their lives. The 
narrative proceeded with a typical romance storyline and contained standard 
elements of the genre, including male and female villains and foils. One month after 
watching it, in our discussion Qunxian recalled little of the romance part of it, but 
focused more on the bitter element: 
When he [the male lead] was young, he used to dagong to support himself. 
The girl [the female lead] was no better. Her father was ill. So, while she 
studied, she had to dagong to support herself and cover her father’s medical 
bills. Both are piteous. They suffered too much at such a young age. The 
actors act really well, and I feel real pity for them. Though this is not real – 
TV dramas must be made up, but you can always find people like them in 
real-world life, around you. I prefer this kind rather than those popular 
 
79 We first met over a dinner organized by Qunxian, Hejie’s elder sister on her mother’s side. At that party all invited guests 
except me were Qunxian’s relatives.  
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romance dramas… all about ‘you love me and I love you’… that is not what 
life is like. To use a metaphor, they are floating in the air. 
Though Qunxian was aware that TV dramas are fabricated, she nevertheless thought 
of Pretty Man as realistic, in so far as the two leads ‘dagong’, ‘suffered too much’ 
and she felt ‘pity’ for them, despite the fact that the two leads were actually running 
away from their multinational corporation-owning parents to whom they could easily 
return. Qunxian herself began to dagong in a shoe factory in Fujian province when 
she was 14 years old, not because her family was in a state of virtual penury, but 
because she did not do well at school and so was expected by her parents to work 
and support the family, particularly to pay her elder brother’s school fees. It is 
interesting that she used the term ‘dagong’ to describe the two leads’ temporary jobs 
at a café, for dagong in the daily use of the term, from my observation, denoted 
working class jobs distinguished from gongzuo, which is often associated with 
middle class jobs with higher income. Her distinction between Pretty Man and those 
romantic dramas that are “all about you love me and I love you” is telling, which 
might on the surface seem implausible since textually speaking Pretty Man was in 
large part a typical romantic drama. However, a text can never be read in its entirety 
and nongmingong are capable of ‘haggling’ about mainstream narratives as much as 
any other groups (Ang 1987; Sun 2014). For Qunxian, Pretty Man is meaningful and 
realistic not because of its romance but because of the bitter element at the 
beginning, which bore a closer relationship to her own experience.  
So far, I have argued that female nongmingong favoured middle class shenghuoju 
because of its realistic nature, which, according to them, stems from their emotional 
identification with certain characters based on a bitter structure of feeling they 
derived from their own dagong experience. For them, the middle class life portrayed 
therein is real insofar as it presents life as one full of bitterness, precariousness and 
suffering, and as far as this bitter structure of feeling is concerned, there is no 
difference between them and their middle class counterparts.  
While this represents a key moment of female nongmingong’s understanding of their 
relationship with the urban middle class, it does not follow that these dramas lured 
them into the illusion that the world is flat. But this awareness of the disparity does 
not undermine the level of realism they invest in these dramas. Rather, they tend to 
explain it in terms of individual suzhi (quality), wenhua and guanxi capital. Jinyu 
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also watched First Half. In our interview she provided a comment about Luo Zijun’s 
career trajectory – in First Half, Luo gets a position in a leading consultant company 
in Shanghai with high income and security: 
well, she is an able person, and finally gets a well-paid and stable job. But I 
think that is because she is educated and skilled and has a strong guanxi 
network. This is beyond my wildest dream for us who are meiyong, meibenshi 
and meiwenhua, incapable, unskilful and uneducated. Maybe my son can do 
this. But I have learned to be content with my lot, to like my life as it is [guo 
ziji de xiao rizi]... for us who are meiwenhua, you can’t expect too much. 
For Hejie, Luo’s career success is also ‘very realistic’,  
…her bestie’s boyfriend used his influence to help her. One of the mall’s 
managers fell in love with her and helped her out a lot. So, her success 
actually owes a lot to others’ help. We definitely need to be independent, you 
need be independent, but it would be useful to have some guanxi. 
This critique of their own identity as meiyong, meibenshi and meiwenhua, and the 
conviction that they deserve their less satisfactory status because of their lack of 
competence compared to their more successful middle class counterparts, can also be 
found in their reception to the representation of urban consumerist culture in 
shenghuoju. In her brief comment on The Times We Had, Laopen responded to a plot 
where the two protagonists travelled together in first-class cabins to Thailand to 
attend meditation classes: “only people who are youbenshi, capable, can travel 
abroad. For us useless people, we can only stand by and envy”. 
To summarise, spending most of their time in the workshop, shenghuoju with a 
metropolitan-setting that female nongmingong find relaxing is crucial in mediating 
their imagination of middle class life and relationship with the urban middle class. 
Shenghuoju cuts across genres and is marked by narratives reminiscent of ‘speaking 
bitterness’, by which Farquhar and Berry (2006) denote a dominant narrative in 
Chinese historical fiction that transforms local stories of personal suffering into 
collective narratives of blood and tears, and in so doing simultaneously constructs 
the nation and the subject. Shenghuoju also draws on personal suffrage but 
transforms it into tales of neoliberal individual development.  
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In their actual reception, what keeps drawing them back to shenghuoju is their 
realistic nature, defined in terms of their emotional identification with individual 
characters based on a bitter and precarious structure of feeling. This in turn 
contributes to the view that middle class life bears no fundamental difference from 
theirs in term of chiku (eating bitterness) and precariousness. Furthermore, they are 
cognizant of the sharp contrast between urban middle class life and their own, 
usually signified by better jobs, modern offices, abundant and fancy consumer 
goods. But this is also realistic for them insofar as it can be explained by the 
language of suzhi they take for granted, a pivotal technique of neoliberal 
governmentality in post-reform China in turning peasants into modern citizens 
(Anagnost 2004; Kipnis 2006; Yan 2008).  
 
7.4 Luogui going viral  
First released in 2014, Luogui is a phenomenal wangda80 that in less than one month 
generated more than 130 million views on one single platform on Tencent Video. 
This success notwithstanding, it has received little attention from mainstream media 
and academia. But this does not stop content producers mimicking its content, form 
and style, giving rise to what I call the Luogui genre among the recent MCNs-
dominated short videos upsurge in China. Although aesthetically unsophisticated, 
Luogui videos were intensively viewed, reposted and debated among my 
nongmingong interviewees of both genders. 
 
7.4.1 Luogui as a genre 
Luogui literally means ‘back home in dire straits’. It follows the homecoming 
journey of Qin, a peasant-turned-millionaire entrepreneur who has spent most of his 
life in business, disappointed by moral degeneracy engendered by the market, and 
feels nostalgic about the old norms of the xiangtu, earthbound, acquaintance society. 
The story revolves around the reactions of different people – his brother, sister, 
childhood friends, middle-school classmates, neighbours, former business partners 
who he once generously helped – to his disguise as a beggar and explores the tension 
 
80 Wangda is an Internet-based film and refers to a new mode of production, distribution and consumption. Normally, its crew 
members operate independently from traditional corporate modes of film production, and its distribution relies mainly on 
Internet-based content platforms.  
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between two contrasting sets of norms: that of the traditional, rural acquaintance 
society and that of the modern, urban market-oriented society.  
To speak of Luogui as a genre I mean the videos under discussion in this section are 
built roughly on a narrative structure and theme indistinguishable from Luogui. 
Theme-wise, central to this genre is the rural/traditional-urban/modern tension, 
though each are preoccupied with individual and isolated incidents – serious disease, 
abject poverty, bankruptcy crises and high-end consumption – and explores different 
aspects of it – kinship, trust, brotherhood or renqing. In terms of narrative structure, 
broken down in terms of Wright’s three essential stages in his study of the western81 
(Wright 1975), Luogui usually starts with an initial situation where a certain 
traditional value is challenged by a modern one, and proceeds with a complex set of 
intermediary interventions, before the threat finally gets removed and traditional 
values are restored. The most basic structure of embedded actions that cause and 
explain this process coherently are best captured by the nine logically related 
functions (Propp 1968) as follows: 
1) A82 hides his social identity (economic success) out of humbleness 
2) B acts antagonistically towards A because of his surface mediocrity or even 
failure, usually on occasions associated with high-end consumption, in a 
capricious, arbitrary and exaggerated manner 
3) A reacts with considerable patience, restraint and tolerance 
4) B‘s antagonism continues in a more aggravated manner   
5) C joins B in disparaging and insulting A while flattering B 
[after several rounds…] 
6) A passively reveals his real social identity through a third party 
7) B and C are surprised by A’s real identity and quickly admit their mistake, 
showing admiration of A, or fleeing with tails between legs 
8) A forgives or condemns B and C for their shallowness and wrongdoings in 
traditional moral terms  
 
81 The western is a genre of fiction often centred on the experience of nomadic cowboys or gunfighters armed with guns and 
riding horses, set primarily in the late 19th century in the American Old West. 
82 A = Hero, personification of traditional values, usually successful in business terms, predominantly male; B = Villain 1, less 
successful than A in business, predominantly male; C = villain 2, least successful in business, usually female; A, B and C were 
previously in a close relationship with each other within an acquaintance society norm. 
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9) A’s identity is restored; the moral value associated with it is reinstated 
[incidental music, usually viral hits among nongmingong on a relevant theme, for 
example, We Are Different, Brother of Life…] 
A slightly different variant of Luogui locates the tension between male characters of 
kinship or brotherhood relations. If there is a villain, it is usually the wife of one of 
the brothers. Typically, the threat is associated with real-world financial difficulties 
in subaltern lived experience, for example, a small business on the brink of 
bankruptcy or serious disease. It usually ends with one party, rich or otherwise, 
resolving things in an economically irrational way, either in return for a previous 
debt of gratitude or in defence of brotherhood and family values. Whatever the value 
and norm addressed, the title usually takes the form of suspense or exaggeration. 
For many (e.g. Liu N 2018), the Luogui, or the emerging Tuwei83 subculture on the 
Chinese Internet it belongs to, represents an autonomous form of rural youth self-
representation, and it gains popularity because it fulfils rural youth’s long-unmet 
desire of self-expression. On the other hand, moral panic abounds, with most 
censuring it as vulgar, nasty, inferior, pornographic, drug-related and crime-prone. 
Others are concerned about the message it spreads, particularly the reification of 
women and male supremacy, arguing that it will contaminate the subaltern mind, 
sparking further social unrest. Echoing the state’s campaign to clean up the Internet, 
these scholars call for joint efforts from the state and Internet companies to curb its 
rampant growth to represent an authentic, harmonious and positive rural culture.  
While I do agree with some of the feminist appraisals, much of this critique is 
merely an elitist debasement of popular culture in aesthetic terms, nothing more than 
the old distinction between high and popular culture taking on a new guise (Williams 
1974). Besides, it also mistakenly treats these videos as autonomous forms of self-
representation from below. Tracing the origins of Luogui videos reveals that most 
are professionally produced by contracted producers to be distributed through MCNs 
for profit, which can be better explained as the outcome of the rise of the digital 
content industry and the state-led campaign of mass entrepreneurship, rather than 
some newfound interest of the subaltern. It is this mediating force of economic 
interest that sustains the continuing production, mutation and diversification of the 
 
83 Countrified and folksy. 
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genre. More importantly, this critique fails to do justice to nongmingong as its 
fervent audience, for it rushes to the conclusion that detrimental content as such 
undermines the subaltern morality without attending to what they actually make of it. 
In interviews, my workmates told me quite another story. 
 
7.4.2 The dialectics of moral critique and pragmatic identification 
While realism is explicitly paramount to female nongmingong’s likes and dislikes of 
shenghuoju, in the case of Luogui videos the issue is more complicated. Jinyu’s 
response to a video entitled CEO Held in Contempt by Ex-wife When Buying A Ring 
for His Wife, but When Making the Payment… – a typical Luogui video featuring an 
ordinary-looking nongmingong-turned CEO, Ming, and his well-dressed ex-wife, Qi, 
in a jewellery store – is telling: 
This is too exaggerated, I think. Very few people will, like Qi’s boyfriend, 
insult others with such dreadful words in public. In my hometown, he will be 
taught a lesson he won’t forget, with fists. But it is true that nowadays people 
like Qi and her boyfriend can be found everywhere, I mean, those who are 
snobbish and get dizzy with a small fortune, fawning upon the rich and the 
powerful, while looking down arrogantly upon the poor and the powerless, 
as if they were superior. This is a time when such villains hold sway. But… 
they are not as rich as big bosses, nor do they have much wenhua... what is 
there for them to brag about? 
In a similar vein, whilst showing me a Luogui video in her dormitory – about two 
brothers and a sister-in-law in which the elder brother becomes seriously ill after his 
deaf younger brother, with his altruistic full support, became a successful 
businessman – Lijie offered her comments: 
I think elder brothers taking care of a disabled younger brother is common. 
Brothers are brothers, and it is just a matter of adding a pair of chopsticks 
on the dinner table. The sister-in-law’s ambivalence toward the younger 
brother is reasonable. After all, they are also poor. But in my experience, this 
is less likely to be the case. Normally, people are more tolerant to the 
disabled than to those with full labour capacity. 
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[The younger brother, after becoming a boss with his brother’s unfailing 
support, without hesitation covers his elder brother’s large medical bill 
following a heart attack]  
This is very touching [Lijie is on verge of tears]. If I were him, I would do the 
same. Family members are always the closest and should always support 
each other without reservation. But this is unrealistic for us. We cannot 
afford surgery for a heart attack. Nobody, even siblings, will lend you the 
money because they have their lots to deal with, not to mention that we will 
not be able to return it, for we do not have the skills and wenhua to do so and 
it is beyond our grasp. My father and your elder brother84 are both ill in bed 
– one cerebral haemorrhage, the other severe fatty liver. Sometimes I wish I 
can have a brother as such. But this is above all unrealistic. We have to rely 
on ourselves. 
Similar to Press’ working class women who were critical of shows with working 
class settings for not perfectly reflecting their life, as the two quotes above show, for 
my participants, Luogui videos are simultaneously realistic and unrealistic.  
The videos are realistic in the sense that they represent directly and in detail some of 
the concrete real-life situations and predicaments they confront in their dagong life. 
For Rizuo, this is a crucial reason to explain why he found Luogui videos interesting 
and relevant: “these videos are about us”. So long as they can ‘recognise’ the 
difficulties and the settings shown therein, it is not surprising that they frequently 
invoke similar experiences of their own to make sense of the videos, as if they were 
real incidents or misfortunes happening to themselves or to real people in their lives. 
In the interpretive process, they either position themselves as part of the context, 
making evaluations or judgements according to their moral standards and knowledge 
of the subaltern experience, as Jinyu did; or they identify themselves with the 
character in trouble, asking themselves “what if this happened to me” and rehearsing 
their own solution in their mind when they had or are facing similar problems. That 
everyday dagong situations and experiences are often exaggerated in Luogui videos 
to create dramatic conflicts and heightened effects does not undermine the videos’ 
realistic nature. For example, although Jinyu thought of the reaction of Qi’s 
 
84 Lijie referred to her husband as my ‘brother’, as I called her ‘elder sister Li’ during the fieldwork. 
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boyfriend in the video as being ‘too exaggerated’, she did appreciate that the 
character was a personification of snobbishness, and the exaggeration was one way 
to bring it out clearly and highlight it.  
However, they do not seem to be convinced by how conflicts are resolved in these 
videos. In Luogui videos, under the surface diversity almost all the conflicts are 
solved by subsuming the logic and power of the market under the traditional moral 
framework dominant in the earthbound acquaintance society. In this utopian world, 
the market is a powerful process that one can master through individual effort, while 
traditional morality is the prime rationale guiding the use of it. For example, in the 
second video, the elder brother’s huge medical bills are covered not by state-
proffered social welfare, but by his younger brother who owns a multinational 
company providing live-streaming services. And what motivates his younger brother 
is the traditional moral value of bao’en, repaying a debt of gratitude, and that of 
brotherhood. 
For my interviewees, this solution is clearly rejected as unrealistic, for this is not 
consistent with their real-life experiences. As far as their dagong experience is 
concerned, the present-day society is one in which snobbish villains hold sway and 
where market logic prevails and undermines traditional morality. It is also 
inconsistent with reality because the solutions are not feasible. The cruel reality for 
them is that failure to outcompete in the marketplace hinders the practice of 
traditional rural moralities they identify with in the face of these situations, as 
bitterly elaborated by Lijie. By watching Luogui videos and rejecting solutions as 
such, they actually level an implicit critique at the ubiquitous penetration of market 
logic in all realms of social life in moral terms. 
But this rejection, if read more closely, stops short at the level of feasibility and the 
critique of the market system does not go beyond moral terms. If the solutions are 
unrealistic for them, it is because they themselves do not have the skills and 
education needed to outcompete in the market. This method of reasoning implies 
that, paradoxically, they actually agree with the solution itself, that is, it is money 
and individual success in the marketplace – rather than, say, solidarity among 
themselves to struggle or the state – that provides the viable and effective solution to 
these life problems. In rehearsing their solutions to these problems, most resort to 
wishful thinking. Lijie wishes that she could have a brother like the younger brother 
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in this Luogui. Responding to different videos, Mindan sighed, “where can I find 
such a man?”, while Rizuo hoped that he could have a sworn brother who could 
offer altruistic help. Though most would add that these thoughts were unrealistic, for 
them it is not the solution per se that is unrealistic, but their inability to take 
advantage of it. 
Historically, rural-urban duality is central to the unfinished proletarianization of 
nongmingong, and how they evaluate this duality and position themselves in relation 
to it is pivotal to this process. For one thing, rural China is tantamount to the 
stabilizer and reservoir of urban reform. Exploitation of rural resources and rural 
labour power based on discriminative institutional arrangements and market 
mechanisms provides the much-needed primitive accumulation for urban capitalist 
development (He 2003; Wen 2013). For another, a parallel process of spiritual 
enclosure takes place quietly in the mind of the nongmingong (Pun and Ren 2008). 
Confronting real-world material changes, they increasingly see no hope in rural areas 
and turn to urban areas for existential needs and self-development. In mainstream 
discourse, being rural becomes associated with backwardness and low sushi. It is this 
dual process that leads to their liminal, semi-proletarian class identity. 
Understood in this context, the popularity of Luogui videos among participants 
amounts to a moment when they negotiate this liminal class identity and position 
themselves between the rural and the urban. While watching these videos allows 
them to come to terms with and morally criticize the life difficulties and inequalities 
engendered by the market system as it is and the norms associated with it, this 
criticism is nevertheless limited to the moral level, and what is reaffirmed in this 
process is rural morality, for example, the code of brotherhood, mutual support 
between family members, and male dominance. What is also constantly reaffirmed, 
as they watch these videos daily in dorms and workshops, is the spiritual enclosure, 
the belief that the future lies with the city – the only effective way out of their 
current predicament lies with market power.  
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7.5 Political infotainment and relationship with the state 
In the previous two sections I discussed two main strands of digital media content 
that emerged from the data. In the following section, I turn to a third category: 
political infotainment.  
 
7.5.1 Political infotainment as a new mouthpiece 
The term infotainment was originally created to capture the downgrading of 
journalistic standards in the production of political information because of the 
commercialization and competition in broadcasting journalism as it increasingly 
relied on entertainment formats (Brants 1998; Langer 1998). I use infotainment here 
because the news pieces under discussion emerge in a similar context of rampant 
commercialisation and competition and rely on entertainment formats, albeit in 
different political and historical contexts.  
Though often mistaken for being user-generated because such content appears to be 
produced and distributed via individual channels, venture capital-backed MCNs that 
provide content production, distribution and promotion services are often behind 
them. Rather than news agencies, individual journalists or nongmingong themselves, 
most political infotainments are created by professional editors in MCNs, and the 
aim is primarily to attract lower-class audiences and generate profits. Textually, 
these pieces fuse a range of informative and entertaining elements – including news 
reports of similar themes, governmental policies, pictures, emojis, stickers, gifs, 
and/or videos – in tabloid style, which according to Sparks (2000: 13) is marked by 
“sensationalism, prurience, triviality, malice, plain, simple credulity”. Below are 
some of the titles characteristic of infotainment videos: 
 “Revolutionary change for hospitals! Good for all! Future is at your 
doorstep!” 
 “The central government started five-clearance! Three groups paled with 
shock! All nongmin [peasants] applaud in high glee!” 
 “They always wear a ten-dollar hat on a five-cent head”: foreign profiteers 
particularly targeting Chinese tourists 
 “Greatest enemy in recovering Taiwan revealed, not US!? Unbelievable!” 
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These headlines give a sense of the general areas the infotainments mentioned my 
workers touch upon, from which two categories can be discerned. First, government 
policies closely related to nongmingong’s livelihood were commonly mentioned. 
While the majority concern rural reform, for example, hukou (land) reform, and 
reform of the social welfare system, a relatively small proportion cover the ‘Internet 
+ hospital’ initiative and anti-corruption campaigns particularly targeting local 
officials. The main thrust of these pieces is to present policies in a way that engages 
nongmingong. A principle method of editing is to rewrite or copy reports by official 
media and add some paragraphs, reviewing the ways in which the policy might be 
relevant for them. 
Normally, the main voices in these pieces come from two sources – one is central-
level officials who mainly elaborate the underlying intentions and rationale for the 
policy under discussion, constructing the central government as a wise, deliberate 
and rational instance of decision-making that is well-informed about the law of 
historical development, fully aware of peasants’ sufferings and dedicating itself to 
unshackling nongmin from corruption and mafia and bringing them to xiaokang, a 
historical stage of material and cultural abundance. The other source is sannong 
experts, experts on rural issues, who speak from a more practical point of view, 
reminding nongmin readers of the concrete steps and timings around which these 
policies might be implemented, and how they can capitalise on them. As a result, 
party lines are seldom contested. Even reports on anti-corruption campaigns do not 
lead to discussion of government accountability but are framed as a reflection of the 
party’s ability and resolution to purify, improve, reform, and excel.  
A second category has to do with China’s relationship with the world. Central to the 
pieces in this category is the historical and contemporary antagonism between China 
and foreign countries, especially the West, and it bolsters a vehemently asserted 
chauvinism. In this narrative, Chinese people today remain spiritually colonised 
(chongyang meiwai) by the West, as evidenced by the super-national treatment for 
overseas students and some Chinese women’s preference for white men; meanwhile, 
the West wilfully denigrates and stigmatises China and Chinese people simply 
because of their nationality. The idea is thus advanced that such inequality and bias 
needs to be addressed and revised by providing evidence of Westerners as disuzhi 
yanglaji (low-quality foreign trash) and conspirators or enemies threatening China’s 
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rise, of the core values of individuality, freedom and struggle as mere fig leaves for 
disgraceful behaviours and invasion of China. ‘We Chinese’ are called upon to stand 
up against the Westerners, urging them to adhere to Chinese law when on Chinese 
soil, and fight for national pride. 
 
7.5.2 Ideological critique of the state 
Most of the interviewees who reported interest in political infotainments of the first 
strand were male workers. Among 25 female respondents, only one reported reading 
and watching infotainments, while others contended that news was “those things that 
men should take care of” (Qiuhong in interview). Male workers tended to resonate 
with this domestic division of labour, considering following policy changes as their 
due responsibility as the man of the family. For them, political infotainment was 
relevant because it keeps them instantly updated on information about policy 
changes hitherto blocked by local officials, thus allowing them to better understand 
their rights, benefits and possible life-changing market opportunities as rural reform 
unfolds.  
In elaborating the significance of political infotainment for him, in a bakery near 
Tangxia’s coach station, Junhua told me that having been away from home for more 
than 15 years, he had little idea of changes in the benefits attached to his rural hukou 
status, such as subsistence allowance and house repair subsidy:  
previously we had a village WeChat group, but our village head never used it 
to disseminate policy information. He still did it face-to-face. The problem is 
that we have only our 75-year-old father at home, for whom it was simply 
incomprehensible. For more than 10 years, we missed all the benefits. It was 
not until last year when the policies became accessible on mobile phones that 
I finally had a clue to claim them, though it often took me a long time to 
check with friends and fellow villagers, before talking to the village head 
directly. 
Junhua and his family received more than 7,000-yuan last year, a great relief from 
the family burden for him. Similarly, Dayi found political infotainment useful 
because it provided information about ecommerce opportunities in his hometown, as 
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he had always been keen to set up his own small business, selling home-grown tea 
and oil.  
Reception of digital infotainment also extends to the discursive level, contesting the 
kind of state-peasant relationship constructed therein. In a toilet break, Mianbange 
shared an article on land reform. An adaptation of an official press release, the 
article, although featuring an inviting headline, drew extensively on official voices 
from the Ministry of Land and Resources and Central Leading Group Office for 
Rural Work.  
At first, the discussion revolved largely around details of the policy itself. The 
general gist was to find out what it was about and how to leverage its potential. Most 
participants, after reading Mianbange’s piece, found it little more than empty 
preaching. Soon Dazhong and another man forwarded two other pieces to their 
WeChat group, one like Mianbange’s and the other that highlighted an expert voice. 
It did not take long for the discussion to evolve into some general complaining about 
the government. Below is an excerpt from my fieldnotes where I reconstructed the 
session based on on-site voice memos and memory: 
Mianbange: These officials always say nothing more than that the 
government is doing us laobaixing, common people, good. To be honest I do 
not quite understand their lengthy talk, but I know I do not believe them. The 
land problem for us is simple, but they make it so complicated.  
Youheng: Don't be too [cynical]. I think this is a good policy. Growing 
agricultural products is just unprofitable. Most of my family’s land is left 
uncultivated, why not contract it out? 
Dazhong: Don't be stupid! The land is not profitable in your hand, but 
profitable for the government. You know. They will sell the land to 
developers. All the money will go to their pocket. 
Rizuo: I do not think it is a good idea to lease the land out for that long. 
What if one day we are too old and weak to work? We have to rely on the 
land. I used to come across news about the land used to grow things that 
significantly undermine its fertility. The boss just does not care, as long as it 
generates profits.  
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Mianbange: Let me tell you why I do not trust the CCP. In the past they 
wanted your tax, so they gave you land, telling you agriculture was 
promising. Now they need your land, and they shamelessly contradict 
themselves. They are experts on extracting the most out of us while 
pretending to do us good. But we never had any choice. If the CCP wants 
your land, they will find a way to achieve it. They do not bother negotiating 
with you. There is nothing you can do unless you have guanxi. Law is for 
those who are rich or have guanxi. You guys are much younger so have no 
idea of what they did before. In our village, a woman got her house bulldozed 
when she was seven months pregnant because of the one-child policy. This 
story is widely circulated, and it must be true, though I never met her in 
person. Such is the CCP, gangster. 
Duan: I agree. I previously ran a food stall in my hometown. But one day I 
was suddenly told my food stall was not ‘civilised’ and my food was not 
clean. This is ridiculous. Later I discovered that our county was preparing 
for the Inspection Team for Civil Cities from Nanning85 during that period. I 
wish they fail.  
Gu: I do not understand why you guys bother talking about all this. You can 
only follow the CCP, get whatever they shanggei ni, kindly offer to you. In 
China, there is no such thing as equality, only obedience.  
Mianbange: The CCP is losing minxin, popular support. Back in the war 
time, people followed Mao wholeheartedly, even sacrificing their lives. Are 
they stupid? No. That is because Mao genuinely cared about them. Mao gave 
them land to grow corn and wheat and fed themselves. He actually saved 
them. What about now? Laobaixing were never put first. They take your land, 
give you several thousand yuan and leave you on your own. When you can no 
longer make ends meet, they give you a name ‘dibaohu’ as if they were 
charity. This is humiliating. What can we do? Nothing.  
As the conversation above shows, while it started from one single infotainment 
article, it became meaningful to Weida workers only when it was interpreted by them 
in relation to other reports on the same topic within the context in which they were 
 
85 Nanning is the capital city of Guangxi, where Duan was from.  
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read and discussed. For them, Mianbange’s piece is no smooth reading; it is full of 
intricate and obscure propaganda that they find “so complicated” and that they 
“cannot relate to”. The other two texts are no different.  
But this does not mean that the texts are entirely lost in this process. In their 
discussion, it is clear that the framing of the issue of rural land reform as one 
concerning the laobaixing-state relationship by the text is accepted, for their talk 
largely centred abstractly around the relationship between the two, with little 
reference to the reform agenda itself. So, rather than the text getting lost, 
nongmingong’s reception of political infotainment is a process where, precisely 
because of the convoluted, formalistic, dogmatic and empty nature of the 
infotainment texts, its particularities become ‘defused’ by the context and subsumed 
under the abstract problematic itself and the underlying ideology that organises these 
particularities around this problematic (Neale 1977; Morley 1998). It is this later 
level that nongmingong readers can better relate to and tend to respond to.  
At the ideological level, most participants strongly criticised the image of an 
omnipotent and peasant-serving government as represented in these infotainments. 
They resolutely rejected this image and subverted it with a deep-seated political 
scepticism stemming deeply from their direct or mediated experience with the 
government through, for example, locally circulated stories, news previously read or 
direct confrontation. Common to the experience invoked is damage to their interest, 
property or livelihood by unexpectedly imposed and forcefully implemented 
policies, whether confiscating food stalls or coercive land-grabbing with 
disproportionately low compensation. 
Mianbange even made a historical comparison between the CCP in the pre-PRC war 
era and the CCP now, where he drew intensively, as he said, on cultural memories 
transmitted from his grandparents by word-of-mouth. From this reflection he 
concluded that while previously peasants were willing to follow the CCP to fight 
because Mao, through land redistribution, allowed them to live on their own – rather 
than with others – with dignity, now the CCP wants their land back, trading their 
independence for the interest of the unholy alliance of the state and the market while 
leaving them in precarity. It is this politics of livelihood, economic autonomy and 
dignity that underlies their political scepticism.  
 199 
 
However, because of its unfathomable nature, the workers fail to relate to the 
particularities of the text and mobilise more detailed, issue-specific experiences in 
reception, for example, in terms of state-market relations. The scepticism they 
developed thus tends to rest at a general, abstract level, with the specific mechanisms 
of power and dominance unattended to.  
This notwithstanding, its radical nature should not be underestimated. Although it 
does not lead to individual or collective class actions, for most people this is not 
because they are unaware of or disagree with the social origin of their suffrage, but 
because there is no viable way to do so. After all, in their experience, struggles have 
led to severe consequences. Later in the fieldwork, when I told participants about a 
recent case of struggle where workers at a factory in Shenzhen had crowdfunded to 
hire a lawyer and won a suit of pension arrears against the factory owner, they were 
very excited and told me that had they had such opportunities, they would do the 
same.  
If nongmingong engage with political infotainment of the first strand primarily out of 
practical concern, what underlies their interest in the second strand is their strong 
identification with China, in both cultural and political-institutional terms. This 
derives mainly from the nationalistic rhetoric of China as victim of Western 
imperialism in mainstream discourse since the early 1990s, with which Chinese 
popular culture resonated, particularly in anti-Japan TV plays. It is these resources 
and discourses that they avail themselves of in making sense of sensational 
infotainments of the second strand. For example, in explaining what a piece he 
reported relevant – Greatest enemy in recovering Taiwan revealed, not US!? 
Unbelievable! – was about, Duan suddenly raised his voice, and his face flushed 
angrily: 
I am very angry. Xiaoriben [shitty Japs]! We should have followed up the 
victory with hot pursuit, then they would not dare to be this aggressive, 
becoming our threat... Why they keep doing this for so many years? 
[Interviewer: For so many years?] You must have seen kangri ju. I like it, 
especially those about old Mao [laomao] leading us to fight the Japs and 
establish our own country. I don't want to make a fuss over the history. We 
were poor, and lagging behind left us vulnerable to attacks. But now we 
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become richer, how dare they keep bullying us? We should give them a dose 
of their own medicine, rather than silently swallow everything. 
To summarise, like in many other capitalist countries, the Chinese state has played a 
crucial role in nongmingong’s unfinished proletarianization and in providing a stable 
external condition for the country’s capitalist development. It is a significant 
enabling and disabling condition for their everyday life and struggle. Therefore, any 
discussion of their class disposition should address how they perceive the Chinese 
state. In this section, I argue that reading and discussing political infotainment is the 
moment in which this perception is forged, negotiated and updated. 
Elitist laments about the degradation of political information notwithstanding, the 
infotainment pieces my respondents found interesting and relevant were based 
largely on official journalism, and they found both practical and critical use for them. 
For them, political infotainment is a newfound source of policy information with 
which they can better navigate the state’s constantly changing policy landscape. It 
also provides conversation pieces for them to discuss issues in daily interactions and 
reflect on the role the state plays in the making of their subaltern status. An analysis 
of their interpretation of these contents revealed that their perceived relationship with 
the state exhibits a combination of radical political scepticism when it concerns 
national issues, and a strong pro-government nationalistic sentiment and big-power 
chauvinism when it concerns China’s relationship with the world, especially the 
West.  
 
7.6 Negotiating patriarchal families and ‘masculine compromise’ 
The last theme emerging from the data is gender. Gender, perhaps more so than any 
other issue, is highly contested in my respondents’ daily audiencing practices and 
media talk, and this owes much to the fact that representations of gender can be 
found across various genres and forms.  
Diverse genres and forms aside, almost all the items my female respondents brought 
up in our interviews centred around female characters or were written from a female 
point of view. Across individual settings and conflicts, the plots or narratives tend to 
revolve around the female protagonists’ interactions and tensions with the family, an 
essentially private realm that can be separated neatly from the public realm marked 
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by waged labour and market production. Besides, the family referred to here is 
usually not her niangjia, natal family, but pojia, the three-generation family on the 
husband’s side. 
For example, in historical family ethics dramas based on lower-class experiences, 
female characters are often care-giving, working mother-wives who willingly and 
selflessly put the family ahead of themselves – even at the cost of their lives – in 
assisting their husbands to carry the pojia family through the uncertainties of the 
radical yet progressive social changes engendered by market reform. The dramas 
usually end by glorifying such characters with little more than poetic justice. 
Besides, short videos or articles on conjugal and po-xi (mother-in-law vs wife) 
relationships are widely circulated by female workers in their WeChat conversations. 
Two phenomena frequently criticised therein are the husband’s lack of attention and 
care for the family, as captured by the catchphrase ‘widowed childcare’, and the 
powerful legacy of son-preference culture, usually personified by feudal-minded, 
high-handed mothers-in-law. In most of these videos and articles, the solution to 
women’s predicaments lies with the husbands coming to their senses and 
transforming themselves into compassionate and supportive men, although 
suggestions of women’s self-transformation into independent, self-interested and 
sexually powerful individuals can also be found. 
In female workers’ reception of these dramas, videos and articles, their focal point is 
without exception the female figures constructed therein. Certain aspects of these 
figures are accepted while others are rejected, and this varies across different age 
groups. 
Niangqin Jiuda, a family ethics drama popular in Weida at the time of my fieldwork, 
is a useful example. Niang sets the scene in a residential community of a state-owned 
factory in a small town before the 1980s. The story revolves around the Tong 
brothers and their niece, Chengcheng, who all lose their mothers before adulthood. 
Most of the episodes are devoted to showing how the eldest brother, Tong Jiageng, 
the father-like figure within the family, with the help of his wife Jia Lihong, leads 
the family to thrive throughout 20 years of radical social change. Focusing primarily 
on rural family ethics, Niang soon began to dominate the TV talk of Jihong86 and her 
 
86 Jihong and Jinyu were both born in 1982, and both had a husband and several children who were reaching adolescence. 
Manrong and Xiaolu, on the other hand, were born respectively in 1989 and 1994, both were married but did not have much 
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friends in the workshop. Below is an excerpt from my fieldnotes of their discussion 
where I joined them and asked what they liked most about Niang: 
Jihong:  …the talk between Tong and his wife after being laid-off. All of a 
sudden, the family lost its income. They… tried to sort things out together. 
They really care about each other. He told his wife to stay at home and rest, 
and she refused because overwork might be detrimental to his health. Later 
when he came back from his brick factory job, she brought him a cup of tea. 
When she started a mahua87 stall… his heart broke… But there are few such 
sensible and supportive husbands like Tong in real life. My husband is rather 
selfish when we are in difficulty. I am like over the moon if my husband is 
half considerate as Tong.  
… 
Jinyu:  What I can recall most clearly was that Chengcheng skipped school 
for Liu Dehua’s concert… I particularly like the way her uncle solved the 
problem. I do not think I can deal with similar problems in a way as good as 
his. I am not a good mother anyway. I should have spent more time with my 
son.  
… 
Xiaolu: To be honest I do not like rural big families. Small is better because 
you are freer. You do not have to deal with self-righteous people who are 
always ready to tell you what is the right thing to do, especially when you are 
a woman. This is also why I prefer dagong than doing small business at 
home.  
…  
Manrong: I think the character of Jia Lihong is unrealistic, sacrificing her 
entire life for her husband and the Tong family, even giving up treatment 
when diagnosed with cancer. It is something that can happen in Qing 
 
experience of conjugal family life. As roommates who often worked in neighbouring workstations, they formed a relatively 
close-knit group. This gave them the liberty to refer to personal experiences when discussing television without having to 
worry about rumours. 
87 Mahua, or fried dough twist, is a traditional snack popular in northern China.  
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Dynasty. She is really stupid… is this even reasonable?… If I were her, I 
would divorce him without a second thought.  
Jihong: You young girls are immature. You will understand all this when you 
reach my age. A family needs Jia Lihong, otherwise, it is doomed to be 
broken.  
Manrong: What about her? Why does she even need Tong’s family? Women 
are human beings, aren’t they?... and we have our own natal family, don't 
we?  
As shown in the extract above, like their colleagues’ reception to shenghuoju, 
realism is a criterion with which Jihong and her TV mates evaluate Niang. And 
similar to their abstraction of shenghuoju into a general individual lived experience 
of precarity and bitterness, they abstract Niang into family experience of a general 
kind, in the sense that the historical and contextual particularities within which the 
story of Tong’s family unfolds are treated as some constant external conditions of 
family life in general, which bear no fundamental difference from theirs and does not 
change over time. It is on this premise that they identify with Jia and draw on their 
actual, perceived or ideal family relations to compare with hers and evaluate her 
choices and decisions. 
For Jihong and Jinyu, family life as represented in Niang is realistic. For one thing, 
they confront similar problems in their own family life, for example, problems of 
livelihood for Jihong and the rebellious behaviours of her left-behind son for Jinyu. 
For another, the judgement of the nature of family problems and the solutions 
offered in Niang are also accepted by them. In Niang and for themselves, family 
problems arise from the family’s inability to cope with external social change, rather 
than being engendered in the first place by these social changes. They are hence to 
be solved by the collective efforts of family members, for which mutual 
understanding and support is essential. It is in this sense that Jihong’s unusually 
detailed recounting of the conjugal dynamics between Tong and Jia can be best 
understood. For her, a sensible, considerate, and helpful husband is the only effective 
solution she can imagine for solving her family problems.  
Considering family problems as such, in my participants’ interpretation they further 
accepted the gendered division of labour within the patriarchal family. Jinyu’s 
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response above might sound like some general regret from a mother who failed to 
provide her children due support. But if we put her words in context – her husband 
actually worked in their home city, lived together with their children but did not 
show much care – her self-blame takes on a new meaning. It is plausible to say that 
by blaming not her husband but herself, she takes for granted the norm wherein 
women are considered to bear more responsibilities in raising children. In a similar 
vein, when Manrong and Xiaolu rejected Jia’s character, who sacrificed her entire 
life for Tong’s family and argued that women are themselves people and have their 
own desires and needs except for those associated with pojia, Jihong disagreed, 
considering them immature. In this process, the gender norms that a woman’s place 
is in the home and that women are subordinate to men are reaffirmed, and 
alternatives are rejected.  
In contrast, Manrong and Xiaolu, who were younger, demonstrated a more radical 
attitude towards patriarchy and the norms associated with it. For Manrong, that Jia 
prioritised Tong’s family while downplaying herself was “stupid”. And when she 
said that this “can happen in the Qing Dynasty”, she did not mean to discuss gender 
norms or family patterns in the Qing Dynasty, but to dismiss it as an absurdly 
traditional and outdated mode of thinking and behaving. Rejecting the construction 
of a model woman in Niang as such, she confirms the idea that women are no mere 
appendage to their husband and family, but first and foremost individuals whose 
desires and wills should treated be seriously in their own right. The husband’s family 
should not be an all-time priority for women. When serious clashes between the two 
take place, women should “divorce without a second thought” because there is no 
point in staying for the benefit of “others”.  
The divided attitudes around patriarchy and women’s gender roles between these 
two age groups can also be found in their responses to the image of women as 
‘independent, self-interested and sexually powerful’ individuals shored up in 
WeChat essays. Elaborating the poetic and figurative expressions in these pieces 
either with personal family experiences or judging it against their ideal family 
relations, while the older group considered women’s self-independence to be 
unrealistic and self-interested and being sexually powerful as immoral, the younger 
group embraced this image more fully, thinking of the family as necessary only 
when it enhances their own wellbeing.  
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If gender was a concern for all my female respondents, irrespective of age and 
marital status, among male respondents only those who were unmarried reported 
gender-related digital media consumption as relevant. For them, WeChat public 
accounts and articles providing advice on how to be a better man were a helpful diet 
of masculinity advice at a time when precarity and social marginality increasingly 
challenged them in this respect88 (Lin 2013; Choi and Peng 2016).  
In contrast to trendy images of xiaoxianrou, little fresh meat, and badao zongcai, 
bossy boss, in mainstream media and consumer culture, the ideal man in these texts 
is more akin to a modern version of the Confucian Junzi.  Somewhere between 
shengren89 and xiaoren90, Junzi is an exemplar of virtuous conduct and spiritual 
living. A person of fortitude, he is noble by character and sticks to the innate 
goodness of his heart. Decorous in his conduct, Junzi unhesitatingly does that which 
is right in all circumstances with zhi, wisdom, and devotes his life to promoting a 
flourishing human community under the ritual norm and propriety system of Li. In 
the modern version, a good man retains spiritual depth and human-heartedness and 
shows great fortitude and decorousness. But he acts properly with worldly wisdom 
and long-term vision in different circumstances and is concerned with the self and 
family responsibility. Preoccupation with personal interests and profits is legitimate 
and glorified. 
Unlike TV dramas, short videos or infotainment articles that are read or watched 
daily, male nongmingong turn to these articles only when the masculinity crisis is 
painfully felt. More than just relaxing, they considered these pieces to be 
enlightening sources of advice, according to which they constantly adjusted their 
understanding of what it means to be a man, and to borrow Choi and Peng’s (2016) 
term, practiced masculine compromise.  
Homing’s digital media engagement, discussed at the end of section 6.2, is telling. 
He lost his life inspiration not just because of work injury, but also because, as we 
can tell from his words quoted earlier, of his inability to earn higher income, get 
 
88 It is worth noting that among this same group of workers, WeChat articles on po-xi relationships were also very popular. This 
is manifest in the fact that although they do not post much in WeChat Moments, these articles often appear there, some even 
with comments. Unlike articles on the same theme among women workers that are usually critical of the patriarchal family, 
those reposted by male workers are often critical of individual woman’s behaviour for violating fudao, the traditional female 
virtue. Perhaps out of shyness or because they genuinely think of these topics about women and family as trivial and 
unimportant, they showed no interest in discussing these articles in detail, in both day-to-day talk and in the interviews. 
89 Those with profound capacity and importance to behave naturally in any circumstances. 
90 Those who cannot transcend personal concerns and prejudices, and act for their own gain. 
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married and live a ‘normal’ life, which for him are the prerequisites to being a real 
man. In his hometown, the Confucian tenet that a man should ‘stand firm’ at the age 
of 30 is widely held. Feeling disgraced and kicked out of society, from time-to-time 
a sense of powerlessness and desperation crept over him. Explaining his passion with 
these masculinity guides, he accepted the adapted Junzi image without much 
reservation: 
I think most of what these articles say are right and are quite useful when I 
felt lost and uncertain about myself. I am now more dedicated, learn to 
compromise and to be practical. Previously I cared too much about quick 
returns and instant benefits, now I understand the limit of myself, the 
importance of worldly wisdom. You have to improve yourself and work hard 
before you are ‘qualified’ to expect more. This is what a true man should do. 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter continued the discussion of nongmongong’s subjective experience from 
the previous two chapters but turned the spotlight from the point of production to 
that of media consumption. This draws on British cultural Marxism that intended to 
provide a socialist understanding of “the significance of working class affluence, 
consumer capitalism, and the greatly expanded role of the mass media” in post-war 
Britain (Dworkin 1997: 79). A central intervention in this regard was to redefine 
social struggle, for the transformation affected the working people’s whole way of 
life and reshaped their identity in new and complex ways that went well beyond the 
point of production.  
The decision to focus on digital media consumption in this chapter was not a blind 
following of this tradition but was based on three of my observations: first, the 
relatively new yet ubiquitous phenomenon of nongmingong watching or reading 
media content of their own choice on their own screens, on and off the shop floor; 
second, the social relations of production and power structure underlying the digital 
content industry that produced these contents; and third, the rise of the industry and 
its intricate relationship with China’s capitalist crisis and the state’s response to it 
through strategic deployment of ICTs and prioritization of consumption. At this 
particular stage of China’s capitalist development, if nongmingong are nowhere near 
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affluence, the relevance of media, a central, modern ideological institution 
(Thompson 1995), as the discursive battleground of class formation is nevertheless 
growing. As cultural scholar Sun Wanning (2014) argued, media and cultural 
practices are integral to the construction of subaltern identity, and this newfound 
front of labour politics is as important as the construction site and the factory 
workshop.  
In her pioneering work in the field, Subaltern China (2014), Sun offered a panoramic 
view of how a whole array of actors, including the state, urban cinema, market 
journalism, independent filmmakers, intellectuals, activists, worker poets and 
ordinary nongmingong, each occupying distinctive positions in social relations of 
production and operating with distinctive modalities of power and concerns, interact 
with each other on the cultural front. Her concern was whether and what forms of 
subaltern consciousness, defined as the level of awareness of working class 
socioeconomic subordination and willingness to talk back to power, emerged from 
these intricate dynamics. In her book, Sun’s exploration spans nongmingong’s 
engagement with hegemonic mediation of various sorts and forms of self-
representation, whether influenced by cultural brokering or not.  
What is most relevant here is Sun’s discussion of nongmingong’s engagement with 
urban cinema featuring nongmingong. Her arguments are twofold. Firstly, urban 
cinema as a crucial potential site for subaltern visibility was dominated by the logic 
of commercial cinema and the mainstream moral grammar of the society. This has 
led to a recognition of nongmingong in terms of economic contribution and long-
overdue social and economic justice but has meanwhile rendered nongmingong 
invisible as rights-bearing political subjects, presenting individual luck as the 
solution to their problems.  
Secondly, Sun found nongmingong’s engagement with urban cinema to be motivated 
by a much-needed relief from daily drudgery, personal preference of stars, and 
identification with the stories. She was pessimistic about its potential for raising 
class consciousness. This is not because she subscribed to the conventional wisdom 
among labour activists that nongmingong lacked the literacy to appreciate the 
intellectual stimulation afforded therein. Following Williams, she argued their 
viewing habits have their root in “ways of living” (Williams 1961: 125) – “the 
punishingly harsh physical demands” (Sun 2014: 113) and changes in 
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socioeconomic conditions will allow them to develop a desire for intellectual 
stimulation. She concluded by pointing to a paradoxical relationship between 
nongmingong’s socioeconomic conditions and subaltern consciousness formation 
through media: 
while a subaltern consciousness may indeed be formed through active and 
creative engagement with the production and consumption of media 
products, such active and creative engagement is unlikely to come about 
without radical improvements in migrant workers’ socioeconomic conditions 
(Sun 2004: 113). 
In this chapter, while I appreciate Sun’s proposition of media as a power-laden site 
of class struggle and class formation, my approach diverges from hers in two main 
ways. First, as discussed previously, following Katznelson and Zolberg (1986), my 
approach to class formation distinguishes between class consciousness and class 
disposition. For the two authors, this distinction is useful because, according to their 
historical studies, the link between class consciousness and class action should not 
be taken for granted, for an historically shared definition of class position does not 
necessarily lead to class conflicts and vice versa. Class consciousness is a slippery 
notion and at best an ephemeral moment that is difficult to empirically pin down.  
If the notion of class consciousness concerns class action itself and assumes the 
necessary link between the two, the notion of class disposition rejects this link, 
reminding us that class formation is a non-teleological process full of contingency, 
and directs our attention to the motivational constructs and inclination to behave 
among the working class. In so doing, it opens up a space of inquiry and allows us to 
put working class formation and the possibilities of class action back into its specific 
historical and social context, urging us to examine the complexities of how working 
class people themselves experience and define their own lived experiences and the 
motivational construct thus emerging, as well as the factors and power dynamics that 
influence this process.  
Second, my approach to the text-audience relationship focuses on the interpretive 
process itself: the ways in which worker-audience and various media texts mutually 
shape each other, for a microsociology of everyday audiencing as such accounts for 
how discursive power constrains and enables while acknowledging the worker-
 209 
 
audience’s agency. In Sun’s analysis, the cinematic text is more or less treated as a 
monolithic whole. This is perhaps best manifested by the fact that although she 
argued that nongmingong’s viewing habits should be understood in relation to their 
ways of life, this could not be found in her explanation of nongmingong’s 
engagement with urban cinema. 
Based on this approach, my findings show nongmingong engagement with digital 
media content is marked mainly by what I call the ‘entertainment-seeking mode of 
viewing’, although some also find its use instructive. Linking it to their ways of life, 
I argue it should not be understood as ‘mere entertainment’ that fills the spiritual 
void of a generally modern, urban kind. Echoing Sun’s observation, digital media 
allows them to deal with the particular pressures, sufferings and tensions of dagong 
experience in present-day China, not least by affording them a space to temporarily 
escape from daily miseries. Although this does not solve their life problems, the 
pleasure and relief are nevertheless real – so too are the associated senses of 
pleasure, freedom and self-control. In a time of surging prices and a local context of 
rapid gentrification, digital media stands out among the few options they have. 
Four strands of digital media content have been identified by my informants as 
interesting, relevant or thought-provoking: shenghuoju; the Luogui theatre; political 
infotainment; and gender-themed articles and videos. These include representations 
of urban middle class life, though most concern their own lives.   
At the level of the texts, my analysis shows similar results to Sun. Despite their 
different themes, these contents are urban-centric, prioritise the voice of the state, 
acknowledge the marginal status and social and economic justice owed to them, 
while presenting market, individual efforts and an omnipotent party state that ‘Serve 
the People’ as the solution to their problems. On each specific subject matter, the 
representations downplay the influence of class and economic subordination while 
overemphasizing the factor of that particular subject matter. Rural subjects as 
political subjects missing from Sun’s urban cinema cannot be found here, and neither 
are representations of nongmingong’s productive activities, politics of production 
and collective struggle. 
In terms of reception, in explaining why they find such content interesting and how 
they interpret it, I have argued that, contrary to Sun’s claim that nongmingong watch 
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films merely for fun and without desire for intellectual stimulation, they constantly 
draw on what I call their ‘bitter and precarious structure of feeling’, a notion by 
which I seek to capture their subjective experience of and before dagong, for 
example, that of material impoverishment, informal employment status,  separation 
from the family, inconstant, unpredictable yet strongly-enforced government 
policies, urban discrimination, and the heavy burden of traditional gender roles, 
among others.  
The use of the words ‘bitter’ and ‘precarious’ to describe their structure of feeling is 
a strategic choice. The word ‘bitter’ is chosen from these workers’ daily language 
and seeks to convey the nature of this subjective experience, for chiku or shouku, 
eating bitterness, was from my impression the single most used term when they 
talked about their own lives. And with ‘precarious’ I intend to capture the 
‘structural’ side of this not-yet-fully-articulated subjective experience. The term 
became widely used, especially in labour and migration studies, since Standing’s 
(2011) influential intervention in which he defined precarity in the context of 
present-day advanced capitalism in three aspects: production (low income and 
unstable and short-term employment); redistribution (the decline of social welfare 
and security); and citizenship (citizens without effective political, cultural and social 
rights). But in the case of nongmingong, while these three aspects all characterize the 
scene91, the particular sense of uncertainty, impoverishment, injustice, capricious 
fate and helplessness engendered by the authoritarian nature of the hierarchically 
organized party-state should be emphasized.  
From an interpretative process, nongmingong position and imagine themselves in 
relation to their middle-class counterparts, the state, their opposite gender and the 
rural-urban duality. Altogether we see a particular configuration of their motivational 
structure descended from engagement with hegemonic representations: although 
they exhibited strong moral critiques of the market, there is little evidence of them 
being sceptical about the market mechanism itself. Most still consider dagong as the 
better way to free themselves from gendered restrictions and rural backwardness. In 
this sense, it actually consolidates their conviction and belief in market mechanisms 
 
91 It should be noted that there is a difference between the Chinese case with its advanced capitalist context in the general trend 
of this development. For example, in the past two decades, government efforts to extend urban citizenship to nongmingong 
have been substantial, although the actual effect merits further investigation.  
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and individual efforts. A strong sense of distrust with the party-state is also 
reaffirmed.  
Based on the discussion so far, it can be concluded that the hegemonic 
representations offered by the digital content industry largely fail to provide an 
alternative and progressive vision for nongmingong to understand the inequalities 
they face. In its actual reception by nongmingong themselves, it has the effect of 
contributing to the subsumption of class discourse or the process of ‘de-
politicization’ (Pun and Chan 2008; Wang 2008; Lin 2015) that lies at the heart of 
contemporary Chinese cultural politics92, while disguised as the problem of gender, 
state or rural-urban divide only, in the name of sympathy and moral critique. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92 The notion of the subsumption of class discourse captures a historical paradox in class politics and class discourse in China. 
At a time when China is trying to turn itself into the world’s factory and a new working class is structurally forming, the 
prevalent political ideology of neoliberalism has delivered a death sentence to ‘class analysis’, and has refused to recognize the 
materiality of the formation of a new class. The concept of class was subsumed in local scholarship and replaced by the concept 
of stratification, a concept that has gained in popularity since the 1990s, leading to an inevitable process of depoliticization.  
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
8.1 Summary of the findings and contribution 
This thesis set out to understand nongmingong’s subjective experience of China’s 
recent ICTs-driven economic restructuring as it pertains to work and leisure, with a 
particular focus on how their everyday practices, identities and possibilities for 
action are shaped by the changing conditions of technological mediation in these 
realms. Questions regarding nongmingong’s work and life, the institutional 
arrangements and the miscellaneous forms of inequalities they face have been central 
to Chinese sociology in the past 40 years. From different understandings of the 
genesis of nongmingong as a social group and its relationship with the historical and 
contemporary development of Chinese modernity, scholars have approached and 
explained the phenomenon from different perspectives, providing different solutions. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, liberal-minded sociologists, disillusioned by Maoist 
socialism that “takes class struggle as the key link”, tend to see nongmingong as 
emancipated migrants who –  as the reform revealed – are liberated from the 
shackles of Maoist socialism and finally free to sell their labour power in the market. 
For them, the poverty, hardship and inequalities the workers must endure in urban 
workplaces has everything to do with the derailed socialism and its legacy, and little 
to do with the market. Their analysis centres around the administrative-driven rural-
urban duality, and the solution to the nongmingong problem lies in the incremental 
administrative reform towards the dismantling of old socialist institutions – 
particularly the hukou-based dual citizenship status system, the dual labour market 
and the dual social welfare system, and the establishment of a perfect market system 
in which rural-to-urban migrants and urban citizens can compete in an equal and fair 
manner. 
Those sociologists who belong loosely to the ‘new left’ collective in China 
foreground the role of both state and capital in the birth of nongmingong as China’s 
new working class, as a contrast to and in tandem with the old state workers. They 
emphasise the role of different types of capital, whether foreign direct investment, 
state-owned capital or minjian ziben, domestic private capital, and understand the 
Chinese state not as a homogeneous entity operating in a vacuum, but as having its 
own internal logics and contradictions – for example, central-local relations, the 
relationship between different governmental department and functionalities, 
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operating with its own historical mandate of continuing the century-long exploration 
of Chinese modernity as a socialist endeavour and within the contemporary context 
of the neoliberal expansion of global capitalism. For these sociologists, the 
nongmingong question is first of all a labour question, and nongmingong as an 
emerging working class identity has more continuities than discontinuities with 
working class groups around the globe, especially in newly-industrialised third-
world countries. What is unique about nongmingong is the particular process of 
proletarianization it has been through. This is marked by China’s socialist revolution, 
its changing relationship with global capitalism, its rural-urban duality and 
industrialisation and urbanisation as two highly disconnected processes (Pun 2016; 
Smith and Pun 2018). 
For these left-wing sociologists, the inequalities and suffering nongmingong face 
cannot thus be explained fully by analysing the administrative-driven rural-urban 
duality alone. They instead draw our attention to the intersection of rural-urban 
duality, market forces, gender, minzu (ethnicity), place identity, among others, under 
global capitalism. They agree with their liberal-leaning colleagues that the hukou-
based rural-urban duality needs reform but diverge in that they do not believe that 
equalities can be achieved simply by removing the underlying institutional 
arrangements and establishing a liberalised market system. Rather, they call for the 
establishment of a bottom-up mechanism through which nongmingong can 
collectively organise themselves and have their own voice heard, which can then 
inform policy-making and legislation in such areas as industrial/employment 
relations, social security, land reform, agricultural development and the construction 
of the “socialist countryside” (Lü 2012; Gu et al. 2014).  
On the other hand, as critical communication scholar Zhao Yuezhi (2007) pointed 
out, China’s pursuit of modernity is a process of industrialisation and urbanisation; it 
is simultaneously a digital revolution. As Chapter 3 has established, in the past 70 
years, ICTs have always been integral to China’s modernisation, from a strategic 
technology of self-reliance in the Maoist era, through a means of relinking with 
global digital capitalism at the start of the reform and an apolitical solution to 
development in the post-Tiananmen era, to restructuring/upgrading through 
networking. As a general purpose technology, the role of ICTs in China’s economic 
development is complex and multiple and they have been adopted to transform 
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almost every element and process of production in order to boost productivity or 
upgrade the economy, giving rise to a proliferation of new arrangements of 
production across industrial sectors.  
As a result, the old labour question returns. Questions about the implications of ICTs 
for labour relations/conditions and worker subjectivities began to be asked, for 
example: to what extent is the very nature of labour altered by ICTs, what new 
arrangements of production emerge, what new forms of domination and resistance 
have crystallised and whether and to what extent are ICTs emancipatory or do they 
reproduce old inequalities? Research in this regard has in recent years focused 
primarily on knowledge workers – mostly urban middle class – in cultural and 
creative industries, for example, student interns in big Internet companies, 
journalists, editors for news websites, and citizen journalists in crowdsourcing news 
agencies (for example, Cao and Xu 2014; Yao 2014; Yao and Liu 2017; Xia 2018, 
2019). It was not until recently, with the decline of the export-oriented growth 
engine and the state-led pursuit of wholesale economic digitalisation that the 
working class labourscape became increasingly mediated by ICTs. My research 
captures this transitional moment and seeks to join the debate on the implications of 
ICTs on Chinese labour.  
Several years into this development, some efforts have been made to answer these 
questions. As an emerging field, although research has been scant, scholars have 
nevertheless focused on different platform sectors, for example, domestic service, 
ride-hailing, and food delivery, and touched upon issues ranging from how platform 
enterprise has taken shape in context, through new modes of labour use and control, 
to platform workers’ strategies of negotiation and resistance (Liang 2017; Chen 
2017, 2018; Sun 2019; Chen et al. 2020). In this thesis, my research builds on and 
contributes to this ongoing debate with a thoroughly worker-centred perspective. 
Specifically, I shift the focus from a particular platform to the digital transition of the 
economy in general. This leads me to contextualise the platform sector in its 
relationship with, on the one hand, other new mediated arrangements of production 
emerging in the transition, and, on the other, its continuity with the factory 
production regime that used to dominate the Chinese working class labourscape, 
reflecting on to what extent it is new. This in turn has allowed me to discuss 
workers’ subjective experiences of the changes in the realm of production brought 
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about by ICTs, as well as the opportunities and challenges thus crystallised and the 
working class subjects thus formed, whether in work or everyday life.  
 
1) Understanding labour control in new mediated arrangements of production 
Under economic digitalisation, platform workers in China now serve both an 
‘invisible boss’ and a traditional human boss (Chen et al. 2020). In response, a key 
debate in the field is to understand the changing nature of labour control – so far, 
scholars have focused on new forms of employment in platform enterprises and new 
ICTs-enabled managerial practices in the labour process. In this thesis, I have 
provided a detailed analysis of labour control in Didi in Chapter 5, and my analysis 
builds on existing literature and seeks to advance it in two ways. First, existing 
studies tend to see platform work as a new model, which ignores the fact that it is the 
product of capital’s endeavour to apply new technologies to restructure the old 
model. Second, a holistic perspective is absent, and attention is given more to the 
role of ICTs at the point of management. This is problematic because labour control 
extends beyond management, but is exercised through the production regime as a 
whole; similarly, ICTs are not just adopted at management level, neither do they 
operate independently from non-technological components of the regime, but are 
infrastructural to the entire production regime. 
My analysis draws on Braverman’s notions of conception, execution and deskilling, 
and Burawoy’s formulation of the labour process and production regime (see also 
Smith and Thompson 1998 and Thompson and Smith 2010 for a review and update). 
The data for my analysis was drawn from three sources: ethnography of drivers’ day-
to-day work and Didi’s platform design; interviews with drivers; and secondary 
sources including government policies about the platform economy and interviews 
and research papers given or published by Didi’s managers and engineers in the 
media.  
The starting point of my analysis was the macro dimension of enterprise’s 
relationship with the state. My findings suggest that the state has high stake in 
promoting the development of platform enterprises like Didi and has introduced 
favourable policies while implementing only lax regulation. For the state, Didi 
represents innovation, higher efficiency and higher productivity. It allows the state to 
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reconfigure its growth pattern, spur economic growth and help mitigate the cost of 
economic crisis and transition. Didi took off quickly largely thanks to relatively lax 
government oversight at the start. And it was only after it seized national market 
leadership that the first set of industry laws took effect. This is in sharp contrast with 
the conditions of labour-intensive manufacturing industries in the PRD where local 
governments have strategically strengthened the enforcement of labour law and 
environmental law to accelerate its relocation in order to propel industrial upgrades.  
In terms of the labour market, if 30 years ago SOE reform and the relaxation of 
hukou provided the much-needed labour force for the sweatshops (Lee 1998; Pun 
2016), now the decline of manufacturing and the de-capacity in coal and steel 
industries have provided a large potential labour pool for platform enterprises. For 
Didi, this has meant an oversupply in the labour market, especially after it secured a 
national monopoly with the power of financial capital and ICTs. On the other hand, 
Didi, among other platform enterprises, defines its relationship with the drivers in 
terms of cooperation rather than employment, while, as Chen et al. (2020) have 
revealed, it actively exploits the flexibility enabled by the third-party labour agencies 
through subcontracting. This helps Didi to evade employer responsibilities for their 
workers as stipulated by labour laws, significantly cutting its costs and making it 
easier to dismiss drivers.  
In the immediate labour process, ICTs contribute to the automation – hence 
deskilling – of the task of delivering a taxi service. Local knowledge of the city, for 
example, road and traffic conditions, and the ability to solicit riders that used to be a 
necessary prerequisite for a capable driver are no longer needed, as a digital map and 
an order dispatching system have been integrated into the app. This has made it 
possible for many – especially migrants – to take up ride-hailing, but it also lowers 
the skill threshold, thus undermining drivers’ bargaining power. 
The pricing and order dispatching subsystems built into Didi’s digital infrastructure 
allocate tasks to drivers and assign each ride a price. Despite their partnership status, 
the drivers have no say in either process. The systems are designed solely by Didi’s 
managers and engineers according to the ‘global optimal’ principle, which means 
coordinating multiple orders to complete the most possible orders in a given 
timeframe safely. The algorithm considers riders’ needs but defines drivers by their 
car specs, and there is no button for drivers to input their needs and preferences. 
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Although the app has a ‘reject’ function, the company has set an upper limit for 
order rejection. Once this limit is exceeded, the drivers can get fined or even 
‘delisted’ from the app.  
Also central to labour control in Didi is its payment system, which is a commission-
based system where a proportion of the fee of each ride completed is extracted in the 
name of information service provision. As stipulated in the contract, it is Didi who 
has the final say regarding how much will be taken from each order. The smooth 
extraction of the commission is enabled by the e-payment system where riders pay 
directly to Didi, who then settles daily with drivers. Like the piece rate system, under 
the commission-based system, the more orders one completes, the more one earns. 
But unlike the piece rate system, under the commission-based system, the drivers 
know exactly how much of their gross income is taken by the company, making the 
extraction of surplus relatively transparent.  
Customer feedback and service as a device of labour control is also built into and 
automated through Didi’s app. The rider rating function allows customers to rate 
each ride delivered according to the criteria set by the company. A less obvious way 
ICTs enhance labour control in the platform model is that it facilitates the managers’ 
continuous re-conceptualisation of the task. While in the factory system it is the 
production process manager who carries out long-range observation, research and 
analysis to optimise the production process, in Didi, much of this work is automated 
through big data.  
In Didi’s daily operation, these subsystems do not operate independently, but 
intersect with each other. Exactly how they intersect to exercise labour control 
depends on what the managers see as effective to secure and maximise surplus 
labour. An example in this regard are the incentive schemes, which require drivers to 
complete a certain number of orders to receive a particular bonus, with the threshold 
varying across different regions and changing across time, but normally requiring 
12-15 hours’ work. Another example is that the order dispatching system is linked to 
the rider rating system, which is further supplemented by a time-consuming, rider-
leaning complaint system comprising the complaint function on the app and a 
hotline. In its actual operation, this effectively saves Didi the onerous task of dispute 
resolution and gives it more space to manoeuvre in exploiting driver-rider 
relationships, either for a larger driver pool or a higher rider loyalty. Further, the fact 
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that the digital systems are inhuman and lack the intelligence and flexibility of 
human workers further tightens control, with the space for negotiation and 
complaint-lodging in workplaces with human managers that is functional to organise 
consent (Burawoy 1979) effectively removed, not to mention that sometimes drivers 
even have to pay the price of technological imperfection.  
On top of this, Didi has developed many offline apparatuses to complement this 
highly automated system. For example, Didi driver’s club and its affiliated WeChat 
groups are an offline centre for driver recruitment and dispute settlement; shenfang, 
anonymous rider, is a surveillance mechanism that allows the company to enforce its 
code of conduct among its designated drivers. 
To summarise, labour control in the platform model is both old and new. Didi’s 
platform regime continues to be characterised by disorganised market despotism 
(Lee 1999; Chan 2010; Lüthje et al. 2014), but this is now mediated by digital 
technologies, as digital apps, algorithm, cloud technology and machine learning are 
deployed in every possible way to deskill tasks, optimise production process and 
reconfigure, tighten, automate and dehumanise control of the workers in the labour 
process. If as Lee (1999) convincingly argued three decades ago that SOE reform 
precipitated the transition of factory regimes in China from organised dependence to 
disorganised despotism, the ongoing digital transformation of the economy gives rise 
to a mediated version of this disorganised despotism: what I call technological 
despotism. 
 
2) Platform jobs reconsidered 
Studies so far have centred on platform jobs as the archetypical ICTs-enabled 
arrangement of production. This is well-founded, for in China, the platform economy 
represents a strategic move by the state to restructure old industries, spur economic 
growth and create jobs, and its development is propelled by the joint force of the 
state and capital. It is gaining momentum and will continue to do so in the future. 
For my respondents, platform jobs are indeed a real and meaningful option. This 
notwithstanding, in its shadow, my research points to the existence of other ICTs-
mediated arrangements of production equally popular among nongmingong.  
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One such arrangement, discussed in detail in Chapter 4, is rijie. Rijie came into 
existence in a time of the decline of manufacturing on the one hand, and labour 
shortage on the other. It is an informal form of labour use created mostly by small-
to-medium labour intermediaries through the location-based social connections 
afforded by WeChat to meet capital’s demands for flexible, cheap labour. It bears 
many similarities with gig jobs: a casual and non-permanent nature, payment on a 
piece-work basis, variable working hours, little job security, dim career prospects, 
and mediation by digital platforms. Within the immediate context of industrial 
China, it resembles agency dispatching or temporary jobs. What makes rijie 
distinctive is that it is based primarily – in some cases entirely – on ICTs-enabled 
connections, which adds an extra layer to its informality.  
For one thing, although gig workers, dispatch agency workers and temporary 
workers do not form formal relations with their employers, they do sign legal 
contracts with the labour agencies or gig platforms that recruit them. This provides 
them at least some form of institutional protection, however unfair the terms and 
conditions and unmeaningful the protection might be (Feng 2019a; Feng 2019b). 
However, rijie operates in a regulatory vacuum, for no written contracts of any kind 
are signed. In disputes, no institutional resources can be mobilised to protect 
themselves, and there is no way they can lodge legal and meaningful complaints and 
take the intermediaries or their employers to court.  
The ICTs-enabled connection on which rijie is based can also be disembedded from 
any offline convention, connections and even locations, and its existence is subject 
to the will of the intermediary. With WeChat, the intermediaries now need no 
physical shopfront or stalls to operate. This is problematic when WeChat groups are 
often the only connection between workers and intermediaries, for once the group is 
deleted, the intermediary can be nowhere to be found. If previously labour 
intermediaries had to operate in the physical location of the shopfront, giving the 
workers some leverage to use nao, create a disturbance, as a strategy to, for example, 
get wages (Pun 2016), now even this option is closed off.  
The case of rijie reminds us that platform jobs are only one ICTs-mediated form of 
production. In the recent transition of the Chinese economy, ICTs have not just been 
deployed by the state and financial capital to restructure old service industries, but 
are in the meantime adopted by other actors within the realm of production to 
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mitigate the cost of transition. The arrangements of production these practices help 
create may be less known, but usually more informal and exploitative in their 
respective ways, especially when the informal economy has always employed a 
substantial portion of the labour force in China (Huang 2009; Friedman and Lee 
2010; Lee 2016). Although rijie appears less often in government reports and the 
media, and no large-scale survey data is available to gauge its scale, almost all my 
respondents reported experience with it, and this was driven not by any peculiarities 
of the group, but by their shared conditions with other nongmingong under wider 
economic transition. Its informality and exploitative nature hence merit more 
scholarly debate and attention from media policymakers. 
My research and analysis of rijie provides a theoretical and methodological 
framework to discern and analyse these less visible ICTs-enabled work 
arrangements. The theoretical framework is a synthesis of Burawoy’s three-element 
framework of production regime and the mutual construction of technology and 
society, which in turn calls for a bottom-up methodology, mapping how actors 
within the production regime adopt ICTs to obscure and secure surplus labour amid 
rapid transition. 
  
3) Bringing the workers back 
A third way this thesis advances the literature concerns nongmingong’s subjective 
experience of production. Studies to date have centred disproportionately around 
platform sectors, which ignores the diversity of their mediated work practices. 
Besides, in their actual analysis, the approach is worker-centred, but the drivers are 
defined more often as employees in terms of employment precarity and market status 
than as workers in terms of their position within capitalist relations of production. 
This leaves important questions unanswered, such as why they choose to work with 
platforms in the first place, and how their class and gender identities and life history 
relates to their experience of production.  
My analysis brings the workers back in (Burawoy 1979; Lee 1998; Shen 2007). To 
do this, I highlight the fact that China’s current ICTs-driven industrial transition is 
built on the now declining labour-intensive, export-driven growth regime, and is 
uneven across sectors, giving rise to a spectrum of (un-)mediated production regimes 
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(Shen 2006). In navigating this changing labourscape, workers make their own 
choices about engagement and disengagement, which, as my findings suggest, have 
close relations with their class and gender identities, life history and concerns.  
Most workers practice multi-jobbing, keeping factory jobs while taking up ICTs-
enabled jobs as a side-line. This is because, in a time of transition, manufacturing 
jobs – despite declining overtime hours (and hence wages), degrading working 
conditions and aggravated exploitation and enhanced control – still offer baseline 
income and social security on which they can rely to cover the daily expenses of 
their three-generation families. Precisely for this reason, these middle-aged, married 
workers, whether male or female, tend to be conservative in their experimentation 
with ICTs-enabled opportunities.  
The decision about which ICTs-enabled jobs to pick is gendered and defined in 
relation to the family. Male workers tend to define themselves as the main 
breadwinners, and would exploit resources at hard to do jobs promising instant or 
predictable income, while female workers are inclined to define their womanhood as 
caregivers, wives and mothers, with the exception of some young women who see 
themselves more as individuals. ICTs do not seem to have afforded them the same 
opportunities as men. Weishang is a popular choice among women but compared to 
Didi and other ‘male’ options, it seldom materialises as an effective source of 
income. Here, history seems to repeat itself, for in Lee’s (1999) analysis of the 
historical transition from central planning to market socialism, market opportunities 
for second jobs or job changes were also biased against women because of their lack 
of marketable skills and because their heavier domestic responsibilities deprive them 
of the flexibility to take advantage of such opportunities. Like Lee’s SOEs women 
who typically stuck to inferior factory jobs, a typical family strategy generally 
requires my female respondents’ continual attachment to factory jobs. 
In terms of the daily work, those who assume a higher position in the factory 
hierarchy along the lines of managerial ranks and skill levels generally have more 
time, energy, guanxi networks and flexibility to practice engaging in side-lines. By 
contrast, rank-and-file workers must usually work excessive, long hours – up to 16 a 
day – on a low hourly rate, while enduring higher physical and psychological risks 
and frequent labour rights infringements. If for the former, ICTs-enabled jobs are an 
opportunity with which they can translate their economic and social capital into extra 
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income, for the latter, ICTs allow them to earn as much as before but in a more 
precarious setting.  
Compared to the conservativism of the middle-aged, some young men are 
emboldened to quit their factory jobs and pursue the new ICTs-enabled opportunities 
of Didi. Most buy their cars with family savings; others invest all their betrothal and 
wedding gifts. For them, factory jobs are associated with repetitive and tedious tasks, 
poor wages, harsh disciplinary practices and dim prospects; with a career in Didi 
they aspire to erli, become established, that is, to gain independence from or become 
the pillar of their natal family. It is worth pointing out that this family support is 
gendered, with sons usually receiving support and daughters expected to marry up. 
Having said this, the young drivers did not consider Didi a permanent solution, but 
an opportunity to quickly amass a fortune with which they could afford to learn 
skills (e.g. barber, automobile repair) and start their own individual businesses back 
home. If the economy can be said to have upgraded through ICTs, what defines the 
inspiration of these working class young men for a sustained, stable livelihood has 
not (Pun and Lu 2010; Li and Tian 2011).  
A key word they use to describe their day-to-day work experience with Didi is 
freedom. For them, being a Didi driver is freer than working in factories as it allows 
them to choose not to work when in dire situations, and they no longer have to bear 
the managerial despotism and depressing physical and social environments of the 
factory. This is nothing like the utopian scenario of overall autonomy and control 
over work as put across by the company. It is hence understandable that Didi does 
not provide the workers with a wonderland of fair, decent and unalienated work. 
Rather, their experience with Didi’s technological despotism can be best described, 
as summarised in Chapter 5, as “betrayal, antagonism and indignity”, “being 
controlled, taken advantaged of and exploited”, with some feeling their masculinity 
challenged. This has much to do with its imperfect and inhumane technological 
system, drivers’ lack of voice within the technological system, the commission-
based payment system, the excessively high bar of the incentive scheme, the sharp 
contrast of driver-Didi relationships before and after it seized market leadership, and 
preferential treatment towards riders.   
In this process, factory experience casts a long shadow over their experience with 
Didi as an important way they evaluate Didi’s platform regime is by comparing it the 
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factory regime. This is evident in how they define ‘freedom’ on Didi; it also 
manifests itself in their explicit refusal of Didi’s use of ‘partner’ and ‘co-operator’ to 
define them. The platform-based restructuring of the service sector of which Didi is 
the epitome happened in the post-2008 era, a time when China’s revised Labour 
Contract Law was implemented with a government resolution, which has led to an 
increase in the awareness of labour rights among nongmingong (Gallagher et. al 
2014). This underlies their understanding of Didi and their motivation, appeal and 
strategy of resistance. 
Drivers’ experiences of Didi are also informed by daily interactions with each other, 
both online and offline. That they no longer need to gather in a geographically 
confined space to work does not stop them from forging meaningful connections 
with each other. In this regard, ICTs – more specifically, WeChat groups – form 
either by themselves or by local businesses seeking to provide services to them, are a 
useful space in a similar way as Pun and Smith’s (2007) dormitory are for factory 
workers. News and interpretations of Didi’s development and market strategies are 
often circulated and debated; similar to Ding’s (2014) Hu’nanese taxi drivers in 
Shenzhen who are connected through intercoms, these online chat spaces allow them 
to negotiate help when problems arise, for example, police inspections or when their 
cars break down in the middle of nowhere. They also constantly exchange the 
whereabouts of female sex workers who are increasingly invisible from the street 
after the government-led anti-prostitution campaign. WeChat aside, they also 
constantly meet each other in offline barbeque and beer sessions, a rare moment of 
relaxation after a long day, and in busy points of the city where they gather for 
riders. These are equally important sites where they discuss and complain about 
work, inform each other of the latest government policies and exchange views about 
Didi.  
It is from these shared life histories, experiences and interactions that they build up a 
relationship they call “jianghu yiqi” and “jiurou pengyou”, which provides a solid 
social and cognitive basis – and hence opportunities – for the mobilisation and 
organisation of collective action and resistance. In the two strikes I observed, these 
experiences and connections were invoked and mobilised. The strategy of 
mobilisation focused on Didi’s labour control and exploitation, particularly its 
extraction of an excessive proportion of their gross income. Messages of solidarity 
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with a clearly defined ‘us’ drivers as antithetical to Didi the company and an 
explicitly articulated demand for fair work conditions were widely circulated across 
different online groups. As in factories, strikes and wildcat actions and individual 
forms of resistance, like climbing up utility poles to attract police and media 
attention, are still the main forms of resistance, and no explicitly political appeal of 
institutionalised self-organisation in the form of, for example, trade unions, like the 
recent Jasic case, is made (Pun 2019; Chan J 2020). Shared place of origin, which 
used to be prominent in forging solidarity under the factory regime (Lee 1998; Chan 
2010), were not even mentioned, while gender – in relation to the discourse of 
masculinity – has become a new source of solidarity. 
Collective resistance aside, individual drivers’ use of bot apps to subvert Didi’s 
technological infrastructure of labour control was found to be pervasive. In this 
thesis, I consider this a new mode of resistance that may open up more possibilities 
for struggle, but I also wish to acknowledge its historical continuity with the radical 
Luddites who destroyed textile machinery as a form of protest (Thompson 1980). 
The fact that these apps were produced by an alternative software industry, 
consisting of programmers of similar social location with the workers, and that these 
bot apps are considered illegal in China, reminds us that lower class people are also 
capable of producing and exploiting technology, and that technological design itself 
constitutes a site of domination and struggle. 
 
4) Nongmingong as a holistic people 
A final contribution to the field is that I reiterate the relevance of seeing 
nongmingong as a holistic people who are not only producing but have a life outside 
production. Chinese labour sociologist Shen Yuan (in Wang 2015) once observed an 
“ascending spiral” pattern in nongmingong studies, from studies of their migratory 
process and post-migration lived experience in urban areas, through an emphasis on 
the politics of production and possibilities for contentious politics, to the more recent 
refocus on the politics of reproduction and its intersection with the politics of 
production. Although I do not consider the latest trend as an ‘ascendance’ from an 
earlier focus on migrant experience, as underlying the two strands of research are 
two different images of the group, I do agree with his advocation of a reproduction 
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turn, as well as the rationale he laid out for this: to study reproduction is to explore 
possibilities of political consciousness, contentious politics and the transformation of 
labour-capital relations by closely examining workers’ everyday lives, which, like 
production, is a site where capitalist relations of production and reproduction plays 
out and a site of domination and resistance.  
Building on this proposition, in this thesis I pointed out that under the digital 
transformation of the Chinese economy, this reproduction turn is becoming more 
relevant, for digital transformation happens not just in the realm of production, but is 
also a process in which nongmingong’s everyday lives are (re-)commodified through 
and consequently mediated by ICTs. As my discussion in Chapter 6 shows, the 
digital transformation of the economy resulted in not only the restructuring of 
China’s service sector, but also its media landscape. Changes in the media market, 
particularly its further segmentation and the rise of the multi-channel network model 
of content production and distribution, the rapid penetration of smart phones, and the 
reform of the telecommunication industry have precipitated notable changes in 
nongmingong’s daily consumption of media and the role of media consumption in 
their lives. While previously they had to go to the factory’s common room or nearby 
corner shops to watch TV, watching favoured content at their chosen time and place 
has now become commonplace. 
For almost all my informants, living in the industrial zone where most businesses are 
centred around existential-level needs, they found watching or reading digital 
content one of the few affordable options to entertain themselves after a long day’s 
work. When asked to name 5-10 articles or videos they found most relevant or 
inspiring, a gendered pattern was manifested, with what I call the luogui genre and 
gender-related articles popular among both gender groups, men preferring political 
infotainments and women preferring what they called shenghuoju. A textual analysis 
shows that these contents, despite their respective themes, are urban-centric, 
prioritise the voice of the state, and acknowledge the marginal status and social and 
economic justice owed to nongmingong, while presenting market, individual efforts 
and/or an omnipotent party state that ‘Serves the People’ as the solution to their 
problems. On each specific subject matter, the representations downplay the 
influence of class subordination while overemphasizing the factor of that particular 
subject matter.   
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In interpreting these contents, nongmingong position and imagine themselves in 
relation to their middle class counterparts, the state, their opposite gender and the 
rural-urban duality, invoking what I call the ‘bitter and precarious structure of 
feeling’. Although they exhibited strong moral critiques of the market, there is little 
evidence of them being sceptical of the market mechanism itself. Most still consider 
dagong as the better way to free themselves from gendered restrictions and rural 
backwardness, thus consolidating their conviction in market mechanisms and 
individual efforts. Besides, a strong sense of distrust toward the party-state is 
reaffirmed. Overall, the subsumption of class discourse continues to be reinforced, 
even in a time when the media market is segmented to the extent that a subsegment 
is developed to explicitly address nongmingong, and their daily consumption of the 
media contributes to the process of ‘de-politicization’ (Pun and Chan 2008; Wang 
2008; Lin 2015) that lies at the heart of contemporary Chinese cultural politics.  
 
8.2 Reform, ICTs and class formation in China 
This thesis set out to understand nongmingong’s experience of the ongoing digital 
transformation of the Chinese economy, and provides an opportunity to reflect on the 
recent reform. To mitigate the economic, social and environmental crisis that 
resulted from the old export-driven growth regime and to reclaim its diluted 
economic autonomy, the state mobilised the power of ICTs as an apolitical solution 
to reconfigure its growth pattern and move the country upward in the global value 
chain. In this process, the state bolstered a discourse of innovation, 
developmentalism and nationalism and introduced favourable policies in areas of 
ICTs-enabled innovation and restructuring, encouraging various types of capital to 
participate in the commodification of a wider range of economic sectors and social 
realms. Against this backdrop of aggressive informatisation and mounting 
technological optimism, this research reveals the other side of the story: in the 
shadow of the burgeoning sharing economy (CNNIC 2020), the productivity 
dividend of ICTs does not much benefit nongmingong, and it poses more challenges 
than opportunities to them.  
It is true that digitalisation has managed to create new job opportunities like rijie, 
weishang and Didi for nongmingong, which have allowed them to earn a good wage, 
make ends meet and sustain their lifestyles in a time of economic volatility. Some 
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have even earned slightly higher income than before. But most did not experience a 
significant increase, except for Didi drivers during the company’s cash-burning 
expansion frenzy or those who assumed higher position within the factory hierarchy, 
either by exploiting managerial flexibility or because they possessed more 
marketable skills. For most rank-and-file workers, the best they could expect was to 
maintain their previous level of income at a higher cost. Usually, they had to juggle 
several jobs and work for an excessive amount of time. All experienced tightened 
workplace control of some sort – more informal work arrangements, less social 
security, abysmal work environments and frequent employer violations of labour 
laws. Some even faced threats to their lives and sexual assault.   
The new platform model – widely praised in mainstream media, government reports 
and much of the academic literature – did not improve their situation much. 
Although most Didi drivers would never want to return to the factory, this is not 
because Didi offers an ideal alternative, but because it allowed them to stay away 
from the depressing work environment of the factory, its physical constraints, 
managerial despotism and the sense of hopelessness and indignity associated with it, 
giving them a sense of hope for the future and the freedom – albeit basic and limited 
– to not work in dire circumstances. The actual situation of the drivers was much less 
rosy, for thanks to ICTs, the new platform regime subjected them to a reconfigured 
labour control of technological despotism. Work arrangements were even more 
informal and their situation more precarious. Managerial domination multiplied, 
even more unfettered and labour control more sophisticated and dehumanised, 
especially when platform managers can now dismiss drivers without legal costs and 
can recruit from a massive pool of disgraced factory workers. Many drivers 
experienced Didi’s platform regime as alienating and their sense of estrangement, 
exploitation, powerlessness and indignity was not dissimilar from – if not deeper 
than – when they worked in factories.  
The digital transformation of the economy also gave rise to a burgeoning and further 
segmented digital media market, which, along with the popularisation of smart 
phones and drop in telecommunication service fees, gave the workers a rare moment 
of affordable relief after a long day’s backbreaking work and an opportunity to 
temporarily escape from their bitter and precarious life. Media consumption also 
helped some break the monopoly of the sometimes-corrupt local government in 
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relation to information about peasant-benefiting policies from the central 
government, and helped others learn about the norms of urban society, thus 
facilitating their integration into it. But this same process also helps naturalise the 
market system and rural-urban duality that are both central to their life problems, 
reinforcing their conviction regarding the logic of competitive market individualism, 
obstructing the workers from seeing the larger picture, and undermining the 
possibilities of a collective identity and social change through collective efforts of 
demanding equality. 
Beyond concerns with the immediate opportunities and challenges, the ongoing 
economic digitalisation has profound implications for class formation among 
nongmingong. As I have established, the transformation is in its nature the ICTs-
enabled reorganisation of the economic structure and social arrangements of 
capitalism in both production and reproduction spheres, which constitute the material 
base of class formation. This is happening in a time of national and global capitalist 
crisis, a time when universal casualness characterises Chinese workplaces; when 
China is witnessing the constitution of a new political subject – one in a growing 
position of power – capable of setting out political demands and reigniting the 
mobilisation of labour globally; and when, due to structural antagonism to capital, 
workers and employers are pressed into combined struggles along lines of common 
class interest in cultures of solidarity, their legal situation may be disadvantaged 
(Pun 2019). 
Against this background, this reorganisation, by providing a temporary fix to 
nongmingong’s life problems amid crises, undermines the class solidarity factory 
workers had on the grounds of similar arrangements of production, common lifestyle 
and similar market/life chances associated with the factory, and channels 
nongmingong into different production regimes, facing different market 
opportunities and forms of precarity. This echoes Huang (2018) and Pia’s (2019) 
concern about the looming threat of automation for Chinese labour. What has 
transpired since is that worker diversity and division is now generated not just 
through migration, rural-urban divide, labour agency, state control and factory 
management, but also by different personal and familial market capacities in 
exploiting the opportunities offered by the digitalisation of the economy.  
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However, this does not undermine the material base of class formation, but instead 
consolidates it. The new platform regime fails to present a radical, equal alternative 
to the old. Universal casualness continues to characterise work arrangements. Its 
particular pattern of arrangement helps intensify labour-capital conflicts and fosters 
labour-capital antagonism, especially given the recent increase in nongmingong’s 
consciousness of labour rights, and their newly gained freedom in and access to a 
wider range of interpersonal and mass communication resources during and after 
work. On top of these, as production is increasingly mediated through ICTs-enabled 
platforms, technology itself constitutes a point of resistance, which opens new 
possibilities for broader social forces to contribute to class formation.  
The process of class formation is becoming ever more complicated. Through 
investigation into nogmingong’s daily media consumption, echoing Pun (2003) and 
Sun (2014), my research suggests that what further complicates this picture is that 
workers’ class-based political consciousness not only takes shape in production, but 
also in reproduction/consumption. Workers’ practices of consumption have close 
relations with their status in the realm of production, but the two do not necessarily 
converge or determine each other. Given these complexities, how the class formation 
process will develop is a contested realm, and further research into nongmingong’s 
wider ICTs-mediated way of life is needed to gauge its directions and trends.  
To contextualise the findings within a longer historical context, as I have 
demonstrated in chapter 3, ICTs have long been integral to the unfolding of Chinese 
modernity, and China’s state-led, market-oriented, techno-driven developmentalism 
has repeatedly marginalized, if not failed, Chinese working class since the economic 
reform in the 1980s. In this light, the recent digital transformation of the economy 
does not seem to reverse the trend but deepen it. The findings prompt us to reflect on 
the question of whether and to what extent the current use of digital technologies for 
development in China still fulfils the promise of socialism and egalitarianism and 
serves the interest of the country’s peasant and working class as enshrined in its 
Constitution. Dallas Smythe (1974) raised this question to high-level officials of 
socialist China in the early 1970s, and roughly a decade ago Zhao Yuezhi (2007) 
followed suit. It seems to me that this question remains relevant today. My 
evaluation based on the discussion so far is pessimistic, but this does not mean that 
there is no hope, for there are many bottom-up technological inventions and forms of 
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techno-social arrangements from which inspiration can be drawn to conceive a better 
ICTs-mediated development and society. For Smythe, the technology under question 
is bicycles, and for Zhao, it is mobile phones. Maybe it is time to ask, after platforms 
and data, what comes next? 
 
8.3 ICTs, capitalism and the future of work  
Beyond the immediate context of China, its recent reform, and its post-reform 
developments in general, are the larger transformations in global capitalism under 
the impact of globalisation, ICTs and changing modes of political and economic 
governance in recent decades. As in China, these transformations have produced 
changes in work and transformations within working life and workers’ subjectivities 
across the globe. The implications of digital technologies on changing forms of work 
and labour precarity are hence a global question. This has given rise to debates 
across national contexts, where scholars seek to understand the nature of the 
transformation and its implication on the arrangements and futures of work and 
labour as well as worker subjectivities and resistance. 
One line of research contends that the idea of a working class defined by its direct 
relationship to production is outmoded. Researching mainly in the context of 
advanced capitalism, scholars in this tradition typically confront a society that has 
undergone a process of de-industrialisation in the post-war era and seen the rise of 
the creative, financial and ICTs sectors as the new pillar industries. They observe 
that in these societies, all aspects of life have been absorbed into the capitalist nexus, 
including our ability to communicate, and therefore all non-capitalists must be 
regarded as part of an undifferentiated multitude that takes the place of the working 
class (Hardt and Negri 2000). Proponents of this tradition have engaged in elaborate 
attempts to link this multitude to Marx’s theoretical edifice of capitalism, asking 
what sorts of commodities the multitude produces and how value thus produced 
accrues to capital. In what is becoming increasingly known as the digital labour 
debate, scholars have discussed how digital labour should be conceptualised, and 
addressed the increasingly blurred boundaries between work and play, production 
and consumption, and propose various new terms like “playbour”, “prosumption”, 
“co-creation” or “free labour” to capture the change. Based on this, they envision 
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various versions of radical progressive politics (Andrejevic 2003; Kücklich 2005; 
Gill and Pratt 2008; Hesmondhalgh 2010; Dean 2012).  
A second line of thought argues that the ‘precariat’ constitutes a new class in and for 
itself alongside the traditional proletariat (Standing 2011). They do not attempt to 
locate them with any precision in relation to capitalist production processes but 
define the precariat in terms of their employment status, work as a form of 
employment, and digital technologies as intermediaries that enable new 
arrangements in the labour market. For these scholars, the solution to the insecurities 
and the sense of meaninglessness of the precariat is not to propel radical changes in 
capitalist relations of production though class solidarity and struggle, but the 
establishment of an ideal work arrangement that features transparency, 
accountability, worker power and democratic ownership. Some within this tradition 
advocate that societies should accommodate themselves to an ever-increasing share 
of on-demand employment and automated labour, rather than to preserve and extend 
the hard-won protections of traditional, full-time employment arrangements. They 
hence support the idea of universal basic income as an institutional arrangement in 
preparation for a society where robots take over most of the tasks of the human 
labour (Standing 2014, 2017; Schor and Attwood‐Charles 2017; Gray and Suri 2019; 
Woodcock and Graham 2019; Graham 2019).    
A third line of thought shares the Marxist influence of the multitude argument but 
stresses the continuity between contemporary developments and the past. Schiller 
(1999) argued that digital technologies do not alter the fundamental logic of the 
operation of capitalism, but capitalism does exploit digital technologies to restructure 
itself. McKercher and Mosco (2008) and Mosco and McKercher (2008) addressed 
the changing nature of work, workers, and their organizations in the media, 
information, and knowledge industries. Huws (2014) provided a similar view: “it is 
still possible to apply Marx’s theory in current conditions, to define what is, or is 
not, a commodity, to identify the point of production of such commodities, whether 
material or immaterial, and to define the global working class in relation to these 
production processes” (262-263).  
My research follows this last line of thought. It revives the relevance of the old 
questions of the politics of production through relevant concepts like conception, 
execution, deskilling, production regime, the politics of production and relations in 
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production that were developed long ago, and established the continuity between 
new digitally mediated forms of production with its older counterparts. Besides, 
while most research produced under this tradition has focused on cultural or 
knowledge workers (McKercher and Mosco 2008; Mosco and McKercher 2008; 
Wang 2011; Yao 2014), my focus on nongmingong as China’s new working class 
provides me a vantage point to reflect on the implications of digital capitalism on the 
working class in developing economies. It also expands the scope of inquiry to the 
politics of workers’ everyday lives and demonstrates that the politics of reproduction 
is equally central to understanding worker subjectivity.  
This provides me a vantage point from which to ponder the relationship between 
technology and the future of work. If for many Western observers, the future of work 
lies in the automation of work, the replacement (and emancipation) of human beings 
by machines and the inevitability of entering a post-scarcity society (for example, 
Benanav 2019; Gray and Suri 2019) – hence the call for the establishment of 
universal basic income (Standing 2017) – the lesson I learn from this study of a non-
Western, working class case in a national context is that it is still too early to make a 
prediction. Nothing is inevitable about the future of work. The process of 
platformatisation or automation, like the process of mechanisation Burawoy debated 
with Braverman, never pushes itself forward smoothly but is a multi-layered, 
struggle-laden process that takes place in local/national contexts. In this process, the 
dynamics between labour and capital set limits on the separation of conception and 
execution. The managers strike the balance between efficiency and domination while 
workers’ increasing power and struggle emanating from their lived experiences of 
production and reproduction are also determinative – rather than derivative. This in 
turn has to do with the connections between local contexts and global capitalism 
(especially its position in the global value chain and what the state sees as the 
balance between economic growth and political autonomy), local configuration of 
state-enterprise relations and labour market arrangements, and the technology in 
question. Class politics still matters, and the alternative lies in both class power and 
alternative technological design, especially in the Global South.  
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8.4 Limitations and future directions 
Upon reflection, this research is more exploratory than explanatory, and it has many 
limitations. While it provides important insights regarding new forms of labour 
organisation and control, nongmingong’s classed, gendered and aged engagement 
with the changing labourscape as well as its implications for class formation in 
China raises many more questions. In what follows, I summarise some of the 
limitations of the project as presented in this thesis and raise some questions for 
further inquiry.  
First, as I have pointed out in the method chapter, because of my identity as a young, 
male university student, my access to interview opportunities and home visits with 
young female workers during fieldwork was limited. Thus, my discussion of female 
workers’ subjective experiences of the changing labourscape and the formation of 
female working class subjects is partial and tentative. A systematic inquiry with a 
gendered perspective into this issue and a comparison between different genders 
would deepen our understanding in this regard.  
Second, rijie as a new mediated arrangement of production and workers’ experience 
of it should have been explored more thoroughly. While currently public attention 
about digital economy and flexible use of labour is mainly focused on the platform 
sector and scholarly attention on student interns, dispatch agency workers and 
workers of ethnic minorities (Su 2010; Chan et al. 2015; Feng 2019b; Ma 2019), the 
existence of the dispersed yet prevalent practice of rijie, its socioeconomic origins 
and scale, the way it operates, and the ways in which it infringes labour rights should 
be acknowledged while the resulting extreme precarity among the workers should be 
recognised and actions should be taken by labour rights authorities to address these 
issues. 
Third, although my fieldwork involved rural home visits with the workers, this was 
barely discussed in the present thesis, which is urban-centric. In doing so it missed 
an important part of nongmingong’s experience with China’s increasingly ICTs-
mediated labourscape – the state-led ICTs-driven rural rejuvenation project and the 
burgeoning rural ecommerce sector in particular. An exploration of to what extent 
this presents nongmingong with an option of self-reliance and sustained livelihood 
deepens our understanding of the social consequence of current reform pertaining to 
nongmingong and class formation. Similarly, future research should also look at 
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platforms other than Didi, providing a thick description of their platform regimes, 
mechanisms of labour control and workers’ experience with it, for arrangements of 
production and labour condition vary significantly across different platforms. 
Fourth, my analysis in the thesis points out that, similar to Smith and Pun’s (2007) 
dormitory, ICTs and the new arrangements of production afford nongmingong a 
space, both online and offline, to communicate with each other, form a relationship 
they call “jianghu yiqi” and “jiurou pengyou”, and to develop shared understanding 
of the platform itself and their relationship with the platform. This collective 
experience in turn paves the way for collective action. How this works should be 
explored further, for example: what communicative resources they draw on in their 
discussion, the structure of the online group itself, and how their online and offline 
lives actually intersect.  
The phenomenon whereby most nongmingong-turned-drivers actively embraced bot 
apps for resistance merits more research, especially because these apps are not 
produced by Internet giants and distributed through app stores, but by a local, 
‘underground’ software industry through an offline network of distribution 
comprising of mobile phone repair shops and WeChat groups. It would be worth 
conducting an ethnography to document the kinds of technological innovations they 
pursued, how they conceived of them, how this process of conception relates to their 
social location, what alternative visions and imaginaries of ICTs are developed, and 
what constraints from the state and other market players face them. It would also be 
interesting to talk to users of these shanzhai apps to see why some of them are 
successful while others are not, especially in terms of negotiating or 
counterbalancing managerial dominance. For those action-minded, it would be 
interesting to explore the possibility of bringing together grassroots app developers 
and labour NGOs toward a new resistance.  
The final point I want to make is to advocate for researching nongmingong as a 
holistic people. As I have argued earlier, a focus on reproduction provides a nuanced 
understanding of nongmingong’s subjectivity formation – this is becoming all the 
more relevant in the digital age and in a time when the state is determined to re-
orient its economic growth to rely more on consumption, not just among urban the 
middle class, but also the working class.   
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Appendice 
 
Appendix I     Glossary  
changmei Factory girls 
dagong working for a boss 
daling gong elder workers 
danwei work unit 
dianda Radio and TV Universities 
diao to rebuke and scold mercilessly  
diduan renkou low-end population 
erli become established 
fulazhang assistant line supervisor  
getihu small-scale individual or household entrepreneurs  
guanxi    connections, relationships, defines the fundamental dynamic in 
personalized social networks of power 
hua jieji, ding 
chengfen    
determining class status of individuals and the family 
 
hukou   household registration system 
jiqihuanren to replace workers with machines 
jingli    departmental manager 
lazhang line supervisor 
laoxiang    people from the same place-of-origin 
liucheng    production process manager 
mangliu      blind flow 
mianzi face and favour 
mingong chao               tide wave of migrant labour 
nongmin peasant; people with rural hukou status 
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nongmingong     rural-to-urban migrant; migrant workers; peasant-turned 
workers 
pugong the rank-and-file workers, the lowest rank within the factory 
hierarchy 
rendi maodun               the contradiction between limited arable land and oversized 
population 
rijie jobs remunerated daily 
shangpin jingji commodity economy 
shengguan production manger 
suzhi quality 
taigan Taiwanese managers 
tiefanwan       iron rice bowl 
three-generation 
family        
a term describing the composition of Chinese families, 
especially those in rural areas. It consists of the core family, 
that is, children and parents, as well as four grandparents.  
xiangtu guanxi                sociality characteristics of a rural Chinese kind 
xiaolingtong Little Smart, an inexpensive wireless technology which offers 
limited mobile service at the price of a landline. The service 
was officially terminated by the end of 2014. 
weishang   micro business 
wenming chengshi          civilized cities 
 
yu guoji jiegui                     joining the international track 
zuo shengyi                        doing business 
ACFTU All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
CCP Chinese Communist Party 
EA enterprise architect system 
FDI   foreign direct investment 
NBS National Bureau of Statistics, the People’s Republic of China 
PRD the Pearl River Delta 
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SOE       State-owned Enterprise 
TVE Township and Village Enterprise 
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Appendix II    Dongguan and Weida in transition  
 
The fieldwork for this thesis was conducted mainly between 2017-2018 in Weida, a 
medium-sized factory in Tangxia township, Dongguan specializing in manufacturing 
keystone modules, keystone patch panels, electrical jack and cables, all of them 
commonly used elements in enabling network connectivity. Apart from Weida and 
Dongguan, I also followed six of my colleagues back home before the Spring 
Festival of 2018, to Lincang, a municipal-level city bordering Myanmar in Yunnan 
Province, Tongren, a city in Guizhou Province, and Baise of Guangxi bordering 
Vietnam. In this section, I will mainly focus on the Dongguan and Weida. And I will 
briefly discuss details about the three villages I visited in its connection with how my 
understanding of nongmingong and their ICTs use evolved throughout the fieldwork, 
which can be found in the method chapter.  
Located at the heart of the Pearl River Delta (the PRD), Dongguan borders the 
provincial capital of Guangzhou in the north and Shenzhen to the south, both 
megacities in China. Widely known as ‘the world factory’, throughout the past 
decades, it has been a magnet for FDI for its favorable land and tax policy as well as 
heavy investment in industrial infrastructure. During the heyday of China’s export-
oriented regime of growth, it was home to more than 10,000 foreign-invested 
enterprises across an area of 6,785 square miles, including Apple, Canon, Samsung, 
Nokia, Apple, Coca-Cola, Nestlé, among others. Eight pillar industries of the city 
included electronics and communications equipment, electrical machinery, textile 
and clothing, furniture, toys, paper products, food and beverage, and chemical 
industries. This, with its livable humid subtropical climate and abundant sunshine 
and rainfall, made it one of the most popular destinations for nongmingong. 
According to the government’s most recent report, of the city’s 8.4 million 
inhabitants, only 2.1 million were registered as residents. Manufacturing aside, it 
was also well-known for its huge underground sex trade and expansive red-light 
districts, earning for it the nickname ‘the Eastern Amsterdam’.  
In the recent decade, Dongguan is undergoing a profound transition in its industrial 
structure.  Negatively influenced by the global capitalist crisis, particularly the Sino-
US trade war, Dongguan has since mid-2000s witnessed waves after waves of 
factory shutdowns and factory relocations to inland China and Southeast Asian 
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countries. In its place, in my fieldwork, I found a number of small family-run 
workshops emerging, most of them at the downstream position in the subcontracting 
networks dominated by larger factories. The condition of the low-end, labour-
intensive manufacturing sector was further undermined by the local government’s 
move to impose more and more stringent environment policies. On the other hand, to 
keep its high economic growth rate and retain it status as the world manufacturing 
powerhouse, two strategies that have been high on the agenda of Dongguan’s 
government are jiqihuanrne, to replace workers with machines, an initiative to 
upgrade the low-end manufacturing industry through automation, and a scheme to 
attract high-tech enterprises, with similar favorable policies as 40 years ago for the 
low-end manufacturers.  
Socially, alongside this economic transition, at the time of my fieldwork, Dongguan 
was undergoing a process of gentrification. On the one hand, in the industrial towns, 
new town centers with high-rise middle-class residential area and shopping malls 
arose. On the other hand, in migrant villages, small real estate enterprises took over 
the residential buildings built by residents themselves, upgraded it and started their 
own renting business at a higher price. Around these migrant villages, more 
supermarkets, convenience store franchises and entertainment facilities were built. 
All these had significantly enriched local life; however, this was achieved at the cost 
of surging prices. In this regard, apart from the bankruptcy and relocation of 
manufacturing factories, these factors have also contributed to its loss of vast 
numbers of nongmingong.  
Also eye-catching in Dongguan’s streets were the cellphones stores and repair shops. 
The sheer amount and density of these shops would surprise many: almost in every 
main road of every migrant village in every industrial town, one could easily find 
shops as such. Most of these shops sold smart phones of domestic Chinese phone 
brands like OPPO, Huawei and Vivo. They were also part of the distribution network 
for many local software companies that developed software for, for example, local 
salesman. ICTs also presented in local life in less visible ways. For example, more 
and more workers began to work for ride-hailing companies like Didi and Shouqi, 
and food delivery companies like Meituan and Eleme. Taking taxis increasingly 
became an ICTs-based undertake even among nongmingong. In the street corners of 
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the town center, one could always spot a group of food delivery drivers gathering 
together, talking to each other while waiting for the next order.  
Weida, as I just stated, was the manufacturing plant of a Taipei-headquartered 
electronics dealer. It was first established in the late 1990s, a time when the 
Dongguan government was still trying to reach out as much foreign direct 
investment as possible. Its original site was in Fenggang, Tangxia’s neighboring 
industrial town that was also part of Dongguan. In the early 2010s, the local 
government of Tangxia Township decided to support the development of high-tech 
sector93, and a crucial strategy in this regard was to build, right by the highway that 
connected Dongguan to Shenzhen, Hong Kong and Guangzhou, a science park. it is 
through this project that Weida moved to Tangxia to its current campus.  
Like other foreign-invested94 enterprises, top on Weida’s hierarchical management 
team were a group of taigan (Taiwanese managers) who oversaw the factory’s 
overall production, administration and communications. The only mainlander in the 
team is a Hubei local who managed government relation for the factory and had little 
role in production.   
From early to mid-2010s, Weida, like many other manufacturing factories in 
Dongguan, had felt keenly the pain of the global capitalist crisis, and associated with 
it, the rise in labour wages. In 2011, attracted by the favorable policy and the cheaper 
labour price there, Weida’s Taiwanese boss, through his connection with some 
custom officer in Guangzhou who came originally from Yanbian, a Korean 
Autonomous Prefecture to the east of Jilin Province in Northeast China, invested the 
company’s second manufacturing facility there. Slightly after I left the Weida, with 
the effort of the Hubei manager, established its third manufacturing campus. More 
recently, I learned from the Hubei manager that Weida opened its fourth site in 
Thailand. These were widely discussed among my colleagues in Dongguan. The pain 
was also felt in the decrease of overtime work and the loss of colleagues. When I left 
the field at the end of April 2018, we had 30 of us working at the Panel group in 
Weida’s manufacturing Department One. At the time of this writing, almost half of 
them left for a new job, some in a different factory, others in the platform economy. 
 
93 This should not be confused with the more recent move of the Dongguan government to turn to the high-tech sector to pursue 
industrial upgrade. 
94 Although the Chinese government insisted that Taiwan was part of the People’s Republic of China, for historical reasons, 
investments from Taiwan were nevertheless categorised as FDI.  
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Appendix III   Migrant Working Lives: a brief life history of the some of the 
interviewees 
 
Junhua, born in 1988, is from the mountainous Heyuan city, Guangdong Province, 
home to the largest Hakka population in China. Although administratively part of 
Guangdong, the frontier of opening up, because of the lack of preferential policies, 
its level of economic development resembles more its poorer neighbor of Jiangxi 
than its richer costal neighbors, and it has always been a major source of migrant 
labour outflow since 1992. Because of his parents’ inability to cover the tuitions for 
him and his three siblings, he dropped out of middle school when he was 14, and 
started his first job as a packer two years later in a state-owned lunchbox factory in 
Heyuan. It did not take long for him to realize that private factories in Dongguan 
offered higher salary, hence his decision to move to Dongguan. Since then, he has 
spent all his life there, switching among different factories. At the time we met in 
early 2018, he worked as a carrier in a furniture workshop. He was very proud that it 
was with his support that his father was able to renovate their rural house that had 
long fallen into despair. Now his biggest concern was to get married.  
 
Hu, originally from a mountainous village in Hengyang, Hunan Province, is the 
youngest interviewee and one of the gay workers I met during the fieldwork. We 
first met each other through the introduction of my gay colleague at Weida. Growing 
up as a left-behind child, ironically, he was not able to get closely along with his 
parents until he started his dagong career in the same factory they worked after 
finishing middle school. He soon left that factory because of his felt need to hide 
from his parents his gay identity. Aged 20, he became a sushi apprentice in a local 
Japanese restaurant in Tangxia after working in a motor factory for three months. 
Although the income was halved, he liked his current job as it allowed him to get up 
later in the morning and promised him a career in the catering industry, especially 
when Japanese food was gaining popularity in third- and fourth- tier cities in China. 
In his spare time, he was a video game player, a star trek fan, and a follower of many 
WeChat public accounts about urban office life. He was also a host at the gay live-
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streaming platform Blued, where he was well-loved for his tattoos and his drag-
queen style. 
 
Boqing was a vocational school graduate majoring in Dental Technology in 
Changsha, the capital city of his home province Hunan. He chose this major in order 
to become a dentist, only to find that the program was designed to train denture 
technicians. Immediately after graduation, he landed in a denture factory in 
Changsha as an apprentice on a monthly wage of 1500 RMB, which was far from 
enough to cover even only his own basic living expenses. His plan to pursue a career 
in the dental industry was further impeded by the fact that one would need a 
university degree to do so in China’s nascent dental industry. These led him to 
Dongguan 5 years ago and he had been part of the quality check team in a local 
electronics factory ever since. Aged 29, he confessed feeling being in a dilemma: He 
was certainly not content with his factory life, but saw no direction toward a better 
future. Like many of his urban peers, he was an NBA fan who knew all its basketball 
stars and teams like the back of his hand, and felt immense pressure as regards 
marriage.  
 
Youcai started his own brick workshop at the turn of 2018, right after I followed him 
to Dashan village, Lincang, Yunnan Province. Dashan is located 40 minutes’ drive 
from Laukkaing District, part of Myanmar’s  Shan State, and 2 hours’ drive from 
downtown Lincang. He could recall trading home-raised pigs for money at local 
markets in Laukkaing, but never set his footstep on Kunming before he was 20, 
neither did his parents throughout their entire life. Born in 1991, after spending 8 
years in primary school, he got his first job in Lhasa at the age of 14 where he 
worked at his cousin’s construction site as an apprentice and then a bricklayer. After 
the project finished, he had to find his own way out. Since then, he had been a 
bamboo logger, a road mender and a pig dealer. In 2015, he even organized local 
villagers to work for the construction team designated by the municipal government 
to pave the road in his village, which he was very proud of since it was the first time 
his village was connected to the outside by asphalt road. Throughout the years, he 
had tried many industries but was never formally employed by any factories or 
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enterprises.  He was very excited at first, but became increasingly tired of the 
uncertainty as he grew older. As he said: ‘basically I am doing whatever I think is 
profitable. And the trends are fleeting in small places like Dashan. I never know 
what I will do next. To be honest I hate this’. 
 
Songlin is a father of two daughters who identifies himself as gay and now manages 
the quality check team in a local electronics factory. Aged 30, he quit school and 
started working at the age of 16 because his father – the then main breadwinner of 
the family - was caught in a serious car accident and became paralyzed in bed ever 
since. At that time, he was a top student at school and was entertained with high 
hope to become the village’s first university student. However, faced with his 
father’s accident, the heavy medical bills it generated and the problem of the 
livelihood of the family, especially his two younger siblings, as the eldest son of the 
family, he felt that he had no choice but to shoulder the family responsibility. Like 
many other nongmingong I met in Dongguan, during the first several years, he 
followed his cousin to Mawei Township, Fujian province and worked as pugong in a 
shoe factory. he too had had a period of time when he frequently changed his job. 
Five years ago, his father’s health deteriorated, which prompted him to consider 
marriage. After marrying his wife, he became more serious with his career. A week 
after their wedding, he left his already-pregnant wife at home to work in Dongguan. 
It is from that time he began to work his current boss, who later left their previous 
company and started his own. During our barbecue & beer talks, he confessed that 
he felt sorry for his wife given his gay self-identification. From time to time he 
would meet gay guys nearby on Blued95, develop romantic relationships and 
occasionally have sex with them, but coming out and divorce are never an option for 
him. The only way he can think of to recompense her is to work as hard as possible 
and improve the material conditions of her life.  
 
Nian obtained his dazhuan (junior college) diploma in Computer Science in his 
hometown Chongqing, but this failed to secure for him a programmer job in a time 
when the threshold of such jobs is a bachelor’s degree. He felt very depressed at 
 
95 Blued is a Chinese gay dating app that is popular among working-class people.  
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first, but soon decided that he did not want to spend the rest of his life in factories. 
Hence his decision to learn woodworking skills in a local furniture factory. 
Unfortunately, only two months after that he got seriously injured - he lost four of 
his five left-hand fingers – because of a mis-operation and the lack of protection. 
This time it took him a year to recover physically and another year to claim 
occupational injury compensation with the help of Tonggeng, a local NGO 
specializing providing legal assistance for occupational hazards victims. Until the 
time we met, he was never able to find another factory job. Instead, he had switched 
between multiple ICTs-enabled jobs, including Meituan driver, Huolala, Didi 
Express. More recently, he was a Didi Daijia, designated driver, starting a day’s 
work from 3 pm and ending at 3 a.m. A handsome young man in his late 20s, he 
used to be very confident about his own attraction to the opposite sex, but this has 
for him long gone because of his poor economic condition and disabled hand. In our 
interview, he confessed strong desire for intimacy and company, and he made it 
explicit that this cannot come from family members and marriage, since he was too 
ashamed to go back home given his poor economic condition.  
 
Shaojing is healthy and robust at first glance, but during our 2-hour interview 
conducted in his factor dorm, he took three 10-min breaks, lying on his bed. This is 
because he was diagnosed with Benzolism three years ago at the age of 26, an 
occupational disease that is not uncommon among migrant workers in the Pearl 
River Delta, and had suffered from blood dyscrasia ever since. The disease almost 
entirely ruined his life. Early in his dagong career, he showed enormous interest in 
mechanics and molding, and throughout the years he had acquired much 
knowledge/skills and abundant experience in these two fields. For a time, this had 
secured for him a technologist position within the factory, enjoying a salary and 
status comparable to that of a floor manager. He did consider hopping to a larger 
company, but every time his boss managed to persuade him to stay by offering better 
incentives.  Everything changed overnight on the day he received his certificate of 
diagnosis, and the boss became even more impatient when his health got worse. 
Born and growing up in a mountain village in He’nan Province, one of China’s most 
underdeveloped provinces with a population of almost 100 million, all of his family 
members – including his parents and his wife and daughter - made a living in 
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Dongguan, which means it is impossible for them to cover his medical bills. At the 
time we met, he spent all day in the dorm every day, constantly harassed and 
embarrassed by his co-workers and boss. No continuous treatment was guaranteed, 
either by the factory or by local bureaus of labour and civil affairs. He felt a 
profound sense of helplessness, anxiety and lostness, not knowing where his future 
was.  
 
Leilei began to work for a local labor intermediary after spending a year in his 
uncle’s family-run manufacturing shop and six months in a charging cable factory in 
Dongguan. We got to know each other because he volunteered to be my interviewee 
when I tried to build connections with workers outside Weida through a QQ group 
chat. Later he told me that it was not because he had much interest in the research 
topic itself, but because he was so boring doing his job during the day that simply 
wanted someone to talk with. Aged 25, he was not happy with his current job and 
thought of it as a waste of time. In a time of significant labor loss in Dongguan, most 
of the time, his job involved little more than sitting behind a job information board 
under a tree at a crossroads, burying head in his cellphone and waiting for the next 
person to come and consult. He had had enough of this but saw no viable way out. 
On the other side of his life, he is a talented musician who plays xiao flute, erhu and 
a little bit of pipa, all of which he learned from his grandfather during his happy 
childhood in a Chongqing rural village.  
 
Gao Dage had worked as a mechanist in various factories in Dongguan when we 
met in a spring job fair in a migrant village near Weida.  He used to run a convenient 
shop and a motorcycle repair shop by a main road in his hometown. Thanks to the 
busy traffic flow, his business went on well and life was well-off. But things 
changed after a new main road was built alongside the old one, which resulted in the 
diversion of a significant volume of the traffic. Not long after that, his business 
gradually became languished. Hence his decision to migrate to dagong. Unlike many 
others who started with pugong positions, with his knowledge and experience in 
mechanical repairing, he was from day one working as mechanists. As he confessed, 
compared to pugong jobs, mechanist positions were less affected by the economic 
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crisis, and he actually quitted his previous job to look for a new one with higher 
salary. He had a daughter who studied in a top university in Malaysia and now lived 
on her own. Compared to his pugong colleagues, he felt lucky for not having to 
worry about his daughter. His biggest concern now was to save some money, for he 
did nto want to become his daughter’s nuisance when he got older.  
 
Li Dage came from the same small town with Gao Dage, a small town in Jinzhou, 
Hubei. He was 35 and unmarried when we met. He started his dagong career as a 
pugong in an electronics factory, and later in the toy industry. In order to improve 
his income and seek for more career opportunities, he began to serve a two-year 
apprenticeship in a local electronic factory as a mechanist and learn to operate 
computer numerical control machines. After the apprenticeship he became a 
technical worker, but that was exactly the time when computer numerical control 
machines became gradually outdated. Therefore, although he no longer needed to 
toil hard on the assembly line, his life was not improved much. during his spare time, 
he liked to play video games on his cellphone and read news. He kept a keen eye on 
news about his hometown and that about the central government. This, according to 
him, was because he wished his hometown would one day be developed enough for 
him to work from there.  
 
Huoming used to work in the furniture industry in Dalingshan township, a town in 
Dongguan where it was the pillar industry. The first 5 years of his dagong experience 
had been a good memory for him, for although physically demanding and tired all 
the time, the job offered good income and he was proud that he was finally able to 
share the burden of the family. Born in a remote village in Bijie, Guizhou, both of 
his parents received little education and cultivated land for a living. Their conditions 
got even worse when his father was seriously injured and became paralysed in bed 
after a road accident when he was 15. Unfortunately, two years ago, one of his 
fingers got cut and everything changed for him overnight. His boss no longer wanted 
him and refused to assist him in applying for work injury insurance and 
compensation package. Meanwhile, he was lucky to meet Laohu, founder of 
Tonggeng, a labour NGO specializing in providing legal support for workers who 
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were injured or diagnosed occupational diseases. With the help of Tonggeng, he 
managed to go through the cumbersome process of application and claimed his 
benefits. At the time of our interview, he worked for an electronics factory as a 
pugong. When we met again in mid-2019, he became radicalised. Now, apart from 
his factory job, he was a dedicated volunteer at Tonggeng and an active disseminator 
of labour activism-related news and articles. Although he was harassed by local 
police in his hometown and was questioned by them for several times when he was 
back home for the Spring Festival in 2019, he firmly believed that he was doing the 
right thing.  
 
Rizuo was originally from a village on the brooder of Vietnam and China, in Baise, 
Guangxi province. Having been single throughout his life, he was among the few 
male workers in our team, and also the most silent. This was because having worked 
in Dongguan for more than 15 years, his passion had been frittered away by the 
repetitive work and the doom prospect. He felt he was entrapped in a dilemma and 
could never walk out by hardworking. After he failed in his attempt to change his 
life with Didi and his father passed away in that same year, he began to participate in 
gambling. He was also keen to become wealthy overnight by winning the lottery. 
When I visited Hong Kong for a workshop during the fieldwork, he was very excited 
and told me to buy a book about how to win Mark Six lottery in Hong Kong for him.  
 
Jincai was from Guizhou, and was 22 when we met. Before coming to Weida, she 
spent 5 years working 15 jobs in her hometown. This was because she was not 
allowed by her father to migrate out to dagong until she was married. In 2016, by 
arrangement of her father, she married her husband who she had met just three times. 
She agreed because she could no longer bear the tedious work and life in the small 
city of her hometown. She never set foot on her husband’s village after their 
wedding, for she could barely get along with him. This was also why she decided to 
discontinue her pregnancy in early 2018 without her husband’s knowledge. 
 
Chaoming was in his late 30s. He was from Hubei. The year 2018 marked the eighth 
year he worked at Sanko. He was among the few who were married in his male 
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colleagues. Five years after getting married, he was now father of two daughters. 
During his spare time, he liked to watch movies, especially martial arts film. That 
had been how he spent the numerous Sunday nights in the past years. When I asked 
him what was his plan for future given the gloomy economy, he told me he dared not 
even just to think about it. He just wanted to work as hard as he could for as long as 
he could and saved as much money as he could. He now considered stability as the 
priority. This is because he was afraid that his wife might leave him. His wife, 
together with two daughters, was now back to her maternal home because she could 
not see the future living with him. From two years ago he went to Heyuan every 
month to visit them in order to make sure she was still his wife. He confessed that he 
could no longer take any risks and was afraid that any failure might lead him to lose 
his family.  
 
Laoliu was the line supervisor at the Panel Line in Manufacturing Department I at 
Weida. She had worked in Weida for 13 consecutive years and became assistant line 
supervisor from the 10th year on.  
 
Laocheng was the assistant line supervisor at the Panel Line in Manufacturing 
Department I at Weida. She had worked in Weida for 9 consecutive years and 
became assistant line supervisor from the 7th year on.  
 
Roy obtained his college (dazhuan) diploma in English in 2010 from a local 
colleague in his hometown Hunan. Because of the lack of the fierce competition in 
urban white-collar jobs, after working two years at a local company, he saw no 
prospect for promotion and decided to quit. He then came to Dongguan and became 
a merchandiser in a local garment factory with the introduction of one of his 
relatives who was its departmental manager. with his expertise in English, he made a 
fruitful career in the factory. in the past five years, as more and more factories began 
to relocate to southeast Asian countries, as one of the few English-speaking 
merchandiser in town, he had received a dozen of offers to work overseas, most of 
them managerial position. However, he was very hesitant to accept them, for he 
worried about his mother who was diagnosed cancer 5 years ago. He was also eager 
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to get married. Previously he had a strong sense of inferiority because he was short – 
he was 1.58m tall. But now, as he did not know how long his mother could still wait, 
he was bolder in this regard. His biggest concern now was to get married and get 
himself established. For him, this was the way he could be filial to his mother.  
 
Xuanfa was in his mid-20s but looked older in grey Odidos T-shirt and paint-
splattered cotton short. I would not have guessed he had been married without his 
telling, as marriage became increasingly difficult for male nongmingong (Murphy et 
al 2011). He and his wife Shujuan first met each other online five years ago. Until 
they married in mid-2016, both worked as pugong in a toy factory, each earning 
2000-3500 yuan per month. The job was OK, but the household income seemed 
modest when they considered having a child. Hence, Xuanfa decided to take up Didi 
while kept his job: “We invest all our savings - the betrothal gift and red envelopes 
from wedding - to make the down payment for an SUV. Nowadays, gongchang 
yuelaiyue buhao zuo, factory work is getting worse. We have to find a way out”. 
Shujuan on the other hand set up a weishang account, micro business, selling a range 
of products from cosmetics to menstrual pads. 
 
Yichen did not appear in the thesis, but his story was also worth documenting. He 
grew up with his father who was a junior manager and divorced his mother when he 
was 5. until he was able to enter middle school, because of his rural hukou status, he 
had to go back to Xianning, Hubei, a city he had never set foot on before that, but 
was where he was registered. Facing a sharp change between the living and studying 
environment, he was totally at loss. Once a top student in Dongguan, after the 
sudden change in the way classes were delivered and teachers taught, and the sudden 
loss of once-close peers and playmates in Dongguan, he became weary of studying, 
even with under the strict discipline of his grandfather who used to be the 
headmaster of the primary school in his home village. Worrying that he might join 
some gang groups, his father spent a big sum of money to send him to a private 
school in Dongguan two years later. But that was already too late. He soon found 
himself no longer interested in studying but preferred to work. So he quit school 
when he was in Grade 8 and got his first job in a local McDonalds as a deliveryman. 
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Later, he also worked a range of other factory and service jobs and finally ended up 
in a local electronics parts factory where he was a stamping machine operator. 
Unfortunately, on the second day, due to the lack of training and of protective 
devices, he was already seriously injured, losing 4 of his 5 fingers of his right hand. 
This happened when he was 18 years old. At the time we met, he already recovered 
from the injury. However, life was getting more and more difficult – especially in 
terms of job hunting – for people with disability like him. Exclusions and mockeries 
seemed to him commonplace and filled his life. Hence his decision to migrate to 
work in Philippines. Last year when we caught up with each other on WeChat, he 
had been in Philippines for a year, was taking a course on mechanical engineering, 
and became a lower-level management.  
 
Yu’er held a high school degree.  I was introduced to him by a friend from Peking 
University in local community-based NGO in Shenzhen where he had been a core 
member for 5 years. He used to be an ordinary worker in a mega factory near the 
village the NGO was based, and the first 5 years he spent working there was 
demanding but for him rewarding. Around 2o13, the company began its relocation 
plan and gave him and his colleagues two options: if he wanted to keep the job, then 
he had to move to Chongqing, where the new plant was located; otherwise he was 
dismissed. Like many others, he chose the latter because he did not consider 
Chongqing an ideal place to work, not least because of the low wage. However, in 
this process he was given no compensation at all, which was up to more than 20,000 
yuan, equivalent of 4 months’ wage. With the help of the NGO he fought back 
succeeded. He became better known among the workers after he published his 
experience of struggle in a worker-oriented WeChat-based alternative media. He 
thus became radicalised ever since. At the point of our talk, he worked night shift in 
a medium-sized local factory and was dedicated to enlightening his colleagues of 
their work-related entitlements and rights, forging solidarity among them. Besides, 
he was also a keen observer and active participant of labour movement in 
Guangdong from whom I learned a lot during the fieldwork.  
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Mianbange came originally from Xiangxi Tujia and Miao Autonomous Prefecture 
and was a member of the Tujia ethnic minority community. He was 37 and had had 
25 years of dagong experience. Throughout his life, he had worked in 15 provinces 
in China, including Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Qinghai, Beijing, Shanghai, Fujian and 
Guangdong, among others. In these cities, he had worked various jobs. When he was 
younger, he worked mainly in the construction industry, and was proudly a member 
of the construction team that completed the Tibet-Qinghai highway, the highest and 
longest asphalt road in the world, and also the relatively shortest, as well as the best 
and safest road to Tibet. He also helped build China’s National Stadium, the Bird‘s 
Nest, and some of the new underground stations and railways in Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen. This floating experience of work gave him no time and opportunity to 
engage in romantic relationship and it was not until he was 30 that he decided it was 
time to settle down. Until then, he had proudly rebuilt his old rural mud-and-straw 
house with bricks and renovated its roof. To settle down, he began to look for factory 
jobs. experienced in construction, his first factory job was at a chemical plant where 
he was poisoned and lost almost all his hair. Finally, he quit without compensation 
from the boss. By recommendation of his wife, he secured a job at Weida. Having 
worked in construction sites for years, assembling jobs at Weida for him are a piece 
of cake.  
 
Haonian used to major in auto-repairing in a vocational school in his hometown 
county. Because he saw no prospect with the study, he dropped out of school and 
joined his mother in Fuyong, Shenzhen, and worked in the mechanist team. Aged 18 
and having no experience working before, factory work for him was more than 
tedious and tiring. But compared to going back to the vocational school, he preferred 
to stay in Dongguan. this was because he was tired of schoolwork; it was also 
because working in a factory allowed him much higher degree of economic freedom 
than studying in a small town, not to mention that he had made many friends and a 
girlfriend here. Growing up as a left-behind children whose childhood friends were 
now all out to Guangdong to dagong, he was eager for their company. But 
meanwhile, two years’ dagong experience also changed him, in the sense that he 
gradually realised how bitter life was for his parents. Out of this concern, he began to 
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feel the family responsibility and became keen to shoulder the family responsibility 
from his parents.  
 
Guixiang and Jihong were two migrant mothers I met during my visit to Dili, an 
NGO specialising in providing support for migrant mothers. Both of them worked in 
Foxconn before they got married and were ‘zuo bangongshi de’, working in the 
office (not on the assembly line). Interestingly, although they did not come from the 
same place of origin, both got the administrative position because they received 
training in computer and knew how to process words and statistics with computer 
software. As they recalled, training courses as such was very popular when they 
started to work, and there was actually a ‘xuediannao rechao’, computer course 
fever, in their hometowns. But this did not change their life as a woman, for it was 
still them who quit their jobs after they were pregnant and took care of family chores 
afterwards. This seems to them natural. Besides, both growing up as left-behind 
children, they were keen to bring their children with them and provide the best 
conditions they could for them, hoping that they could receive better education and 
suffer less after growing up.  
 
Xiaohe was a college of mine at Weida. She was originally from a remote part of 
Yunnan and was a member of Bouyei ethnic minority group. I knew very little about 
her as she tended to keep silent during work. And I later learned from Laoliu that she 
did not even know how to write her name in Chinese, since she had spent all her 40 
years’ life living in her Bouyei community in semi-tropical, high-altitude forests and 
spoke a Tai language, a language similar to Siamese, Laotian, Shan language and 
Zhuang. This unfamiliarity with the Chinese language had made things even more 
difficult for her. She used to work for the pin-inserting team where her colleagues 
were a group of Bouyei workers introduced to Weida by a gongtou, a Mandarin-
speaking Bouyei labour intermediary, and was later ‘borrowed’ to the panel team as 
the orders for her team dwindled. As Laoliu found it difficult to communicate with 
her, she was soon borrowed out again to the wet printing team, a position all my 
colleagues would avoid. two weeks later, she quit the job.  
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Chensheng was a technician in a local plastic infusion factory and had worked with 
his boss for 6 years. They were previously colleagues in a plant of the same kind of a 
multinational company and his boss decided to start his own workshop 6 years ago.  
being a founding member of his current plant, he enjoyed a very high level of 
flexibility in terms of work arrangements, for example, so long as he set the machine 
in its due course, he was the only one who could leave the factory early. He and his 
wife rented a room 5-min walk from their factory. To save some rent, they chose to 
rent an old house where it was very humid. The couple had two children, one was a 
16-year girl who was in her first year in a local vocational school and the other was 
an 8-year-old son. Chensheng’s parents were about to turn 70 and their health 
conditions worrying. Among his five brothers, only the youngest was now at home 
because of the leg disability resulted from a work-related injury 8 years ago. Without 
a full-time caregiver at home, he was worried about his parents’ health as much as 
his two children’s safety and study, especially given the rising amounts of child 
trafficking cases ever since his home village became the new forefront of 
commercial housing development. Therefore, from the year before last year, he 
installed many security CCTV cameras in and outside his house, which was linked to 
the 55’ television set he bought during the Spring Festival last year, and two apps in 
his phone, which allowed him to check out whatever happened on the other side of 
the signal. he told me that he checked the apps every two hours, and would call his 
brother if he could not see his father. There was a time when his father fell to the 
ground because of high blood pressure. Thanks to the cameras, he was able to react 
in time.  
 
Dayi worked in the garment industry in Guangzhou’s largest urban village, Kangle 
village, which was also the biggest base for garment industry in China. We got to 
know each other during my visit to his home village. It was also him who warmly 
gave me a tour around the village. He was 30 and unmarried so far. Eager to get 
married, he attributed his singledom to his poor economic condition: until the time I 
visited, his house was among the few that was built by mud. The only brick house 
they had was built last year for his elder brothers’ wedding. In his yard, his parents 
kept two farm cattle, which they relied on to farm their land up on the hill on which 
his house was built. He felt very embarrassed about this poverty. But he disliked 
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Guangzhou either, for he found the food there unclean, and life too busy. When I left 
his village, he told me that his plan for the next year was to look for some odd jobs 
in a nearby city; but when I caught up with him later, he was back in Guangzhou 
again, doing exactly the same job he did last years, working for the same boss.  
 
Xiaoping came from Nanyang, Henan. Before she came to Shenzhen and began to 
dagong, she stayed at home for two years after middle school, and weaved handmade 
rugs and carpets which were in turn exported to the US and European countries.  
Although their products were usually sold at a price of 400-500 dollars or pounds, 
they could earn only 200 yuan for each item they produced, which took them around 
6-9 months. Two years later, his father ran into a road accident and was seriously 
injured. To make things even worse, the driver runaway after he hit. Unable to afford 
the prohibitive lawyer fees, they did not get any compensation from the preparator. 
Facing conditions as such, she decided, at an age of 16, to go to Shenzhen to look for 
a job.  Almost 20 years later, she became a mother of a son, and found it quite a 
headache that her son did not seem to like and listen to her at all. What worried her 
more was that he did not seem to show any interest in studying, which she had 
worked so hard to afford him to do and entertained high hope that he could change 
his life by going to a university.  
 
Xiaomei was born in 1999, unmarried and a mother of two. She spent most of her 
childhood in a remote village in Lincang, Yunnan Province, a city that was not yet 
connected to the outside by highway, and was geographically on China’s boarder 
with Burma. Although very tired, she enjoyed her time working in Dongguan. For 
her, factory jobs were easier and much less demanding than cultivating land or 
harvesting tobacco or tea. Besides, she liked factory job also because of the income 
and the economic autonomy from her father, as well as the beautiful clothes, 
wonderful food and close friends she has made here. For her, rural life was too 
boring.  
 
Dazhong was 22 and had spent 7 years at Weida after dropping out of school. 
Because his mother was a forewoman here, his factory experience was less stressful 
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and arduous. He was even appointed the assistant line supervisor at the age of 19, but 
soon resigned from the position by himself because of his inability to manage. From 
2014 on, he had quit weida three times to work for Meituan. Slightly before I left the 
field, he quit again and started a new job in Shenzhen, again in the food delivery 
industry. 
 
Gaoqun originally came from a mountain village in Lupanshui, Guizhou province, 
and we first met each other at Kaiping‘s place over a weekend dinner. Aged 17, she 
was already a mother of two. She came to Dongguan and started to work in a 
printing facility after dropping out of school and getting married at 14. Two months 
after that she found herself pregnant and decided to resign to dip her toes into 
weishang, after her request to change for a different shift in the factory was declined.  
 
Laoganma first arrived in a shoe factory in Fujian when she was 15 years old. Born 
in a mountainous village in Jiangxi, she was a top student when she was in primary 
and middle school. She lost the opportunity to continue her study in high school 
when her brother was admitted by a top middle school in her home city. To help 
her parents out and support her elder brother and younger sister, she started her 
dagong career. 10 years later, after both her brother and sister graduated from 
university, she was already 25, an age which was traditionally considered too old for 
an unmarried girl. She had had a lover previously who she wanted to marry but did 
not have the opportunity to do so, for according to their custom, once a woman was 
married, she was supposed to ‘belong’ to her husband’s family and should contribute 
economically to his family. She finally married her current husband at the age of 26. 
But life has not been so fair to her. After she married and had three children, her 
husband was diagnosed severe Cirrhosis and was advised by the doctor not to work. 
what made her conditions more difficult was that her husband, after falling ill, 
developed a suspicion of her having extra-marital affairs with male workers in the 
factory. This has resulted in quarrels after quarrels. Her decision to came to work in 
Weida was actually a compromise with her husband, for her husband would not 
allow her to dagong unless he had someone who could keep her under watch – at 
Weida, this was his cousin who was the vice manager at Manufacturing Department 
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Two. She found this bearable during normal days when work was very busy, but 
during holidays, whenever she thought about this, she would feel very aggrieved and 
come to tears in bed.  
 
Tang used to be a had worked in factories for more than a decade before hopping on 
to become a Didi driver since as early as 2014. In 2015, he came back to Dongguan 
with a group of fellow villagers. Together they formed a group to provide mutual 
support. 8 of them rented a 5-room apartment in order to reduce living costs. Every 
two months, one of their wives came to Dongguan to cook for them. Except for Tang 
and the other driver who bought their own cars, the remaining 6 drivers shared three 
cars that they co-invested. 
 
Qiuhong was born after the 1990s and began to work after graduation from high 
school.  She was admitted to a vocational school, but did not consider it a good 
option, for many of her fellow villagers who went to vocational schools ended up 
working in east costal factories. But she did learn some skills, 0f which most useful 
to her career was computer skills. Sanko was her second factory where at the time of 
our talk she had worked for 5 years as a sheet-maker in the quality check team. It 
was also at Sanko where she met her beloved husband. Four months before we met, 
she happily found herself pregnant. And after that, her husband made a big decision, 
that is, to quit his line supervisor job and invest their 5-year savings – with some 
financial support from their parents - to open a workshop by themselves. When I 
visited them in the first half of 2019, they had done very well. With the friends and 
connections he made during his job as a line supervisor, her husband was able to 
secure enough orders to keep their machine humming. Altogether they had 5 
employees, all of them their fellow villagers. Qiuhong, on the other hand, taught 
herself some basics in accounting and took over the accountant role in their business.  
 
Hong had been the supervisor of the quality check team at Sanko since as early as 8 
years ago. She impressed me a lot with the confident smile on her face. She was born 
into a relatively well-off family in Bijie, a mountainous area in Guizhou Province. 
perhaps because of this , her parents were relatively open-minded and did not 
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stopped her when she proposed to dagong at the age of 16. In our interview, she 
spent 20 minutes telling me in detail of her love story with her husband and how 
they almost missed each other because the postman lost her letter at a time when 
ICTs were not yet so commonplace. Talking about work, she lamented that she 
missed a valuable opportunity when she was young. she had been working and living 
in Shenzhen for 15 years. During the past 15 years, she had worked for only two 
factories. 8 years ago when her previous boss decided to relocate to Dongguan and 
asked her if she wanted to move. She rejected this offer because her then boyfriend 
(now her husband) did not want to give up his job. She told me she was very 
regretful, for if she made a different decision, she would be one of the most senior 
staff and would get at least departmental manager positions. thsi year marked the 9th 
year she spent at Sanko. Life for her was not bad. Everyone in Sanko knew about her 
and called her ‘Sister Hong’ with respect. She no longer even thought about 
promotion, for Sanko was a family-run factory where the managers were all family 
members of the boss. Her concern now was to do her job well while devoted the rest 
of her time in weishang. In her leisure time, she was a filmgoer and plaza dancer.  
 
Aiping and her husband used to be a honeycomb briquet dealer during their initial 
years in Guangzhou. Later honeycomb briquet was banned from use in urban areas, 
hence they switched to factory jobs. for them, the central concern in their life was 
not to buy a house nor the education of their children, but their son’s disability. Their 
son was born deaf and could not hear anything without the cochlear implant, which 
was very expensive.  
 
Bangshuan studied computer science at a local vocational school in Nanyang, 
Henan Province. He got his first factory job in the name of ‘internship’, a common 
way in which vocational schools in inland provinces collaborated with labour 
agencies in the Pearl River Delta to ‘provide jobs’ for their students. I added the 
quotation marks because it was not a proper internship, for the factory jobs they 
usually did had nothing to do with their major. For example, Bangshuan’s first job 
was assembling toys. But having had a taste of economic autonomy, Bangshuan 
never made his way back to his hometown. From then on, he had worked in more 
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than 8 factories. His employers included high-tech unicorn like Dajiang Drone and 
multi-national companies like Canon. When he learned that I came from a British 
higher education institute, he began to ask me about IELTs tests and TOFEL, for he 
planned to migrate to the US to work while looking for opportunities for studying. in 
his spare time, he was a game player and a dedicated reader, with particular interest 
in ancient Chinese history. 
 
Huage was a veteran labour intermediary who had worked in the industry for more 
than 10 years. Originally from Hengyang, Hunan, he started to work in Shenzhen as 
a factory worker in the shoe industry, and moved to Dongguan together with his boss 
not long after that. He started to dip his toes in the labour intermediary industry 10 
years ago. At the initial stage, this was no difference with working in a factory 
except the particular job he was made to do. Five years ago, he rented a shopfront 
near Weida and became an independent labour intermediary. Five years on, he told 
me that it was not easy for a waidiren, non-locals to survive in this industry, for they 
did not have the resources, especially connections with the government, that were 
much-needed in handling the issues and problems in running an agency. But 
recently, he began to reach collaborations with local vocational schools in 
Hengyang, which became new growth point of his business.  
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Appendix III   Interview Guide96 
 
A. briefing  
1) introduce yourself… (age, education, place of origin, hometown, job, family 
members, living conditions…) 
2) When did your first migrate out to dagong? what had motivated your 
decision to do so?  what was the circumstances (how was it related to your 
family, education and other conditions?) 
3) how do you spend your day here in Dongguan? describe a normal workday 
and a normal weekend? 
…… 
B. work experience  
1) How many jobs have you done in your dagong experience? what industries 
do they belong to? can you still recall why you quit each time? 
2) Can you briefly describe your work environment? time rate or piece rate? 
working hours? What do you think of factory jobs? how would you describe 
it? how is it compare from previous? 
3) What do you think is important if one wants to make factory life easier and 
more endurable? Any stories? what kind of relationship do you think is the 
most useful in factories? 
4) What do you think of your colleagues on the shopfloor? Do you expect to 
make good friends in factories? what is your principles in your relationship 
with them? Have you guys had any conflict before? why? any stories?  
5) What do you think of the managers and the way the manage on the 
shopfloor? what is your principles in your relationship with them? Have you 
had any conflicts with them before? why? any stories?  
6) Have you had any experience of unfair treatment or anger during work? how 
do you react? 
7) What would you say if your children want to dagong? why? what suggestions 
will you give them? 
 
96 this is a translated version of the original interview guide in Chinese.  
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8) What have motivated you to dagong throughout the past years? what is your 
main concerns in life? what do you consider as your way out?  
9) what is your evaluation of the future of working in factories? why? what is 
your plan for the near future and in the long run? If it permits, will you 
choose to settle down in Dongguan or in your home city? why? 
…… 
C. think-out loud 
1) What kind of ICTs do you use here in Dongguan, back at your rural home or 
anywhere else (cellphone, television, computers, internet café, text message, 
letters)? 
2) Can you recall any past interesting experience with ICTs when you were 
young? 
3) When did you get your first phone? why? how? what are your criteria of 
choosing a cellphone? is there any particular functions you look for most? 
4) how much do you spend on these ICTs monthly? 
5) Can you give me a tour of your cellphone? What apps do you use?  Where 
did you first get to know them? Why do you download them and keep them? 
What uses do you find in them? 
6) which ones do you use most or consider most important and useful for you? 
why? what do you often use them for and when do you use them? 
 
Usually until this point during the interview, I have learned the main concerns of 
theirs that shape their uses of ICTs and the specific apps or activities they engage in. 
In actual interviews, these include work and income; family relations, digital media 
consumption, rural political participation, dating and sex (especially young gay 
men), parenting (especially children’s education), self-organised entertainment. 
Questions specific to each of these issue areas are than posed. Below I use two of 
them as examples to give a sense of what kinds of questions get asked: 
 
C1. work and income-related  
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1) what work and income-generating activities did and do you engage with 
online? 
2) how did you learn about them? what leads you to it? Why do you decide to 
take up it? Why do you take up this one rather than another? 
3) can you show me how it works on the app?  
4) does its operation involve other platforms or apps? does its operation involve 
non-technical elements? 
5) can you describe for me a typical day or scenario working with it? how long 
do you spend on it? how do you find it when compared with factory jobs?  
6) how do you make profits from it? Is it remunerative enough? Do you think 
you are well-paid?  if so, how do you achieve that? If not, why do you think 
this was the case? 
7) what about the job do you like most? what do you dislike it? is there any way 
you can offset it?  
8) what has kept you to it? 
…… 
C2. digital media consumption  
1) where and when do you often watch digital media? why do you watch them? 
2) What kind of content interests you most? can you names 5-10 pieces that you 
find most impressive, interesting, relevant or thought-provoking? 
3) what are the social contexts you often watch them? Do you often share these 
contents to people around you?  do you discuss these contents with others? 
4) Can you show it to me, talk me through it or provide me a recount? What do 
you see in there? what do you think the item is about?  
5) what in these items interest you most? why? 
6) what are the elements in there that impressed you most? why? in what way? 
7) what in the item is thought-provoking for you? what does it remind you of? 
what does it inspire you to think?  
8) what do you find relevant in these dramas? in what way was it relevant? 
……  
C3 … 
C4 … 
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C5 …  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 300 
 
Appendix V   Information sheet  
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Appendix VI   Consent form 
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Appendix VII  Liker et al. (1999)’s four paradigms of studying the relationship 
between technology and the organisation of work 
 
 
 
